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This thesis initially sets out to examine the context o f the purchase of two aircraft, on the 
authority of Michael Collins and funded by the second Dail, during the Treaty 
negotiations of 1921. The subsequent development of civil aviation policy including the 
regulation of civil aviation, the management of a civil aerodrome and the possible start of 
a state sponsored civil air service to Britain or elsewhere is also explained.
Michael Collins’ leading role in the establishment o f a small Military Air Service in 1922 
and the role of that service in the early weeks of the Civil War are examined in detail.
The modest expansion in the resources and role of the Air Service following Collins’ 
death is examined in the context of antipathy toward the ex-RAF pilots and the general 
indifference of the new Army leadership to military aviation.
The survival of military aviation -  the Army Air Corps -  will be examined in the context 
of the parsimony of Finance, and the administrative traumas of demobilisation, the Anny 
mutiny and reorganisation processes of 1923/24.
The manner in which the Army leadership exercised command over, and directed 
aviation policy and professional standards affecting career pilots is examined in the 
contexts of the contrasting preparations for war of the Army and the Government.
The Air Corps’ active roles during the Emergency are assessed against the background of 
inadequate preparation, insufficient and inappropriate aircraft and improbable tasking by 
GHQ. Secondary roles in support of the RAF war effort are also elucidated.
The Army’s investigation, into the inadequacies of the Air Corps, is examined against the 
background of the command exercised by an inexpert and disciplinarian officer. The 
investigation itself is assessed in order to highlight any the bias or prejudice that may 
have pertained.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Until relatively recent times the study of the military and defence matters of the state 
has been very much a minority interest. With the establishment of Military Archives in 
1986, and the release of increasing amounts of the more sensitive UK material, the years 
from 1990 have seen a significant upsurge in interest in the history of the early decades of 
the state. Inevitably greatest concentration has been on the period covering the War of 
Independence, the Civil War and the army mutiny, that is, 1919 to 1924 -  in addition to 
the Emergency (1939 to 1945). Those major and minor works that do deal with aspects of 
military history very much concentrate on those aspects of the Defence Forces and 
defence policy that reflect the dominant army ideology and the precedence of the infantry 
ethos. In an infantry dominated Defence Forces the air element has traditionally 
constituted a very minor proportion of the personnel -  about 10% at the maximum that 
pertained during the Emergency. Being perceived, in the two dimensional thinking of the 
Department of Defence and Defence Forces Headquarters, as being of much lesser 
military importance neither the state’s air nor naval forces are represented by 
appropriately qualified staffs at DOD or the DFHQ. To a certain extent, reflecting this 
cultural imbalance, the main historical works of recent times have largely ignored air 
aspects of defence policy and practice.
To a major degree this imbalance in military historiography is a reflection of the 
cultural imbalance evident in successive Defence Forces handbooks and the manner in 
which the Air Corps has been presented. Produced and edited by a succession of Army 
officers these handbooks have generally presented a brief and somewhat simplistic and 
inaccurate picture of the history and heritage of military aviation. The most recent 
handbook (1988), in the course of a feature on the training schools of the Defence Forces, 
makes no reference to the Flying Training School that has been in existence at Baldonnell 
since 1922. Similarly no reference was made to the Air Corps Apprentice School that was 
set up in 1936, the fore-runner, by twenty years, of the Army Apprentice School. It is, 
however, considered that successive generations of Air Corps flying officers have been
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somewhat remiss in failing to foster a better historical awareness. Traditionally, flying 
officers, while progressive and up-to-date in professional and technical matters, have not 
been aware of or shown any great interest in their aeronautical past and roots. While it 
might be expected that a certain modicum of officers would have given a lead in the 
matter of the history and heritage of the corps, this has not been the case. With only a 
single exception to date the leadership of the corps have, in terms of historiography as in 
terms of projecting a unique military culture and ethos, remained meekly subservient to 
the dominant infantry culture of the forces. The resultant subjugation of the history of 
military aviation requires to be reversed by way of a comprehensive and objective study.
The first published general history of the Irish Army was just that - a history of 
the Army - as distinct from being a history of the complete Defence Forces.1 While 
Duggan’s history purports to be inclusive of the Air Corps and Naval Service the 
occasional references to selected aspects of the two minor services only serve to illustrate 
the traditional irrelevance of air and naval matters in the overall scheme of things. It 
could be argued that this particular history attempted too much in a single volume and, as 
such, not only does it not do justice to air and naval matters, it does the Army no great 
service either. In paying lip service to the Air Corps Duggan reveals nothing new with the 
occasional interjection of a few well known facts. His opening remark, to the effect that 
‘the Air Corps sprung up spontaneously in 1922’, sets the tone for a less than complete 
assessment of the military aviation of an infantry Army.2 He fails to identify the 
establishment of the Military Air Service on the authority of Michael Collins or the full 
extent and proper nature of its operational role during the Civil War. Similarly the 
activities of the Air Corps during the Emergency, particularly the roles of the operational 
squadrons are overlooked.
While O’Halpin’s Defending Ireland is the most authoritative work on the subject 
of defence policy during the first eighty years of the State, it demonstrates some of the 
inadequacies that permeate both the major and minor literature insofar as it relates to 
military aviation.3 While one would recognize that aviation did not have a major role in 
the overall scheme of things in the National Army of the Civil War period, this work does
1 John P. D u g g a n ,  A history of the Irish Army (D u b l in ,  1991).
2 Ibid, p . 108.
3 E u n an  O ’H a lp in ,  Defending Ireland: the Irish state and its enemies since 1922 (O x fo rd ,  1999).
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not acknowledge the existence of military aviation in the form of the hastily and 
informally established Military Air Service (July 1922 to October 1924) or of the more 
legally based Army Air Corps, prior to 1932. O’Halpin, in the context of the ceremonial 
connected with the Eucharistic Congress of that year, makes inaccurate reference to ‘a 
miscellany of Air Corps aircraft’ that ‘flew over Dublin in cruciform formation’ as part of 
the Army’s ceremonial function in connection with the Eucharistic Congress in June 
1932.4 As appropriate to a small formation the six aircraft were all of the same type -  the 
then recently-acquired Avrò 631 Cadet training aircraft.
O’Halpin’s treatment of the Air Corps and its functions in the benign Irish 
neutrality of the Emergency period is less than comprehensive. He confuses the 1939 
peace establishment (April 1939) with the war establishment of May 1940 and gives no 
assessment of the personnel resources or their training.5 O’Halpin apparently overlooks 
the fact that the Corps’ traditional role of army cooperation had been abandoned in favour 
of general reconnaissance, coastal patrol and fighter roles -  all roles commensurate with a 
properly organised and equipped air force and, as was to be proved, quite outside the 
scope of the state’s army aviation during the emergency. Similarly he did not mention 
that an Air Corps detachment had been sent to Rineanna, prior to the outbreak of war, for 
the purpose of maritime reconnaissance.6 While he recognised the lack of pre-war 
planning and the inadequacies of the various aircraft and their support, O’Halpin does not 
discuss the aviation ramifications of the air defence orders of the General Staff. And, 
while recognising that a ‘woefully ill-equipped’ Air Corps was of ‘almost no operational 
use’ during the Emergency he offers no explanation for the improbable air defence role
n
assigned to No. 1 Fighter Squadron in 1940.
O’Halpin does note the aircraft recovery operation carried out by Air Corps for 
the benefit of the Allies.8 There was also the question of the refuelling and release of 
force-landed Allied aircraft and the military value thus provided to the UK and US. 
While mindful of the intelligence activities of the British air attaché he may not have
4 Ibid,  p . 133.
3 Ibid, p .154.
6 W.J. K e a n e  to O C  S. C o m d . ,  12 A p r .  1940, A p p e n d ix  N o .  XXII, R e p o r t  a n d  f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m i t te e ,  10 
Jan. 1942 (M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 )
7 E u n an  O ’H a lp in ,  Defending Ireland: the Irish state and its enemies since 1922 (O x fo rd ,  1999),  p. 154.
8 Ibid,  p. 155, c it ing  A iden  Q u ig le y  ‘Air aspec ts  o f  the  E m e r g e n c y ’ in Irish Sword, xix, nos.  75 &  76  
(1 9 9 3 -4 ) ,  p . 89.
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appreciated the significant level of cooperation between the RAF and the Air Corps 
generated by the relationship between the attaché, Wing Commander Lywood, and Col. 
P.A. Mulcahyin 1940/42.
O’Halpin is very general in his observations on the proceedings, finding and 
recommendations of a very extensive and comprehensive report.9 While he rightly 
identifies unrest amongst Air Corps officers as a main reason for the inquiry of 1941 he 
does not discuss the fundamental reasons behind the unrest. O’Halpin’s suggestion that 
‘the wartime experience of the Air Corps raised more questions than it answered about 
the practical value of the defence forces having an air arm at all’ serves to illustrate a 
slightly incomplete understanding of the fact that the Air Corps had, in effect been placed 
on active service during the Emergency and given air missions for which it was neither 
prepared nor equipped.10 One must however recognize that O’FIalpin, more than any 
other military historian, has achieved much in unravelling the rather elusive subject of 
defence policy. This subject had remained under-studied, and therefore undefined, up to 
the end of the twentieth century. In the context of a state with little or no concept of 
national defence, let alone air defence, his failure to identify an air policy can be 
understood. Similarly his relative lack of insight in to Air Corps wartime activities can be 
understood when one considers the extent to which Military Archives protects the 
material that it considers to be too sensitive for today’s historians and students alike.
In a manner very similar to O’Halpin’s, the major detailed study of the Civil War 
by Michael Hopkinson fails to reflect any aspect of the state’s early military aviation and 
its role in the hostilities of the period June 1922 to May 1923.11 It maybe that the author 
was aware of the purchase and the operation of aircraft for intelligence purposes, but 
considered their contribution to be irrelevant. However it might also be considered that 
the very deliberate action of Collins, in initiating a relatively small military air arm to 
conduct intelligence gathering activities, escaped the scrutiny of another historian of note. 
In his failure to perceive the first-hand involvement of Michael Collins in the state’s first 
military aviation endeavours Hopkinson is not alone. He joins, or is joined by, many
9 P ro c e ed in g s  o f  c o m m i t te e  o f  in v es t ig a t io n  into th e  e f fec t iv en ess ,  o rg a n is a t io n ,  e q u ip m e n t ,  t ra in in g  a n d  
ad m in is t ra t io n  o f  the  A ir  C o rp s ,  10 Jan .  1942 (M A ,  A C S  22 /23) .
10 E u n an  O ’H a lp in ,  Defending I re lan d ,  p . 155.
11 M ich ae l  H o p k in so n ,  Green against green; the Irish Civil War (D u b l in  1989).
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historians including Margery Forester, Tim Pat Coogan, Joseph Lee, Eoin Neeson, and 
more recently Peter Hart, who have studied Michael Collins and his times without 
detecting his considerable involvement with the early months of the country’s civil and 
military aviation. It is of note that only one author dealing with the period, Meda Ryan, 
connects Collins and military aviation. In her case such matters were quite peripheral to 
her main thesis.
The broad military and defensive ramifications of neutrality and of the interaction 
between British and Irish administrations during the Emergency period are elucidated in 
considerable and accurate detail by Robert Fisk.13 This seminal work on the political, 
diplomatic and military aspects of the Emergency cannot be faulted in the manner in 
which the author demonstrates how Eire survived the travails of the Emergency at a 
considerable cost to its political, military and diplomatic reputations. It must be 
appreciated that this work was researched and written before some of more sensitive 
material relating to Anglo-Irish relations, during the period 1938-1945 period, was made 
available at The National Archives, Kew. It was also prior to the National Archives Act, 
1986 that established (Irish) Military Archives on a regulatory basis. At Military 
Archives Fisk only got access to carefully selected material which he cites as confidential 
Dublin sources. Access to the more sensitive material, still selectively retained from 
public scrutiny, would have allowed Fisk to better document the considerable cooperation 
between the military forces, north and south. While his understanding of the overall 
military situation in Eire was comprehensive, his comments on Air Corps matters were 
less incisive. In common with others he noted the wide range of inadequate aircraft and 
the general powerlessness of the air arm. He also comments on the aircraft recovery 
operation and the value to the Allies represented by the early repatriation of aircrew. 
However, also in common with others, and not unconnected with poor access to military 
records, both the unplanned and ill-prepared tasking of the Rineanna detachment and 
Fighter Squadron’s ill-advised role in the defence of Dublin, escape his attention.
While his work reflects the fullest possible research of the material then available 
Fisk suggests that the public records that survive for the Emergency represent only a
P  M e d a  R y an ,  The day Michael Collins was shot (S w o rd s ,  1994),  pp  24-55 .
13 R o b e r t  F isk ,  In time of war; Ireland, Ulster and the price of neutrality 1939-45 (L o n d o n ,  1983).
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fraction of that which should pack the shelves of the archives in Ireland. The statement 
that ‘in 1945, the Irish authorities shredded about seventy tons of documents which were 
considered too sensitive for the scrutiny of historians’ suggests that the full truth of the 
1939 to 1945 period will probably never be known. One wonders was Fisk being too 
generous to the memories of de Valera and Aiken when he credits the ‘authorities’ with 
this apparently premeditated destruction.14
While not strictly a work of historical record one must comment on Donai 
MacCarron’s book on Irish military aviation, Wings over Ireland, principally because it is 
the only substantial one that purports to tell the story of the Air Corps (for the period 
1921 to 1996).15 While MacCarron tells the story of Irish military aviation it appears not 
to be based on broad research of the primary material. It is not comprehensive enough in 
its scope and is lacking in critical analysis. It is understood that much of the text covering 
the early years derives from infonnal interviews with some of the principals conducted in 
the latter years of their lives. As a result the story for the period of my interest, 1921 to 
1945, is largely apocryphal and anecdotal and, being based on fading memories and 
inadequate research, somewhat imprecise. This book over-concentrates on accidents, 
mishaps and other incidents, and technical minutiae much loved by aircraft enthusiasts 
and not appreciated by the serious academic. While much more extensive and detailed in 
its coverage of the story of military aviation than any other, it is nonetheless lacking as a 
secondary source due to the absence of notated research of primary sources and adequate 
identification and acknowledgement of the secondary works reflected in the text.
Possibly the only article published in an academic journal and totally concerned 
with an aspects of the history of the State’s military aviation is Aidan Quigley’s in the 
Irish Sword of 1993-94.16 While this work does highlight and detail some of the 
personnel, training and equipment difficulties of the Emergency Air Corps, it does not 
identify the reasons for the lamentable lack of policy and preparation. Neither does the 
author identify the cultural chasm between the Army and the Air Corps that should have 
been obvious at the time. He did not detect the relationship that developed between his 
artillery corps commanding officer and the British air attaché and the resultant close
14 Ibid,  ix. T h is  is the  on ly  su b s tan t ia l  s ta te m en t  o f  fact the  so u rc e  o f  w h ic h  is  no t  c ited  by F isk .
13 D o n a i  M a c C a r ro n ,  Wings over Ireland; the story of the Irish Air Corps (L e ice s te r ,  1996).
16 A id a n  Q u ig ley ,  ‘A i r  a sp ec ts  o f  the  E m e r g e n c y ’ in Irish Sword x ix ,  n o s .  75  & 76  (1 9 9 3 -9 4 ) ,  p p  86 -90 .
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cooperation with the RAF. As the author was a very young Air Corps flying officer at 
the time his paper is somewhat influenced by a junior officer’s perception of the rights 
and wrongs of the time and as such lacks a certain balance.
A significant difficulty arises in considering the much-admired Encyclopaedia o f  
Ireland (2003), as a reference work, in the context of its coverage of military aviation. In 
common with the Land Commission, possibly the most important institution in the 
context of the agricultural economy and the modem social history of the Irish state, the 
Air Corps has been omitted from this work that purports to represent a comprehensive 
over-view of Irish development since earliest times. Against this background one 
wonders what inference to take from the exclusion, or indeed inclusion, of a particular 
subject, institution or individual. On the one hand the Royal Flying Corps / Royal Air 
Force, in Ireland for much of the time between September 1913 and the end of 1922, 
warrant an appropriate entry. So also do a select few ‘Irish aviators’ who served with the 
RFC / RAF in the two world wars. However the Air Corps is not listed in the subject 
index under either ‘aviation’ or ‘military’ and is only mentioned in passing in other 
aviation related entries. Baldonnell, the state’s civil airport from 1919 to 1940, the Air 
Corps main base since May 1922 and the aerodrome with the longest record for 
continuous aviation activity on the island, is similarly ignored. Baldonnell is also omitted 
from a political map of Ireland that places a civil airport in the North Slobs of county 
Wexford.17
In Irish military historiography there are very few works that examine, in a critical 
yet balanced manner, aspects of the ideological approach of the Army leadership to the 
country’s defence. Theo Farrell’s paper properly questions the military thinking of the 
1930s that put a premium on the necessity to form a massive conventional defence force 
for the protection of the country against possible British invasion.18 While the work does 
not relate specifically to preparations for air defence, it goes a long way to explaining the 
rationale behind Col. M.J. Costello’s grand plan (March 1938) for an air force of ten 
operational squadrons that, one presumes, was to be the air element of such a defence.
17 Brian Lalor (Ed.), The enlyclopaedia of Ireland (Dublin, 2003), xxxiv.
I!i T h e o  Farrell ,  ‘P ro fe ss io n a l iz a t io n  and  suic idal  d e fe n c e  p l a n n in g  by  th e  Ir ish  A rm y ,  1921-1941’ in 
Journal of strategic studies 21, n o .3 ( S e p te m b e r  1998), p p  67-85.
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Bearing in mind the paucity of work on the state’s military aviation, tremendous scope 
exists for the examination and elucidation of a subject virtually unknown to researchers 
and academics. The early section will aim to explain, for the first time, the genesis of the 
state’s aim to establish a civil air service as early as 1922. Similarly the purchase of 
aircraft, on Michael Collins’ authority during the treaty negotiations, will be examined in 
the context of civil and military aviation contingencies anticipated by Collins and his air 
advisor, C.F. Russell, a former RAF pilot officer. The formulation of a civil air policy, by 
Russell but with Collins’ authority and backing, in the first half of 1922 was to lead to the 
establishment of a small civil aviation department in the Army. This department, 
however, was to give way to military aviation after the outbreak of hostilities. Also for 
the first time the purchase and operation of military aircraft, for intelligence purposes, 
will be assessed in the context of Collins’ need for information on the disposition and 
activities of the Irregulars during the first months of the Civil War. By virtue of his 
actions Collins, in effect, established the Military Air Service that was to become the Air 
Corps in October 1924. The decisions and events of the period from July 1921 to August 
1922, relating to civil and military aviation, casts light on an aspect of Collins’ leadership 
and foresight that has escaped the attention of the country’s historians heretofore. 
Similarly the use of aircraft, for intelligence puiposes during the Civil War, adds a 
dimension to that campaign that has not previously been considered.
The threat to the future of the Air Service immediately after the Civil War and the 
efforts made to discharge its ex-RAF pilots will be assessed in the context of 
demobilisation, the reorganisation of the Army in 1923/24 and the trauma of the army 
mutiny of 1924. It will be seen that army aviation survived this period despite the 
ambivalence of the minister, Richard Mulcahy and of the antipathy of an anti-British 
clique of army officers. These aspects of the formative years of the Defence Forces have 
not previously been identified or studied. The survival of army aviation in the period 
coming up to the Emergency will be examined in the absence of defence policy and in the 
context of the government’s continuing preference for civil aviation demonstrated by the 
establishment of Aer Lingus and of the meteorological, air traffic control and 
aeronautical communications services in 1936.
8
My study of the contacts, between Irish civil service and military, and their UK 
counterparts, will demonstrate a considerable degree of cooperation between the two 
administrations in the matter of preparation for war. It will be suggested that this 
cooperation started at about the time of the return of the Treaty ports and continued, 
particularly at a military level, throughout the Emergency. There is new evidence that, as 
part of this cooperation, de Valera’s administration was guided by the UK in preparing 
for the outbreak of hostilities by being supplied with several key war planning 
documents. The role that this cooperation and guidance played is illustrated by the nature 
of the passive defence strategy, developed by de Valera’s government, but apparently 
based on British advice on censorship, petrol rationing, intelligence and other preparatory 
actions commensurate with such a passive defence strategy. This concept, that the British 
had a greater influence over Irish defence strategy than had the Irish military, has not 
previously been postulated. In the matter of pre-war military cooperation the role of Col. 
Liam Archer, acting under de Valera’s specific, but unknown, instructions is identified. 
Several hitherto unknown meeting between Archer and UK officials or military officers 
suggest de Valera’s personal oversight of both pre-war and wartime military cooperation 
with Britain.
The government’s defensive strategy for the Emergency, based almost exclusively 
on passive defence measures, has not previously been identified in the surviving records. 
At the same time the Army will be seen to have adopted a contradictory position based on 
a major conventional force consisting of a much enlarged army and a significantly 
expanded air force. In the absence of aviation historiography the extent of the Army’s 
ambitious plans for military aviation have not previously been recognised and studied. It 
will be argued that a grossly ineffective Air Corps resulted from the inability of the 
higher authorities -  government and Department of Defence, to coordinate defensive 
plans and make the necessary preparation. It will also be suggested that aerodrome 
support services to military aviation such as meteorology, air traffic control and 
communications developed in a haphazard fashion that contributed to the ineffectiveness 
demonstrated during the Emergency.
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This work relies almost exclusively on primary sources, the vast majority of which 
appear not to have previously been visited by historians of any ilk -  aviation, military, 
social or political. Accessing these sources has not represented any major initiative on my 
part. As I have observed in the past it was merely a matter of searching the appropriate 
major archives and being rewarded with a considerable quantity of material of the highest 
quality. One can only wonder why more of the sources are not already reflected in 
secondary works.
When Richard Mulcahy (1886 — 1971) left the positions of minister for Defence 
and commander-in-chief in April 1924 he had the good sense to take with him all the 
material relating to the early military affairs of the State. Whether this action was to 
safeguard this historic material or the reputations of himself and his pro-Treaty comrades- 
in-arms is immaterial. While he may possibly have carried out some tidying up 
subsequently, this material eventually became available for research purposes having 
been deposited in the UCD Archives in 1972. This microfilmed material, the Mulcahy 
Papers, is possibly the single most important source for the history of the early Defence 
Forces. It is also essential to an understanding of the events and influences that brought 
about the Military Air Service in 1922. While much of the aviation material is 
concentrated on a single microfilm a trawl of the entire collection was required due to 
inadequate collating and cataloguing. The essentially air material includes much 
correspondence between the Air Service and Michael Collins in July and August 1922. 
Also included is material concerning aircraft purchase, the hiring of pilots and the 
organisation of reconnaissance operations during the Civil War. Some later material, 
mainly on administrative and supply matters, relate to the period from September 1922 to 
April 1924 when Mulcahy was in charge.
The MacEntee Papers, also in University College Dublin Archives, relate to pre­
war Army, including aviation, planning and include material that helps to explain the 
contradiction between what Theo Farrell termed the suicidal planning of the Irish army in 
the lead up to the Emergency and the passive defence strategy actually adopted by the 
government.
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The files of National Archives of Ireland, particularly the early Department of Finance 
files, those of the Taoiseach’s office and Finance’s supply files (DF S) provide some 
details of policy and financial decisions having relevance in the area of the state’s 
military aviation. While a complete picture of policy and financing does not emerge some 
select subjects are illuminated. A relatively small number of the Department of An 
Taoiseach (DT S.) files relate to matters concerned with civil aviation policy. A single 
file, relating to the purchase of the state’s first two aircraft in 1921 and to proposals for 
the development of civil aviation between 1921 and 1932, provides a detailed exposition 
of the emphasis of Michael Collins, and the first administration, on the concept of 
establishing a civil air service to the United Kingdom or to Europe in 1922. The file 
demonstrates that, while a civil aviation department had been set up by April 1922 the 
worsening military situation caused such matters to be put on the long finger The later 
material, from 1924 to 1932, explains the continuing desire of the early administrations to 
foster civil aviation -  something that had not transpired before the 1932 change of 
administration. A continuous thread was the perception of the Air Service / Air Corps, 
not as an instrument of defence policy, but rather as the nucleus of a civil air service. 
Mainly it was seen as the source of technical and professional personnel and support that 
would be the foundation on which a civil air service might be established.
A small number of early Finance files reflect some of the business transacted with 
the Aircraft Disposal Company in 1922/23 and facilitates an assessment of costs 
associated with early aircraft purchases. The Department of Finance supply files, because 
they generally deal with new or unexpected, as distinct from the annual recurring, 
expenditure are far from comprehensive in their scope. However these files, provide an 
overview of decisions of greater and lesser importance that demonstrate the total control 
exercised by Finance over defence policy on the basis of generally miserly amounts of 
money. Individual files deal with expenditure varying from the complete defence 
estimates for a given year (one to two million pounds) to authority for minor unexpected 
expenditure as small as ten shilling. A 1924 file affords a considerable insight into the 
start of the cadet scheme for Air Corps pilot officer recruitment and training. In particular 
the suspicious attitude to the infantry, towards potential pilots from outside the Army’s 
realm of influence, is revealed. A similar file, covering the establishment of the short
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service pilot scheme in 1939 indicates that this scheme was basically established for the 
benefit of Aer Lingus and civil aviation after the Emergency rather than immediate pilot 
requirements. A 1939 file, dealing with the construction of an aircraft hangar at Rineanna 
(Shannon), helps to underline the precedence of expenditure on civil aviation over that of 
military aviation and the total lack of preparation for even a modest expansion of military 
air facilities in the run-up to the Emergency.
Military Archives holds the greatest bulk of material relating to military aviation (and to 
early civil aviation) considerations. The early Department of Defence series o f files 
includes a small number dealing with the early months of the Air Service and in 
particular cover the purchase and delivery of Bristol Fighter aircraft in July and August 
1922. With most of the other aircraft purchases o f 1922 and 1923 also detailed these files 
provide a detailed insight into the start of the early air operations. While the collection of 
Air Corps files is far from complete some insight is provided into aircraft purchases, pilot 
recruitment and training, and organisation and establishment. Being mainly 
administrative in nature these files hold little relating to the policy and practice in military 
aviation. The DOD 2 Bar files, mainly supporting plans and proposals for which financial 
sanction would be required from the Department of Finance, represent DOD decisions on 
such matters as aircraft purchase and the recruitment and training of pilot officers.
The Emergency Plans Division material, representing the documentation 
produced by GHQ plans and operations staff during the Emergency, casts some light on 
the role of Fighter Squadron in 1940-41. In general the material is confusing due to 
inadequate collation and dating that precludes an adequate assessment of the chronology 
and development of the plans.
The single most important source in Military Archives is the proceedings and 
report of the investigation held in 1941. On completion on 10 January 1942 it appears to 
have been strictly limited to circulation within GHQ. There is no indication that the Air 
Corps received a copy. A 1942 memorandum by Major W.P. Delamere suggests that, at 
or about the time he was appointed officer commanding Air Corps, he was allowed 
examine the report. However he was only given sufficient time to read the findings and
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recommendations of the committee before making his observations.19 While the report 
and its findings have been commented upon very briefly by both Aidan Quigley and 
Eunan O’Halpin, no one heretofore appears to have studied it in depth and made an 
assessment of the conduct of the investigation and of the report and findings of the 
committee and its recommendations.
As befits such a voluminous report I intend to provide the first complete and 
objective appraisal of the report and the manner in which it was conducted in order to 
assess any bias or prejudice that may have existed. The report and proceedings consists of 
one report volume with annexes, three volumes of witness evidence and a further volume 
of appendixes. The investigation was, in effect, into the demoralised state of the Air 
Coips following the collapse of its operational capacity due to inappropriate and ill- 
equipped aircraft and inadequate supplies of spares in the early Emergency. The evidence 
given, supported by appendixes representing many policy-related documents not 
available elsewhere, gives considerable insight into the effectiveness, equipment, 
training, and general management of the Air Corps from 1935 and earlier. As a source 
that could support several doctorates it would be difficult to overestimate its importance 
in terms of discerning the exact circumstances that contributed to the mismanagement of 
the country’s small air arm at a crucial time.
Arising out of my service in the Air Coips and a twenty-year interest in its history 
I have a personal collection of a small amount of material that aids my understanding of 
some of the main themes that I cover. Of particular relevance are files on meteorology, 
since 1924 and Air Traffic Control since 1935. I have been fortunate to acquire original 
copies of the early General Routine Orders (1922/23) and Staff Duty Memos (1923/24) 
that are essential to detailing the hiring and firing of officers in 1922 to 1924. Original 
copies of the Air Coips establishment tables issued in 1924, 1931/32, 1934, 1937, 1939, 
1940, 1943 and 1946 are essential to an understanding of the ever-changing organisation 
and structure of a very small coips. Complementing the establishment tables, I have 
acquired many nominal rolls showing the appointments of individual officers at various 
junctures. While some are undated cross-reference with the known dates of changes in 
establishments, and other events helps to establish the relevant dates reasonably
19 ‘Memorandum of discussion with the COS’, 30 Dec.1942 (MA, EDP/24/2/1).
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accurately. The original organisation charts and nominal rolls of the Air Corps’ flying 
units, apparently produced by the squadron commanders for the start of the investigation 
in January 1941, capture the exact disposition of personnel and aircraft at a critical 
juncture in the history of the Air Corps.
I was also fortunate to acquire, from Lt. Col. Jim Teague on his retirement in 
1981, his private material relating to aircraft accidents from 1923 to 1978. The 
information, displayed only in tabular and graph form, demonstrates the correlation 
between aircraft flying hours and flying accidents. In particular it emphasises the 
inordinate incidence of flying accidents in the years 1936 to 1942 and the total number of 
aircraft written off during that period.
The National Archives at Kew hold a significant number of files dealing with military 
aviation matters in Ireland. The earlier material, the Air files covering aspects of the 
supply of the first Bristol Fighters in 1922, correspondence relating to the RAF 
withdrawal from Ireland and reports on aspects of the Air Service then being formed, all 
complement very well the Mulcahy Papers (UCDA), the early DOD files in Military 
Archives and the National Archives file on the development of civil aviation. The 
combination of the material from UCDA, National Archives, Military Archives and The 
National Archives greatly elucidates early developments in both civil and military 
aviation.
A small number of Air files give a flavour of the intelligence activities of the 
British air attaché in Eire in 1940/42 and of the exchange of assistance between the Air 
Corps and the RAF -  particularly from 1940 to 1943. Less relevant, in the Air Corps 
context, are the many Air, Dominions Office and Cabinet files that detail the considerable 
level of staff planning and preparation carried out by the RAF in anticipation of being 
called upon to counter a German invasion of Ireland. Dominions Office and Cabinet files 
help to illustrate the nature of cooperation established between the two countries in 
preparation for the Emergency. In this respect they complement similar material in 
Military Archives. These files also support the contention that Col. Liam Archer was a 
frequent visitor to the UK prior to September 1939 and had a key role in the military 
cooperation between the two countries before and during the Emergency.
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I do not consider that there is any unusual aspect to the manner in which this subject has 
been researched or presented. Having served in the Air Corps from February 1961 to 
August 1999 I have had the distinct advantage of being trained in, and absorbing, the 
aviation culture and of meeting and serving with a few of those officers mentioned. I am 
however aware that familiarity with the people, the subject and the folklore could effect 
objectivity and have thus tried to strike a balance in the way that I perceive the decisions, 
actions and events of the first twenty-five years of the state’s military aviation.
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CHAPTER 2
‘CIVIL AVIATION -  DEVELOPMENTS IN SAORSTAT EIREANN’ 1
The Defence Forces of today, consisting of army, air and naval elements, are officially
*
designated as Oglaigh na hEireann which traces its lineage and name back to the
*
formation of the Irish Volunteers (Oglaigh na hEireann) at a meeting held in the mansion 
house on 25 November 1913.2 Only partially quoting, but not citing, the aims of the Irish 
Volunteers, John P. Duggan describes this first Irish army as a ‘volunteer force, a 
people’s army formed to secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the 
people of Ireland without distinction of creed, class or politics’.3 However the Irish 
Republican Army that fought a guerrilla campaign in 1919-21 with the aim of ending 
British occupation and rule did not greatly reflect such lofty ideals. The Anglo-Irish War 
was ‘characterised by guerrilla warfare, ambushes, raids on police barracks, and planned 
assassinations’ on the part of the IRA and ‘reprisals, the shooting-up and buming-up of 
town, executions and terrorising’ on the part of the British forces.4 With the Anglo-Irish 
truce of July 1921 and the Treaty of December 1921 political differences caused divided 
loyalties that were to culminate in civil war by June of 1922. The anti-treaty element of 
the IRA was to be termed the ‘Irregulars’ by the pro-treaty element which itself evolved 
to become the National or Free State Army backing the provisional government.
While the there was a significant RAF presence in Ireland during this IRA 
campaign, armed military aircraft were not to play a significant role. Royal Flying Corps 
aircraft had originally been deployed in Ireland as early as August / September 1913 
when a detachment of five aircraft of No. 2 Squadron, with the requisite ground support 
personnel and equipment, was dispatched to Rathbane in Limerick to support the British
1 Title of file (NAI, DT, S.4002).
" Defence Act 1954; Irish Defence Forces handbook1968), p .l .
* Irish Defence Forces handbook ( 1968), p.l; John P. Duggan, A history o f the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991),
p. 1.
4Donal McCartney, ‘From Parnell to Pearse (1891-1921)’ in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin (eds), The course o f 
Irish history (Cork, 1984), p. 311.
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military manoeuvres in Munster.5 From May 1917 a major expansion in the number of 
squadrons, training new pilots to support the RFC aspect of the British war effort, 
brought about the selection of numerous aerodrome sites in Britain and Ireland. Sites for 
four substantial aerodromes were found in the general vicinity of Dublin. Starting about 
November 1917 training depot stations were built at Baldonnell, Cookstown or Tallaght, 
Collinstown (county Dublin) and Gormanston on the coast of county Meath. However 
with the armistice of November 1918 the nascent training regime was wound down, 
before it had gotten fully established and organised, and most personnel had been 
demobilised by February 1919.°
At various junctures during the Anglo-Irish war seven flights from 2 Squadron 
and 100 Squadron RAF occupied the major aerodrome at Baldonnell, the airfields at 
Fermoy, Castlebar and Oranmore as well as landing grounds at Athlone and Birr though 
an RAF presence was not continuous at all locations. As early as 1919 in the context of 
exercising military control in Ireland the viceroy had recommended to Lloyd George that 
aircraft should be deployed to strongly defended aerodromes so that patrolling by aircraft 
armed with bombs and machine guns would counteract the military activities of Sinn 
Fein. Seven flights of No. 2 and No. 100 Squadrons, RAF, mainly equipped with Bristol 
Fighters, were dispersed throughout the country during the 1919 to 1921 period. 
However, the government initially did not permit the aircraft to use bombs or machine 
guns mainly because of the difficulty of identifying, from the air, civilian-clad irregular 
soldiers operating amongst the general population. The greatest opposition to the use of 
armed aircraft came from Major General Sir Hugh Trenchard who opposed their use 
unless a state of war had been declared.7 Even though permission was granted in March 
1921 to arm the aircraft caution dictated that ‘the only real use which the Army found for 
the RAF was in transporting senior officers and in running an air mail service once the 
roads and ordinary mails had become dangerous’.8 Townshend asserts that the utility of 
RAF aircraft was limited due to the lack of communications with base or ground forces.
3 Karl E. Hayes, A history o f the Royal Air Force and the United States Naval Air Sendee in Ireland 1913 — 
1923 (Irish Air Letter, 1988), pp 3-5.
6 Ibid, pp 7-17.
7 Patrick J. McCarthy, ‘The R.A.F. and Ireland 1920-1922’ in Irish Sword xvii, no. 68 (1989), pp 174-88, 
passim.
8 Charles Townshend, The British campaign in Ireland 1919 -  7927(Oxford, 1973), p. 171.
17
He also suggested that the fact that ‘nothing was done to create air camps or increase the 
number of landing grounds’ had contributed to a lack of effectiveness.9 However the 
listing of the many RAF facilities available would suggest that aerodrome infrastructure 
was not wanting. In addition to the four training depot stations there were four other 
class ‘A ’ aerodromes -  Fermoy (Cork), Omagh (Tyrone) Oranmore (Galway) and 
Aldergrove (Antrim). They also had forty-three class ‘B’ and ‘C’ airfields. In addition 
they had the use of over sixty sites, many on the landed estates o f the Anglo-Irish gentry, 
generally located near a military or Royal Irish Constabulary barracks. These were 
marked with a large cross and were designated and listed as landing grounds.10 
Townshend, citing the future Field Marshall Montgomery (Brigade Major, 17th Brigade, 
Cork) as saying that the RAF aircrews knew nothing about the war, suggests that ‘a more 
imaginative approach by the Army might have yielded different results’.11 
Notwithstanding the caution exercised in the operation of military aircraft, the RAF lost a 
small number to IRA fire. Most of the losses resulted from opportunist attacks on 
individual aircraft involved in the delivery of military mails in the south western 
counties.12 With the signing of the Treaty in London on 6 December 1921 and its 
subsequent ratification by the Dail (Irish parliament) in January 1922 the two squadrons 
of RAF began withdrawing from Ireland. While 100 Squadron was withdrawn from 
Baldonnell in early February 1922 an ‘Irish Flight’ of four Bristol Fighters was formed 
there in April 1922 and operated in support of British army units withdrawing from 
Ireland. The Irish Flight operated from Collinstown from early May 1922 before moving 
to Aldergrove in Northern Ireland on 29 October 1922 and being disbanded from 1 
November 1922.13 The Irish Flight had vacated Baldonnell on 3 May 1922 at the request 
of the Provisional Government who wanted to have it run as a civil airport.14
In terms of civil aviation Ireland was somewhat of an aeronautical backwater. The 
country had no aircraft manufacturing capacity other than the very limited efforts of
9 Ibid, pp 170-71.
10 [RAF, List of aerodromes], SO Book 122; Capt. C.H. Pixton, ‘Complete List of Landing Grounds -  
Ireland’, Army Book 129 (in my possession). The contents of these undated reference books suggest that 
the period from late 1917 to late 1922 is covered.
11 Townshend, British campaign, p. 171.
12 Hayes, RAF and USNAS in Ireland, pp 50-57.
13 Ibid, pp 60-65.
l4‘Minutes of Civil Aviation Department’ meeting, 23 Mar. 1922 (NAI, DT, S.4002).
18
enthusiastic amateurs while a significant sports aviation event had taken place on 
Leopardstown Racecourse as early as August 1910.15 The fact that the U.K. Civil 
Aviation Act, 1918 did not apply to Ireland reflected the paucity of aviation activity on 
the whole island of Ireland at this juncture. It was to be 1936, coinciding with the 
beginning of a state sponsored air service by the newly formed Aer Lingus, before 
primary legislation was passed by the Dail to provide for the regulation of civil aviation. 
16 From 1919 Baldonnell Aerodrome functioned as Dublin’s civil airport for the 
occasional aircraft that crossed the Irish Sea -  a function that would continue under the
1 7new administration from May 1922 to January 1940.
Against this background the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, in addition to providing 
for Britain retention of the naval ports at Cobh, Castletownbere and Lough Swilly, 
provided for the installation of military aviation facilities in their vicinity if so required 
by British coastal or maritime defence considerations. The treaty also provided that ‘a 
convention shall be made between the same governments for the regulation of civil 
communication by air’.18 The various accounts of the early days of Irish aviation cite the 
purchase of a passenger aircraft during the treaty negotiations in London as the first event 
in the history of the state’s military aviation. These accounts also suggest that the aircraft 
was specifically purchased in order to facilitate an expeditious departure for Michael 
Collins and the other plenipotentiaries should the treaty negotiations fail.19 While this 
version of events is accepted in the mythology of Irish aviation and, though it is based on 
a personal recollection of an officer on the fringes of the treaty negotiations, it will be 
seen that the myth falls well short of the complete story.
The main aim of this opening chapter is to identify and examine the aviation 
connotations, military or civil, of the peace and treaty negotiations, as well as the 
personal position of Collins in such matters. These aspects are important in the context of 
identifying indicators of a future aviation policy. Key considerations will be establishing 
the motives behind the decision to purchase not one, but two aircraft, during the treaty
15 Madeleine O’Rourke, Air spectaculars; air displays in Ireland (Dublin 1989), p.17.
16 Air Navigation Act, 1936.
17 Baldonnel; Dublin’s civil airport 1919 to 1939 (Irish Air Letter, 1989), passim.
18 Annex to ‘Articles of agreement for a treaty between Great Britain and Ireland’, 6 December 1921.
19 Liam Byrne, Histoty o f aviation in Ireland (Dublin, 1980), p. 52; Donal McCarron, Wings over Ireland; 
the story o f the Irish Air Corps (Leicester, 1996), p. 11.
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negotiations and to establish the full circumstances of same. Detailing the specific roles 
of Michael Collins and Charles F. Russell in the formulation of the state’s first aviation 
policy and the precise intent of that policy in relation to establishing a civil air service is 
one of the main objectives of this chapter.
Peace negotiations
Following the truce of 9 July 1921, that marked the cessation of hostilities between the 
IRA and the British forces in Ireland, the latter half of that year was dominated firstly by 
peace negotiations carried out at arms length and, later in the year, by the bi-lateral 
negotiations carried out in London that lead to the Treaty of 6 December 1921. It was 
during these two negotiating phases that the initial concepts of Irish defence and aviation 
began to be formulated. An early British paper put considerable emphasis on the strategic 
position of Ireland.
The position of Ireland is also of great importance for the air services, both military 
and civil. The Royal Air Force will need facilities for all purposes that it serves; 
and Ireland will form an essential link in the development of air routes between the 
British Isles and the North American continent. It is therefore stipulated that Great
Britain shall have all necessary facilities for the development of defence and of
20communication by Air.
This and similar conditions, including a requirement that the new state contribute 
financially to the army, naval and air defence of Great Britain prefaced a negotiation 
process that, in terms of defence, greatly emphasised Britain’s strategic requirements. At 
this early stage the Irish, particularly Erskine Childers still held out hopes of creating ‘a 
gradually expanding, as finance allowed, modest naval force purely for coastal defence 
and reconnaissance’ being able to slowly develop a small naval capability. Eventually 
recognition of the precedence of Britain’s strategic needs combined with the financial
■°F.nclosure, ‘Proposals of the British Government for an Irish settlement’, David Lloyd George to Eamon 
De Valera, 20 July 1921, in Ronan Fanning (ed.) Documents on Irish foreign policy, i, 1921-1922 
(Dublin,1999), p. 237.
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impracticality of the proposition put the matter of an Irish naval force on the long finger. 
In regard to ‘army and air’ Childers suggested:
It is no doubt agreed that we should maintain an army with a small standing force
highly disciplined and well-equipped, and a wider reserve; with a strategic
organisation based on the idea of rapid concentration for coastal defence. A small
air establishment disposed on the same principle, specialising in coast
2 1reconnaissance and perhaps in anti-submarine and commerce protection work.
This modest proposal was quoted in the context of a British statement laying down a 
condition that Ireland contribute militarily and financially to the common defence 
requirements of Britain and Ireland. In consideration of aviation matters initial British 
concerns were totally selfish. They claimed that Ireland’s geographic position was of 
great importance in the context of British ‘military and civil air services’ and ‘that Ireland 
will form an essential link in the development of air routes between the British Isles and 
the North American Continent’.22 Childers proposed that the condition ‘that Great Britain 
shall have all necessary facilities [in Ireland] for the development of defence and 
communications by air’ be opposed on the basis ‘that Atlantic reconnaissance and anti­
submarine work can be done by her by other means’. The proposal to continue to have 
Royal Air Force stations in Ireland was rejected on the basis that their only possible use 
would be against Ireland.22 The provision of facilities for British civil and military 
aviation in Ireland did not feature in the Treaty eventually agreed and signed. However 
the initial civil aviation considerations, particularly that regarding future transatlantic air 
travel, is of interest in the context of the later development, by the Irish Government, of 
the flying boat base at Foynes and the nearby land aircraft base at Shannon. Foynes and 
Shannon would be developed prior to and during the Second World War -  many years
2l‘Memorandum by Erskine Childers on Irish defence as affected by British proposals of 20 July 1921’, 
July 1921, Fanning (ed.), Documents on Irish foreign policy, i, 192 -1922, p. 239.
'2 Enclosure, ‘Proposals of the British government for an Irish settlement’, 20 July 1921, David Lloyd 
George to Eamon de Valera (London), in Ronan Fanning (ed.), Documents on Irish foreign policy, i, 1921- 
1922, p. 242.
2j Memorandum by Erskine Childers, July 1921, Ronan Fanning , Documents on Irish foreign policy, i, 
1921-1922, p. 239.
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before Irish commercial aviation had any use for facilities that would be of considerable 
benefit to the Allies during the ‘Emergency’.
While the Irish peace negotiators in July 1921 were anxious to minimise, if  not 
eliminate entirely, all aspects of the British military presence in Ireland and to negate the 
perception of any Irish obligation to contribute to Britain’s military defence, it is doubtful 
if they had any defined concept of airspace or air defence. The preference in the peace 
negotiations, expressed as an overall defence policy was to stand alone ‘with complete 
independent control of our own territory, waters and forces’ suggests that military 
aviation was not identified as a separate consideration in the defence of the country. 
However the statement that ‘we must be clear as to what our naval and military policy 
would be’ could be interpreted as including aviation -  on the basis that the term ‘military’ 
would include army and air in the early years o f military aviation.24 The Irish policy 
position conceded that while naval defence was the essence of a country’s defence, it 
would take some time to build up even a minimal capability. In the absence of air and 
naval defence the Irish policy position could be construed to suggest that greater defence 
was afforded by the absence of British forces. It was in effect an early admission that the 
new state would not be able to defend itself in naval and air terms and that in time of 
threat the erstwhile enemy would become an ally and defender.
Treaty negotiations
The first indication of an ideological environment conducive to the development of civil 
and military aviation in the new state came about during the Treaty negotiations in 
London in the autumn of 1921. The matter of military aviation in particular was 
approached by the British side in a manner similar to the policy adopted in regard to the 
retention of the ports and certain naval facilities, though examination of the accounts of 
the informal meeting of the defence groupings suggests that the British did not approach 
the discussions on aviation with a well thought out and unified position. The RAF was 
not represented at the initial meeting of the sub-group dealing with defence matters which 
was called to discuss the naval and air aspects of concern to both sides. However the
24 Ibid.
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opening British position was that Ireland would not be permitted either naval or air forces 
and that both functions would remain British responsibilities with Britain’s defence
25requirements as the priority.
At a later meeting Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Trenchard stated that ‘we 
want bases for our aeroplanes such as would be required for the defence of Britain’. He 
suggested that an attack on Britain, from the continent, might be made by ‘ aircraft routing 
around by the west of Ireland’ and we ‘want to be in a position to put a squadron in 
Ireland to deal with any attack by air’. He contended that an air attack that might come 
through Ireland constituted a particular threat to Britain. In their consideration of such 
matters the Irish delegation was fortunate to have as their secretary, though strictly 
speaking not a delegate, Robert Erskine Childers. Childers’ experience as a naval officer, 
Royal Naval Air Service / Royal Air Force observer (navigator) and his knowledge of 
military and naval science placed him in an excellent position to counter any extreme 
position adopted by the British.26 Childers reminded Britain’s main air delegate (his 
former superior), that Ireland did not play an important part, from an air point of view, in 
the war with Germany. He also pointed out that aircraft with sufficient range for such an 
attack had still not been developed. Trenchard agreed that aircraft with ranges of the 
order of 500 to 600 miles were then only available but that there was also the matter of 
carrier borne attack.27 It is possible that Trenchard had his own agenda to ensure the
retention of a more substantial RAF. The RAF, as the third and very junior service of the
28British forces, was fighting for survival in the face of Army and Navy prejudice. It had
9Qbeen decimated after the Great War and a possible withdrawal from Ireland would lead 
to two more squadrons being disbanded, further undermining the cultural argument for 
the retention of an independent air force and parity with the Royal Navy and the British 
Army.
The matter was resolved by Winston Churchill who brought a degree of logic to 
the discussion by stating that any developments in air power that might be made by her
23 Conference on Ireland, Committee of defence, 17 Oct. 1921 (UCDA, MP, P7/A/73/32.)
26 Jim Ring, Erskine Childers (London, \996),passim.
21 Conference on Ireland, Committee of defence, 17 Oct. 1921 (UCDA, MP, P7/A/53).
28Sir Phillip Joubert de la Ferte, The third service; the story behind the Royal Air Force (London, 1955), pp 
72-3.
29 Michael Armitage, The Royal Air Force; an illustrated history (London, 1993), Appendixes 1, 2 and 3.
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enemies would be matched by similar technical advances by Britain and that it was 
therefore immaterial whether RAF aircraft were based in Britain or Ireland. He indicated 
that, in contrast to the case for naval bases and for possible naval airbases nearby, it 
would not be necessary for Britain to retain any RAF bases in the new Irish state. On the 
matter of civil aviation, while both Churchill and Trenchard emphasised that the British 
future requirement for ‘stopping places for cross-Atlantic travel’ the question remained 
unresolved -  possibly because this was still a somewhat remote concept. Collins, 
showing no great concern about military aviation, asked if Britain ‘would give us landing 
places in England [for a civil air service]’, was apparently pleased to be reassured by 
Churchill that ‘there would be perfect reciprocity’ and that the State’s future participation 
in civil aviation in particular would, by international convention, be on the same basis as 
any independent country. ’0 Some alarm was later caused in the Irish camp when the 
British indicated a new condition that Ireland would not be allowed develop an ‘air 
force’. When queried on the matter the British quickly clarified that this only related to a 
prohibition on Irish naval aviation.31 While most discussion on Irish defence and air 
matters was confined to sub-committee level the most definitive statement on defence 
policy was to be made in the context of final stages of the main negotiations. A 
significant amendment to Article 7 of the draft agreement, attributed by Frank Pakenham 
to the ‘republican wing’ of the negotiating team, indicated a much more positive and 
strident policy position on defence than had been discussed internally or previously 
articulated in negotiations.
As an associated State Ireland recognises the obligation of providing for her own 
defence by sea, land, and air, and of repelling by force any attempt to violate the 
integrity of her shores and territorial waters.32
While this amendment, with most of the others proposed by the Irish negotiators on 4 
December 1921, were turned down out of hand by the British and of course not reflected
30 Minutes of committee of defence, 17 Oct. 1921, (UCDA, MP, P7/A/73/53).
31 Minutes of conversation, Tom Jones / Erskine Childers, 28 October 1921, Ronan Fanning, Documents on 
Irish foreign policy, i, 1921-1922, p. 296.
32 ‘Amendments by the Irish representatives to tire proposed articles of agreement’, 4 Dec. 1921 (NAI, DE 
2/304/1).
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in the signed Treaty, it is not clear to what extent it represented the actual defence 
ideology or doctrine that would guide the new Free State. In the context of the 
negotiations it did not meet with Collins’ approval.33 It could be argued that the state’s 
‘defence by sea, land and air’, as undertaken in the 1920s and subsequent decades, fell 
well short of such aspirations. The tenth amendment proposed on 4 December 1921, to 
the effect that ‘a convention shall be made between the British and Irish Governments for 
the regulation of civil communications by air’ was ultimately included as paragraph three 
of the annex to ‘The articles of agreement for a treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, 
December 6, 1921’.34 While it is not clear at whose insistence such a provision was made 
it would seem very likely that, in view of his previous concerns regarding possible future 
air services, it would have met with Collins’ full approval.
The purchase of aircraft
In the mythology of Irish aviation it is accepted that, while the Treaty negotiations were 
still in progress, a civil passenger aircraft, a Martinsyde Type A, Mk. II, was bought in 
England in late October 1921 on the authority of Michael Collins. Based mainly on 
Emmet Dalton’s recollections of 1951, the mythology also suggests that the machine was 
purchased solely to act as a ready means of escape to Ireland, for Collins and a small 
number of the his fellow negotiators, in the event of the Treaty negotiations breaking 
down. In 1951 Dalton responded to a query from Lt. Col. W.J Keane:
At this time I was chief liaison officer and also director of training for the army. I 
had discussions with Michael Collins, and together we put before the General Staff 
the idea formulated by me that we should purchase an air-plane in London and have 
it standing by in readiness to fly Collins ...back to Dublin in the event that the
35negotiations broke down.
33 Frank Pakenham, Peace by ordeal (London, 1962), p.  265.
34 Ibid, p. 372.
35 Emmet Dalton to Lt. Col. W.J. Keane, 23 Oct. 1951 (MA, PC 137).
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While Collins’ safe passage home would have had a considerable degree of priority it is 
not easy to accept that Collins, and the second Dail, could justify the expenditure of 
£2,600, and more, solely on a get-away aircraft.36 Examination of Dalton’s account of 
the events of October 1921, presumably reflecting original documents apparently still in 
his possession in 1951, together with the comments of Sean Dowling, one of his 
contemporaries, suggest that Dalton’s account may not be fully accurate or indeed that he 
may not have been privy to the complete plan regarding the purchase of aircraft and that 
his part in the events may not have been as important as he suggested. The identities of 
the principals involved in the decision to purchase aircraft are not in doubt though the 
particular roles played by Collins, Russell, Dalton and McSweeney require clarification.
According to Dalton he was authorised by Collins to put into effect his plan to 
purchase an aircraft for the purpose outlined. He had known Jack McSweeney, more 
formally known as William J. McSweeney, a former RAF pilot officer who was a Dublin 
IRA Volunteer, from their involvement in a previous IRA operation and now sought his 
assistance in this aviation matter. Dalton was introduced to another ex-RAF pilot named 
Charles F. Russell, a member of the 4th Dublin Battalion IRA, by Commandant Sean 
Dowling. Dalton was very matter-of -fact in his account of the start of a very important 
mission.
I called these two young men together, had a long conversation with them, became 
convinced of their loyalty, and sent them to England to examine the possibility of 
purchasing a suitable aircraft. Russell, who had spent some time in Canada, was to 
act as if he were making the purchase for a Canadian forestry department.37
Commandant Sean D. Dowling, formerly of 4th Battalion, Dublin Brigade, had a 
somewhat different version of the thinking behind the proposal to purchase aircraft. He 
later recalled the first meeting of C.F. Russell and Emmet Dalton;
36‘Summary of expenses in connection with the purchase, maintenance and equipment of two aeroplanes’, 
C.F. Russell to M.Collins, 27 Feb. 1922 (NAI, DT, S.4002).
37 Emmet Dalton to Lt. Col. W.J. Keane, 23 Oct. 1951 (MA, PC143).
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When I introduced Russell to Dalton they began to discuss how his special 
experience as a pilot could be helpful to the I.R.A. Russell said that, for instance, if 
the negotiations for a treaty broke off and fighting began again, he could go to
T O
England and seize a plane, fly it over here and bomb enemy positions.
While this proposal did not relate to that of acquiring a passenger aircraft for a hasty 
retreat the idea of purchasing such an aircraft may have been the product of the 
discussions between Russell and Dalton, and possibly others, rather than the singular idea 
of any one person. Subsequent action, the purchase of a military training aircraft, would 
suggest that Russell’s idea of bombing British forces became one of the main 
contingency plans adopted by Collins. Russell apparently accompanied Dalton to London 
at the time of the treaty negotiations, though his function there was solely in relation to 
the purchase of aircraft and the making of arrangements for a possible flight to Dublin. 
There is no contemporary record of McSweeney having been in London at this time 
though the payment by Russell of £25 ‘to Lt. McSweeney, I.R.A.’ for ‘expenses before 
the purchase of the machine’ strongly suggests that he had been in London for the aircraft 
evaluation phase but had returned to Dublin after a machine has been decided upon, to 
organise the personnel, equipment and arrangements for the possible arrival there of the 
aircraft carrying Collins.39 That McSweeney had performed ‘GHQ staff duty in London 
during [the] treaty negotiation’ in the autumn of 1921 is confirmed by his officer’s 
history sheet compiled in early 1924.40
In any event Russell, apparently accompanied by McSweeney, began a survey of 
aircraft manufacturing companies and an evaluation of the various aircraft they had to 
offer. He was seeking aircraft to fulfil three particular roles. Firstly he wanted a ‘machine 
capable of direct flight [to Ireland] (a) for passengers, (b) freight’. Secondly he sought a 
‘machine suitable for military undertakings i.e. bombing in Ireland’ and thirdly a 
‘machine sea-plane [sic] suitable for transporting freight from ship in home waters to [a] 
base in Ireland’. He ‘interviewed’ representatives of five aircraft manufacturing 
companies; Avro & Co.; Martinsyde & Co.; Short Bros.; Vickers Ltd. and De Haviland &
38 Sean Dowling to W.J. Keane, 12 May 1965 (MA. PC143).
39 Enclosure (2), 21 Oct. 1921, Emmet Dalton to Lt. Col. W.J. Keane, 23 Oct. 1951 (MA, PC143).
■“ Officer's history sheet, 16Feb.l924 (MA, SDR 3718).
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Co. and received quotations in respect of a variety of aircraft. The Vickers Viking and the 
Martinsyde Type A, Mk. II were the machines considered for the primary role of 
transporting passengers or freight. The Vickers Viking, which was an amphibious aircraft 
with a useful load of 1250 lbs and a range of 400 miles, was rejected out of hand even 
though it was considered suitable for all three tasks. The aircraft ‘is, we consider, out of 
the question at the price quoted -  £4,675’. The delivery period of three months after the 
placing of an order, and the aircraft’s handling when landing on grass, were also deemed 
to be unacceptable. Its greater stability on water in bad weather conditions was cited as an 
advantage over the Martinsyde aircraft. However, apparently mainly on the basis of 
price, the Viking was eliminated.
The machine to our mind which is suitable for purpose (1) is the ‘Martinsyde’ Type 
A, Mk. II, 4 seater biplane. This machine is fitted with a Rolls Royce engine, and is 
complete with floats or land undercarriage, and is quoted to us at a price of £2,600.
It has a range of 550 miles at [a] erasing [sic] speed of 100 miles per hour. Delivery 
could be made within twenty-eight days. (Photographs of this machine are 
enclosed) 41
Russell deemed that the Martinsyde would also be suitable for the ship to shore freight 
role. At first glance it is not obvious why Russell should have considered the Avro 504K 
in the context of bombing in Ireland. As noted by Russell in his evaluation this particular 
type, with its 110 HP Le Rhone engine was ‘the English Army standard training 
machine’ and at 288 pounds, had a load carrying capacity that would normally be 
considered too low for bombing purposes. While a gunnery trainer version of the Avro 
504K, with a 130 hp engine, had been developed by way of modifications incorporated in 
the basic machine there is no record of a version fitted out for conventional bombing.42 
Such a standard training aircraft could only be used for bombing by the rather crude 
practice of having the second crew member drop bombs over the side of the rear cockpit 
manually -  an accepted practice in earlier times. However the major advantage of the
41‘Investigation into aircraft available in England for purposes which are as hereunder’, Enclosure (1) 
Emmet Dalton to W.J. Keane, 23 Oct. 1951 (MA, PC 143).
42 A.J. Jackson, Avro aircraft since 1908 (London, 1990), p. 68.
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Avro 504K would be in the fact that, if questions were asked by the U.K. authorities, it 
could correctly be described as a training machine. Against the 504K Russell considered 
the de Haviland DH 9 which he stated ‘was used during the European War as a long 
[range] bombing machine and was found very suitable as such’. The DH 9 was 
considered by Russell to be suitable for the proposed bombing role but he eliminated it 
on the basis of cost. He stated that ‘the price however, being £1000 is exorbitant except 
for permanent use’. This latter comment suggests a short term bombing role for whatever 
aircraft was to be purchased and limitations as to the monies available.
The Martinsyde Type A Mk. II and the Avro 504K therefore comprised Russell’s 
eventual choice of aircraft types. In effect he selected two aircraft to carry out four 
distinct roles. While the choice of the Avro 504K training aircraft in a bombing role must 
have been a considerable compromise caused by a lack of sufficient funds, the more 
intriguing aspect is why Collins felt he required an aerial bombing capability at that 
particular juncture. A likely explanation is that Collins, with the technical and 
professional assistance of Russell, was hedging his bets while awaiting the outcome of 
the treaty negotiations. On the one hand he was preparing for a peaceful outcome to the 
negotiations by purchasing an aircraft capable of several commercial roles. On the other 
hand he was preparing for the possible failure of negotiations and resumption of 
hostilities by having the same aircraft available to get back to Ireland in a hurry while 
also purchasing a training aircraft that might be used for bombing purposes should 
hostilities be rejoined. In the event of a successful outcome to the treaty negotiations the 
Avro 504K would make a very satisfactory training aircraft for either the civil or the 
military aviation organisation, if and when developed in the new state.
The aircraft having been selected, Russell’s next task was to affect the actual 
purchases. The financing of the aircraft purchases was, in itself, an interesting 
arrangement though the exact mechanics are not totally clear. While it is known that the 
Dail Defence Department channelled £3050 through the Irish Self-Determination League 
of Great Britain it is not clear exactly when the monies were paid to the League. The 
context suggested by the Dail accounts for 1 July to 31 December 1921 and Russell’s 
account forwarded to Collins in late February 1922 indicate that £3050 was forwarded to 
the League on the basis of an estimate, by Russell, of what monies would be required to
29
effect the purchase of aircraft. 43 This mechanism appears to have been used to obviate 
the necessity for Russell to pay for goods and services by means of cheques drawn on a 
Dublin bank in order to hide the financial transaction from the British authorities in 
Dublin Castle. Dublin Castle not only monitored the Dail’s Dublin bank accounts but had 
been engaged in ‘pinching Michael Collins’ “war chest” from the Munster and Leinster 
Bank’ in October 1920 -  apparently on dubious authority.44
On 19 October 1921, Russell received a cheque for £1,500 from Art O’Brien of 
the League.45 About two days later Dalton and Russell reported to the Chief of staff in 
Dublin:
We have succeeded in purchasing a Martynside [sic] Aeroplane which can carry ten 
passengers or 16,000 pounds weight of munitions. We intend that this shall serve 
several puiposes -  it can be used, if necessary, in a break of the present 
negotiations. I have the pilot over here and the machine will be ready for flight 
within two weeks.46
The content and styles of this progress report appear to indicate that the first two 
paragraphs, including the above extract, were written or dictated by a non-expert, such as 
Dalton, who appears to have greatly exaggerated the passenger and weight carrying 
capacities of the aircraft. With a full fuel load, a useful load of 600 pounds and two 
passengers, or a maximum of about 800 pounds, would have been more correct. While 
the transportation of five passengers would have necessitated a reduction in the fuel load 
Dublin would still have been well within range.47 The latter paragraphs, giving exact and 
coherent instructions covering all aspects of the arrangements to be put into effect by 
McSweeney in Dublin, were most likely dictated by Russell. Russell suggested that ‘it 
would be necessary to have six men on the approved landing ground i.e. a flat part of the 
race course’ at Leopardstown. Equipment and materials required included two motor
43 ‘Department of Defence special expenditure’, lJuly 1921 to 31 Dec. 1921 (NAI, DE 3/4/10); Irish Self-
determination League, London office accounts, 1 Oct. 1921 to 31 Dec. 1921 (NLI, Art O’Brien papers, Mss
8431-2); C.F. Russell to M. Collins, 27 Feb. 1922 (NAI, DT, S. 4002).
44 Michael Hopkinson (ed.), The last days o f Dublin Castle; the Mark Sturgis diaries (Dublin, 1999), p.60.
45 C.F. Russell to M. Collins, 27 Feb. 1922 (NAI, DT, S. 4002).
46 Enclosure (2), Emmet Dalton to Lt. Col. W.J. Keane, 23 Oct. 1951 (MA, PC 143).
47 Ibid; Ray Sanger, The Martinsyde file (Tunbridge, 1999), p. 181.
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cars, ‘sixty gallons of 1st grade Aero Petrol (this can be purchased from Lemass of [the] 
“L.S.E” Motor Company), 2 ft. square of chamois cloth, five gallons of water.’ The 
instructions went on to detail all arrangements required including those peculiar to a 
possible night landing.48
Russell appears to have made a down-payment on the aircraft on or about 20 
October 1921. In the case of the Martinsyde the basic price was £2,300 with a further 
£300 for floats. An additional £100 was paid to have the aircraft modified in order to 
increase the passenger seating capacity from four to five. In the case of the Avro 504K 
training aircraft, originally quoted at a price of £175, a down payment of £130 was made 
while the eventual cost was £260 though no reason for the increase is given. On 12 
December 1921 Russell drew down a second payment, this time of £1,200, and a final 
amount of £250 on 30 December. All payments were apparently made ‘on the 
instructions of the M.O.F.’ (Minister of Finance - Collins)49 The measured manner in 
which Russell received the monies suggests that it was paid as required to meet his 
purchasing obligations and to a preset limit of £3050.
The total amount spent on the purchase of the two aircraft and the associated 
expenses was £3,767. 10s or almost 40% of the purchases made by the director of 
purchases of the Dail Eireann Department of Defence.50 In the context of the limited 
financial resources of the first and second Dails and of the then current ministerial salary 
of about £300 per annum, the expenditure of such a sum in aircraft, for whatever purpose 
they were intended, represented a very substantial, though risky, investment.51 It is not 
obvious to what extent the surreptitious circumstances surrounding the purchases 
contributed to the overall cost of the operation of buying two aircraft. However it is noted 
that while the two aircraft cost a total of £2,960 the associated costs increased this figure 
by some 24%. The Martinsyde, after modification, was test flown at Brooklands on 24
48 Enclosure (2), E. Dalton to W.J. Keane, 23 Oct. 1951 (MA, PC 143). Leopardstown was not an
aerodrome. Ireland’s first air display had been held there in August 1910.
4> Irish Self-determination League, London office accounts, 1 Oct. 1921 to 31 Dec. 1921 (NLI, Art O’Brien 
papers, Mss 8431-2). These manuscripts comprise two boxes of miscellaneous unsorted material relating to 
the League and other Sinn Fein organisations in Britain.
30 Russell to Collins, 27 Feb. 1922; ‘Civil Aviation’, 7 Apr. 1922 (NAI, DT, S. 4002); ‘Quartermaster 
general’s account’, 1 Jan. 1922 to 1 Oct. 1923 (NAI, DE 3/4/7).
11 Ronan Fanning, The Irish Department o f Finance, 1922-58 (Dublin, 1978), pp 13-23,
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November 1921 by a Capt. Clarke who was paid £25 by Russell, apparently to ensure 
that the aircraft was ready to fly at short notice. (Appendix 1)
With the successful signing of the Treaty on 6 December 1921 and with no 
immediate necessity to use either aircraft both were put into storage and were eventually 
delivered to Baldonnell, as freight, in June 1922.52 One of the more interesting items of 
expenditure was one of £25 apparently incurred by Russell in late 1921. The payment 
was made to the director of the Handley-Page London / Paris air service for a report on 
the costs and ‘the commercial possibilities of an air service between Cove [sic] and 
London’.53 The acquisition of such a report in early 1922 in conjunction with the roles 
specified for the Martinsyde aircraft, strongly suggest that the administration, with 
Collins and Russell as the prime movers, were seriously contemplating the early 
establishment of a civil air service.
In due course the expenditure of the monies, that had been authorised by Collins 
and expended by Russell, was accepted by the provisional government as a legitimate 
expense of the Free State. On 27 February 1922 Collins wrote ‘asking for [a] statement of 
expenses incurred’ by Russell. Replying the same day from the Aviation Department of 
GHQ, Beggars Bush barracks Russell acknowledged the receipt of £3,110 (the additional 
£60 was from ‘other sources’), and accounted for the expenditure of £3,247. 10s., 
indicating that he was due to be repaid £137. 10s. (Appendix No.I)54 Subsequently 
Richard Mulcahy, in his capacity as Minister for Defence, wrote to the Minister for 
Finance:
I desire to make application for the sum of £520, being [the] immediate financial 
requirements for the civil aviation Dept. An outline of the expenditure to be 
covered, is attached. The cash is required urgently, please.55
The expenditure mentioned was the Civil Aviation Department’s estimate of the expenses 
that were expected to arise from the storage in Britain, and the delivery to Ireland, of the
32 Aircraft log book, Avrò No. 1; Log book Martinsyde Type A, Mk. II, Air Corps Museum.
33 ‘Irish air force...what is required’, Aviation Department memo, 2/3 Mar. 1922 (MA, PC143).
54 C. F. Russell to Michael Collins, 27 February 1922 (NAI, DT, S.4002).
55 MFD to MFF, 7 Apr. 1922 (NAI, DT, S.4002).
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two aircraft purchased in October 1921. The note was initialled by ‘MO’C’ with the 
instruction that ‘this application is in order, please pay’.56 Above the signature ‘M. 
O’Coileain’, five days later, Collins wrote to Defence in regard to transactions by Russell 
in October 1921:
The total amount was £3050. It was decided at a provisional government meeting 
that we should accept liability for that sum. It is now a matter of putting the matter 
formally in order, so that we can get it repaid to the Dail. Will you please endorse 
this and send it forward to Mr. Duggan for his endorsement, in accordance with 
[the] recommendation regarding Defence accounts.57
As the above authorisation only related to the £3050 Russell had received from the Self- 
Determination League, cabinet approval for the additional £520 was recorded on 18 April 
1922.58 It is not clear when the outstanding balance of the monies spent by Russell was 
endorsed by the Department of Defence and paid by the Department of Finance but it was 
probably with little delay. While civil aviation was to recede into the background after 
the start of hostilities on 28 June it appears to have been financed for some time 
thereafter. On some date between 1 November 1922 and 15 August 1923 the army 
finance officer, Thomas O’Gonnan received some £1,364 from the Civil Aviation 
Account and refunded it to Dail Eireann. It must be presumed that Russell had been 
repaid the money due to him prior to 1 November 1922.59
The Civil Air Service
In early 1922, while the Provisional Government was beginning to take responsibility for 
the administration of the new Free State and the army was taking over a large number of 
military installations from the departing British Army and Royal Air Force, Russell and 
McSweeney were informally appointed to positions in the General Headquarters of
56 Ibid.
37 ‘Air Services’, M. O Coileain to MFD, 12 Apr. 1922 (NAI, DT, S.4002).
58 ‘Extract from Cabinet minutes, 18 Apr. 1922’ NAI, DT, S.4002).
,9 Refund to ‘Minister for Defence account’, 1 Nov. 1922 to 15 Aug. 1923’ (NAI, DE 3/43A).
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Oglaigh na hEireann in Beggar’s Bush Barracks under Emmet Dalton. Dalton explained 
to W.J. Keane:
Plans and suggestions were drawn up by McSweeney and Russell in what was
known as the Aviation Department ..... This aviation dept, came into being as a
subsidiary Department to my branch training’ [sic].60
In the initial weeks of 1922 the two officers worked in the Aviation Department where 
no apparent distinction was made between military and civil matters, though a conscious 
decision was made to the effect that ‘the [civil] aviation service be worked as a military 
department’.61 However, it is apparent from the major surviving source on the subject, 
(DT file S.4002), that Russell was concentrating on policy matters relating to civil 
aviation while McSweeney was addressing the subject of military aviation. Their 
appointments received the formal approval of the Air Council meeting of 23 March 1922. 
The minutes record that ‘Mr. W.J. McSweeney was appointed director of military 
aviation with the rank and allowance of a commandant general’ and that ‘Mr. Chas F. 
Russell was appointed director of civil aviation and secretary to the Air Council. It was 
decided that he should have an allowance equal to that of the military director’.62 There 
are a number of indications that this division of responsibility was a considered decision 
on the part of the provisional government, indicating that Russell was the superior 
manager and staff officer and that the development of civil aviation, rather than military, 
was the new state’s priority. Charles F. Russell had been selected by Dalton and 
apparently confirmed by Collins, ahead of McSweeney who, having joined the IRA 
earlier was notionally senior to Russell and who might have expected to take charge of 
the air operation. It seems that the superior ability of Russell was evident from an early 
stage. The decision to have Russell take charge of the operation to purchase aircraft and 
of the contingency plans associated with a hasty retreat from London must have been 
endorsed by Collins. Russell had apparently accomplished this task to the satisfaction of 
Dalton and, more importantly, to the satisfaction of Collins. Finally it would appear that
60 E. Dalton to W.J. Keane, 23 Oct. 1951(MA, PC 143).
61 Extract from cabinet minutes, 27 Feb. 1922 (NAI, DT, DT, S.4002).
62 ‘Civil Aviation Dept. — minutes’, 23 Mar. 1922 (NAI, DT, S.4002).
34
Russell had been appointed, in an informal manner, to the new and more important, 
position of director of civil aviation by Collins himself on Saturday 18 February 1922, 
when, initially, the title of superintendent of civil aviation’ was used. On that occasion 
Collins apparently asked Russell for a paper exploring the manner in which commercial 
civil aviation might be initiated in Ireland. Russell rsponed within days:
With reference to our conversation on Saturday [18 February 1922] I am sending 
you herewith [a] scheme for handling aeronautical affairs in Ireland, which 
however I have only had time to outline roughly. During the preparation of this 
report I have had before me reports on the management of aeronautical affairs in 
practically every country in the world, and while it is not an exact duplication of 
any one country’s methods, it is more or less [on] the lines of the New Zealand 
government [policy].63
The submission by Russell of a five page paper on civil and military aviation, based on 
material already in his possession, and in such a brief time, strongly suggests that he was, 
on his own initiative or on some understanding with Collins, well advanced in his study 
of military and civil aviation matters. Collins, having indicated his preference for civil 
aviation and for air communications with other countries during the Treaty negotiations, 
apparently required Russell’s professional background and communications skills to 
further, in particular, the state’s civil aviation aspirations. In the ‘preliminary remarks’ of 
his paper on a ‘scheme for handling Irish aeronautical affairs -  military and civil’ Russell 
may have been simplistic when he stated that aviation could be divided into two branches 
-  civil and military. However he was not only informing Michael Collins and his 
department but also educating ministers and officials of other departments as well as the 
General Staff, many, if not all, of whom would have little appreciation of air matters. He 
defined civil aviation as comprising ‘aircraft construction’ and ‘civil air transportation 
which together aim at the acceleration of inter-communication and the expansion of trade 
by means of air transport’. He considered the ultimate objective of military aviation to be
63 C. F. Russel] to M. Collins, with enclosure, 20 Feb. 1922 (NAI, DT, S.4002). Russell apparently typed 
all his own papers.
35
‘direct defence’. He considered that ‘the duties of Air forces once war is joined’ would be 
to ‘manoeuvre to attack enemy air, land and sea forces and territory, and to defend home 
territory from the air’ and enable ‘arterial air routes to continue to operate by protecting 
them from hostile air attack’. He highlighted the similarities of, and the differences 
between, civil and military aviation but emphasised the fact that they were closely allied 
‘because in future the actual cadres which compose [sic] the country’s service air forces 
in peace, can only be augmented in war by a reserve of men (who might well be placed 
on a volunteer basis) by material and experience in construction and design afforded by 
Commercial aviation’.64 He warned ‘that commercial aviation cannot be fostered merely 
as a reserve for the country’s military air forces’ and that ‘its test must be that of a 
commercial success’. He foresaw the main potential for the development of civil 
aviation ‘for the time being’ in the carrying of mails. Other roles included ‘the high speed 
carriage o f ‘small and valuable goods, passengers, and for sundry purposes such as 
mapping and survey work’. To support his claim for the transportation of mails he cited 
large savings made in the U.S. by a commercial air mail Service operating between large 
cities. However he did not suggest how such a service might fare in Ireland or between 
Ireland and Great Britain.65
In summarising ‘Ireland’s position’ he stated that ‘one may safely say that [as a 
nation] we know practically nothing about aviation either military or civil’. He stated that 
‘we have in Ireland about fifty ex. English army flying officers, 8 of whom served with 
the I.R.A’ and that only one or two of whom had flown ‘since the close of the European 
War’ while suggesting that ‘as far as can be ascertained we have only one’ (unnamed) 
‘commercial aviator in Ireland at the moment’. He suggested that ‘as a result of 
conditions in Ireland we have not yet had the necessity for a department to handle and 
foster commercial aviation’. Noting that the Civil Aviation Act, 1918 did not apply to 
Ireland Russell listed the various regulatory duties and functions, provided for in that Act, 
that would be required to be performed by a government ‘aviation department’. These 
would include the testing and licensing of both pilots and aircraft and the issuing of 
appropriate certificates, airworthiness of aircraft; physical standards for air pilots, the
64 Ibid.
65
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collection of meteorological information, wireless communication with aircraft and much 
more. To carry out such an extensive range of duties Russell considered that a regulating 
aviation department required ‘an aerodrome suitable from a commercial and military 
point of view’, ‘several aeroplanes for testing purposes’ and ‘suitable wireless equipment 
for communication within a radius of 500 miles’. In proposing that, in affect, an 
‘aviation department’ would function as a regulatory body and as an aerodrome operator 
Russell was combining two functions that might later be considered incompatible. 
However, but in the context of a country with practically no aviation activity it probably 
made sense at the time. This dichotomy did not arise as the approaching civil war was to 
stymie early plans for the regulation of civil aviation and plans for state-sponsored 
commercial air operations. As a result the early administrations only slowly and 
reluctantly undertook their obligations under international conventions.
Russell’s recommendations, of February 1922, for the development of civil or 
commercial aviation included aspects that he considered would dovetail with the military 
requirements of the new state;
Having in mind our present aeronautical condition, our army aerial requirements in 
the near future, together with the necessity for government assistance to 
commercial aviation -  I hasten to suggest Government action on the lines 
mentioned hereunder.
“A” The creation of an aviation department under the Minister for Defence- 
whose duties shall be detailed elsewhere.
“B” The creation of a school of aeronautics and flying at the government 
commercial aerodrome.
“C” The adoption of this school of flying and aeronautics by the military 
authorities.
“D” The appointment of a commercial air council -  The following to be 
included on the Council:- 
President, Minister for Defence.
Postmaster General.
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Representatives from Land[s] & [Ordnance] Survey.
O/C Military Air Service.
Representatives of aviation companies in Ireland.
(Superintendent of Aviation Dept, to be secretary to Council)66
Russell detailed the duties of the Air Council in terms of exploring commercial air 
possibilities, considering a scheme for a mail and passenger service from Cobh to London 
or between other points, and of considering the possibilities of locating herring shoals 
from the air. He also foresaw that the ‘comparative smallness’ of the ‘Military Air 
Service’ should preclude it being ‘saddled with the expense of a School of Aeronautics’ 
and, as a result, would become the best customer of the ‘civil aviation Dep[artmen]t of 
aeronautics and flying’ and that the military and civil organisations would have a certain 
level of inter-dependence.
Russell proposed the appointment of a ‘superintendent of commercial aviation’ 
who would be responsible for the many regulatory duties provided for by the Civil 
Aviation Act, 1918. These included the registration, licensing and airworthiness of 
aircraft and for the licensing and fitness of pilots. Such an officer would also be 
responsible for the running of the aerodrome and schools of aeronautics and flying as 
well as advising the government on all aeronautical matters. The estimated annual cost of 
the office of the superintendent was put at £12,000, while the annual cost of the schools 
of aeronautics and flying was put at £13,820. He suggested that the position of 
superintendent of commercial aviation be announced sooner rather than later and 
advocated the taking over of Baldonnell which would be divided between ‘the 
commercial people’ and the military.67 While Russell displayed considerable confidence 
in the future of Irish aviation, the absence of legislation, regulation and the rudiments of 
commercial aviation activity - all fundamental aspects identified by him- were major 
obstacles to success on any level. Given these stark facts and the worsening political 
situation it would have been difficult for the provisional government to have great faith in 
the possible success, at that time, of the proposals as initially drawn up.
66 Ibid.
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On Thursday 23 March 1922, having apparently been postponed from both the 14 
and 15 March, a ‘meeting of members of the Government, members of the General Staff, 
and officers from the Military Aviation Department’ was held at Beggars Bush Barracks 
to consider an agenda based on the various proposals contained in Russell’s ‘Scheme for 
handling Irish aeronautical affairs’.
The following were present at the meeting;-
Mr. R. Mulcahy, T.D., Minister for Defence -  chairman.
Mr. M. Collins, T.D. Minister for Finance.
General O’Duffy, T.D. Chief of the General Staff.
Lieut. General J. O’Connell, Assistant Chief of staff.
Major General J.E. Dalton, director of training.
Commdt. General W. J. McSweeney, director of military aviation.
Mr. C.F. Russell, director of civil aviation and secretary to the Air Council.68
The numbers and elevated status of those attending the first meeting of the Air Council 
bears witness to the govermnent’s interest, at least at this juncture, in supporting both 
civil and military civil aviation. It is also probable that Collin’s sponsorship of the 
concept of aviation in general had a positive influence on the level of attendance. Many 
decisions, mainly of an organisational or administrative nature, were recorded. It was 
decided ‘that aviation be divided into two sections, namely military and civil’. 
McSweeney and Russell were confirmed in their respective appointments while the Air 
Council was confirmed as comprising; ‘Minister for Defence; Minister for Finance; 
Minister for Trade; Chief of the General Staff; Director of Military Aviation; Director of 
Civil Aviation; and Representatives from Land & Survey.’ The meeting adopted a 
recommendation that the proposed school of aeronautics be directed by the proposed 
Civil Aviation Department and that fuller information be sought on a scheme proposed 
by Dublin Corporation that would provide such a school within the existing technical 
school system. The meeting also adopted the recommendation ‘that a school of flying be 
started under the direction of the Civil Aviation Department’ and that that school ‘be
68‘Civil A viation D epartm ent, m in u tes’, 23 M ar. 1922 (N A I, D T, S .4002).
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adopted by the military aviation authorities for the training of their pilots.’ It was decided 
that Baldonnel Aerodrome would be the most suitable for all purposes’. General Dalton, 
in his capacity as chief liaison officer, ‘was directed to make the necessary arrangements 
for the taking over of this aerodrome at an early stage’. In the matter of military aviation 
‘it was decided that the military air authorities should aim at the organisation of one air 
squadron for the present’. The detailed consideration of ‘air estimates’ was postponed pro 
tem while ‘both departments were asked for their immediate financial requirements’.69
While aviation matters appear to have been of significant interest to Collins in 
particular, and to the administration in general, it is to be noted that no aviation proposal 
having significant financial implications was adopted at this stage of the planning 
process. There was evidence, in the first minutes, of a certain air of caution that was to 
become more pronounced in the coming weeks. While no reference is made to the 
deteriorating political situation heading towards civil war it was, no doubt, a major 
disincentive to any significant investment in personnel, aircraft, equipment or general 
facilities or even a regulatory body. In this regard the attendance at the next Air Council 
meeting was telling. The meeting held on 6 April 1922 was attended only by the 
Minister for Defence and the two directors. The minutes of the meeting reflect a 
significant slowing down of the initial impetus generated for Collins by Russell. Russell’s 
Civil Aviation Department proposal for a school of aeronautics at Baldonnell was put on 
hold while a similar scheme proposed by the Dublin Corporation technical committee 
was referred to the engineers of both bodies so that a joint report could be prepared for 
consideration by the Air Council. In the meantime the estimates for the schools of 
aeronautics and flying were being withheld. It was also decided that Russell would 
produce a memorandum on the methods and conditions to apply to entry into the schools 
and on a possible scholarship scheme to ensure adequate numbers of students. In his 
paper he was also to address the matter of entry to a military air service by means of 
graduation through the schools. Russell indicated that the school of flying was the only 
aspect of civil aviation on which it was intended to incur expenditure for the time being 
and that all purchases of equipment would be brought up for the Air Council’s sanction 
before it was purchased. The meeting decided to forward a statement of the Civil
69 Ibid.
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Aviation Department’s immediate financial requirements, no details of which were 
recorded in the minutes, to the Government.
The director of civil aviation ‘enquired whether his department or the military 
department would be responsible’ for the ‘taking-over of Baldonnel Aerodrome.’ The 
meeting decided ‘that the military authorities should take over the aerodrome and arrange 
with the Civil Department to let them have the required number of sheds.’70 This 
particular decision was ambiguous in that all aviation came under military control and the 
‘military authorities’ was not defined. In the event the complete installation was 
eventually taken over by the Army on 3 May 1922 apparently as just another military 
barracks.71 Subsequently responsibility for the aerodrome and the civil aviation functions 
were taken over by Russell in his capacity as director of civil aviation at some date 
between 3 and 12 May 1922.72 The composition of the small staff of the civil aviation 
department that moved into Baldonnell in May 1922 confirms that it was initially 
administered as a civil rather than as military aerodrome.73 No discussion took place on 
the subject of the ‘purchase of machines for the school of flying’, or on ‘the appointment 
of a consulting engineer’, and was postponed to the next meeting. The matter of ‘foreign 
quotations for aeroplanes’ was discussed briefly and also deferred for consideration at the 
next meeting.74
On 25 April 1922 Russell had reported that he was in receipt of queries from two 
British based air service companies who had expressed an interest in running air services 
between Dublin and such cities as Manchester and London. One company was preparing 
to commence operations between London and Dublin via Manchester on 1 June 1922. 
The second company wanted to operate between London and Dublin and were requesting 
support from the Irish government in the form of a subsidy. These overtures brought into 
focus a number of problems that the government had not even begun to address. Firstly 
Baldonnell, then still occupied by the RAF, was not designated as an aerodrome for civil 
aircraft entering the state nor was it designated a customs aerodrome as required by the 
Convention for the regulation of aerial navigation. There were five other important areas,
70M in u tes  o f  A ir  C o u n c il m ee tin g , 6 A p r. 1922 (N A I, D T , S .4 0 0 2 ).
71 Freeman’s Journal, 4  M ay  1922.
' E. D a lto n  to  C .F . R u sse ll, 12 M ay  1922 (M A , L ia iso n  o ff ice  file ).
73 ‘D ep artm en t o f  C iv il A v ia tio n , B a ld o n n e ll’, 20  Ju ly  1922  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /4 9 /3 8 )
4 M in u tes  o f  A ir  C o u n c il m ee tin g , 6 A pril 1922 (N A I, D T , S .4 0 0 2 ).
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including the formulation of local flying regulations at Baldonnell, where the absence of 
legislation and regulation was hindering the opening up of the country to civil aviation. 
The situation in respect of commercial activity was similarly difficult in that the 
government had not adopted a policy in respect of subsidies, if any, to be offered to 
companies interested in serving Baldonnell or elsewhere.75
Russell attempted to convene a meeting of the Air Council for the 5 May 1922 
and distributed an agenda of seven items that included two important matters postponed 
from the poorly attended meeting on 6 April, as well as the matters of the air service 
proposals made by the two British companies. However there is no record of minutes of 
the 5 May 1922 meeting. A further meeting of the Air Council was requested by Russell 
for 15 May 1922, with an agenda of sixteen items agenda that included those carried over 
from the two previous agendas. The new items for discussion included a small number 
concerning the infrastructure and services at the recently taken over aerodrome at 
Baldonnell and some items relating to the schools of flying and aeronautics. Once more 
the absence of minutes suggests that this meeting did not take place. To overcome the 
absence of legislation and regulation an undated ‘notice of motion by Mr. C.F. RusselT 
proposed that selected articles of the International Air Navigation Act, 1919 be adopted 
‘to form as a temporary measure, an arrangement whereby foreign aircraft can 
immediately undertake commercial air services to and from Ireland’. He also proposed 
the adoption of the appropriate articles of the same act ‘to form as a temporary measure 
an arrangement whereby the necessary control over foreign aircraft arriving in Ireland, 
may be obtained’ and included appropriate draft regulations. As with much of the 
previous correspondence on this file the absence of comment or annotation suggests the 
attention of the president of the Executive Council was elsewhere.
In the meanwhile Russell had prepared an exhaustive study of the policy and 
practice internationally in the matter of ‘subsidies for civil aviation’. In an eleven page 
memorandum, dated 2 May 1922, he examined the direct and indirect assistance provided 
to air service companies by the governments of some eleven countries, mostly European 
but including the United States. He defined indirect assistance as the provision of 
‘aerodromes and ground mechanics, light houses, pilot training schools, meteorological
75‘Foreign A ir S erv ices’, C.F. R ussell to M .C ollins, 25 A pril 1922 (N A I, DT, S .4002).
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information, and technical and medical testing of pilots’. Direct assistance was supplied 
‘by means of subsidies generally based on the number of flights’ ‘or of passengers or so 
much per pound of freight’. The study was intended as an aid to Collins and the 
administration to formulate a policy on subsidies that might be used to help to foster 
commercial aviation. The material, indicating the definition of subsidies and exploring 
current international practice, should have left the Government in no doubt as to the 
range of options they might consider.76
Russell elicited no response to any of his correspondence after 6 April 1922 and 
apparently did not succeed in assembling the Air Council. With the inexorable approach 
of hostilities the government apparently had no time to consider aviation matters in 
general and civil or commercial aviation in particular. In effect the civil aviation file in 
the office of the President of the Executive Council, and most likely similar files in other 
departments, was to remain closed until January 1924.
Pilot medical standards
As early as 20 February 1922, in keeping with the emphasis on preparing for civil 
aviation, Russell had identified ‘the maintenance of a physical standard for Air Pilots’ as 
one of the more important duties of an aviation department. In preparation for the time 
when it would be necessary to have civilian pilots medically examined on a periodic basis 
Dr. E.A.K. Mills was instructed to visit ‘London to enquire into the medical tests and 
qualifications for air pilots’ and subsequently reported.
I visited the Air Ministry, Kingsway, W.C., where I interviewed Colonel Heald, 
who explained and demonstrated the medical tests. I also saw a pilot under 
examination. He facilitated me in every way and answered my queries to my entire 
satisfaction, and has given me complete insight to the various tests and scientific
77instalments necessary for the working of this department.
76 ‘S u b s id ie s  fo r c iv il a v ia t io n ’, C .F . R u sse ll to  M . C o llin s , 2 M a y  1922 (N A I, D T , S .4 0 0 2 ).
77 U n s ig n ed  ty p ed  c o p y  re p o rt , E rn es t M ills , 6 M a y  1922 (M A , L ia iso n  o ff ic e  g e n e ra l file )
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Mills was supplied with a complete list of the instruments and equipment required for the 
medical examination of pilots. He was brought to Oxford University and met specialists 
who were developing more searching medical tests for pilots. They advised him further 
on the general subject and offered assistance if required in the future. Mills also acquired 
a full bibliography of the English, American, French and Italian major works and articles 
relating to aviation medicine and got advanced notice of material about to be published.78 
Though medical examination was originally intended specifically for civilian pilots the 
Army Medical Corps would first use the expertise for the benefit of military aviation
which started in July 1922.79 Capt. E. A. K. Mills was to be discharged with effect from
8027 June 1924, some weeks after the ‘army mutiny’ of that year.
Contrary opinion
To what extent Michael Collins and his fellow ministers on the Air Council accepted 
Russell’s staff papers, minutes of meetings and financial projections relating to the new 
State’s aviation policy and plans for the development of commercial aviation is not 
absolutely clear. The main source for the period, the file ‘Civil aviation - developments in 
Saorstat Eireann’ (DT, S.4002) covering the period 1922 to 1932 comprises documents 
apparently forwarded to the president of the Executive Council for information only, and 
reflect no action or interest on his part. Without the benefit of the handwritten notes, 
queries and comments to be found on working documents it is not easy to judge how the 
matters may have been viewed by GHQ, by the minister for Trade and his department or 
indeed by Michael Collins himself in his capacity as Minister for Finance. At one level it 
can be observed that Russell’s various papers appear to have received very little scrutiny 
or detailed investigation as to the merits of his general theories on aviation or the 
practicality of the proposed schemes. It is not unreasonable to suggest that if Russell’s 
work had come in for adverse comment some such comments would be recorded on the 
file viewed. It is considered that while Russell’s standing as an aviation specialist resulted 
from his considerable expertise in such matters, the unrecorded mandate received from
78 Ib id .
79 G en era l R o u tin e  O rd e r N o . 9, 20  D ec . 1922.
80 S ta f f  D u tie s  -  A p p o in tm e n ts  an d  D isc h a rg e s  M e m o  N o . 15, 31 D ec . 1924.
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Collins may also have protected him from possible detractors. While the Air Council, on 
Russell’s recommendations made various recommendations for the expenditure of 
substantial sums the provisional government, through the early department of Finance, 
approved no significant capital investment. Nor did they sanction any significant 
recurring expenditure. The expense incurred involved no more than relatively nominal 
figures on, for example, the taking-over of Baldonnell as a civil aerodrome and the 
putting in place of a small civilian air staff. Civil aviation staff had been recruited as early 
as April 1922 and, notwithstanding waning interest caused by the worsening political and 
military situation, a total of sixteen personnel, including Russell, were eventually on the 
Army payroll on 20 July 1922.81 (Appendix 4)
The above is not to state that there was no dissenting voice to the various aviation 
proposals but this came from a member of the military staff of GHQ a Captain Dunphy. 
In April 1922 a brief report was made on ‘the financial estimates presented by the aerial 
directors showing the initial outlay and general expenditure for one year’ as presented to 
the GHQ. Severe criticism of Russell and McSweeney and of their plans for the 
expenditure of £47,550 on civil aviation and £137,846 on military aviation was detailed.
I understand that the expenditure of this amount will be for all practical purposes in 
the hands of the aerial directors. The directors did not furnish me with proofs of 
their competency to act as expert purchasers of machines and stocks [sic ] or of their 
experience in selecting men for what may be regarded as lucrative appointments. 
The production of an air pilot’s certificates would scarcely be regarded by the 
average businessman or government as sufficient to justify a claim to the 
establishment of an air force involving an initial outlay of £180,000. In my opinion, 
which has been stated by me to the directors, a simile between their claim and that 
of an engine driver to organise and establish a railway company is not incorrect
 The Great War has thrown upon the scrap heap many hundreds of competent
ainnen who are presently out of employment. The loosing off of a further supply
81 ‘D e p a rtm en t o f  C iv il A v ia tio n ’, C .F . R u sse ll to  W .J . M c S w e e n e y , 20  Ju ly  19 2 2 , (U C D A , M P , 
P 7 /B /4 9 /3 8 )
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of civil air pilots will not of itself bring the [Air] Council any nearer to
82accomplishing the object in view.
Captain Dunphy was similarly critical of the estimated costs of raising a military 
squadron and warned that a squadron costing £350,000 annually in Britain could not be 
raised in Ireland for a sum between £95,000 and £115,000. He was also critical of the fact 
that the aviation proposals had not ‘been discussed with the trading community, or 
chambers of commerce’ He recommended that a ‘scientific organiser competent to advise 
the Air Council on all matters relating to military and civil aviation be secured on loan 
from a foreign government’ and that, taking into consideration the amount to be 
expended, the approximate cost of £2,000 for the services of a consultant expert for one
83year would be money well spent.
While one could not question the advisability of having the civil and military 
aviation proposals critically examined from a financial point of view an impartial 
observer might consider that there was more to Capt. Dunphy’s assessment of the 
aviation plans and estimates and to his implied personal criticism of the individuals 
responsible for formulating them. Given the personal relationship between Collins and 
Russell and McSweeney and the confidence the latter pair obviously enjoyed, Dunphy 
may have been unwise in his comments. It is possible that he may have perceived the two 
young directors in their former guise as enemies of the IRA and possibly owing too much 
allegiance to their former service -  the RAF. It is a recognised fact that certain factions of 
the Army could not countenance the concept of ex-British personnel, particularly those 
without pre-truce service, serving in the emerging Free State National Army.84 In the 
context of the odium applying to ex-British personnel two very young officers, having the 
rank or status of commandant general and enjoying considerable influence at the highest 
level of government, were bound to become the objects of prejudice and professional 
jealousy. In any event it is unlikely that Russell and McSweeney appreciated the analogy 
between their profession as pilots and that of an engine driver. No doubt it would not be 
the last time that such sentiments would be expressed though possibly not recorded.
82‘A v ia tio n  -  M ilita ry  and  C iv il’, C a p ta in  M . D u n p h y  to  C O S , 8 A p ril 1922 (N A I, D T , S. 4 0 0 2 ).
83 Ib id .
84 M a ry an n  G ia la n e lla  V a liu lis , Almost a rebellion; the Irish army mutiny of 1924 (C o rk , 19 8 8 ), p. 24.
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It is noted that the aviation plans of early April 1922 were still underdeveloped 
and had not been subjected to the scrutiny of the Department of Finance. At the same 
time little expenditure had been sanctioned while the personnel of the civil department 
were on the Army payroll. Also it was most likely that other concerns were distracting 
the various ministers and their departments from making an adequate appraisal of all 
aspects of the aviation proposals. Russell himself had recommended ‘the appointment of 
a consulting engineer’ who would no doubt have evaluated the proposals before they 
were forwarded to the department of Finance.S5 Capt. Dunphy’s report made no 
allowance for the immature nature of the plans and in this regard his criticism may have 
been premature. In the circumstances it is unlikely that anti-British sentiment alone had 
any influence on the eclipsing of the civil and military aviation proposals. With the start 
of the Civil War civil aviation was to be subsumed into the military and in the absence of 
any formal sanction for the initiation of military aviation a rudimentary force was to 
evolve and be financed from existing army resources.
Conclusion
The peace and treaty negotiations of the latter part of 1921, apart from confirming that 
the new state could raise an army that included an aviation element, did not identify such 
aviation or other aspects of air defence as a national priority. However it is clear, from his 
relatively brief contribution to the discussions on civil aviation, that Michael Collins was 
very anxious to have civil air transportation services established between Ireland and the 
U.K and possibly to the continent. It is probable that it was at Collins’ instigation that 
provision was made, as an annex to the Treaty articles of agreement, for an Anglo-Irish 
convention on civil aviation. While the Martinsyde aircraft was purchased in October 
1921 with two contingencies in mind on balance it was an indicator of Collins’ 
confidence in the outcome of the negotiations and of his intention to facilitate the 
commencement of commercial aviation at an early date. It does not seem at all reasonable 
that such an aircraft would be purchased solely as a means of escape from Britain. 
Bearing in mind the open circumstances of his presence at the negotiations and his
85 ‘Civil aviation departm en t-m inu tes , 6 A pril 1922: A ir C ouncil agenda, 15 M ay 1922 (N A I, D T, S.4002).
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residing at Cadogan Gardens the concept of a dramatic escape by aeroplane would not 
appear to have been very practical. The attention, by Russell, to the specification of the 
machine and to the three distinct commercial roles that it could fulfil, very strongly 
suggest that the aircraft’s commercial potential was paramount and that the escape 
function was a secondary consideration. In the case of the Avro 504K it seems probable 
that the balance between a possible bombing role and a future training role would have 
been even.
In the context of the efforts made, in the first half of 1922, to develop plans for 
the development of civil aviation in general and the establishing of a civil air service in 
particular, the working relationship between Michael Collins and C. F. Russell appears 
an intriguing one. It is almost universally agreed that that Collins was modem and 
progressive and had an uncanny knack of choosing the right individuals to whom he 
might delegate. As early as the Treaty negotiation Collins had shown a particular interest 
in civil air services and appropriate air access to Britain. The purchase of the Martinsyde 
demonstrated his intent to initiate such a service should the circumstances permit. In 
Russell Collins found an equally enthusiastic individual who had the professional 
expertise and the broad vision that allowed him identify and articulate the state’s 
obligations in civil aviation regulation and its options in terms of developing and 
subsidising a civil air service to demonstrate a certain independence of Britain in such 
matters. It is not easy to identify which of the two was making the running. On balance it 
was possibly an equal partnership with Collins having the broader aim regarding air 
communications and being in a position to endorse and authorise those ideas projected by 
Russell which be considered best suited his purpose.
The diminishing interest shown by the lack of attendance at Air Council meetings 
very much indicated the extent to which the approaching civil war was impinging on 
ministers’ thinking and on plans for aviation. It seems very possible, had the Civil War 
not intervened, that plans for a subsidised air service would have come to fruition sooner 
rather than later. As it was Russell had managed to progress matters to a position where a 
small Civil Aviation Department had been formed and was in possession of a viable civil 
aerodrome. In more favourable circumstances, with a five-seat passenger aircraft and the 
necessary financial sanction an air service could have undertaken with the minimum of
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difficulty. In the meanwhile, with enthusiasm for civil aviation having waned, there was 
no significant shift towards the development of military aviation. As a result, plans for 
establishing a military squadron were to remain very tentative until the actual outbreak of 
hostilities.
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CHAPTER 3
MICHAEL COLLINS, THE MILITARY AIR SERVICE AND THE CIVIL WAR
In the first six months after the Truce the peace negotiators showed no great urgency to 
develop a concept of national defence, and much less, air defence. Subsequently the 
provisional government, mainly influenced by Michael Collins who in turn was advised 
by C. F. Russell, displayed a distinct and pragmatic preference for the development of 
civil commercial aviation rather than adding an air element to an evolving regular army. 
Even as civil war loomed the new administration had requested that the RAF, then 
policing the British military withdrawal from Ireland, should vacate Baldonnell 
Aerodrome so that the new Civil Aviation Department could take it over as a civil airport. 
The Civil Department, under Charles F. Russell, took over Baldonnell in May 1922 while 
the concept of a military squadron, of token strength and an undefined role, received the 
administration’s vague support and little or no financial backing. The evolving political 
and military circumstances of the spring and early summer of 1922, that would result in 
civil war from the end of June, dictated that civil aviation aspirations be abandoned and 
that the very modest levels of military and civil aviation resources then in place be 
amalgamated under military command so that a very basic level of air power be raised to 
enjoin the Civil War.
This section of the study examines the new state’s reluctant change of emphasis 
from civil to military aviation and the role of Michael Collins in sanctioning the 
acquisition of aircraft and the commencement of military air reconnaissance operations. It 
will look at the functioning of an air element that was hastily assembled with the 
immediate task of gathering intelligence on the activities of the Irregulars in a situation 
where military wireless communications had not been developed to replace telephone 
communications that were being destroyed by the anti-Treaty forces. A central aspect of 
this particular study will be to assess the evolution of an air reconnaissance capability, its 
effectiveness or otherwise, in the first weeks of Civil War as well as the general state of 
military aviation at the time of Collins’ death.
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The start of military aviation
With matters relating to both military and civil aviation being administered under the 
aegis of the nascent Army and while Russell was exhorting support for various aspects of 
civil aviation, W.J. McSweeney was carrying out a similar, if less thorough and expert, 
exercise in support of military aviation. An early proposal, for an ‘air service department 
separate and distinct from any other department’, included recommendations concerning 
the status and functions of the ‘chief executive officer of the [Military] Air Service’. 
While they were not expressed in Russell’s articulate manner the recommendations were 
to the effect that the officer commanding Air Services should be a member of the General 
Staff and have equal rank with the heads of other headquarters departments and army 
corps. This was proposed by McSweeney on the basis that the General Staff would have 
the benefit of professional expertise on air matters, to ensure that the Air Service would 
have the appropriate status and so that the officer commanding the Air Service would be 
au fait with the overall military operational situation and make decisions accordingly.1 
The record does not reflect how this particular matter was received by the army 
leadership.
The first policy document proposed by McSweeney that is known to have been 
forwarded to the Air Council for consideration was presented to the Chief of Staff on 4 
March 1922. Entitled the ‘Irish Air Force -  the present position and what is required’, 
the submission made an opening, inaccurate correct, statement to the effect that the 
aviation department, under the director of training, had ‘one 5 seater aeroplane 
purchased at a cost of £2,600 and one dual control Avro machine purchased at a cost of 
£130’. It stated, also inaccurately, that the ‘total expenditure to date was £3000’ though it 
did not account for the suggested balance of £270. The paper went on to detail three 
military options, all involving the disposal of the Martinsyde passenger aircraft (a very 
new and as yet unused civil machine), and the purchase of various numbers of single seat 
Martinsyde F.4 (Buzzard) scout or reconnaissance type aircraft, and of the two seat 
version, the Martinsyde F.4 A. A detailed and priced proposal for the suggested 
constitution of a military air service again included provision for the officer commanding
1 ‘W h a t is r e q u ire d ’, u n sig n ed  m em o  d a te d  13 F eb ru a ry  1922 (M A , L ia iso n  o ff ic e  file ). T h e  d o c u m e n t 
a p p ea rs  to  be  a re -ty p e d  copy .
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to be represented at General Staff level. The overall plan for personnel and for the 
purchase of aircraft and other equipment had, as its immediate objective, the establishing 
of a school of flying. This school, which would cost £23,595 to set up and run for six 
months, would train the personnel for a squadron of sixteen aircraft in six months. 
However an Air Squadron, consisting of only eight officers and forty other ranks, would 
cost four times as much to set up and run for six months. The ‘grand summary air 
estimate’ of £150,026, providing for an air squadron - £95,346; school of aeronautics - 
£8,583; school of flying - £23,597 and air reserve - £22,000, was put to the Air Council 
meeting of 23 March 1922. The schools of flying and aeronautics were considered to be 
part of the civil department while the air reserve idea was lost. In the context of the time 
such possible expenditure appears to have received little consideration. The only aspect 
of the military air service proposal approved was the general concept of an air squadron. 
As mentioned previously ‘it was decided that the military air authorities should aim at the 
organisation of one air squadron for the present’.2 As with the proposals in respect of 
civil aviation, no financial sanction for the proposed air squadron was sought, or 
provided. As a result the establishing of such a squadron remained in limbo pending a 
significant change in the military situation. It was of no help to McSweeney that the 
government, even as civil war was threatened, tended to encourage civil aviation almost 
to the exclusion of military. On the outbreak of civil war, therefore, a somewhat notional 
Military Air Service consisted of no more than eight personnel including ‘Miss M. 
Kieman, typist’.3 While the headquarters had remained at Beggar’s Bush Barracks after 
the take-over of Baldonnell on 3 May 1922 the first non-commissioned personnel of the 
Air Service initially reported to Captain W. Stapleton of the garrison.4
The general circumstances surrounding the lead up to civil war are possibly best 
summarised in the words of the acknowledged authority on the subject and period:
It took six highly confused and tense six months for the divisions over the Anglo- 
Irish Treaty to result in civil war. During that period sundry attempts to settle the 
political and military divisions, or at least to postpone them, failed. On all sides,
2 ‘C iv il A v ia tio n  D e p a r tm e n t’ A ir  C o u n c il m in u te s ’, 23  M ar. 1922 (N A I, D T , S .4 0 0 2 ).
3 ‘M ilita ry  A v ia tio n  -  p e rs o n n e l’, 2 0  Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /4 9 /3 7 ).
4 Sgt. J. C u rran , s ta te m en t to  W .J . K e an e , Ju n e  1944 (M A , P C  143).
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however, there was a reluctance, right up to the Four Courts attack, to concede that 
war was inevitable. The Treaty left many issues open to debate and interpretation; 
such ambiguity made it less likely that divisions would quickly come to a final 
test.5
Such was the pace of the evacuation by the British Army that military installations were 
taken over by the local IRA with the provisional government powerless to prevent anti- 
Treaty forces occupying many such barracks, posts and airfields. In terms of territory the 
anti-Treaty forces occupied about two thirds of the country.6 In Dublin many elements of 
the No. 1 brigade had adopted an anti-Treaty stance though all barracks in the city 
remained under the control of the pro-Treaty IRA.7 The military take-over of the Four 
Courts by anti-Treaty forces of the Dublin No. 1 Brigade on 13 April 1922 was a 
symbolic act that illustrated how tenuous was the authority of the provisional 
government. The failure to prevent it and the delay in ending that occupation was to 
emphasise the Provisional Government’s military weakness and to try the patience of the 
British Government as they awaited decisive action.8 While Free State forces, using 
artillery pieces borrowed from the British, had commenced the shelling of the Four 
Courts on 28 June 1922 initial efforts had not succeeded in dislodging the rebels. The 
following day Winston Churchill in his capacity as chairman of the CID sub-committee 
on Ireland, indicated that he was particularly anxious that adequate supplies of artillery 
ammunition should be available to the British forces not yet withdrawn from Ireland 
should the provisional government relent on its opposition to British military assistance 
and agree to the offer of heavy artillery to end the occupation of the courts building. 
Similarly Churchill proposed that the RAF should lend aircraft, painted in Free State 
colours, and pilots, to the Free State forces. While the chief of the air staff, on the 
grounds of the possible adverse effect on the morale of aircrew, was opposed to painting 
RAF aircraft in Free State colours but would do so if ordered by higher authority. He 
suggested that the RAF could bomb the Four Courts with 112-lb bombs with delayed
M ich ae l H o p k in so n , Green against green: the Irish civil war (D u b lin , 1986), p .52.
6 Ib id , xix
7 Ib id , pp  58 -72 ,
8 Ib id , pp  72-3 .
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action fuses that would burst inside the buildings.9 To prepare for such an eventuality the 
Royal Air Force prepared for dispatch to Dublin, or actually sent, a considerable array of 
aircraft and munitions:
The following is the position at 12 noon to-day (30lh) ... 3 DH 9A [aircraft] with 3
1121b bombs each are at Shotwick awaiting .... good weather  1 Vickers
Vimy with 2 550 lb bombs is ready at Spittlegate... a lorry with 6 2501b bombs 
had an accident by Spittlegate ... 6 sets of bomb racks crossed by mail steamer last
night  50 1121b bombs with instantaneous and delay action fuses are due
Kingstown to-night there are 200 201b bombs at Collinstown and 500 at
Aldergrove. Arrangements .... to send 12 2501b bombs to Collinstown.10
Notwithstanding the Irish caveat regarding British military assistance, the Irish Flight, 
RAF had prepared for the possibility that it would be ordered to bomb the Four Courts. 
On the evening of 29 June, even as provisional government forces were bombarding the 
Irregulars, RAF crews were practicing their bombing techniques. Between 18.30 hours 
and 20.15 hours that evening at least four R.A.F. crews carried out bombing practices on 
their aerodrome at Collinstown using Bristol Fighter H. 1485 (and possibly others). This 
particular aircraft was to be handed over to the National Army within the week.11 While 
stories, to the effect that British aircraft did in fact bomb the Four Courts, are told no 
evidence has yet been found to support the contention that the RAF carried out any 
bombing on behalf of the provisional government.
Buying the first military aircraft
In the meanwhile IRA Headquarters at Beggar’s Bush Barracks had taken some steps to 
initiate the purchase of at least one military aircraft. On 20 June 1922 the Chief of Staff, 
General Eoin O’Duffy, received a receipt from William J. McSweeney recording that the 
latter had ‘received from Chief of Staff the sum of one thousand three hundred pounds
9 Ibid, p. 121.
10 A ir  M in is try  m in u te  sh e e t, A .V .M ., D .T .O . to  C A S , 30  Ju n e  1922 (N A , A ir  8/49).
11 A irc ra ft log  bo o k , H.1585, 29 Ju n e  1922 (A C  M u seu m ).
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[for the] purchase of [an] aeroplane’.12 Before the end of the month O’Duffy apparently 
issued another cheque, this time for £2,500, bringing the total for which McSweeney 
would subsequently account to £3,800.13 It is unlikely that O’Duffy had any role in the 
matter other than that of supplying the funds and later a letter authorising the purchase. 
As Collins did not assume the functions of commander-in-chief until 12 July 1922 
Me Sweeney’s actions had to be authorised by his military superiors. The subsequent 
involvement of Collins in military aviation matters would strongly indicate that the initial 
decision to purchase a reconnaissance aircraft was his -  probably advised by Russell and 
under pressure from the British to do something about the occupation of the Four 
Courts.14 McSweeney purchased a return ticket and travelled to London by boat and train 
on 21 June 1922, apparently with verbal orders to purchase a military aircraft. On 24 June 
he visited the Aircraft Disposal Company, the Finn charged with the disposal of British 
war surplus aircraft. He handed over a cheque for £400, drawn on one of two accounts he 
held in Dublin, presumably as a deposit on a Bristol Fighter F2B. However, apparently 
not having written authorisation, he was not allowed take delivery of the machine. On 26 
June he paid ‘C. Baker’ three pounds seven shilling and ■Gamages’ two pounds two 
shillings for goods or services that are not identified. For reasons that are not obvious he 
stayed in London a further three days, arriving back in Dublin on the morning of the 30 
June.15 He apparently proceeded direct to GHQ and collected a letter of authorisation 
signed by the chief of staff. This was addressed, incorrectly, to ‘Martinsyde & Co., 
Woking’.
The bearer, Commandant General McSweeney, has authority to purchase one two 
seater reconnaissance machine which he will fly back to Ireland. The account will 
be settled on being furnished to me.16
As O’Duffy had already given McSweeney thirteen hundred pounds it is not clear why he 
should wish to settle the subsequent account and, in the event, did not. Accompanied by
12 R e ce ip t d a ted  2 0  Ju n e  1922 (M A , A C /2 /2 /1 ) .
13 A rm y  fin an c e  o f f ic e r to  W .J . M c S w ee n ey , 12 Ju ly  1923 (M A , A C /2 /2 /1 ) .
14 H o p k in so n , Green against green, p p  72-3
13 ‘S ta tem en t o f  e x p e n d itu re ’, C o m d t. G en . M c S w ee n ey , 2 8  Ju ly  1923 (M A , A C /2 /2 /1 ) .
16 C O S to  M a rtin sy d e , 3 0  Ju n e  1922 (N A , A ir  8 /49 ).
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Volunteer Thomas Nolan, who was to act as observer or navigator for the delivery flight 
of the aircraft, McSweeney returned to Britain on the evening mail boat of 30 June 1922. 
On arriving at the Croydon offices of the Aircraft Disposal Company on 1 July 
McSweeney signed an undertaking, presumably dictated by him but typed on ADC note- 
paper, confirming the purchase of a Bristol Fighter aircraft:
At the direction of the chief of staff, General O’Duffy, I hereby place with you a 
firm order for one new Bristol Fighter fitted with [a] new 300 H.P. Flispano Suiza 
engine, at a price of £875 delivered to me in flying condition at your Croydon 
works. The machine to be fitted with one Vickers gun and one Lewis gun, at an 
additional price of £225....The above price to include one dual instruction flight 
and one solo flight on your stock machine.17
The provision in the contract that McSweeney would undergo one instructional flight and
one solo flight, on the company’s stock aircraft, was apparently to refresh McSweeney’s
flying skills in view of the fact that he had probably not flown any aircraft since being
18discharged from the RAF almost exactly three years previously, on 4 July 1919. On the 
same day he paid a further £400 to the ADC. A further payment of £1,100, made on 15 
July, brought the total paid to the ADC to £1,900 while the contract price for the Bristol 
Fighter was only £1,100 - compared with an original new price in the region of £2561.19 
It is not clear why McSweeney paid £800 over and above the agreed price for the single 
aircraft particularly as there is no evidence of spares being purchased in addition. It is 
possible that this represented down payments on two additional aircraft, but there is no 
evidence of authority for such an action.
Despite the fact that McSweeney had informally ordered the aircraft a week 
earlier and confirmed it in writing on the 1 July the aircraft, ‘Machine No. H.1251’, was 
not ready to be test flown until 3 July. This was probably most likely due to the removal 
of the 200 hp Arab E.3534 engine and its replacement with the 300 hp Hispano-Suiza
17 ‘C e rtified  tru e  c o p y ’, 21 Ju n e  1954 , C o m d t. G en . M c S w e e n e y  to  A D C , 1 Ju ly  1922  (M A , P C  143).
18 A irc re w  se rv ice  re co rd , W .J. M c S w e e n e y  (N A , A ir  7 6 /3 2 9 ) .
19 ‘E x p en ses  o f  M a jo r  G en era l M c S w e e n e y  d u rin g  [th e] y e a r  1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 3 ’; ‘S ta te m e n t o f  E x p e n d itu re ’, 28 
Ju ly  1923 (M A , A C /2 /2 /1 ),' C h a z  B o w y e r, Bristol Fighter F2B; king of two-seaters (S h e p p e rto n , 1985), 
p .124.
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engine, the most powerful of no less than eleven engine options available for the Bristol 
Fighter.20 The machine was test flown by a Captain Stocken for fifteen minutes starting 
at 17.12 hours the same day. Even then the delivery flight could not commence as 
McSweeney had not had his familiarisation flights. These apparently occurred on 4 July. 
On that day McSweeney signed an undertaking or indemnity agreeing ‘to exonerate 
unconditionally The Aircraft Disposal Company, Limited, from any responsibility
whatever for any accident that may occur to me while flying machines the property of the
21said company’. He also agreed to pay for any damage done to Avro 504K D.9358. At 
this point the key records relating to the events of 3/4/5 July 1922 give rise to certain 
ambiguities. The signing of the undertaking and the completion of two familiarisation 
flights on 4 July suggest that the aircraft could not have left Croydon until the early 
afternoon of that day. In the meantime the aircraft log book records that the ‘machine
B.F.2B [H.] 1251 arrived at Baldonnel [on] 4/7/22. Time in air three hours’, without 
citing any particulars of the crew, the route taken or the dates and times of individual legs 
of the journey -  a timetable that is possible.22 However McSweeney’s expense account, 
not tendered until August 1923, indicates that he and Nolan had departed Croydon on the 
3 July, landed at Shotwich, presumably late that evening, and spent that night, and a 
second one, at a hotel in Chester and therefore could not have arrived at Baldonnell until 
5 July 1922 at the earliest. This chronology does not allow for the familiarisation flights 
on 4 July and therefore may well indicate a slight error in McSweeney’s expense account. 
The expense account entry that reads ‘flew to Shotwick -  arrived 3/7/22, Hotel Chester 3- 
4-5/7/22’ might more correctly relate to a departure on 4 July followed by two overnights 
(4/5 July and 5/6 July) in Chester and a departure to, and arrival at, Baldonnell on 6 July
1922. This latter scenario is also suggested by a brief telephone message, recorded at 
GHQ on 7 July, stating that ‘Comdt. General McSweeney rings from Baldonnel to say he 
has arrived with plane and awaits instructions’. This message suggests that McSweeney 
may have arrived at Baldonnell late on 6 July but did not inform GHQ until the following 
morning.2’ In the circumstances, while it cannot be stated categorically on what date
20 L o g  bo o k , B F  II (A C  M u seu m ); B o w y er, Bristol Fighter, p. 124.
21 W .J . M c S w ee n ey  to  A D C , 4  Ju ly  1922 , ‘c e rtif ie d  tru e  c o p y ’ b y  W .J . K e a n e , 21 Ju n e  1954 (M A , P C 1 4 3 ).
23 A irc ra ft log  bo o k , B F  II, p .5 (A C  M u seu m ).
23 P h o n e  m essa g e  A /1 7 9 , 7 Ju ly  1922  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 6 /2 6 6 ) .
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Bristol Fighter F2B ‘BF IF was delivered, it is strongly suggested that it was not on 4 
July 1922 and that, on balance, it is most likely that the aircraft arrived in Baldonnell on 6 
July 1922. The log book entry indicating 4 July 1922 possibly relates to the departure 
from Croydon rather than the arrival at Baldonnell.
Two RAF aircraft acquired
In the meantime, in Dublin and surrounding counties, with the retaking of the Four 
Courts by provisional government forces, the Civil War was under way. At an early 
stage, in view of the destruction of telephone lines, Michael Collins had identified an 
urgent requirement for reconnaissance aircraft and took decisive action. On the morning 
of the 4 July Collins made representations to Dublin Castle as a result of which Alfred W. 
Cope, under-secretary at Dublin Castle, sent an urgent, yet long and detailed, telegram 
addressed to Lionel Curtis in the Irish Office at the Colonial Office, London, for the 
attention of Winston Churchill.
Collins wants two aeroplanes one with undercarriage for bombing and one without. 
Reasons for request are McSweeney has not brought over his plane yet due to 
inclement weather. Telegraph and telephone communication is interrupted and 
particulars of the surrounding country are not available. Reports come in of 
concentrations of irregulars in Dublin county and neighbouring counties. Troops 
and transport are sent out on these reports and search country for hours for these 
concentrations but fail to find them and men and time are wasted. Collins is 
satisfied he could clean up the country districts if he could get early information of 
concentrations and keep up communications. As an example of (2) above there 
were reports yesterday that irregulars were doing well in Drogheda. At P.G.’s 
request I got through to Gormanstown by wireless for information but wires were 
down between Gormanstown and Drogheda and no information could be obtained.
It would be most undesirable for P.G. to use our pilots owing to the dead set which 
is being made by republicans on P.G. receiving assistance from us. Each issue of 
the Republic of Ireland mentions either Mr. Churchill, General Macready or myself
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as giving assistance in the fight and the mainspring of the republican propaganda is 
that British forces are prompting and assisting in the killing of Irishmen. I suggest 
one aeroplane being handed over at once. Can this be done please. The handing 
over should be at Baldonnell. The P.G. have one or two efficient ainnen -  of this I
24am certain.
The citing of inclement weather as delaying the delivery of the aircraft from London does 
not appear valid. The reason quoted more likely represents the urgency and frustration of 
Collins who was awaiting the delivery of an aircraft the purchase of which he had, in all 
probability, authorised some two weeks previously. The appeal from Collins, which was 
received in the Colonial Office at 11.39 am the same day, in addition to constituting an 
urgent request for reconnaissance aircraft, explains much about the military situation as it 
was developing in the aftermath of the re-taking of the Four Courts. Collins recognised 
immediately that the absence of adequate communications rendered it very difficult, if 
not impossible, to counter the activities of the Irregulars who were, of course, responsible 
for the destruction. Even in the areas close to the city provisional government forces were 
apparently operating at a considerable disadvantage, a situation that required the type of 
intelligence that aircraft operating from Baldonnell could provide. With Churchill and the 
Colonial Office well disposed to Collins and the provisional government, the British 
government, in keeping with the policy of affording whatever military help might be 
requested, gave a swift and positive response. At 14.20 hours on 4 July 1922 the War 
Office sent a secret dispatch to the British GHQ in Dublin to the effect that ‘two Bristol 
aeroplanes from [the Irish Flight at] Collinstown will be handed over at once to 
provisional government’ and that the aircraft ‘should be equipped as provisional 
government may desire’.25 Later that day the head of the RAF in Ireland, Group Captain 
Bonham-Carter received a secret dispatch by telegram:
Orders have been issued through War Office to supply provisional government with 
two service aeroplanes. You will hand over two serviceable Bristol Fighters armed
24 T e le g ra m , ‘C o p e  to  C u rtis  fo r M r. C h u rc h il l ’, 4  Ju ly  192 , (N A , A ir  8 /4 9 ). T h e  w o rd  ‘u n d e rc a r r ia g e ’ 
sh o u ld , m o re  c o rre c tly , re ad  ‘b o m b  ra c k s ’ .
25C ip h e r  M .O . 3, W a r O ff ic e  to  M c C re a d y , 4  Ju ly  192 2  (N A , A ir  8 /49 ).
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and equipped as they may require. Machines will be replaced as soon as weather 
permits. Offer any technical advice and ensure that machines are efficient in every 
way. British marking [are] to be removed.26
With McSweeney still away taking delivery of the first aircraft C.F. Russell, the director 
of a Civil Aviation Department that was, in effect, under military command, was the only 
pilot available to take delivery of aircraft. It was to be early the following afternoon 
before C.F. Russell could proceed to Collinstown. There he took possession of one of the 
only three serviceable Bristol Fighters of the Irish Flight, RAF. Taking off at 15.00 hours 
and, allegedly wearing a bowler hat, he flew Bristol Fighter E.2411 the ten mile journey 
to Baldonnel in fifteen minutes. That this aircraft actually arrived at Baldonnel before the 
one flown from London by McSweeney is inferred by the fact that it was given the Air 
Service serial number ‘BF I’ though this cannot be taken as being conclusive. However, 
as argued above it is unlikely that McSweeney’s aircraft arrived at Baldonnell before 6 
July -  and therefore was given the number ‘BF II’. While log book entries should be the 
most reliable historical record manifest inconsistency in the keeping of log books, by an 
inexperienced and as yet poorly organised ground staff, was to make it difficult to detail 
the chronology of aircraft flights, to identify individual missions and assess the overall 
operational use of aircraft throughout the Civil War period.
Air operations
As the instigator of efforts to establish military aviation Michael Collins controlled and 
directed the operational use of aircraft during the months of July and August 1922. 
Telephone messages and other correspondence in the Mulcahy Papers indicate that the 
designation of particular missions was done by Collins in consultation with Russell or 
McSweeney or both, mainly by telephone but sometimes in person with the flying 
officers. There is no evidence that the staff of GHQ had any active role in the matter 
though, being in receipt of reconnaissance reports received by telephone or in writing or 
both, they would have been well aware that an air operation was in hand. At eight of ten
26A M  to  B o n h a m -C a rte r ,  4 Ju ly  1922  (N A , A ir  8 /49 ).
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meeting of the general staff or War Council held in July and August, the subject of ‘air’ 
or ‘aviation’ featured on the agendas. However the relevant minutes reflect no discussion 
of the subject. This probably reflected a policy, dictated by Collins, which restricted the 
air intelligence to those who needed to know. While it is also possible that GHQ staff had 
very little interest in the activities of two ex-RAF pilot officers and had little faith in the 
use of aircraft for intelligence purposes it seems likely that Collins’ reports to the War
27Council on aviation matters went unrecorded on his instructions.
While there was no apparent policy or overall plan for air reconnaissance the air 
operation fell in to three fairly distinct phases -  the month of July in the Leinster area, the 
month of August mainly in the Munster area and, from October 1922, in the Munster area 
with missions carried out from bases in Fermoy and Tralee. During the month of July 
about twelve reconnaissance missions were flown in the Dublin area and the south 
Leinster counties of Wicklow, Wexford, Carlow and Kilkenny against Irregulars who 
were being driven south by Provisional Government troops. C. F. Russell, now second- 
in-command to McSweeney, flew the majority of the reconnaissance patrols during July 
and August 1922. Given the standard of log book keeping and the paucity of 
reconnaissance reports it is not possible to be definitive about the extent of the air 
operation, either in July or later. The aircraft log books, in many cases, do not identify 
the mission area while flights are not recorded in chronological order. Some entries 
appear to have been written up days in arrears without regard for accuracy in the matter 
of dates. It appears that an unknown, though probably small number of entries, was 
omitted entirely.28 Reconnaissance reports appear not to have been made prior to 16 July, 
while only three are available for that month.
It should be appreciated that in early July 1922 the Military Air Service had only 
two pilots and two observers, and, with the delivery of the second RAF Bristol Fighter 
from Collinstown on 10 July, a total of three aircraft.29 W.J. McSweeney, who had been 
on the Army payroll since April 1922 had, as his observer or navigator, Lieut. Tom Nolan 
who was still of volunteer rank when hurriedly pressed into service on 30 June for the 
delivery flight of BF II. Lieut. Nolan is recorded as being appointed to a ‘commission as
27 M ic ro film  P 7 /B /4 7  (U C D A , M P ).
28 Ib id ; A irc ra f t  lo g  b o o k s , B F  I, B F  II and  B F  III (A C  M u seu m ).
29 L o g  b o o k , B F  III (A C  M u seu m ).
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2nd Lieutenant in the Aviation Section I.R.A.’ by McSweeney on 7 July 1922 ‘subject to 
ratification by the chief of staff. 30 C.F. Russell, the only other pilot, had as his observer 
Staff Captain W. Stapleton who first flew on 10 July 1922.31 Stapleton, who had been a 
member of the garrison at Baldonnell and who had ‘put in a temporary transfer to
32aviation as an observer’ is later recorded as actually joining the Air Service on 11 July. 
Like Nolan, Stapleton appears not to have had any aviation training or qualifications of 
any kind before commencing flying with the Air Service.
The first reconnaissance mission, for which a report survives, took place on 
Sunday 16 July 1922. That afternoon McSweeney and Nolan left Baldonnell at about 
15.00 hours in Bristol Fighter ‘BF III’ to carry out reconnaissance in the Tullow and 
Baltinglas areas, apparently in preparation for an attack by government troops on 
Irregulars that was planned for the following morning. They observed nothing unusual at 
Baltinglass and observed at Tullow that ‘the town was full of men’ but that ‘they were 
only standing around and there appeared to be no activity of a military nature’ They also 
reported that the roads into the town were partially blocked but that there were no sentries 
at these barriers. On route to Newtownbarry (Bunclody, Co. Wexford) the engine of 
McSweeney’s aircraft began to cut out forcing him to turn for home and to use the hand- 
pump to maintain fuel pressure. Eventually the engine failed from fuel starvation 
resulting in a forced landing in a field at Ballycane, Naas, Co. Kildare. Nolan was injured 
during the landing as the aircraft was badly damaged when it hit an open ditch. The 
aircraft was to remain out of service until February 1923.33 A number of significant 
factors may have contributed to this first accident for the Military Air Service. Firstly 
there was the matter of McSweeney’s relative inexperience and lack of recent flying 
practice. Secondly his lack of familiarity with the operation of the systems of the 
particular aircraft type, a type he had not flown during his service with the RAF, put him 
a severe disadvantage, ft appears unlikely that he had had sufficient time to receive 
technical instruction on such matters from the ADC at Croydon earlier that month. Even
30 W .J. M c S w e e n e y  to  V o l. T . N o la n , 7 Ju ly  1922 (M A , P C 1 4 3 ).
31 A irc ra f t  L o g  B o o k , B F  1 (A C  M u seu m ); ‘M ilita ry  A v ia tio n  — P e rs o n n e l’, 22 Ju ly  1922  (U C D A , M P , 
P 7 /B /4 9 /3 7 ).
32 M c S w e e n e y  to  C O G S , 2 4  Ju ly  1922  (M A , A /0 6 8 8 6 ) .
33 M c S w e e n e y  to  A G , 17 Ju ly  1922  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B 4 9 /4 1 );  L o g  b o o k  B F  III (A C  M u seu m ).
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if he had his lack of experience with the fuel system would have told.34 This unfamiliarity 
most likely caused McSweeney to mismanage the somewhat complex fuel system of the 
Bristol Fighter and probably resulted in the fuel starvation that eventually caused the 
accident.35
Subsequent events suggest that air reconnaissance missions, and the intelligence 
they afforded, were already an important aspect of the fight against the irregulars after 
just only one week of such operations. With the reconnaissance mission of 16 July to the 
Wicklow / Carlow / Wexford area not completed C.F. Russell and his observer, Capt. W. 
Stapleton were detailed, probably on a direct order from Collins, to undertake the same 
mission early the following morning. In very poor weather conditions Russell and 
Stapleton took off from Baldonnell at 07.00 hours in an unidentified Bristol Fighter, 
probably BF I. They carried out reconnaissance of the towns of Tullow and Baltinglass in 
particular. On their return to Baldonnell at 08.45 hours Russell reported the presence of 
barricades on the roads to the north and south of Tullow at about 07.40 hours though he 
‘found the town asleep’ saw neither Irregulars nor state troops. When he arrived over 
Baltinglass he found ‘a good number of people about the streets’ and all roads and 
bridges intact. Fie reported that his aircraft had been hit by one of a total of eight shots, 
fired from three separate locations in Baltinglass, but that he was unable to return fire 
because of the poor visibility and mist at 200 feet. Russell’s report was relayed by phone 
to Army Headquarters where it was recorded as being received at 09.15 hours.36 What 
effect this mission, and the information it provided, had on the ground operation against 
the Irregulars of the area is a matter of conjecture but by 22.40 hours that night GHQ had 
issued a press statement to the effect that at 14.00 hours troops had captured Baltinglass 
and that troops now occupy Baltinglass [and] Newtownbarry. Twenty-five men and a
37significant amount of arms and ammunition had also been seized.
34A irc re w  se rv ic e  reco rd , W .J . M c S w e e n e y  (N A , A ir  7 6 /3 2 9 ).
'5 Roval Air Force Training, Part 1, Flying Instruction (A ir  M in is try , 1923), p p  15 8 -1 6 3 .
36 R e c o n n a is sa n c e  re p o rt, 17 Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 7 /6 9 ).
37 Freeman's Journal, 18 Ju ly  1922 .
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Organisation and personnel
By the outbreak of the Civil War on 28 June 1922 there were, in effect, three separate 
organisations, paid off the Army payroll, based at Baldonnell. The aerodrome at 
Baldonnell was actually under the military control of a garrison which had moved in after 
the aerodrome had been taken over by Capt. O’Grady from the departing Irish Flight of 
the RAF at midday on 3 May 1922. The newspaper reports of the matter suggest that the 
initial garrison consisted of troops from Clonskeagh Castle. However the same report 
records, incorrectly, that Baldonnell had been the demobilisation base for the RIC. (The 
major RIC demobilisation process took place at Gonnanston, County Meath) On 28 June 
1922 the garrison numbered about ninety all ranks and its main function and
i o
preoccupation was the security of the Camp.
The Civil Air Service, that had been given Government approval to assume the 
functions of the civil aerodrome authority at Baldonnell, had seven staff members in 
April 1922, including Russell. In addition to its intended task relating to management and 
running of the civil aerodrome Russell’s department was notionally preparing to facilitate 
commercial aviation if and when such activity received government sanction. By 20 July 
the Civil Aviation Department had a total of sixteen personnel, fourteen civilians, 
including ‘Chas. F. Russell, the director of civil aviation and secretary to the Air Council’ 
and two army volunteers. Five of the sixteen had been recruited after the commencement 
of the Civil War. Two engineers were included. Charles J. O’Toole had been employed 
as an aero ground engineer since 14 June 1922 and William J. Guilfoyle, a maintenance 
engineer had been on loan from Irish Lights since 30 April 1922 on the understanding 
that he would be reinstated to his previous position should his services not be 
pennanently required by the civil department or service.39 The most recent member of 
staff, E. Broy, accountant and clerk, had been employed with effect from 19 July at a 
salary of £5 per week while A.J. Russell, brother of C.F. Russell, was being paid one 
pound ten shillings per week as a junior clerk.40 Broy’s employment in the civil
38 R e p o rt to  s ta f f  m ee tin g , 28 Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /4 0 ) .
39‘D e p a rtm e n t o f  C iv il A v ia tio n ’, 20  Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /4 9 /3 8 ).
40 Ib id .
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department was apparently as a result of representation he had made to Collins who in 
turn had arranged employment with the new air service.41
By way of contrast, the Military Air Service, which aspired to be equipped and 
function as the effective military air element of the Army, consisted of only five 
personnel, including ‘Commandant General’ W.J. McSweeney at the end of April and 
had only risen to a total of eight by 28 June. The Civil War was to bring about significant 
though contrasting changes in fortune to the two aviation departments though the 
function of GHQ in these developments would be reactive than rather than proactive. By 
22 July 1922 the strength of the personnel in military aviation had increased by twenty- 
nine to a total of thirty six and included eight civilians.42 Much of this increase can be put 
down to the immediate effect of the general recruitment call of the minister for Defence 
in early July. In the case of Baldonnell the vast bulk of the new volunteers went to the Air 
Service. With continuing recruitment 100 officers and men had joined the Air Service by 
mid-November 1922 by which time the garrison unit, now known as the ‘Air Service 
Infantry’ had reached a similar figure.43
However, on or about 22 July 1922, the civil department ceased to exist for all 
practical purposes. This decision coincided with a review of organisation and personnel 
requested by the minister. On 17 July Richard Mulcahy had written to the Air Service, 
and sent a reminder four days later, requesting a statement of the number of men 
employed in that department plus a diagram indicating the organisation. ‘Will you also let 
me know their ranks, duties, date from which they have been employed and their pay’ 
and ‘let me have the same particulars regarding the men employed in Civil Aviation 
under Russell’.44 McSweeney had Russell supply the required details of the sixteen 
personnel of his department and subsequently forwarded nominal rolls of the two air 
elements indicating, in the cases of almost all, the effective date, type of employment and 
weekly rates of pay. (Appendix 4) The nominal roll of McSweeney’s thirty-five 
subordinates in the military department included five officers, twenty-two NCOs and 
Men as well as eight civilians. The names of five volunteers, posted to the unit on the 22
41 O f f ic e r ’s p e rso n a l f ile  (M A , S D R  169).
42 ‘M ilita ry  A v ia tio n  -  p e rs o n n e l’, 22 Ju ly  1922  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B 4 9 /3 8 ).
43 B a ld o n n e ll re tu rn , 12/13 N o v . 1922  (M A , A rm y  c en su s)
44 ‘A v ia tio n ’, M F D  to  C o m d t. G e n e ra l M c S w ee n ey , 17 Ju ly ; 21 Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B 4 9 /4 3 -4 4 ) .
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July, had been appended in manuscript. McSweeney also forwarded a covering letter that 
confirmed the amalgamation of the civil and military aviation resources at Baldonnell:
During the present hostilities, Civil and Military Aviation have been combined and 
the various Civil and Military Departments are working together as one unit , all 
under military control with the Director [of Civil Aviation] as 2nd in command. The 
duties are divided into 7 details;
Discipline.
Aeroplane repair and maintenance.
Electric power and water supply and sewage.
Buildings, repairs and technical stores.
Aerodrome labourers (carpenters, labourers etc.)
Quartermaster Stores. 45
McSweeney explained that while ‘each department was under a responsible man’ the 
organisation was ‘only at an embryonic stage of development’. He stated that the 
attaining of maximum efficiency depended on the sanction for increased pay for qualified 
mechanics, the supply of more aeroplanes and new transport, all of which he had 
previously requested. While the Military Air Service had no transport of its own its 
transport depot was maintaining the transport on charge to the garrison.46 He also 
forwarded a copy of a newly drafted ‘Standing Orders’ that detailed the daily routine to 
be observed by all military personnel, as well as standard practices and safety precautions 
to be observed by military and civilian alike, in the hangars and workshops.
While the bulk of the civil department employees merely transferred to the 
military payroll as civilians a small number, including C.F. Russell and his brother 
Arthur, joined the Military Air Service.47 On 19 July, McSweeney had already requested 
the chief of staff to ‘please sanction’ the appointment of ‘Capt. C.F. Russell, director of 
civil aviation’ to ‘the rank of commandant’. 48 Eamonn Broy also made the transfer from
45 D M A  to  M F D , 22  Ju ly  1922  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /4 9 /3 6 ).
46 Ib id .
47 B a ld o n n e l re tu rn , 12/13 N o v . 1922 (M A , A rm y  cen su s).
48 W .J. M c S w e e n e y  to  C O S , 19 Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /4 9 /3 4 ) .
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civilian to military. In light of his DMP background and his distinguished record in 
republican intelligence during the War of Independence his employment, initially in civil 
aviation, and later in military, might appear unusual. However he appears to have had a 
certain interest in aviation from at least October 1921 when he was in London with 
Collins and had been on the periphery of events associated with the purchase of aircraft at 
that time. It may well have been Broy who typed the Dalton / Russell report of 21 
October 1921 informing GHQ about the purchase of aircraft. As a result of research 
carried out by the late Colonel Billy Keane in the 1950s we know that Broy, on 28 
October 1921, had purchased a book entitled The German Air Force in the Great War 
and, much later, a German Air Force Handbook for the year 193 6.49 While Eamonn 
Broy’s level of interest in, and knowledge of, aviation, may be a matter of conjecture it 
appears that his drift towards civil aviation, in the first instance, and later into military 
aviation, may more correctly have been a drift away from intelligence work. A 
compelling reason for Broy’s change of career is recorded on his military personal file in 
Military Archives:
Broy was in Oriel House up to some time in April 1922, when he left as a result of 
a disagreement with Tobin, who was at that time in charge of Oriel House. He later 
joined the Army, sometime in July or August 1922 I believe.50
While Broy had been employed in the Civil Air Service from 19 July 1922 ten days later 
he was given the commissioned rank of commandant and appointed adjutant, Air Service 
by order of Michael Collins and subsequently functioned as second-in-command to the 
director of military aviation until May 1923, apparently with considerable dedication to 
the Air Service and loyalty to General McSweeney.51 The suggestion, by Padraic 
O’Farrell, that Eamonn Broy adopted an anti-Treaty stance during the Civil War is quite 
erroneous.52
49 T h e se  b o o k s w ere  p re sen te d  by  B ro y  to  th e  O ff ic e rs ’ M ess , B a ld o n n e ll in th e  early  1950s. T h e  f ly le a f  o f  
th e  e a rlie r  b o o k  w as a n n o ta ted  ‘E . O ’B ro ite , 15 C ad o g an  G d n s ., S lo an  S q r. 28 /X /1921
50 U n s ig n e d  f ile  m em o , 13 N o v . 1925 (M A , S D R  169).
51 O ff ic e r ’s h is to ry  sh ee t (M A , S D R  169).
52 P a d ra ic  O ’F a rre ll, Who’s who in the Irish war of independence and civil war 1916 — 1923 (D u b lin , 
1997), p. 145.
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Two days after announcing the amalgamation of the civil and military aviation 
resources at Baldonnell McSweeney made a submission to the Chief of General Staff in 
tenns that suggest that he considered that he had command of all army elements at 
Baldonnell, including the garrison, with himself holding the appointments of both DMA 
and station commander. His submission in relation to the garrison was imprecise but 
suggested the unit’s strength to be in the region of 100 all ranks including five officers 
and sixteen NCOs but that the personnel were liable to be posted elsewhere, for civil war 
action, without being replaced. Indicating that a barrack staff of thirty men, a daily guard 
of twenty one men and a weekly emergency guard of twenty-one men could not be 
maintained from existing resources, he recommended that the garrison be increased to 
250 men, or 2 companies and a barrack staff of 50. He considered that ‘the ratification of 
the following appointments will effect a considerable improvement in organisation. He 
recommended ‘S/Capt. Conry to be permanent camp O.C.’ and ‘2/ Lt. Wilson to be 
pennanent camp adjutant with the rank of captain’. He also made recommendations for 
the posting of officers to various appointments including his own as station commander, 
apparently in addition to director of military aviation.53 The inference in McSweeney’s 
submission regarding the command of the various elements at Baldonnell did not escape 
the notice of chief of general staff, Richard Mulcahy, though his instructions to Emmet 
Dalton, now GOC 1st. Eastern District, were brief and somewhat ambiguous. Mulcahy 
directed Dalton to make arrangements, sooner rather than later, ‘to bring the Garrison at 
Baldonnell up to the numbers necessary to cany out garrison duties.’ In a manuscript 
postscript to the note he indicated that ‘the division of authority and responsibility 
between McSweeney and OC Garrison require clear definition and understanding’.54 The 
inference in this direction is that Mulcahy considered the Air Service and the garrison to 
be of equal status under officers of similar standing. Dalton confirmed that he would 
increase the numbers in the garrison up to 100 (plus 50 of a barrack staff) and that he was 
‘also arranging the division of responsibility.’55 However there is no evidence, then or 
subsequently, that Dalton issued any directive clarifying the matter of command.
53 W .J . M c S w e e n e y  to  C O G S , 24  Ju ly  1922 (M A , A /0 6 8 8 6 ).
54C O S  to  G en era l D a lto n , 2 4  Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /4 9 /2 5 ).
55 J.E . D a lto n  to  C O S , 26 Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /4 9 /2 4 ).
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At this early juncture in the formation of the Air Service it appears that the 
infantry and air personnel had already divided along cultural lines undermining whatever 
authority McSweeney may have considered he had over the garrison on the basis of his 
rank. When an unknown GHQ officer visited the aerodrome on 30 July 1922 he recorded 
that he had met Commandant Russell and ‘visited both camps, lower camp and upper 
camp generally speaking careless, number of men at present much too small for effective 
care and control’. While he observed that ‘it is proposed to put the entire air 
establishment under army control’ -  something that had in fact been done a week earlier 
-  he made no reference to the command status of the various formations at Baldonnell.56 
A further indication of the apparent divide was the existence, in August 1922, of two 
guard rooms as well as separate sleeping quarters and officers’ messes for infantry and air 
personnel.57 That Dalton failed to act on the matter of the division of authority and 
responsibility can be inferred from a later communication that listed the various aspects 
of command and control which, at that late stage, still remained to be clarified.58 The 
failure of GHQ to approve a formal establislrment and to clarify the command status of 
the Air Service was to leave McSweeney in a nebulous position, in effect, up to his 
eventual dismissal in March 1924. It is also noted that Dalton also failed to increase 
garrison numbers before he was transferred south to Cork in early August. By the time of 
the Army census in November 1922 the total of the combined garrison and barrack staff 
was still only about 100.
Reconnaissance missions in Munster
Before the end of July the general line of contact between the Army and the Irregulars 
had cleared south Leinster as the latter group retreated southwards and westwards with 
the hostilities becoming somewhat concentrated in Munster.59 The radius of action of a 
Bristol Fighter operating from Baldonnell, as the RAF had found previously, extended
’6 U n s ig n e d  re p o rt, ‘V isit to B a ld o n n e ll’, 30  Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /2 8 ).
37 U n s ig n e d , u n d a te d  m em o, ‘T e le p h o n e s  at B a ld o n n e ll’, c irca  A u g u s t, 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /7 ) .
58 U n s ig n e d , u n d a ted  m em o, ‘S ta tu s  o f  A ir  S e rv ic e ’, w ith  co v e rin g  le tte r C O G S  to  C -in -C , 24  Jan . 1923 
(M A , A /0 8 0 7 5 ).
59 D u g g a n , Irish army, pp  89-91.
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only as far as Fermoy.60 As a result aerial patrols became less practical and productive 
due to the constraints of aircraft range and endurance. The report by Russell and 
Stapleton on their ‘reconnaissance and propaganda-dropping flight’ of 22 July illustrated 
the difficulty. Having been directed to drop newspapers in addition to carrying out 
reconnaissance Russell reported successfully distributing ‘600 copies of the Weekly 
Freeman’s Journal (War Edition) and 9,000 copies of An tOglach (War Special)’ among 
the main towns of the county of Kilkenny. However, having insufficient endurance over 
the operational area to pursue the required reconnaissance objectives he had to curtail the 
flight though he did report that one of the bridges in Clonmel had been blown up.61 
While, according to a garbled report recorded in GHQ, a propaganda-dropping mission 
was flown into County Tipperary on the 2 August 1922 the military situation on the 
ground would require that aircraft be operated from airfields further south and eventually 
be based closer to the ground action. On 4 August Michael Collins recorded a brief note 
in relation to the ‘Air Services’:
Interviewed Commandant Russell, 4th August, 11 am, arranged that as soon as 
practicable reconnaissance will be made of Youghal and Cork. This will be carried 
out probably from Waterford. The Waterford station is in the process of being 
fixed.62
This requirement was apparently already known to McSweeney who had gone down to 
Kilkenny by road on 29 July and, with Comdt. General Prout, had picked out two landing 
grounds. He considered that one of the grounds, which had been used by the British 
during the War of Independence, was only safe for landing ‘in the directions NW & SE’. 
He picked a second field six hundred yards away ‘for landing in the directions NE & 
SW’. The location of this former RAF ground was not specified but was most likely one 
of only three British landing grounds in county Kilkenny designated for use during the 
earlier hostilities. He also visited Waterford and inspected and approved a landing ground
60 U n d a ted  m ap , ‘R A F  in I re la n d ’ (N A , A ir  8 /49).
61 ‘R e p o rt o f  re c o n n a is sa n c e  and p ro p a g a n d a -d ro p p in g  f l ig h t’, C ap t. C .F . R u sse ll  to  G H Q , 22 Ju ly  1922 
(U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 7 /138).
62 M . C o llin s  f ile  m em o , 4 A ug . 192 2  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /2 9 ).
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at an unspecified race course -  presumably that at Tramore, about seven miles south of 
the city.63 McSweeney prepared detailed instructions for the use of the forward ‘aero 
bases’ for the guidance of the troops that would have to support Air Service use of the 
selected fields. His instructions included provision for security, marking the landing 
grounds and the cutting of meadow grass to allow aircraft to operate. In particular he 
detailed the arrangements for the availability of fuel and oil that the Air Service would 
supply and forward to Kilkenny military barracks in advance of any mission involving 
either of the Kilkenny landing grounds.64
As McSweeney had departed for London on 30 July to purchase more aircraft it 
fell to Russell and Stapleton to carry out the reconnaissance mission to the Cork and 
Youghal area, though, for reasons that are not clear this did not get under way until 7 
August. On 6 August the Air Service confirmed to Collins that ‘arrangements have been 
made for the establishment of operational bases at Kilkenny and Waterford’ confirming 
that base kits of petrol and oil supplies had been dispatched and had been received at both 
locations.65 The log book for BF I indicates that Russell and Stapleton left Baldonnell at 
11.35 hours on 7 August 1922 to commence the mission to Cork with had four specific 
objectives. The main task was to meet the Cork commander and inform him that various 
requisites were being dispatched from Dublin. Russell was also to carry out 
reconnaissance of the whole area, give armed support to ground troops where required 
and distribute copies of a special air edition of An tOglach.66
With McSweeney and Russell away from base Commandant Eamonn Broy was in 
charge at Baldonnell and was keeping GHQ informed as to the positions, as he knew 
them, with regard to the Cork mission and McSweeney’s trip to London. On 9 August 
Broy reported to GHQ that he had been unable to communicate with Kilkenny or 
Waterford by telephone or by wireless since the aircraft had left. ‘I therefore had a private 
motor car commandeered yesterday and sent Lt. Nolan and a man in mufti to get through 
to Kilkenny and Waterford’. Having left Baldonnell at 20.45 hours on 8 August Lt. Nolan 
made contact with Russell in Waterford at 05.45 hours on the 9 August. Russell reported
63 W .J. M c S w ee n ey  to  G H Q , 30 Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /1 0 /3 3 ).
64‘A ero  B a se s ’, W .J. M c S w ee n ey  to  C -in -C , 30  Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /3 4 ) .
65 A S  to M . C o llin s , 6 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /2 6 ).
66 ‘A eria l re co n n a is sa n ce  re p o r t’, C . F . R u sse ll to  G H Q , 10 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B 1 0 /1 3 -1 4 ).
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that ‘they had made a successful landing at Kilkenny and Waterford’ on the 7 August. 
Russell later reported to Broy that he had tried to send a message to Collins to the effect 
that he had not been able to fly on the 8 August due to the fact that it had been raining all 
day.67 The actual reconnaissance of Youghal and Cork apparently took place on 9 August 
though neither the aircraft log book nor Russell’s report of the 10 August 1922 make this 
adequately clear. The reconnaissance mission coincided with the ship-borne attack by 
Government troops on Cork and environs.68 It was a relatively short mission, leaving 
Waterford at 16.10 hours returning by 18.10 hours. Russell subsequently reported that 
‘the message was delivered to the C.O. at his H.Q., Rochestown’. He also stated that 
Thomastown was very quiet while Youghal was similar with Free State troops moving 
freely about the town. He observed that two ships were tied up at Passage West and, 
while a few troops were about, there was no fighting and that civilians were moving 
freely through the streets. His report on Cork suggests that he had arrived over the city at 
or close to the termination of the military operation that had cleared the irregulars from 
the area.
One would imagine to see Cork city from the air that the whole town was 
enveloped in flames. Closer examination revealed the fact that all barracks, police 
and military, were on fire. Also what appeared to be a private house, half a mile 
north of Victoria Barracks. Victoria Barracks was, in spite of smoke and flame, a 
scene of great activity. Large numbers of men were moving about in a very excited
69manner.
Russell reported that a total of 4,000 copies of An tOglach had been dropped over 
Youghal and Cork City and that while no opportunity had presented itself to use machine 
gun fire in cooperation with friendly troops he had returned lire after coming under attack
70at Midleton on the return journey to Waterford.
67‘A eria l action  at W a te r fo rd ’, E. B ro y  to  M . C o llin s , 9 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /21).
68 H o p k in so n , Green against green, pp  162-64.
69 ‘A eria l re co n n a is sa n ce  re p o r t’, C. F . R u sse ll to  G H Q , 10 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /1 3 ) .
70 Ib id .
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After the taking of Cork Collins concentrated aerial reconnaissance on the general 
area of the counties of Limerick, Tipperary and Cork with some missions coinciding with 
his own visit to the area. Russell and Stapleton had been due to go to the Limerick area 
on 12 August but were again delayed by bad weather.71 At noon the following day 
Russell received a cipher message from Collin indicating that he should report to 
Limerick Junction at any time after eleven’ and that all arrangements, including a car, 
were in place.72 After some difficulty with damaged telephone lines Broy replied, at 
14.50 hours, to the effect that the aircraft had left at 13.00 hours for Limerick Junction.73 
It is not at all clear whether Russell landed at Limerick Junction or not. However it 
appears that he did land at the Fair Green in Limerick on 13 August in BF 1 and operated 
from there on 13 and 14 August. Later on the first afternoon Russell carried out a patrol 
of a large part of north Cork. He subsequently reported that the railway bridges at Mallow 
and near Buttevant had been observed to have been blown up while the latter was still 
burning fiercely. He also reported that three small road bridges near Buttevant had been 
destroyed and that his aircraft had come under heavy fire from a machine gun post a half 
mile north of Mallow.74 On the morning of 14 August Russell patrolled the areas of 
Bansha, Ballylanders and Kilfinnane in Tipperary and reported little of interest other than 
being shot at from Ballylanders.75 In the afternoon he patrolled Charleville, Buttevant and 
Liscarroll in the county of Cork, subsequently reporting having observed only Free State
76troops in Charleville and having twenty shots fired at the aircraft in Buttevant.
Some technical aspects relating to the operation from Limerick give rise to a 
degree of ambiguity. In preparation for the Limerick operations the Air Service had to 
have fuel and oil dispatched to Limerick, but still having no indigenous road transport, 
apparently arranged for the convoy bringing Collins southwards to convey the necessary 
supplies. For Collins’ journey it had been suggested that ‘only the best cars’ were 
required.77 For reasons associated with the transport arranged for Collins’ journey of 12
71 C o p y  c ip h e r  m essag e , 12 A u g . 1922 (B ro y  p r iv a te  p a p e rs , in p o sse s s io n  o f  M s. A in e  B ro y ).
72 Ib id , 13 A u g . 1922.
73 Ib id , 13 A ug. 1922.
74 ‘A eria l re co n n a is sa n ce  re p o rt’, 13 A u g . 1922  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /3 9 /2 1 ) .
73 ‘A eria l re co n n a is sa n ce  re p o rt’, 14 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /3 9 /1 7 ) .
76 ‘A eria l re co n n a is sa n ce  re p o rt’, 14 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /3 9 /1 6 ) .
77 U n s ig n e d ,u n d a ted  m em o  re  ‘T ra n s p o rt d e ta i l ’ (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /3 /7 3 ) .
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August the aviation fuel supplies did not reach their destination. The matter is explained 
by a letter of complaint from Collins and directed at the QMG:
I have to report to you that on Saturday morning, 12th Inst., there paraded as 
follows; one touring car, one Crossley tender, one Lancia car. The Lancia went at 
fire at Naas, was restarted, had difficulty getting to Roscrea. Near Roscrea the 
Crossley ran out of petrol -  no spare petrol in any of the cars - and both the tender 
and Lancia would, therefore, have been left on the road were it not for a supply of 
aviation spirit which was being taken, at the request of the Air Service, to
no
Limerick.
Aviation folklore suggests that, as a result of not having aviation fuel at Limerick, 
Russell’s aircraft was supplied with motor petrol and that engine failure, a forced landing 
and damage to the undercarriage ensued. Indeed Collins’ own diaiy and other records of 
the time suggest that the aircraft sustained a certain level of damage, most likely on 
Sunday 13 August. At 10.43 hours on 14 August Comdt. Broy received a wireless 
message, via ‘O/C Troops Limerick’ and Portobello Barracks, requesting the dispatch of 
‘10 hrs.[worth of] petrol and oil immediately, also spare wheel and two mechanics for 
duty here: send direct to Limerick City’.79 Within the hour Broy had confirmed that 
Russell’s requirements had been dispatched at 11.30 hours. While it is not clear how 
and where Broy acquired the necessary transport at such short notice it is probable that he 
negotiated the use of a vehicle on charge to the Baldonnell garrison. On the following day 
Collins made a cryptic note in his diary confirming that the ‘aeroplane wheel and stmt 
smashed. Mechanics arrived for repairing on Monday 14th’ at about midnight and that he 
had visited the Fair Green at 11.30 hours on Tuesday to find that the work had not 
started.81
While all the indications are to the effect that Russell’s aircraft had sustained, at 
some time on Sunday 13 August 1922 or early on the Monday morning, a level of
78 ‘T ra n s p o rt’, M . C o llin s  to  Q M G , 17 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /3 /4 0 ) .
79 W ire le ss  m essag e , R u sse ll to  B ro y , 14 A u g . 1922 , B ro y  p r iv a te  p a p e r  ( in  p o ss e s s io n  o f  M s A in e  B ro y ).
80C o p y  w ire le ss  m essag e , B ro y  to  O /C  T ro o p s , 14 A u g . 1922 , B ro y  p r iv a te  p a p e rs  (in  p o sse s s io n  o f  M s. 
A in e  B roy .
81 C o llin s  d iary , 15 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P a /6 2 .)
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damage that might have precluded it being flown the reconnaissance reports indicate that 
one mission had been flow on Sunday afternoon and a further two on Monday 14 August. 
While the circumstances appear contradictory it must be assumed that the damage, while 
requiring a replacement wheel, was not sufficient to render the aircraft totally 
unserviceable. The fact that the repair work had not been initiated on the Monday 
afternoon and completed by Tuesday morning would tend to confirm this supposition. A 
more complete understanding of the matter is hindered by the fact that the aircraft log 
book (BF I) not only fails to record the reconnaissance flights of the 13 and 14 August 
but also contains no reference to repairs to the undercarriage of the aircraft about that 
time. However the completion of other repairs, carried out during August / September 
1922, appear to be recorded twice.82
Modest expansion and support services
At the general staff meeting of Friday 28 July 1922 Michael Collins reported on the 
‘position with regard to the air force’ based on a meeting he had with McSweeney and 
Russell earlier that day. He announced his decision to approve the purchase of two SE 
5A aircraft which he noted had a range of 200 miles and were fitted with two Vickers and 
one Lewis guns each as well as bomb racks. He indicated that ‘these will be wired for this
or
evening and one way or another will be across [here] on Monday evenings’. While 
Collins gave no rationale for the decision to purchase aircraft it was probably due to the 
poor serviceability of the existing machines and to the fact that two new pilots, 
Lieutenants F.S. Crossley and T.J. Maloney, had recently been appointed.84 Despite the 
tone of his briefing to the General Staff, that indicated a considerable degree of urgency, 
the objective of having two new aircraft delivered by the following Monday evening was 
to prove very optimistic.
McSweeney and Russell had apparently used their meeting with Collins to bring 
up matters of concern on which they hoped he could be of assistance. While Collins 
subsequently took up in writing several aspects of the support services required by
82 L o g  b o o k , B F  I, pp  11- 12 (A C  M u seu m ).
S3 ‘P o s itio n  w ith  re g ard  to  th e  a ir fo rc e ’, C o llin s  to  G e n e ra l S ta ff , 28  Ju ly  1 9 2 2  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /3 3 ) .
84 B a ld o n n e ll re tu rn , 12/13 N o v . 1922 , (M A , A rm y  c e n su s) .
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military aviation he noted in particular two subjects for mention at the general staff 
meeting. He informed the meeting, for the particular attention of the QMG, that the Air 
Service required 20,000 rounds of selected aerial ammunition and 2,000 rounds of tracer 
rounds as well as a Crossley tender and a three ton lorry. On the matter of special aerial 
ammunition for the Air Services Collins subsequently wrote to the QMG reminding him 
that he (the QMG) on 28 July had taken ‘certain notes for the above, namely 20,000 
rounds of selected aerial ammunition’ and 2,000 tracer bullets in addition’ and inquired 
as to whether he had received delivery yet. Collins emphasised that he was informed by 
Russell that aircraft guns were jamming after only five, ten or fifteen rounds while using 
ammunition intended for infantry weapons.85
In the first two weeks of August, while Russell and Stapleton were carrying out 
such reconnaissance flights as the weather would allow McSweeney was in London 
acquiring the aircraft recently approved by Collins. He left for London on 30 July, 
remained there for eight days that included certain delays, and completed the purchase of 
a Martinsyde F.4 ( Scout / Buzzard) and a S.E. 5A -  not two S.E. 5A aircraft as indicated 
by Collins. Due to the urgency indicated by Collins McSweeney endeavoured to keep 
him informed at every stage. On Wednesday 2 August, writing from the Imperial Hotel, 
Russell Square, he informed Collins that he intended inspecting the aircraft on the 
following day with a view to carrying out test flights on the Friday and leaving for home 
the same day.86 However on Monday 7 August McSweeney again reported to Collins 
indicating that, while the aircraft were to have been ready for delivery on Friday 4 August 
one had a leaking radiator and that he had found the guns to be out of order on the other. 
As a result the aircraft were not ready until 17.00 hours on Saturday. The departure was 
further delayed by bad weather and the Bank Holiday.87
Eventually the two aircraft, the S.E.5A being flown by McSweeney, and the 
Martinsyde F.4 by a Mr. Perry, left Waddon on Tuesday, 8 August routing to Shotwick in 
Chester. On route the aircraft ran into a thunderstorm -  the same or similar weather to 
that being experience by Russell on his mission to Cork about the same time. Writing 
from the Lamb Hotel, Nantwich on the following day McSweeney reported that ‘the rain
85 C -in -C  to  Q M G , 10 A ug . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /3 /7 3 ) .
86 M c S w ee n ey  to  C o llin s , 2 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /1 0 /2 7 ) .
87 M c S w e e n e y  to  C o llin s , 7 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /2 3 ) .
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tore the fabric off one blade of my propeller and owing to the vibration and running out 
of petrol I had to make a forced landing in the nearest field’ near Nantwich, Cheshire. 
The context suggests that it is more likely that the damage was caused by hailstones 
rather than by rain. The second aircraft, in a similar condition, had landed four miles
away. He indicated that he had made arrangements to have new propellers fitted,
88hopefully by 10 August, with the intention of reaching Baldonnell the same day. 
Having first engaged the services of six men to picket and cover the two aircraft 
McSweeney verbally contracted the services of L.B. Fitch and an assistant to effect the 
replacement of the propellers. These two men stayed with the aircraft, day and night and 
completed the repairs on 10 August after which the two machines were flown to 
Shotwick. There the S.E. 5A was found to be unserviceable and, after a further delay of 
five days that is not explained, the Martinsyde was flown to Baldonnell by Perry on 15 
August while McSweeney had returned by the mail boat on 14 August.89 The SE 5 A was 
eventually delivered in early September.90 In effect the urgently required delivery of two 
aircraft had, due to technical and weather difficulties, taken about five weeks. The 
technical difficulties did not end there. Within days the SE 5A was lost. On 8 September 
1922 the machine was being flown to Limerick by Lieut. F.S. Crosseley when he got lost 
in low cloud in north east Cork. He reported that the engine lost oil pressure due to the 
failure of the big end bearing and that he had made a forced landing in the vicinity of 
Macroom. The aircraft was subsequently burned by Irregulars.91
The next, and final, consultation with McSweeney and Russell was to result in 
Collins making policy decisions regarding aircraft, personnel and operations support 
services required by military aviation. These decisions and actions were to have major 
ramifications for the future of the air operation and, eventually, for the survival of the 
nascent air organisation itself. With Collins and Russell returning from the Munster area 
and McSweeney back from London a meeting was arranged for Baldonnell at 22.30
88W .J. M cS w een ey  to  C o llin s , 9 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /1 8 ) .
89 ‘E x p e n se s  o f  M a jo r  G en era l M c S w e e n e y  d u r in g  y e a r  1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 3 ’, c irc a  1 N o v . 19 2 3 , (M A , A C /2 /2 /1 ) ;  
A irc ra f t log book, M a rtin sy d e  S c o u t M S  I, A ir C o rp s  M u se u m .
90 A n th o n y  P. K e a rn s , ‘T h e  Irish  A ir  C o rp s ; a h is to ry ’ in Scale aircraft modelling, V o l. 3, N o . 10 (Ju ly  
1981), p. 449 .
91 W ire le ss  m essag e ; C ro ss le y  to  M c S w e e n e y , 8 S ep t. 1922 ; R u sse ll to  M c S w e e n e y , 11 S ep t. 1922 
(U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /4 8 /1 3 4 ; / 1 19)
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hours on 15 August 1922.92 Earlier that day McSweeney had carried out a 
reconnaissance mission in the Dundalk area. This apparently was the only such mission 
north of Dublin and apparently the first by McSweeney since his accident on 16 July.93
Collins, in summarising the major decisions taken at the meeting recorded that 
‘we discussed the question of air services generally and came to the conclusion that it is 
essential that we order a flight of, say S.E. fives [sic], also two Avro [504k]s and a spare 
engine for an Avro [504K]’ - for which McSweeney was to submit an estimate of costs. 
He also approved the decision that ‘up to six pilots are to be taken on immediately’ 
stating that ‘these will be admitted on approval and if not satisfactory will be dispensed 
with at once’. The third major decision authorised the occupation of an air base in 
Munster. Arrangements were made for Russell to fly to Limerick and on to Fermoy to 
report on the condition of the ex-RAF aerodrome there. If Fermoy was found to be 
satisfactory Collins wanted McSweeney to fly down a second aircraft while ‘if the 
condition [was] not satisfactory the Board of Works would be requested to provide some 
temporary covering’. The ultimate intention was to conduct air operations from a base 
such as Fermoy as the ground war was well outside the range of aircraft operating from 
Baldonnell. A lesser concern to Collins ‘was in regard to the fact that a previous decision, 
to have pilots paid two and a half times the rate of pay appropriate to ‘ordinary 
volunteers’, had not been acted upon.94
McSweeney and Russell apparently used the occasion to renew their 
representations regarding such matters as communications, ordnance, transport and 
meteorology though actions already initiated by Collins, mainly referring such matters to 
GHQ staff, would suggest that they were pushing an open door. On 17 August 1922 he 
wrote to the QMG on the matter of a ‘car for Baldonnel aerodrome’ pointing out that the 
‘old ford’ was not reliable enough to bring reconnaissance reports in to GHQ after flights 
and requested that arrangements be made to ‘exchange it for some really reliable 
serviceable car’.95 In the absence of a wireless, and satisfactory road transport, the 
telephone was the only means of communication available to the Air Service. While
92 P e rso n a l n o tes , M . C o llin s , 16 A u g . 1922  (U C D A , M P , P 7 a /6 2 ).
93 P h o n e  m essag e , M c S w e e n e y  to  G H Q , 15 A u g . 1922; U n d a te d  p ilo t re p o rts  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 7 /3 1 4 ; 
/3 3 1 ).
94 ‘M e m o  o f  in te rv ie w ’, M . C o llin s , 16 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /1 0 /1 1).
95 C o llin s  to Q M G , 17 A u g . 1922  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /3 /4 2 ) .
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Collins noted the matter of ‘aerodrome -  air communications’ it is not known if he made 
any firm direction on the matter of a wireless for Baldonnel.96 He had earlier contacted 
the postmaster general with regard to the ‘telephones at Baldonnel Aerodrome’ claiming 
that it was difficult to be heard on a defective system which he described as being 
extremely unsatisfactory.97 The system was reported to be under repair on or about 21 
August and was expected to be restored to service before the end of the month.98
Indicating the continuing urgency of the matter of aviation ammunition Collins 
sent the QMG a second reminder, eight days after the previous, asking curtly ‘I should 
like to know if anything has yet been done about the matter’.99 The QMG eventually 
replied on 22 August 1922 and begged to inform Collins that he had ‘succeeded in 
procuring 4,800 rounds of special ammunition’ which he understood was all that was 
available at the time. The response was too late to receive the Collins’ attention and the 
related subject of the supply of bombs would later be taken up by McSweeney with 
Richard Mulcahy who replaced Collins as commander-in-chief.
While Collins’ involvement in the matter is not totally clear, problems relating to 
meteorology were the subject of notes between GHQ, the Air Service and the Department 
of Agriculture. The basic problem probably related to the absence of meteorological 
forecasts for aviation purposes. In the context of Air Ministry’s continued responsibility 
for the management of the country’s meteorological stations, any short-term solution 
would do little to improve the situation. On 10 August the Department of Agriculture, 
replying to Collins’ minute of the previous day, reported to him that it had arranged for 
the ‘ Meteorological Office of the Ordnance Office’ to supply observations of ‘barometer, 
rain, sunshine, approximate wind speed and direction, humidity, atmospheric temperature 
and fog’ at 10.00 hours each morning. The Air Service at Baldonnell did not take 
observations and, even if it did, it had no expertise to generate forecasts. In the 
circumstances, the availability of the observations recorded in the Phoenix Park would 
have been of little benefit.
%C o llin s  n o te s , 17 A u g . 192 2  (U C D A , M P , P 7 a /6 2 ).
97 C -in -C  to  P o s tm a s te r  G e n e ra l, 10 A u g . 1922  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /6 ).
98 E . B ro y  to  P o s tm a s te r  G e n e ra l, 21 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /1 0 /5 ) .
99 C o llin s  to  Q M G , 18 A u g . 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /3 /3 4 ).
7 9
Conclusions
While recruitment for Russell’s Civil Air Service continued after the start of hostilities 
the onset of war eventually caused the administration, through the foresight and initiative 
of Collins, to concern itself more with military aviation. While the initial authorisation to 
purchase aircraft indicated air reconnaissance as the preferred role Collins did not rule 
out bombing and other armed roles and actively supported the Air Service in procuring 
ammunition. By any objective yardstick the output for the period 6 July to 22 August 
1922, in terms of the number missions flown, was very modest, amounting to about one 
mission every other day. The question arises as to how timely and valuable the air 
intelligence became in the overall context of the Civil War. In the absence of evidence 
that such evaluation was conducted at the time inferences must be drawn from the 
manner in which Collins used aircraft and endeavoured to extend their use. Many factors 
conspired to frustrate Collins’ intent. Not least of these was what must have been seen as 
inordinate delay in actually procuring aircraft. Equally it could be said that he might have 
bought more aircraft earlier and, also earlier, hired more ex-RAF pilots. An underlying 
prejudice, amongst Collins’ army subordinates, towards Ex British servicemen was 
probably a major factor.
Given the limitations in aircraft and pilot numbers and the effect of adverse 
weather, the intelligence gathered, while it might have been timely in individual 
instances, may not have indicated Irregular activity over a sufficiently large area. Due to 
the localised nature of the ground operations and centralised manner in which air patrols 
had to be directed and reported it is generally impossible to associate particular air patrols 
with specific military actions. Notwithstanding it is considered that very early in the 
reconnaissance regime the value of air patrols was realised. This is mainly demonstrated 
by the fact that the aborted patrol to the Wicklow / Wexford area on 16 July 1922 had to 
be completed early the following morning in preparation for an operation by Free State 
troops planned for that day. Similarly Collins saw the necessity for an extended patrol 
into Waterford and Cork in early August 1922. This air patrol was given four specific 
tasks that demonstrated the flexibility of such patrols though in this particular instance 
circumstances appear to have delayed the mounting of the operation until the Free State
8 0
action in Cork was well under way while meteorological conditions affected its conduct 
and reduced its effectiveness.
Despite the relatively low level of air patrolling and an apparently modest return it 
is considered that Collins saw the potential of an expanded Air Service to contribute to 
the support of the army in its pursuit of the Irregulars as they undertook guerrilla style 
operations in the wider Munster area. The value Collins put an air reconnaissance can be 
gauged from the level of his support for better support services such as meteorology, 
communications, ordnance and transport and his eventual approval for a significant 
increase in both pilot and aircraft numbers. The increase in pilot numbers along with a 
substantial investment in aircraft and the associated move to a forward base such as 
Fermoy would represent a considerable increase in the air capability. However the 
change in leadership after Collins’ death was to negate much of this potential due to the 
length of time taken to recruit pilots, to purchase additional aircraft and to effect the 
move to Fermoy.
While Michael Collins was the superior authority in such matters as personnel and 
aircraft purchase and also directed the conduct of aerial reconnaissance, the air effort 
during July and August was conducted by a veritable triumvirate -  Collins, McSweeney 
and Russell. Under Collins’ overall direction McSweeney was very much occupied with 
administrative and organisational matters and the purchase of the required aircraft while 
Russell did the bulk of the flying and possibly interfaced with Collins to a greater extent 
than McSweeney. Notwithstanding McSweeney’s relative inexperience, and his 
nebulous position in the Army command structure, air reconnaissance assumed an 
important but limited role during July and August 1922 due no doubt to Collins’ direction 
and sponsorship. With Collins’ untimely demise and despite increased numbers of 
aircraft and pilots the positions and roles of Russell and Me Sweeney in the overall 
scheme of things were to alter significantly.
81
CHAPTER 4
FROM CIVIL WAR TO ARMY MUTINY
In the nine week period between the decision, on 20 June, to purchase the first 
reconnaissance aircraft, and the death of the Michael Collins on 22 August 1922, a very 
informal Military Air Service had been formed under the overall aegis of the regular 
National Army that was still evolving from its guerrilla roots. The Air Service of 22 
August 1922 had a total of nine officers but only four (ex-RAF) pilots, two of whom had 
not yet seen operational service. The technical staff consisted of thirty-one NCOs and 
men of uncertain technical experience and expertise. The service had been so organised 
as to support the operation of aircraft in an armed reconnaissance role in support of 
ground troops against the anti-treaty Irregulars. While under the military command of W. 
J. McSweeney the air element had been subject to the close supervision and operational 
control of Michael Collins and reported to him. Based on his decisions the as yet poorly 
equipped and ill-prepared Military Air Service had greater potential for air operations 
than proven capacity at the time of Collins’ death on 22 August 1922. The future of the 
service was uncertain in the hands of a new commander-in-chief and army hierarchy that 
had previously shown little enthusiasm for military aviation. To a great extent the policy 
decisions, to expand pilot and aircraft numbers and to extend the air operation into the 
south-west, were to direct the new leadership in the direction chosen by Collins whether 
they were convinced or not as to the potential of air power in a civil war situation. .
The following section aims to examine the implementation of Collins’ expansion 
plans and the conduct of air support in the south-west during the guerrilla phase of the 
Civil War. It is intended to assess the role or roles undertaken and, if possible, the 
effectiveness of the use of aircraft by the local commanders and the extent to which the 
Army leadership at GHQ backed the development of the support services that the state’s 
early military aviation required. The reasons for, and the results of the pilot recruitment 
and training programme initiated in late 1922, will be assessed in the context of the 
generally antagonistic attitude to former British service personnel. The start of the
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demobilisation and reorganisation processes, insofar as they affected the Air Service, will 
be examined against the backdrop of the disharmony of the ‘army mutiny’ of 1924.
The implementation of expansion plans
On the day Collins was killed it was reported that while the irregulars were being driven 
from their bases they were still not at all vulnerable in Cork and Kerry and that, while the 
Free State army was capturing towns, they were not capturing Irregulars or their 
weapons, in significant numbers. In effect the guerrilla phase of the war had commenced 
and, initially at least, government troops were not getting the upper hand. It was also 
suggested, in the Irish Times of 15 August 1922 that, if the pro-Treaty forces had moved 
quickly enough, the war could have been over in three weeks.1 Apparently it was for this 
phase of the war that Collins had authorised the expansion of the Air Service with the 
intention of occupying airfields in the south west. It had been Collins’ obvious intention 
to have action taken on aircraft purchase and the recruitment of pilots and the move to 
Fermoy or elsewhere in Munster, sooner rather than later. Flowever the taking on of 
additional pilots was the only matter that started with little delay but even that process 
proved tediously slow. A full month was to pass before McSweeney set off for London to 
buy more aircraft -  the last of which would not be delivered until 22 November -  four 
full months after Collins’ death. Despite the urgency indicated by Collins, Fermoy would 
not be occupied by an air detachment until 1 October 1922 -  a delay of almost six weeks.
The initial recruitment of additional pilots had started about 11 July with the 
signing of Lieut. J McCormac, who, for reasons that are not stated, was dismissed the 
same week.2 On 29 July Lieut. Frederick S. Crossley had been put on the payroll 
followed, on 19 August, by Lieut. Thomas J. Maloney.3 Like McSweeney and Russell 
the new pilots had previously served with the RAF -  Crossley with No. 41 Squadron 
initially and later with 1 Squadron in France where he was wounded on 6 July 1918. 
Maloney had served with 57 Squadron.4 Unlike the two senior pilots the new pair had no
1 H o p k in so n , Green against green, p. 172.
2 ‘M ilita ry  A v ia tio n  -  p e r s o n n e l’, 22  Ju ly  1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /4 9 /3 7 ) .
3 O ff ic e rs ’ h is to ry  sh e e ts  (M A , S D R  5 5 0 ; S D R  1767).
4 A irc re w  se rv ic e  re c o rd s  (N A , A ir  7 6 /1 1 5 ; A ir  7 6 /3 3 ).
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IRA service -  pre-truce or post-truce. Probably greatly influenced by his own 
embarrassing experience when returning to flying after a three-year break, McSweeney 
sent Crossley and Maloney to the Aircraft Disposal Company in Croydon in early 
September 1922, to avail of instructional and solo flying by way of re-introduction to 
flying duties and as preparation for active service. While the number of hours flown by 
each is not known, it is probable that they only received a small amount of dual 
instruction Avro 504K and solo flying on Bristol Fighter.7
In September four more pilots, including William P. Delamere, were taken on. 
Delamere’s later account of the early days of the Air Service, that reflects the adverse 
effect of the passage of fifty years on the memory, nonetheless gives an insight into the 
circumstances that surrounded the recruitment of the individual pilots. In his own case he 
recalled that while at home in Dublin, on holiday from his engineering employment in 
England, he was approached by an individual with connections to W.T. Cosgrave, 
president of the Executive Council. He was asked if he would like to fly again and, 
having answered in the affirmative was subsequently called for an interview by General 
McSweeney. Following the interview he ‘was accepted for an appointment as a pilot in 
the new Army Air Service’. He suggests that the manner in which other pilots were 
recruited was most likely similar.6 It is strongly suggested that the fact that the subject of 
the recruitment of ex-British service personnel, particularly those without pre-truce 
experience in Oglaigh na hEireann, was such a sensitive matter that the Army resorted to 
word-of-mouth rather than advertising the fact that positions for pilots existed - hence 
the somewhat surreptitious method of recruitment described by Delamere. It was to be 
early December 1922 before the last of the six pilots, as authorised by Collins in August, 
was taken on. With the departure of C.F. Russell to the Railway Maintenance and 
Protection Corps about the middle of September, the dismissal of Capt. John Amott in 
mid-December and the recruitment of an additional two pilots in early December the total 
number in service at the end of 1922 would still only be ten.7 With few operational 
missions, that can be identified from log books or elsewhere, being flown after 16 August
3 A D C  to  W . J. M c S w e e n e y , c irca  1 Sep t. 1922  (in  p o sse s s io n  o f  A .P . K earn s).
6 W .P . D e la m e re , ‘E a rly  d a y s  in th e  A rm y  A ir  S e rv ic e ’ in  An Cosantoir xxx ii (S ep t. 1972), p. 168.
7 A p p e n d ix  4 , M ic h a e l O ’M a lle y , ‘T h e  m ili ta ry  a ir s e rv ic e  1 9 2 2 -2 4 ’ (B A  th es is , Ju ly  2 0 0 2 , N U I
M a y n o o th ).
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the latter part of August and much of September 1922 appears to have been taken up with 
the conduct of a series of instructional and re-familiarisation flights for newly recruited 
pilots.8
The correspondence of early September, between the new commander-in-chief 
and the Air Service and relating to military aviation matters, suggests a period of 
adjustment and review on the part of General Richard Mulcahy. It also possibly explains 
the delay in ordering and taking delivery of aircraft. An undated file memo, of circa 5 
September, suggests an appraisal of the aviation resources required in the context of air 
operations in the west and south west. However the matters enumerated were couched in 
terms that suggest that they were items for an agenda rather than decisions taken. While 
the considerations listed were very similar to those matters on which Collins had made 
decisions on 16 August the fact that such decisions had already been made was not 
acknowledged. Mulcahy appears to have generally endorsed, Collins’ decisions though 
in some respects the new proposals went further than Collins had. In relation to aircraft, 
where Collins had decided to acquire a flight (of unspecified number), Mulcahy proposed 
to discuss at a General Staff meeting general aviation arrangements and authorise, if 
necessary, the purchase of two more Bristol Fighters at a cost of £1,160 each -  apparently 
in addition to the flight authorised by Collins on 16 August. Mulcahy proposed that 
Fennoy would be the main airfield for the whole south-west and that Russell would take 
charge of the area. He intended to attach four machines to Fermoy and two to Limerick. 
He further proposed to have enquires made by General Sean McEoin, GOC Western 
Command, with a view to finding the best location for basing two aircraft in the Clare
9area.
At about the same time Mulcahy, in responding to an aircraft purchase estimate 
submitted by McSweeney, presumably that originally requested by Collins on 16 August, 
indicated that he was unable to lay his hands on the estimate at that time but gave fonnal 
authority to proceed with the purchases as agreed in their recent conversations, that is 
instructional machines, three Bristol Fighters and three Martinsyde Scouts. 10 Six days 
later Mulcahy wrote to the Air Service indicating that, in view of the loss of the SE 5A a
8 B risto l F ig h te r; M a r tin sy d e  F. 4 , lo g  b o o k s (A C  M u se u m ).
9 ‘F o r a v ia tio n  f i le ’, C -in -C  u n d a te d  m em o , c irc a  5 S ep t. 192 2  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /4 9 /1 5 ).
10 ‘A v ia tio n ’, C -in - C  to  C o m d t. G en era l M c S w ee n ey , 5 S ep t. 1922  (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /4 9 /1 6 ).
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few days previously, McSweeney should make arrangements to order two additional 
machines for the Western Area.11 The authorisations of 5 and 11 September translated 
into an order for two Avro 504K ‘instructional machines’, a total of five Bristol F2b 
Fighters and three single-seater Martinsyde F.4 scout aircraft -  a total of ten aircraft.
As he later recorded McSweeney commenced his ‘journey to London for [the] 
purchase of 5 Bristol Fighters, 3 Martynside [sic] F. 4’s & 2 Avros’ on 22 September 
1922 and stayed there for five days. While in London he apparently confirmed an order 
for five Bristol Fighters and two Avro 504K aircraft from the ADC at Croydon. He also 
travelled out to Woking in Surrey and there confirmed an order for three Martinsyde F.4 
machines though the ADC acted as agents in this case.12 While he had authority to 
purchase ten aircraft in actual fact eleven machines, the additional one being a third Avro 
504K, were delivered between 16 September and 22 November 1922. It is noted that the 
first aircraft of this order, BF IV, was taken on charge at Baldonnell on 16 September, a 
week prior to McSweeney’s latest trip to London.13 It appears that the ADC accepted a 
telephone, or more likely, a telegraph order from McSweeney on or about 14 September, 
fitted a 300hp Hispano Suiza engine to Bristol Fighter E.1958 (BF IV) on 15 September 
and, flown by a company pilot, had it delivered to Baldonnell the following day. This 
aircraft, which was delivered with Lewis and Vickers guns, and bomb racks for twenty 
pound bombs, was damaged on landing at Baldonnel on its delivery flight and did not 
enter service in Air Service colours.14 It appears that the additional Avro 504K, unlike the 
Bristol Fighter, a training aircraft, was an eleventh aircraft and was delivered by the ADC 
by way of compensation for failing to deliver a serviceable machine on 16 September. 
Unlike the circumstances when he had purchased the Bristol Fighter in July McSweeney 
was not in a position to settle by personal cheque. The account, for a total of £15,000, 
was forwarded for payment to the AFO via the QMG.15
1 'C -in -C  to  C o m d t. G en era l S w ee n ey  (s ic ) , 11 S ep t. 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /4 9 /1 2 ).
I2‘ M c S w e e n e y  e x p e n s e s ’, 1 N o v . 1923 (M A , A C /2 /2 /1 ) ;  R ay  S anger, The Martinsyde file, p .246 .
13 K e a rn s , ‘Irish  A ir  C o rp s ’, p. 4 4 9 .
14 A D C  to C o m d t. G en era l M c S w ee n ey , 16 S ep t. 1922 (M A , A /0 6 9 5 9 ); L o g  b o o k , B F  IV  (A C  M u seu m ); 
D e liv e ry  n o te , A D C  to  M c S w e e n e y , 15 S ep t. 19 2 2 , in m y  p o sse ss io n . A .P . K e a rn s  re co rd s  th is  a irc ra ft as 
E .1 9 5 9  th o u g h  th e  d e liv e ry  n o te  in d ic a te s  E .1 9 5 8 .
15 D M A  to  Q M G , 17 S ep t. 1922 (M A , A /0 6 9 5 9 ) .
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Detachments to Fermoy and Tralee
While Collins had appeared very anxious to have aircraft based at Fermoy before the end 
of August the first aircraft did not arrive there until 1 October 1922.16 It is not at all clear 
why this should have been so. While the number of pilots, at four, was very low a single 
aircraft and crew could have been posted before the end of August had the new c-in-c and 
general staff wished to put into immediate effect the decisions made by Collins. With the 
military activity largely concentrated in the Munster area, and Russell having operated in 
that area from a temporary base in Limerick there was no reason why a single aircraft and 
crew could not have been sent to the south west. Similarly the availability of aircraft 
appears not to have been a consideration as the service machines ordered on 14 
September only began to enter service from 13 October, well after the eventual 
occupation of the aerodrome.
While the army leadership may initially have been waiting for the delivery of new 
aircraft before occupying Fermoy, it is possible that their hands may have been forced by 
circumstances in Baldonnell. It is suggested that Lieut. J.C. Fitzmaurice and Lieut. T.J 
Maloney were sent to Fermoy at short notice after a disagreement with General 
McSweeney. The point at issue was apparently the promotion to the rank of captain of 
John Amott. Amott had joined the Air Service (on 15 September) after both Maloney and 
Fitzmaurice and, in theory, would have been junior to both. Not only was he promoted to 
captain but he was also designated as ‘acting 2nd in command of flying’. The general tone 
of Fitzmaurice’s unpublished memoir suggests that he had no doubts about his own worth 
as an officer and pilot and it would have been out of character for him not to have 
objected to such action. It is suggested that the Maloney and Fitzmaurice were 
contemplating resigning over this matter when they were detailed, at short notice, to fly 
to Fermoy. Three pilots are reported to have flown to Fermoy on 1 October 1922. In 
addition to Fitzmaurice in MS I, Lieut. Maloney and Lieut. F.S. Crossley are reported as 
travelling in a formation of three unspecified aircraft.17 The assertion that the three 
available service aircraft in the Air Service had moved to Fermoy on 1 October 1922
16 A irc ra ft log  b o o k , M S  I, A C  M u seu m .
l7T e d d y  F e n n e lly , Fitz and the famous flight (P o rtlao ise , 1997), p. 99; ‘N a m es  o f  s ta f f  em p lo y e d  in th e  
A v ia tio n  D e p t .’, A G  to  C -in -C , 18 O c t. 1922  (M A , A /0 7 2 7 9 ).
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cannot be confirmed from the aircraft log books. The log book for Martinsyde Scout (MS 
I) confirms that Fitzmaurice flew to Fermoy on 1 October 1922. Flowever the log book 
for BF II records that Lieut. F.S. Crossley and ‘A/M Spittel’ arrived there on the 
following day. The log book for BF I records no flying, or servicing, between 24 
September and 10 November 1922 and only indicates that the aircraft had been flown 
from Baldonnell to Fermoy on 13 November 1922 by Lieut. W.P. Delamere. The Army 
census records that Fitzmaurice, Crossley and Maloney were at Fermoy Aerodrome on 
the night of 12/13 November 1922. Eventually four aircraft and crews were posted to 
Fermoy and a single machine, with air and ground crew was based at Tralee.18 As the 
senior officer Lieut. F.S. Crossely was the first commanding officer at Fermoy. However 
it appears that Fitzmaurice and Maloney were not satisfied with him as CO. With 
Maloney’s connivance Fitzmaurice apparently brow-beat Crossley into vacating the 
position and Maloney was appointed to the post. Subsequently, after Maloney had been 
transferred back to Baldonnell, Fitzmaurice took over.19
Notwithstanding Collins’ suggestion that the Board of Works should make good 
any damage to the aerodrome in preparation for aircraft the sight that greeted the Air 
Service was less than wholesome. The departing Irregulars had apparently left the 
aerodrome buildings in a ruinous state. Fitzmaurice subsequently provided a colourful 
description:
The aerodrome presented the appearance of having suffered an attack by a flock of 
locusts possessing a voracious appetite for galvanised iron sheets, wood, glass and 
everything that went to make up the aerodrome buildings. It had been completely 
stripped. The stripping had not been done in any amateurish fashion. The work had 
obviously been executed by skilled craftsmen and [the material] was intended for 
erection elsewhere. We discovered that the various buildings and station equipment
had been dismantled and sold by auction and the materials scattered about in the
20numerous farmsteads for miles around.
18 ‘A rm y  A ir  S e rv ic e ’, s tre n g th  re tu rn , 21 A u g . 1923 (N A I, F in 1 /2875).
19 S ta te m en t, J .C . F itz m a u ric e  to  W .J . K e an e , 7 D ec. 1950  (M A , P C 1 4 3 ).
20 J.C . F itz m a u ric e , u n p u b lish e d  m em o ir, p. 128 (E s ta te  o f  P . S e lw y n  - J o n e s ) .
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Fitzmaurice opined that the material had been sold at action and that the proceeds had 
gone to ‘Mr. de Valera’s war coffers’. However he claimed that all the material could be 
traced through the auctioneer’s books.21 In the context of the aerodrome’s immediate use 
it was of particular note that the steel-framed Robin type hangars built by the British had 
been stripped of the galvanised sheeting leaving a bare metal frame. The repair of this 
damage led to industrial unrest and to a question in the Dail. On 18 October the Voice o f 
Labour was reported as carrying an article suggesting that soldiers were acting as scabs in 
the matter of the rebuilding of Fermoy aerodrome.22 On 25 October 1922 McSweeney 
replied to a query from the COS partially based on information he had received by 
wireless from the officer in charge of the detached flight at Fermoy. He confirmed that 
the corrugated sheeting of the hangars had been removed but that it was essential that 
aircraft to be covered against the elements. McSweeney reported that he had initially 
gone to Fermoy and had bought and supplied a number of tarpaulins to provide 
temporary cover for aircraft. The quartermaster had been instructed to engage the 
services of a local contractor to affect more pennanent repairs but it was alleged that the 
contractor’s labourers would not work due to high winds. Due to the urgency of the 
situation the Air Service engaged the services of unemployed locals at soldiers’ rates of 
pay - £1. 4s 6d. per week, plus overtime, until the job of covering one shed had been 
was completed.23 In reply to the Dail question of Tomas de Nolga, Eamonn Duggan, on 
behalf of the Minister for Defence, put a slightly different slant on the matter:
The aerodrome at Fermoy is not being rebuilt. It was decided to cover one shed 
with corrugated iron sheets, and the work entailing the employment of 15 or 20 
men at most was given to Mr. Mahoney. His men gave trouble by refusing to hold 
down the sheets on the shed in a gale, and soldiers had to be put on the job in order 
to get it done. Except in this case soldiers were not employed on the same work as 
civilians.24
21 Ib id .
22 F ile  m em o , 18 O ct. 1922 (M A , A /0 7 4 7 2 ) .
23 D M A  to  C O S , 25  O ct. 1922 (M A , A /0 7 4 3 5 ) .
24 D ai! E ire an n , P a r lia m e n ta ry  d e b a te s , vo l. 1, 1922 , 1 9 6 2 -6 3 .
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To say that Fermoy was not being rebuilt would be a moot point. Considering 
Fitzmaurice’s description ol’the skeletal nature of the various buildings rebuilding would 
be the appropriate term. In the circumstances of the time, with a civil war to be fought, 
the get-the-job-done attitude of Fitzmaurice seems to have been appropriate. However the 
condition of Fermoy aerodrome on 1 October 1922 was apparently much as it had been 
when abandoned by the Irregulars by the middle of August. Despite the fact that Collins 
had, back in August, identified the aerodrome as an important facility in the developing 
military scenario, and that it might require repairs, nothing had been done in the 
meanwhile to provide the basic facilities required for aircraft.
Fermoy operations
While the precise role of the Air Service detachment in Fermoy appears not to have been 
documented, the air support role differed somewhat from that the armed reconnaissance 
role carried out under the direction of Collins.
Our duties consisted of providing air escorts to military convoys moving through 
difficult mountain countryside. These convoys were engaged in cleaning up 
operations which called for the establishment of a garrison in every town and 
village. They were subject to ambush only in difficult country where the terrain was 
suitable to the irregulars, that is to say, stretches of country allowing them a safe 
commanding fire position from which a river or deep, wide rivulet prevented 
pursuit by the ambushed party. Trees were felled across the roads to contain the 
convoys during the period of these ambushes. Our arrival over such scenes brought
25an abrupt end to these capers.
This general description suggests a change, from the armed reconnaissance approach of 
July and August to the armed escort role that would be practiced over the autumn and 
winter of 1922-23. However the first missions flown by Fitzmaurice, and many others
23 J .C . F itzm a u ric e , u n p u b lish ed  m em o ir, p. 128 (E s ta te  o f  P. S e lw y n  - J o n e s ) .
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carried out over the winter and spring of 1922-23, were general reconnaissance patrols -  
initially to west Cork on 9 October and to east Cork on 10 October 1922. Other missions 
involved the dropping of propaganda material in territory held by Irregulars. Despite the 
fact that the Fermoy detachment consisted of four aircraft and four crews little is known 
of the day-to-day operation. This is mainly due to the fact that the central control of the 
Collins era was dispensed with and, with the Air Service detachment under the direct 
command of Maj. Gen. Emmet Dalton, GOC Cork Command, the recording of 
reconnaissance reports was apparently abandoned. Generally, in the absence of standing 
orders and patrol reports of any kind, it must be presumed that both types of mission were 
flown as directed by the local commander on a day to day basis.26
The operations of the Tralee detachment.
Lieutenant William P. Delamere, who reported to Baldonnell on 21 September 1922 and 
was posted to Fermoy on 13 October, subsequently operated out of Tralee from 1 
December 1922 to 12 October 1923 -  initially under General W.R.E. Murphy, GOC
27Kerry Command and, from January 1923, under Major General Paddy O’Daly. The 
Tralee detachment consisted of Delamere, who, along with his observer Lieut. Charles 
‘Tiny’ Flanagan flew the single Bristol Fighter, and two unnamed technicians. The Tralee 
landing ground consisted of what appears to have been a marginally suitable field of 
about twenty two acres that adjoined the Militia Barracks in the townland of Cloon More 
in the south eastern part of Tralee town. It had a small hangar associated with it. This was 
located in an adjacent field, in Cloon Beg, and had been part of the original RAF Class B 
aerodrome of the 1919-1921 period.28 Unlike the practice at Fermoy most, if not all, of 
Delamere’s operational flights appear to have been reconnaissance patrols (as distinct 
from escorts) over the ‘very wild country’ of the mountains of Kerry. Between the 4 and 
21 December 1922 Delamere and Flanagan flew nine flights, mainly reconnaissance
26 L og  b o o k , M S 1 (A C  M u seu m ); F itz m a u ric e  u n p u b lish ed  m em o ir, p .129 (E s ta te  o f  P . S e lw y n -Jo n e s). 
F i tz m a u r ic e ’s acco u n t o f  h is  c iv il w a r fly in g  d e ta ils  a sm all n u m b er  o f  m iss io n s  bu t h is reca ll is  so 
co lo u rfu l and  id io sy n c ra tic  as to re n d e r  su ch  a cc o u n ts  u n re p re se n ta tiv e . H e  fa ils  to  reca ll an y  m iss io n  flo w n  
by  o th e r  p ilo ts .
27 F ly in g  log  b o o k , W .P . D e lam ere  (in  p o sse ss io n  o f  P e te r  D e lam ere ); D u g g a n , Irish army, p. 85; 
H o p k in so n , Green against green, p. 2 05 .
D raw in g , ‘T ra le e  lan d in g  g ro u n d ’; R A F  a e ro d ro m e  b o o k  (in m y  p o sse ss io n ).
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patrols that were somewhat curtailed by the mountainous terrain and the adverse winter 
weather. On 14 December he reported being fired on at Ballyheige while patrolling in the 
Listowel / Ballybunion area. He dropped propaganda pamphlets in the Ballyheige area on 
19 December and in the Farranfore area two days later. Of a total of just six patrols 
carried out by Delamere and Flanagan in January only one was of note. On the afternoon 
of 16 January 1923 Delamere reported being fired on by Irregulars while patrolling in the 
Brennan’s Glen area. He dropped two bombs and ‘held the Pajoes in houses until dark -  
troops approaching and attacked the Pajoes’, killing one and wounding two.29 The Kerry 
Command’s report of the event read slightly differently:
Army aeroplane flying over Brennan’s Glen fired on by party of 30 Irregulars. One 
bomb dropped and machine gun fire opened from aeroplane. Simultaneously, 
Dublin Guards from Killamey arrived on scene and attempted encircling 
movement. Irregulars retreated and in running fight Irregulars suffered six 
casualties.30
From an operational point of view February 1923 was even quieter. Though ten flights 
were flown, to Fermoy and Baldonnell, all were apparently for technical or 
administrative purposes. On 10 February Delamere and Flanagan flew to Baldonnell 
in Bristol Fighter BF I and, due to technical difficulties with the replacement aircraft,
BF VIII, did not get back to Tralee until 9 March 1923. The rest of March was similar 
to the previous month, with only three flights out of thirteen being of an operational 
nature. A further three flights, all reconnaissance patrols, were earned out during April 
1923.
In May 1923 Delamere carried out nine operational flights. The first of these 
he recorded as the first day of a big round-up operation in the Kenmare area. From an 
air reconnaissance point of view he recorded that there was little to report. Operating 
under a new operations order, they patrolled the areas of Killamey, Caragh Lake and 
Castleisland on the 8, 17 and 18 May respectively but recorded that ‘nothing of
29 W .P . D e lam ere  lo g  b o o k  (in  p o ssess io n  o f  P e te r  D e lam ere ).
30 K erry  co m m a n d  o p e ra tio n s  rep o rt, 16 Jan . 1923 (M A , C W /O P S /1 2 /B ).
9 2
importance was observed’. With the Irregular leadership declaring a ceasefire on 24 
May 1923 Delamere was to fly his last operational mission on 20 June when he 
observed the ‘railway troops [being] withdrawn from the lines’ in the Killamey area.
On 28 June 1923 he flew back to Femioy and, on the following day commenced two 
weeks leave.31 In the absence of an explicit air operations policy at GHQ or Command 
level, and of patrol reports, it is not at all easy to assess the effectiveness or otherwise 
of the Tralee Detachment. However, even allowing for the difficult terrain and adverse 
weather, the completion of only thirty-one operational missions in seven months of 
civil war operations appears to represent a modest return while the military 
intelligence value must remain a matter of conjecture.
On 16 July 1923 Delamere and Flanagan, still flying BF VIII, returned to 
Tralee and flew on the occasion of the parade and march-past for President Cosgrave’s 
visit to Ballymullen barracks on 12 July. After the Civil War, between July and 
October 1923, the detachment completed only nine flights, mainly between the bases 
of Tralee, Fennoy and Baldonnell. Tralee closed on 12 October 1923 and the small 
detachment moved back to Feimoy. Similarly aimless flying continued at Fennoy 
until it too as eventually closed on 14 April 1924.32 It is not clear why Tralee was kept 
open until October 1923 and Fermoy until April 1924. While it is possible that GHQ 
wanted to have aircraft in the south west in case of any minor hostilities it is possible 
that the detachments may simply have been forgotten -  only coming to the attention of 
GHQ again in the context of the administration of the demobilisation and the 
reorganisation processes of 1923/24. There can have been little operational necessity 
for either detachment remaining in place after May 1923.
Personnel and support services
While Collins, in August 1922, had apparently been convinced of the necessity to provide 
standard support services to military aviation, such as transport, communications, 
ordnance and meteorology and had initiated appropriate action, these matters were not to
31 W .P . D e lam ere , p i lo t ’s lo g  bo o k  (in  p o sse ss io n  o f  P e te r  D e lam ere ).
32 Ibid.
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receive similar priority from the new leadership. The matter of communications, probably 
the most fundamental and essential support service, was a case in point. With no sign of a 
wireless station being established at Baldonnell by 26 September 1922 McSweeney made 
representations to Mulcahy:
In view of the establishment of an aero base at Fermoy two wireless sets are 
extremely urgently needed, one at Fermoy and one at Baldonnel to communicate 
with each other. It would be very economical if we could arrange the handing over 
of eight aeroplane wireless sets by the British Government for reconnaissance work 
 worth £40 each...33
This was not an unreasonable request given that aircraft wireless telegraphy sets had been 
standard equipment on operational aircraft since the Great War and accordingly training 
in wireless telegraphy was a fundamental aspect of pilot training. In like manner 
communication between Fermoy and Baldonnell, using sets of appropriate frequency and 
power, would be considered essential to the management and operation of air resources. 
To date, as was demonstrated during Russell’s mission to Waterford and Cork in early 
August, aircraft had no wireless communications with Baldonnell or elsewhere while all 
longer range communication with Baldonnell had to be relayed, via GHQ, by means of 
the local, short range, security net. Having been requested by Mulcahy to address 
McSweeney’s request for ground stations and aircraft wireless sets Liam Archer, OC 
Communications Department, quoting from a report on the distribution of 30 watt 
wireless sets, indicated that one would be installed at Fermoy Aerodrome, apparently for 
communication with GHQ, but that no set was available for Baldonnell. 34 In response 
Mulcahy asked for clarification on the matter of aircraft wireless sets, which Archer had 
apparently ignored. Archer’s response was short and to the point and indicated that his 
report of ‘29 September had covered all queries raised by the memo of the director of 
aviation’.35 Mulcahy did not pursue this line in the matter of aircraft radios further.
33 D M A  to  C -in -C , 26 S ep t. 1922 (A /0 7 0 4 1 , M A ).
34 A rc h e r  to  C -in -C , 29  S ep t. 1922 (M A , A /0 7 0 4 1 ) .
3:1 C -in -c  to  A rch er, 29  Sep t. 1922; A rc h e r  to  C -in -C , 3 O c t .1922 (M A , A /0 7 0 4 1 ) .
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Subsequently, and rather meekly, he approached the question of installing a 
wireless set at Baldonnell’ from a different direction. The principal function of such a 
radio would be to receive meteorological reports. ‘I would like to know if the 30 watt 
receiver will do their work effectively and whether there is a set to spare.’ Archer replied 
succinctly that ‘no 30 watt set was available for Baldonnell’.36 In effect Archer was 
bluntly ignoring the request of his commander-in-chief. It can only be implied that the 
position adopted by Archer, and apparently not subsequently challenged by Mulcahy, 
was that he (Archer), as director of communications, would decide what communications 
equipment, ground and air, was appropriate to military aviation. Mulcahy’s failure to 
resolve this matter in effect confirmed that the air communications requirements of the 
Air Service was an independent signals function to be exercised without reference to the 
commanding officer of the State’s military aviation. Unresolved difficulties in respect of 
the authority over aviation communications policy was to have a major influence on the 
relationship between the Signal Corps and the Air Coips in later years and, in particular, 
was to adversely affect the standard of the air-to-ground and ground-to-air air 
communications during the Emergency.
The position in relation to ordnance was not unlike that pertaining to 
communications, though in this case Mulcahy himself was to be responsible for the 
prevarication. The QMG had reported to the Mulcahy that he had succeeded in acquiring 
4,800 rounds of aerial ammunition, probably from the departing RAF, in response to 
Collins’ requests on the matter during the early weeks of August. There was also an 
uncertain level of interest in having the Air Service develop a capacity to drop bombs
37and, paradoxically, standard hand grenades from aircraft on patrol duties. While it is not 
clear what armament was being carried on operational aircraft most if not all were 
apparently capable of returning fire, with Vickers and or Lewis machine guns, if fired 
upon. In September 1922 McSweeney had a limited stock of 9 pound bombs that had 
possibly been acquired from the departing RAF and which he used to test for their 
effectiveness against Irregulars. He reported that he had used two aircraft on Sunday 24 
September to test the new 9 lb. bombs. Stating that four bombs had been dropped from
36C -in -C  to  A rc h e r , 10 O ct. 1922; A rc h e r  to  C -in -C , 12 O c t. 1922 (M A , A /0 7 0 4 1 ) .
37 Q M G  to C -in -C , 22  A ug. 1922; C O S  to  D M A , 3 S ep t. 1922 (U C D A , M P , P 7 /B /3 /1 1; P 7 /B /4 9 /1 7 ) .
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500 feet and that holes, two feet wide and one foot deep, had been made in the selected 
grass area while pieces of shrapnel had been scattered twenty feet around. He suggested 
that such bombs should be very effective when used on roads. The 9 lb bombs were 
apparently not compatible with the bomb racks (suitable for 20 lb bombs) purchased with 
many aircraft thus making it necessary to manufacture launching tubes to be used by the 
observer in two-seat aircraft. He suggested that single seat aircraft, such as the 
Martinsyde F.4, required a compatible bomb and bomb rack combination that could be 
operated by cable. He also reported sending a Cooper type bomb, which he had ordered 
to be stripped, to the director of munitions in the hope that similar bombs could be 
manufactured locally.38 Having received no response to his report on the testing of 9 lb. 
bombs McSweeney reminded Mulcahy that he had attempted to order over 300 bombs 
and 105,000 rounds of assorted aerial ammunition, when he was last in London. The War 
and Colonial Offices required Mulcahy’s authorisation before supplying the items. 
Mulcahy replied, stating that he was not taking any steps with regard such munitions until 
a conference with representatives of the British War Office due to be held in January
1923. By February 1923 Mulcahy had not met officials of the War Office and apparently 
did not perceive a genuine demand for such armament. He recorded a file memo to the 
effect that the bombs were not required at once and that the question of obtaining them 
need not be considered until Army representatives visited the War Office and continued
39to prevaricate on the matter.
Pilot training.
By the end of 1922 a total of seventeen aircraft had been acquired by the Air Service 
though at least two of these had been written off as a result of accidents. At the same time 
ten pilots, of the thirteen recruited in 1922, remained in the service. C. F. Russell’s last 
recorded flight during the Civil War had taken place on 6 September. He was transferred 
from the Air Service about that time and put in charge of the new Railway Maintenance 
and Protection Corps, a corps made necessary by the wanton destruction of the railway
38 D M A  to  C O S , 26  Sep t. 1922 (M A , A /0 7 1 8 9 ) .
39 D M A  to  C O S , 4 D ec. 1922; C O S  to  D M A , 5 D ec . 1922: C -in -c  f ile  m e m o  6 F e b . 1923 (M A , A /0 7 1 8 9 ) ..
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infrastructure perpetrated by the Irregulars 40 Donal MacCarron’s account of the early 
years reflect the popular belief that Capt. John Amott, the seventh ex-RAF pilot, who had 
been taken on 15 September 1922, was lucky to escape with his life when ‘dismissed’ 
about 21 December the same year. He had allegedly been identified as a former Auxiliary 
and invited at gunpoint to take the mail boat to Britain -  and did so!
With five aircraft and pilots stationed in the south west the remaining resources at 
Baldonnell were apparently directed to undertake pilot training. While the 
commencement of pilot training was not formally announced by GHQ until 20 December 
1922, aircraft log books suggest that training had commenced, on a totally ad hoc basis, 
as early as the latter part of October 1922. About that time a number of officers, including 
Lieut. Arthur J. Russell, Lieut. Tom Nolan and Lieut. Ned Fogarty had commenced 
flying training on Avro 504K.41 On 20 December 1922 the Adjutant General advertised 
a limited number of vacancies for pupils in the ‘aviation department of the Army’. 
Officers, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three, wishing to transfer to the 
‘department of aviation’ were invited to apply through their Command HQ. After 
interview successful applicants were to be attached to the ‘Flying Corps’ for an 
unspecified time and if found satisfactory as pilots would be transferred on a permanent 
basis.42 In the context of the involvement of a rudimentary Military Air Service in the 
Civil War, its ill-defined functions and poorly organised nature, the training of new pilots 
drawn from the officer body of a largely irregular army made little sense at the particular 
time. Its only logic was in the perception of an army leadership that apparently 
considered it necessary to replace Ex-RAF pilots with officers of an acceptable 
nationalist background as quickly as possible. (See Chapter 6)
Demobilisation
As soon as the Civil War had come to an end in May 1923 it was inevitable that action 
had to be initiated to effect reductions in Army strength and to reorganise for roles and
40 G en era l R o u tin e  O rd e r N o . 16, 24  Jan . 1923 . T h e  e ffe c tiv e  d a te  o f  R u s s e l l ’s n e w  a p p o in tm e n t is no t 
re co rd e d  in th e  G R O  o r on h is  O f f ic e r ’s h is to ry  sh e e t on  h is  p e rso n a l f ile  in  M A .
41 L o g  b o o k s , A v ro  5 0 4 K  I, II, III an d  IV  (A C  M u seu m ).
42 G R O  N o . 9 ,2 0  D ec. 1922.
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functions more compatible with the new peace situation and the impecunious state of the 
country’s finances.43 The initial demobilization proposed was a reduction, in total Army 
numbers, from the May 1923 figure of 55,000 to 31,300 by January 1924.44 Even before 
demobilisation had taken place the secretary of the Department of Finance, Joseph 
Brennan, questioned the necessity for the Air Service in terms that put its survival in 
severe doubt.
As the Minister of Defence is aware the position of the public finances is such as to 
render it imperative that drastic economies be affected in all services which are not 
immediately essential in the public interest. In this connection the Minister of 
Finance would be glad to learn whether the Minister of Defence sees any urgent 
reason for the maintenance at the present time of an air branch in the Army. The 
Minister of Finance finds it difficult to believe that the upkeep of an Air Service in 
this country at the present time can be justified by any arguments which are not 
much outweighed by counter-arguments based on the grave injury being done to 
the economic interests of the country by the present high level of taxation and of 
government expenditure.
The minister would also be glad to be supplied with details showing the strength, 
distribution and equipment of the Air Service at the present time.
Pending the further consideration of this matter the proposals put forward on 31st 
ultimo by the army finance officer for the grant of additional and extra pay to Air 
Service personnel in certain cases are being held over.45
Nothing on the Department of Finance file indicates on what criterion they based their 
rather blunt opinion. It is generally acknowledged that military expenditure soared out of 
control during and immediately after the Civil War.46 However, it is not generally 
appreciated that the actual expenditure on the Army vote for the Civil War period was of
43 R o n an  F an n in g , The Irish Department of Finance 1922-58 (D u b lin , 1 9 7 6 ), pp  114-6 .
44 J.P . D u g g an , A history of the Irish Army (D u b lin  199 1 ), p . 130.
43 Aireacht Airgid to  Sec  M in is try  o f  D e fe n c e , 20  A u g u s t 1923 (M A , A /0 9 9 7 1 ) .
46 P e te r  Y o u n g , ‘D e fe n c e  and  th e  n ew  Irish  s ta te , 1 9 1 9 -3 9 ’ in  Irish Sword x ix  (1 9 9 3 -4 ) , p. 10.
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the order of £7,459,104 for 1922/23 and £10,461,401 for 1923/24.47 On a purely 
financial basis it was clear that an army of over 55,000 simply could not be supported on 
a permanent basis. However when one considers the total numbers in uniform during the 
war and the rather minute size of the air component the cost of the aviation element may 
not have been disproportionate. The Military Air Service, including the infantry troops 
known as the Air Service Infantry and the garrison element at Baldonnell, had peaked at a 
total of 540 all ranks, 298 infantry and 242 aviation, in June 1923.48 The entire Air 
Service represented less than one percent of the whole Army at its maximum strength 
while the specific aviation element amounted to only .44 %. The cost of .44% of the army 
for the two years works out at about £79,000. To this must be added the cost of 
purchasing and operating aircraft that would have been over and above the cost of 
infantry soldiers. The total cost of buying twenty-two aircraft, plus the operating cost of 
spare parts, fuel and oil during the Civil War was put at £29,000 by McSweeney and 
apparently was not contested by Defence or Finance.49 With no additional aircraft being 
purchased in 1923/24 a notional £500 would probably cover any additional costs to the 
end of the financial year 1923/24 - a total of £29,500. In effect the Air Service had cost 
the state less than £110,000 out of the total of £ 17.91m expended on the Army in the two 
year period. It is possible that Finance, based on the fact that sums of up to £1,200 had 
been spent on individual aircraft, had a perception that the Air Service could not be 
justified on a financial basis.
Despite several reminders and requests from Finance, the Defence files do not 
indicate that the minister had considered making a case for a future military air service or 
that he had referred the matter for the consideration of GHQ and the Air Service. The 
minister was further reminded that approval of a flying pay regime, decided by the Army 
Pay Commission in May 1923, and proposed for some Air Service personnel, was being 
withheld pending his reply to the original query.50 In November he did forward the 
statistical return requested in mid-August. As McSweeney had provided the required
47 Undated memorandum, ‘Expenditure from the Army vote in the Civil War period’, circa 1939 (NAI, DT, 
S. 11,101).
48 Air Service strength return, June 1923 (MA, A/09971).
49 Unsigned memorandum, 15 June 1923 (MA, A/09971).
^Minutes of 23rd Session, Army Pay Commission, 3 May 1923 (NAI, DF, S.004/0248/24); File memo, 30 
Oct. 1923 (MA, A/09971).
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information, on the numbers and distribution of personnel and details of the aircraft on 
charge, within two days there is no obvious reason for GHQ’s delay in forwarding the 
same to Finance.51 As late as 24 December 1923 the Department of Finance was still 
endeavouring to elicit from the minister or from his department, the case required to 
justify the retention of the Air Service.52 Not only did Mulcahy fail to supply the required 
case but apparently failed to even acknowledge that such a case was required. In the 
absence of such a case it is not known what Mulcahy’s policy on aviation may have been 
or why he was apparently so ambivalent or indecisive about the military aviation for 
which he was ultimately responsible. Based on the indifference to military aviation he 
displayed during the Civil War it might be considered that Mulcahy was reluctant to 
support either the continuation or demise of the Air Service and, in effect, seemed content 
to leave the judgement and decision to others.
In the meanwhile Major General W.J. McSweeney, GOC Air Service had 
submitted to GHQ a proposal, for an Air Service consisting of a headquarters and two 
squadrons, to be included in a reorganised Army. He cited the necessity to have 
sufficient, but undefined striking power, available to counter potential enemies. He also 
indicated the necessity to be able to patrol fishing grounds to identify, and presumably 
monitor foreign trawlers. While McSweeney considered two squadrons to be the 
minimum size of aviation unit that would be effective and viable the reasons he cited by 
way of justification may have been seen as far from compelling by a General 
Headquarters staff that had previously displayed little appreciation of air power and the 
operational application of aircraft.53 It was at times such as these that the absence of 
Russell’s superior ability as an aviation staff officer was sorely missed. McSweeney was 
informed that an establishment for two squadrons were being recommended but that 
financial considerations might not permit. Within days it was also stated that ‘in all 
probability it may be decided by the Executive Council to abolish the air force [sic] 
entirely’.54 In the event the officer establishment, eventually published in February 1924 
and intended for activation in the following April, provided for a headquarters and two
51 GOC AAS to CSO GHQ, 23 Aug. 1923 (MA, A/09971).
52 Sec DF to AFO, 24 Dec. 1923 (NAI, FIN 1/2975).
53 GOC, AAS, to COGS, 24 Oct. 1923 (MA, A/09971).
54 COGS to GOC, AAS, 26 Oct. 1923 (MA, A/09971).
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squadrons with a total of forty-three officers. With the addition of an appropriate 
establishment of NCOs and men this establishment, had it been proceeded with, might 
have been expected to bring total Air Service numbers to about 500 all ranks. In the new 
army McSweeney was to have been reduced to the rank of colonel.55 However the 
scheme proposed for the Air Service in February only provided for a total of 287 all ranks 
-4 3  officers, sixty NCOs and 184 privates.56
As was the case throughout the Army, the reorganisation and demobilisation 
process in the Air Service was further interrupted and complicated by the Army ‘mutiny’ 
of March 1924. In personnel documentation the term ‘crisis’ was the more frequently 
euphemism denote the unpleasantness or internal strife that accompanied the 
reorganisation plans that were being attempted in 1923 and early 1924. The difficulty 
arose due to the manner of the demobilisation process aimed at reducing officer numbers 
from 3,300 to 1,800 and from the manner in which officers of War of Independence 
repute were allegedly being targeted for discharge. Three categories of officers were 
identified as being liable to dismissal: unsuitable officers, post-truce officers who had no 
special qualifications and pre-truce officers who were surplus to requirements. On 7 
March 1924 some 900 officers were demobilised.57 In Baldonnell some eight officers fell 
into these categories. On 7 March 1924 four officers o f the ‘Air Service Infantry’ and 
four of the ‘Air Service’ were demobilised.58 The latter group included Lieut. William 
McCullagh who had been injured in a flying accident on 25 June 1923 and was classified 
as Tong term sick’. He was apparently dismissed on medical grounds rather than coming 
under the demobilisation criteria proper. Also demobilised was 2/Lieut. John Vincent 
Norton, one of the trainee pilots taken on in 1922/23.59
Brigadier General Liam Tobin and Colonel C.F. Dalton had assumed the 
leadership of the pre-Ttruce officer group who took exception to freedom fighters being 
discarded while ex-British officers and soldiers were retained. In fact only 157 technical 
officers, that would have included eleven former RAF pilots in the Air Service, were so
53 S ta f f  d u ty  m e m o  N o .  12, 29  Feb .  1924.
36 ‘N o te s  on A r m y  E s t im a te s ,  192 4 /2 5 ,  Ju n e  1924  ( N A I ,  D F ,  S .0 0 4 /0 0 0 5 /2 7 ) .
3/ D u g g a n ,  Irish Army, p. 131.
38 ‘D i s c h a rg e s ’, S t a f f  D u ty  M e m o  N o .  13, 6 M ar .  1924.
39 O f f i c e r ’s pe rso n a l  fi le ,  ( M A ,  S D R  1182);  R e c o rd  o f  p i lo t  in ta k e  to A i r  C o rp s  ( A C  M u s e u m ) .
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retained/'0 After written and verbal confrontation with the government the ‘mutiny’ was 
contained and turned into what might nowadays be termed a redundancy scheme.
Thirteen Air Service officers who had been nominated for appointments in the 
reorganised Army, including McSweeney, are recorded as having ‘resigned due to the 
crisis’.61 While in general the particular circumstances surrounding the mutiny and the 
discharge or demobilisation of individual officers are not detailed in the surviving records 
circumstances applying to some of the flying officers in Baldonnell can be elucidated. 
This is mainly due to access gained some years ago, to the Military Archives files on a 
very small number of pilot officers. Maj. Gen. W.J. McSweeney was one of the most 
senior officers to be listed as a mutineer and the only officer, other than Liam Tobin and
C. F. Dalton who were actually named, who can be identified from the Dail debate of 
March 1924. It is considered pertinent that Colonel C.F. Dalton, one of the founder 
members of the Irish Republican Army Organisation in January 1923 and later one of the 
two officers who challenged the government on 6 March 1924, was adjutant at 
Baldonnell from 30 June 1923 to 29 March 1924.62
While there is no evidence to confirm any ulterior motive in the matter some 
might consider it extremely odd that a disaffected officer like Dalton would be appointed 
adjutant to any military formation. His co-conspirator, Major General Liam Tobin had 
been appointed aide-de-camp to the governor general. The thinking behind the latter 
decision was possibly that, in such an appointment Tobin might not be in a position to 
spread the rot of dissent throughout the army barrel. However the appointment of Dalton 
could be interpreted as having malevolent intent. When C.F. Dalton was appointed 
adjutant, Army Air Service in July 1923 he succeeded Col. Ned Broy who had retired in 
June 1923 after less than a year in army uniform.63 It is not recorded why Broy retired 
but his marriage in July 1923 may have been an influence.64 Similarly it is possible that 
Broy, who was not a pilot and who was eleven years older than his immediate superior, 
General McSweeney, did not see a future for himself in military aviation thus 
precipitating a move back to his earlier calling as a policeman. Broy had originally been
60 D u g g an ,  Irish Army, pp .  130-137 .  See  a lso  O ’H a lp in ,  Defending Ireland, pp  45 -5 2 .
61 ‘Lis t  o f  o f f ice rs  w h o  re s ig n e d  o w in g  to c r i s i s ’, c irca  M a rc h  192 4  (M A ,  A / 1 1657).
62 V a l iu l is ,  Almost a rebellion, p. 32 ;  O f f i c e r ’s h i s to ry  sh e e t  (M A ,  S D R  601) .
63 O f f i c e r ’s h i s to ry  sh e e t ,  ( M A ,  S D R  601) .
64 P e rso n a l  c o m m e n t ,  M s  A in e  B ro y ,  6 Feb .  20 0 2 .
102
specifically appointed to his position in the Air Service by Michael Collins having 
immediately previously been briefly on the staff o f the Civil Aviation Department.65 In 
September 1922 the Adjutant General reported that Broy ‘had brought the standard of 
discipline to a very high pitch and that he is a person well suited to accept the 
responsibility of carrying on in the absence of the director [of military aviation]’.66 In 
May 1923 GHQ eventually got around to formally endorsing those temporary 
commissions and appointments of Air Service officers originally authorised by 
McSweeney and, in Broy’s case, by Michael Collins. When this was done, by means of 
publication in General Routine Orders, Eamon Broy was the first Air Service officer so 
endorsed. On 4 May 1923 the former ‘Lieut. Comdt.’ E. Broy was confirmed in the rank 
of Colonel in the appointment of ‘adjutant, Air Service, and O/C ground organisation’ in 
the chief of s taffs department. Over three weeks later, on 28 May 1923 ‘Major General 
John [sic] McSweeney’ was confirmed as ‘officer commanding, Air Service’, also in the 
chief of staffs department. Without a definition of the term ‘ground organisation’ it is 
unclear what Broy’s responsibilities precisely were. In publishing Broy’s appointment 
before that of McSweeney and in making Broy ‘O/C ground organisation’ GHQ may 
have been trying to make a clear distinction between the Air Service per se, that would be 
under McSweeney, and the Air Service Infantry and the garrison troops under Broy. It 
could be inferred that McSweeney’s command only extended to Air Service personnel 
and that Broy was in command of ground troops at Baldonnell. This distinction was not 
made clear in May 1923 and was to be made no clearer in March 1924 when McSweeney 
and others were being dismissed as alleged parties to the mutiny.
Notwithstanding confirmation, on 4 May 1923, of his original appointment of 29 
July 1922 Eamonn Broy resigned with effect from 22 June 1923.67 While his retirement 
may have been influenced by his forthcoming marriage, or his age, it is also possible that 
his resignation was related to the appointment of C.F. Dalton. There is at least one 
indication that Broy may have left Baldonnell abruptly. Shortly after the mutiny 
Commandant Mason, who was taking over the duties of camp commandant, found two 
trunks the property of Eamonn Broy in a room most recently vacated by McSweeney.
65 W .J .  M c S w e e n e y  to A G ,  18 Sept .  1922 ( M A ,  A /0 6 9 4 2 ) .
66 A G  to  C - in -C ,  19 Sep t .  1922, O f f i c e r ’s p e rso n a l  f i le  ( M A ,  S D R  169.
67 C e r t i f ica te  o f  m i l i ta ry  se rv ice ,  29  Sept .  1926 (M A ,  S D R  169).
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Apart from personal items one trunk contained some 896 rounds of .303 service 
ammunition.68 It would not normally be in the character of Eamonn Broy to abandon 
service ammunition in the manner suggested. Similarly there is no evidence of him 
falling out with McSweeney. It is possible that Broy had resigned and that while leaving 
Baldonnell in somewhat of a huff neglected to tidy up his affairs. A possible reason for 
an apparently rushed departure is that it may have been intimated to Broy that he accept a 
change of appointment to make way for Dalton and that he chose to resign rather than 
move elsewhere.
The appointment of C.F. Dalton as adjutant of the Air Service could be viewed in 
the context of the prejudice of the old IRA against ex-British officers holding 
commissioned rank in the National Army of 1923/24:
The old IRA men in the army generally objected to the presence of those who had 
never participated in the national movement, and particularly to those who were 
regarded as enemies prior to the Truce with England.69
As the Air Service had a significant concentration of such personnel it might be 
considered that it made little sense to appoint a disaffected officer such as Dalton to the 
position of adjutant. Considering the disciplinary aspects of the attendant duties the 
appointment of C.F. Dalton as successor to Broy could be viewed, at best, as careless and 
at worst, as being deliberately seditious. It cannot be ruled out that Dalton had been 
moved to Baldonnell, not to negate his potentially malevolent influence in the Army 
generally, but rather to foment dissent among a corps of ex-RAF officers, a group with 
which it would have been known he could not identify.
While the effect of Dalton’s influence in Baldonnell cannot be judged validly it is 
significant that twelve infantry and air officers of an IRA background are recorded as 
having been dismissed as a result of the army crisis of 1924. Only one ex-RAF officer, 
McSweeney, is similarly listed though eventually two more would be dismissed. As pilot 
officers at Baldonnell were not in any of the three categories of officers originally
68 C o m d t .  T. M a s o n  to C O G S ,  14 A p r .  1924 ( M A ,  A /0 6 9 4 2 ) .
6 ,‘R e p o r t  to A r m y  e n q u i r y ’, C o l .  M .J .  C o s te l lo ,  22  A pri l  1924  (M A ,  P C 5 8 6 ) .
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designated for demobilisation the discharge of three pilots requires explanation. In 
particular McSweeney’s retirement should not go without comment.
On an undated list of ‘resignations, dismissals and absenters’ McSweeney was 
recorded, along with C.F. Dalton as a deserter.70 On a list dated 19 March and apparently 
later than the first, McSweeney and Dalton are recorded under the heading ‘Additional 
resignations due to crisis’.71 While his adjutant, Col. Dalton, was one of the ringleaders 
there is no direct evidence that McSweeney took an active part in the mutiny. In fact they 
were unlikely bedfellows -  if bedfellows they were. McSweeney was one of the 157 ex- 
British officers whose proposed retention in the Army so antagonised Dalton and others. 
The circumstances surrounding McSweeney’s dismissal are not clear and, in some 
respects, appear contradictory. J.C. Fitzmaurice, in his unpublished memoir, states that 
McSweeney, on some unspecified date about the time of the mutiny (February / March 
1924), had travelled down to Fermoy in his own car allegedly in possession of a 
significant quantity of misappropriated arms. Fitzmaurice states that he was amazed to 
find that McSweeney had taken the side of the mutineers. Fitzmaurice, in stating that he 
was questioned as to his attitude and that of his officers in the matter, implies that the 
reason for the visit was to persuade Air Service officers to join the mutiny. Fitzmaurice, 
who had no time for McSweeney, confirmed his allegiance to the state and managed to 
persuade MsSweeney to leave Fermoy.72 In the absence of any other account it is not 
possible to confirm or deny the veracity of this serious allegation. The alleged incident 
does not sit well with other aspects of the mutiny period insofar as McSweeney was 
concerned. Had this incident happened it probably would not have gone unreported. 
Similarly an assertion by Comdt. J.J. Flynn is difficult to understand. In the course of 
contesting his own dismissal Flynn states that he found that his GOC was absent from 
Baldonnell on Monday 10 March 1924. The circumstances of McSweeney’s resignation 
would appear to contradict this opinion.
In view of the unproven allegations against him it is fortunate that the 
circumstances of McSweeney’s resignation or discharge can be detailed to a greater 
extent than most. On Saturday 8 March 1924, two days after the ultimatum to the
7(1 U n d a te d  list, ‘R e s ig n a t io n s ,  d ism is sa ls  and a b s e n te r s ’ (N A I ,  D T ,  S .3720) .
71 L is t  o f  A d d i t io n a l  re s ig n a t io n s  d u e  to cris is ,  19 M a r c h  1924 (N A I ,  D T , S .37 2 0 ) .
72 F i tz m a u r ic e  u n p u b l i s h e d  m e m o i r ,  p p  140-1 (E s ta te  o f  t h e  late  P a tr ic ia  S e lw y n -Jo n e s ) .
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Government that had initiated the crisis, three line officers of the Air Service had 
absconded from Baldonnell with three Lewis guns and a Crossley tender. On Monday 10 
March 1924 McSweeney made a phone call to General Mulcahy, commander-in-chief 
and Minister for Defence. While we do not know the initial reason, or all the matters 
discussed, we do know that they discussed the matter of McSweeney’s resignation. The 
phone call was mentioned on 11 March when the matter of the mutiny, including the 
taking of arms from Baldonnell and elsewhere, was being reported to the Dail.
In connection with the Baldonnell incident the OC of the aerodrome yesterday 
tendered his resignation on the ‘phone. He was told his resignation would not 
be accepted in that way, and he said that if that was so he would have to be 
regarded as a deserter.
The clear inference in the Minister’s statement is that McSweeny’s resignation was 
directly related to the taking of weapons by absconding officers. It might be inferred that 
the minister had demanded the GOC’s resignation holding him responsible for the actions 
of his subordinates. In the heat of the moment McSweeney appears to have tendered his 
resignation verbally, maybe indicating that he was unlikely to put it in writing. In the 
event McSweeney submitted not one but two letters of resignation. Immediately after the 
telephone call to the minister he wrote.
Baldonnell
10/3/24
Minister for Defence 
Sir,
I have the honour to tender my resignation from the Army. I rang you up on 
the ‘phone this evening and you accused me of breaking my word of honour. I 
assert now that I kept my word to the letter, also my Oath.
W. J. McSweeney
73 Dail  E irean n ,  p a r l i a m e n ta ry  d eb a tes ,  Vol.  6, (1 9 2 4 ) ,  1944.
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Major General
G.O.C. Army Air Service74
Following the telephone conversation a GHQ officer was sent out to Baldonnell. It is 
possible that he had instructions to request McSweeney’s written resignation. The visit 
caused McSweeney to write again -  this time, without due deference, to the chief of staff.
Baldonnell
10/3/24
Lt. General Sean McMahon 
Parkgate
I desire to tender, from today, my resignation from the Army, and in doing so I 
wish to state that I faithfully kept my word I gave to you & the M.D. last night. 
Judging from Col. O ’Connor’s arrival in Baldonnel, and the document he carried, 
you do not appreciate the word of honour of an officer.
W. J. McSweeney 
Major General 
G.O.C. Air Service.75
The arrival of an officer from GHQ, possibly with a prepared letter of resignation, and 
the writing of a second letter of resignation adds little to our understanding of the reason 
or reasons for the initial telephone call and ultimately for the resignation at the particular 
juncture. While McSweeney may have rung the minister on his own initiative it is more 
likely that he was responding to a query from the Minister, about the misappropriation of 
anns, in the context of an inevitable Dail debate. The tone of the letters of resignation 
suggests a difference of opinion on an important matter though it is not obvious what 
matter of honour was in question. As McSweeney was one of a number of the ex-British
74 W .J .  M c S w e e n e y  to M F D , 10 M a r .  1924, O f f i c e r ’s p e rso n a l  file  (M A ,  S D R  37 1 8 ) .
73 W .J .  M c S w e e n e y  to C O S ,  10 M ar .  1924, O f f i c e r ’s p e rso n a l  f i le  (M A ,  S D R  3 7 1 8 ) .
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officers whose appointment and proposed retention was cited as a factor in the mutiny it 
probably suited Mulcahy to be able to hold him responsible for the mutinous actions of 
three line officers of the air station. In the context of the mutiny it may have suited the 
minister to be able to force the resignation of a major general who had no pre-Truce 
service but had previous service in the RAF. The misappropriation of amis by his 
subordinates was probably more than adequate reason for requiring McSweeney’s 
resignation.
In spite of McSweeney’s early resignation and the fact that the Army Enquiry 
Committee avoided giving reasons for individual ‘resignations’ the enquiry found that 
‘Major General William J. McSweeney’ ‘had absented himself in such a manner as to 
show wilful defiance of authority’.76 That he was absent is not supported by the fact that 
he telephoned the minister on the 10 March, was available to receive an emissary from 
the chief of staff and had resigned with immediate effect. Perhaps McSweeeny was 
deemed to be absent because he departed before his resignation had been accepted. 
Unfortunately the records fail to reflect the precise circumstances of officers who were 
deemed to have absconded or absent. Nor is there evidence to corroborate Fitzmaurice’s 
assertion implying McSweeney’s active, even armed, support for the mutiny.
The question still arises as to the exact nature of McSweeney’s position vis-à-vis 
the mutiny. While he might not have seen eye to eye with C.F. Dalton for obvious 
reasons, as an officer who owed his rank and career to Michael Collins and who was due 
to be reduced to the rank of colonel in the proposed reorganisation, McSweeney might 
have held a grudge against the current leadership. Some evidence to support this is 
provided by Capt. Patrick (Joe) Mulloy, a fonner IRA officer and more recently of the 
Air Service Infantry, who was an Air Service observer by the time of the mutiny. In a 
pamphlet published some fifty years after the events he observed on the ease with which 
the infantry at Baldonnell might have contributed to a general coup d ’etat initiated by 
Tobin and Dalton:
In Baldonnell the headquarters of the newly formed Air Corps [sic] the G.O.C.,
General McSweeney: the adjutant Colonel Dalton, one of the signatories on the
76 U n d a te d  ‘Lis t  A ’, S u m m a ry  o f  o f f ice rs  (M A ,  A / 1 1657).
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ultimatum presented to the government, and the bulk of the officers of the garrison 
were involved [in the mutiny], and it would be a comparatively simple matter for 
the G.O.C. to issue instructions that orders from him only were valid. The flying 
personnel were not involved as they were largely ex-R.A.F. and would take their 
orders from the G.O.C. Thus the whole camp, with the Air Corps [sic], could be 
taken overnight, without a shot being fired.77
These first-hand observations by Pat Mulloy seem to suggest that while McSweeney was 
in sympathy with the mutiny his position was a personal one and that he did not attempt 
to influence the rest of the ex - RAF group of officers. Similarly it can be argued that 
those infantry officers at Baldonnell, and the line and air officers of the Air Service, who 
supported the ‘mutiny’ and who would have had good republican records, were more 
likely to have been rallied to the cause by Dalton rather than by McSweeney. Fitzmaurice 
intimates that McSweeney did not enjoy the confidence of the ex-RAF pilot group though 
we only have his apparently jaundiced views on this matter. He described McSweeney as 
a ‘youth who bore the exalted rank of major general’ and who was ‘an ex-cadet of the 
Royal Air Force whose flying experience was practically nil’.78 On the basis of his 
background and military culture McSweeney would have been held in similar odium by 
the former IRA officers of the garrison. It is of note that McSweeney, who appears to 
have had little if any involvement in the mutiny, resigned on 10 March 1924 while C.F. 
Dalton did not resign until 25 March.79 Their respective personal files in Military 
Archives indicate that W.J. McSweeney was paid off with £100 while C.F. Dalton was 
paid £225 for ‘excellent service prior to the Truce’.80 There is major irony in the fact that 
one of the main functions performed by Dalton during the demobilisation and 
reorganisation process was to bear witness to, and certify, the satisfactory nature o f the 
service of the individual ex-RAF pilot officers.81
77 P a t r ick  M u l lo y ,  Mutiny without malice ( T h o m o n d  P u b l i sh in g  C o m p a n y ,  L o n d o n ,  1974),  p. 5. T h e  
ear l ie s t  use  o f  th e  n a m e  ‘A r m y  A i r  C o r p s ’ o ccu rs  in a d ra ft  e s tab l i sh m en t  d a te d  2 M a y  1924  on D T  file  
S .3 4 4 2 B  in N A I.
7 J .C .  F i tzm a u r ic e ,  u n p u b l ish ed  m e m o i r ,  p. 121 (E s ta te  o f  th e  late  P. S e lw y n -Jo n e s ) .
79 L e t t e r  o f  re s ig n a t io n ,  25 M a rch  1924  (M A ,  S D R  601).
80O f f i c e r s ’ h is to ry  shee ts  (M A ,  S D R  601; S D R  3718 .
81 O f f i c e r s ’ h is to ry  shee t  (M A ,  S D R  1333; S D R  1187; S D R  975).
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By definition Air Service pilots should have been excluded from the 
demobilisation process. Nevertheless a total of four ex- RAF pilots were discharged as a 
result of the intertwined reorganisation, mutiny and demobilisation processes. In addition 
to McSweeney only J.J. Flynn is recorded as having resigned due to the crisis. 
Commandant Flynn, who had been in charge of pilot training, was found to have 
absented himself in the same manner as McSweeney though again the precise 
circumstances are not explained.82 It is not impossible that a factor contributing to the 
dismissal of Comdt. J.J. Flynn, chief flying instructor, was the abject failure of the ill- 
advised pilot training scheme that had been advertised directed by GHQ in December 
1922.83 However the main reason cited is the fact that he was declared to be have been 
absent on or about 10 March 1924. The full circumstances, based on Flynn’s account 
recorded some six weeks later, are as follows.
At the time of the army mutiny Commandant J.J. Flynn was second in command 
to McSweeney. It appears that he had received, on 9 March 1924, McSweeney’s verbal 
permission to be absent from Baldonnell for twenty-four hours so that he could attend to 
private business in Sligo. On his return he found Baldonnell had been taken over by 
troops from the Dublin command and that McSweeney had absconded. He was arrested 
and spent ten days in Arbour Hill Detention Barracks. On 21 March 1924 he was released 
having given his ‘parole to come up for trial when duly summoned’.84 About four weeks 
after his release he wrote to the Minister for Home Affairs, Kevin O’Higgins, giving an 
understandably biased account of his travails over the previous five or six weeks and 
seeking redress that he could not get elsewhere. He explained that he had been on leave 
and how he had been arrested on his return and spent ten days in Arbour Hill. He 
indicated that he had made his loyalty to the State known to the Chief of Staff. While he 
was considered to have been absent without leave he was not tried on any charge. While 
in Arbour Hill he had been referred to as a mutineer though not allowed to associate with 
that group of officers. On his release he was initially not allowed back into Baldonnell 
but was summoned there on 5 April and had an interview with the Chief of Staff to whom 
he explained his situation. As a result he was allowed back into Baldonnell but, while
82 U n d a te d  ‘Lis t  A ’ , ‘S u m m a ry  o f  O f f i c e r s ’ (M A ,  A / 1 1657).
83 G en era l  O ’D u f f y ’s S c h e m e ,  E x p la n a to ry  N o te s ,  p. 37  (N A I ,  D T ,  S .3 4 4 2 B ) .
84 D ec la ra t io n  s igned  J.J.  F ly n n ,  21 M a r .  1924 ( M A ,  M S  388).
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retaining his rank, was removed from his position as squadron commander and made 
subordinate to Capt. T.J. Maloney (the new commanding officer). Dissatisfied with the 
situation he felt compelled to tender his resignation and did so on 10 April 1924. On 13 
April he was informed by Capt. T.J. Maloney, apparently incorrectly, that his resignation 
had been accepted by the Chief of Staff. He was directed to report to the Staff Duties 
office in GHQ and was informed that he should proceed on leave while awaiting the 
decision of the Army Council as to whether his resignation would be accepted or not. 
Citing the fact that those at the top of the Air Service were being given greater 
recognition for their service with foreign armies than he was receiving as an old IRA man 
Flynn pleaded that, as the only remaining flying officer at Baldonnell with an IRA record 
and continued to support the Treaty. He requested Kevin O’Higgins to have the whole
85matter investigated and that he should be allowed withdraw his resignation.
The case was referred by Kevin O’Higgins’ office, to the office of the President 
of the Executive Council. The President referred the matter to General O’Duffy, GOC 
Forces, for his opinion. It was suggested that there might have been a mistake and that the 
treatment of Flynn might have been harsh.86 O ’Duffy recommended that Flynn not be 
allowed withdraw his resignation. He did soon many grounds. Not least of these was that 
Flynn could not prove that he was not absent on 10 March 1924. O’Duffy’s put great 
emphasis on the fact that Flynn had been ‘absence from his post at the time practically 
the entire staff absconded from Baldonnel’ stating that that it was more than a 
coincidence. The most damning comment was that which cited Flynn’s letter of 
resignation in which he had expressed opinions that echoed those of Tobin and Dalton the 
chief mutineers. Citing also Flynn’s ‘mutinous and indisciplined [sic] remarks’, and his 
intemperate language in his letter of resignation and his intemperate behaviour when 
dealing with the Chief of Staff, O ’Duffy suggested that he ‘could not reaccept him in the
87anny in any capacity’ and recommended accordingly.
The tone and inference in O’Duffy’s assessment of ex-Commandant J.J. Flynn is 
possibly more telling than the content as it emphasises the summary manner in which 
officers were found to have absconded, and subsequently discharged, without due
83 J.J. F lynn  to K e v in  O ’H ig g in s ,  20  A p r .  1924, o f f i c e r ’s p e rso n a l  f i le  (M A ,  S D R  975).
86 U n d a ted  E x ec u t iv e  C o u n c il  n o te ,  o ff ice r ,s  pe rsonal  f i le  ( M A ,  S D R  975).
87 G O C F  to P re s id en t ,  7 M a y  1924 ,  O f f ic e r ’s pe rsonal  f i le  ( M A ,  S D R  975) .
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process. Flynn had the misfortune to be absent from Baldonnell about the time that three 
officers had absconded with armament and a vehicle and so certain suspicions were 
attached to him at GFIQ. Having been arrested and lodged in Arbour Hill he was put in 
the same category as those officers who had been arrested at a meeting of mutineers held 
in Delvin’s hotel on 18 March 1924.88 Thereafter his own intemperate behaviour gave the 
GOCF and the COS sufficient cause to confirm his discharge.89 It appears that neither 
GHQ nor GOCF had any solid evidence against Flynn and though he had been arrested, 
and subsequently released, with a view to being charged he was never formally tried. 
While it might be considered that Flynn’s greatest crime was to speak ill of his superiors 
the records suggest that he was discharged, without due process, on the suspicion of 
being absent for twenty-four hours. It is probable that many others were summarily 
dismissed in a similar manner as no formal charges were ever brought against alleged 
mutineers -  not even Tobin and Dalton, the ringleaders.
The last of the four ex-RAF pilots to be let go was Wilfred D. Hardy who was 
discharged on 27 June 1924 though, as an officer with special qualifications he might 
have been retained.90 His commanding officer, Major T.J. Maloney, argued strongly in 
favour of his retention and protested ‘at the proposed demobilisation of a good officer 
who was in line to be appointed flight commander’ and suggested that Hardy had been
selected for discharge on the basis that he was non-Catholic.91 Maloney had apparently
not been told that Eoin O’Duffy, in his capacity as General Officer Commanding the 
Forces, had indicated to the Executive Council on 29 May 1924 that Hardy had two 
brothers in the Six Counties Special Constabulary and was being dismissed on those 
grounds.92
As the ex-RAF pilot group at Baldonnell were notionally exempt from 
demobilisation it could be concluded that GHQ made maximum use of the confused 
circumstances surrounding the mutiny to dismiss as many of that group as possible. In 
doing so they were, in effect, pandering to the prejudices of those, both serving and 
demobilised, whose main objection was to the proposed retention of ex-British officers
88 See  O ’H a lp in ,  Defending Ireland, pp  45 -52 .
89 G O C F  to  p re s id en t  E C , 7 M a y  1924 ,  O f f i c e r ’s p e rso n a l  f i le  (M A ,  S D R  975) .
90 O f f i c e r ’s pe rsonal  File  (M A ,  S D R  1187).
91 O C  A i r  S e rv ice  to  C O S ,  2 0  Ju n e  1924,  O f f i c e r ’s pe rso n a l  file  (M A ,  S D R  1187).
92 G en .  E. O ’D u ffy  to  P re s id en t ,  E C , 29  M a y  1924  (N A I ,  D T  S .3720) .
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who had no pre-truce service. The pilot group, even though all were of Irish birth or 
origin, represented a considerable concentration of such officers and were an easy target 
for demobilisation. In effect no distinction was made between the RAF who left Ireland 
in 1922 and a small number of ex-RAF Irishmen who served the state well during the 
Civil War. One of the ex-RAF pilots, J.C. Fitzmaurice, writing some years later 
described, in very strong terms, the position in which that group had found themselves in 
1924:
Unfortunately the stinking evils of patronage, nepotism and corruption, now rife in 
my native country and slowly bringing it to ruin, commenced raising their ugly 
heads about this [time] and we Irishmen who had held His Majesty’s commissions 
were treated with grave distrust by the politicians and the majority of the Old I.R. A.
93officers who always referred to us as the ‘Exers’ -  delightful term!
A similar, though less trenchant opinion was expressed by another officer:
I am, of course, well aware of the prejudice against British officers which is openly 
exhibited by some officers of the National Army and under the circumstances that 
prejudice is inevitable, but I make no apology for the part I played in the Great 
War.94
On the other hand Col. C.F. Russell, when asked by the mutiny inquiry committee if he 
had experienced hostility or jealousy on the grounds of being a former British officer, 
indicated that he had not experienced such treatment from either colleagues or from 
higher authority.95
93 J.C. F i tzm au r ice ,  u n p u b l ish ed  m e m o i r ,  p . 143 (E s ta te  o f  the  late  P. S e lw y n -Jo n e s ) .
94 ‘S ta te m en t  o f  Lt. Col.  T h o m a s  R y a n ’, 12 A p r .  1924 ( U C D A ,  M P ,  P 7 /C /8 ) .
93 C .F .  R usse l l  to  A r m y  c o m m it te e  o f  inqu iry ,  9 M a y  1924 ( U C D A ,  M P ,  P 7 /C /2 8 ) .
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Conclusion
After the death of Michael Collins it took a considerable length of time to implement his 
decisions regarding the extension of air operations in Cork and Kerry. This delay was 
symptomatic of the general failure to execute a rapid push into the south west that might 
have foreshortened the war. It took an inordinate length of time, three months, to recruit 
six additional pilots. This was most likely due to the informal manner in which the 
application and selection system appears to have operated.
Collin’s decision to purchase additional aircraft had to be reviewed by his 
successor resulting in a delay of about three weeks before the order was placed and a 
further five weeks before the order was filled. In the meanwhile there was a delay of six 
week before the decision to occupy Fennoy was implemented. There was no apparent 
reason for this delay as it transpired that the move south was not dependent on obtaining 
all the additional pilots or the additional aircraft.
At Tralee, with the aircraft under local control there was a modest return in terms 
of operational missions flown. The intelligence value was probably similarly modest. 
With the air operation out of Fennoy under the command of General Dalton and with 
control exercised at local level it is probable that the overall return, in tenns of the 
missions flown by four aircraft and crews, was equally modest. In the absence of 
contemporary records, such as reconnaissance reports, the effectiveness or otherwise of 
these escorts and patrols carried out cannot be gauged. After the Civil War it is doubtful 
if there was a good military reason for maintaining the Fermoy and Tralee detachments in 
place until well into 1924.
While the demobilisation mutiny processes had a significant affect on the Air 
Service considerably many more line officers than ex-British resigned or were 
discharged. In the absence of evidence to the contrary the posting of C.F. Dalton appears 
to have had little affect on the loyalty of Air Service officers. If he influenced anyone it 
appears more likely that it was line officers with pre-Truce service. While theoretically 
Air Service pilots were in a special category that was not subject to demobilisation the 
authorities appear to have taken advantage of the confused circumstances of the mutiny 
to discharge a significant proportion, four out of eleven, of the remaining ex-RAF pilots.
1 1 4
Though McSweeney may have felt aggrieved at the prospect o f being reduced in rank 
there is scant evidence of him having absconding -  at least not until he had tendered two 
letters of resignation. In all probability, as had been implied by Mulcahy in the Dail, he 
was held responsible for the loss of arms that occurred at Baldonnell.
On the basis of the known details in his particular case Comdt. J.J. Flynn appears 
to have had good reason to feel aggrieved with the way he was treated. The records 
suggest that he had the misfortune to be missing from Baldonnell at a critical juncture. It 
also suggests that proof of his absence would not have passed the test for being beyond 
all reasonable doubt. The discharge of many officers as a result of the mutiny appears to 
have been based on perception rather than hard evidence and due process. Lieut. Hardy’s 
only sin was to have two brothers in the Norther Irelans’s Special Constabulary while it is 
not possible to assess the rights or wrongs of Lieut. W. A. McCullagh’s demobilisation 
on medical grounds.
While it was inevitable that military expenditure would be reviewed and 
subsequently severely curtailed in the wake of the Civil War it is not at all clear on what 
precise financial basis the Department of Finance proposed to abolish the Air Service. It 
is obvious that the department was appalled by the cost of the war and most likely 
perceived aviation as being hugely expensive though it apparently cost less than a half of 
one percent of total Army expenditure for the period in question. Between May 1923 and 
March 1924 the Air Service appeared to survive more by accident than design. It was to 
take General O’Duffy’s scheme of reorganisation to put it on a slightly firmer footing.
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C H A P T E R  5
In the early months of 1924 the implementation of the Army demobilisation and 
reorganisation processes was proceeding with difficulty against the background of unrest 
leading to mutiny. The Department of Finance, on the basis of excessive cost, had 
expressed itself to be very sceptical about the necessity for any aviation element in a 
reorganised and reduced Army. In the meanwhile General Richard Mulcahy, as Minister 
for Defence and commander-in-chief of the forces, was loath to express an opinion on the 
retention of the Air Service even though he was in overall charge of the reorganisation 
process. Under the reorganised establishment proposed in February 1924, and 
subsequently abandoned, the Air Service was to have consisted of a headquarters and two 
squadrons with appointments for a total of forty-three officers. This suggested the 
possible establishment of an air service totalling about 500 all ranks. Arising out of the 
Army mutiny (or crisis) of March 1924 some thirteen of the thirty officers nominated to 
fill vacancies under a new establishment are recorded as having resigned. As this number 
included the GOC, adjutant, quartermaster and chief technical officer of the Air Service, 
a camp commandant, backed up by troops from the Dublin Command was appointed to 
administer the aerodrome. Given the ambivalence of the post-Collins Army leadership 
where a military aviation unit dominated by ex-RAF pilots was concerned and the 
parsimonious attitude of the Department of Finance the future of the Air Service was not 
assured.
The following section of this study will examine the reorganisation process that 
resulted in the Air Service being reduced to a somewhat nominal Army Air Corps of 151 
all ranks. The viability of the flying organisation of the October 1924 establishment will 
be assessed in the context of a predominantly infantry army. It is also intended to 
identify and examine the Army’s air policy as reflected in day-to-day decisions on 
aircraft purchases and organisation in the period 1924 to about 1936. The ill-defined 
concept of the command of military aviation will be examined against the background of
P O L IC Y , O R G A N IS A T IO N  A N D  C O M M A N D , 1924  -  1936
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frequent and short-term changes of commanding officer. The reasons for the successive 
appointments of two inexpert (in an aviation context) army officers, Major J.J. Liston and 
Major P.A. Mulcahy, to the command of the Air Corps in the 1930s require examination 
as does the concept of the position of director of military aviation.
The 1924 reorganisation
In March 1924, as a consequence of the mutiny, General Eoin O’Duffy had been 
appointed Inspector General and General Officer Commanding Forces (GOCF). His main 
function was to oversee the completion of the demobilisation and reorganisation 
processes that had eluded General Mulcahy. O ’Duffy’s reorganisation proposal provided 
for an Army Air Corps of 155 all ranks as the air element of an Army of 18,966 all 
ranks.' It is necessary to examine the rationale behind O’Duffy’s scheme of 
reorganisation to understand the position of the aviation element in the context of an 
infantry army. As the scheme was basically one for the reorganisation of the Army in the 
absence of a government or a ministerial statement on defence policy O’Duffy had to 
make assumptions in terms of what threat was to be guarded against. He decided to couch 
his proposals not in terms of national defence against external aggression but rather in 
tcnns of the threat to national security still posed by the IRA:
The question to be now considered is whether the Saorstat has greater reason to be 
apprehensive of an attack by forces from outside the state or an attack by Forces 
within its boundaries. The experience of the past two years combined with present 
day knowledge would go to show that internal disorder is more imminent and more 
to be apprehensive of. We must next decide as to the most effective arm of the 
service to cope with internal disorder. Again our experience has shown that the 
highly trained and mobile Infantry man was the most effective weapon used against 
the Irregulars while the practical utility of the Air Service was not considerable.
'G e n e ra l  O ’D u ffy s  s c h e m e ,  ‘A r m y  o rg a n is a t io n ’, pp  2 8 -9 ,  G O C F  to E x e c u t iv e  C o u n c i l ,  2 M a y  1924 (N A I ,  
D T ,  S .3442B ).
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While the above statement might be considered more appropriate to a preamble outlining 
defence philosophy it was not cited in order to elucidate military doctrine but rather to 
minimise the value and potential of army aviation in the an internal security context of 
the state’s defence requirements and to justify the establishment of what was to be a 
token Air Corps. O’Duffy’s scheme of reorganisation was very heavily weighted towards 
‘the highly trained and mobile infantry man’ and in effect established the precedence of 
an ‘infantry arm’ that was to dominate the military doctrine of the Defence Forces.2 This 
precedence was reflected in the essentially infantry nature of the establishment of GHQ 
and its three military departments (Chief of Staff, Adjutant General and Quartermaster 
General), the three territorial Commands and the Curragh Training Camp; nine brigades 
and twenty-seven infantry battalions. The ‘infantry arm’, in effect, comprised upwards of 
75% of the reorganised Army.
While the case stated for the leadership structures, that demonstrated the 
precedence of the infantiy ethos, were detailed and cohesive some of the cases made in 
support of the inclusion of individual corps and services were general and vague and 
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the individual nuances of standard military corps 
roles and functions. In particular the cases stated for such corps as the Artillery, 
Armoured Car, Air and Cavalry suggest that those drafting them lacked conviction as to 
the military value of, and necessity for, some of the more technical elements of a modem 
army.
The cases stated for the Army Transport Corps made a recommendation for no 
less than 407 all ranks and 282 horses for the Horse Transport division, in a Corps of 
1142 all ranks, without suggesting how such equine resources would function in an 
internal security army. The composition of the Army Corps of Engineers case indicated a 
more professional approach and probably reflects the superior staff work of its first 
director, Col. C. F. Russell, who had initially impressed as director of civil aviation and 
second-in-command of the Military Air Service, and more recently as OC Railway 
Maintenance and Protection Corps. In general terms the explanatory notes portrayed the 
infantry arm as being indispensable and the other corps and services as optional extras, 
reflecting the belief that only the infantry soldier was capable of affecting a defence
2 Ibid; John  P. D u g g a n ,  A history of the Irish Army (D u b l in ,  199 1), passim.
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against an internal threat. It is known that, while the reorganisation scheme bore Eoin 
O’Duffy’s signature when submitted to the Executive Council, the document had in fact 
been drafted by Col. Dan Elogan who later became Army Chief of Staff.3
The case made for an Army Air Corps in the new organisation was unstructured 
and vague and largely aspirational in tone. It clearly indicated that any aviation element 
established would, at best, have but a very minor and peripheral function in the overall 
scheme of defence. In the context of an army structured for internal security and 
dispersed around the country largely in the manner of the garrison units of the previous 
regime no operational function was envisaged for military aviation. The main arguments 
for the inclusion of an ‘Army Air Corps’ could be seen to be somewhat contradictory:
The question as to whether our financial resources would permit making the Army 
more complete and efficient by means of an adequate air service was to certain 
extent answered by the actual existence of such a unit containing personnel, plant
and machinery and machines The necessity for the inclusion of an Air Service
in the organisation of a modem Army is scarcely necessary to demonstrate
.................Having regard to our limited finances it is not possible to build up an air
force of adequate strength to afford protection against external aggression.4
While it was indicated that it was not necessary to state an ideological case for an air 
element in a modem army, it is obvious from the context that the main argument in 
favour of including an air element in the new establishment was that such an organisation 
already existed. While the case suggests that the inclusion of an air element in 
predominantly infantry army would make it more complete and efficient it was also 
contended that the effectiveness of military aviation in an internal security situation was 
not significant. In effect the case stated for an Army Air Corps was so lacking in 
conviction that it provided scope for higher authority to include or exclude such an 
element.
3 G enera l  E. O ’D u ffy ,  let ter  re C o l .  D a n  H o g an ,  7 M a y  193 0  (N L I ,  O ’D u f fy  P a p e rs ,  B o x  5, F o ld e r  40 ) .  I 
am indeb ted  to D r .  Fea rg h a l  M c G a r r y  fo r  th is  in fo rm a t io n  an d  re fe rence .
4G enera l  O ’D u f f y ’s s c h e m e  , E x p la n a to ry  n o te s ,  1 Ju ly  1924 ,  pp  3 6 -7  (N A I ,  D T ,  S .3 4 4 2 B ) .
119
It is also obvious from the context that no review had taken place to establish the 
effectiveness, or otherwise, of the Air Service during the Civil War. It can be argued that 
such a review could not have taken place. There are various indications that Gen. 
O’Duffy and Col. Hogan did not have available any record of the operational use of 
aircraft for the period July 1922 to May 1923 on which to make such a judgement. The 
principal repository of material relating to armed aerial reconnaissance patrols and 
missions during the Civil War, the files of the commanders-in-chief (Collins and 
Mulcahy) which now constitute the Mulcahy Papers in UCDA, had been commandeered 
and retained by Mulcahy when he resigned in March 1924. In addition no record appears 
to have survived of the details of the air patrol and escort missions earned out by the 
Fermoy and Tralee air detachments in the period from October 1922 to May 1923. A 
particular instance is indicative of the GHQ’s poor appreciation, and inadequate record, 
of military aviation activity in the early years. In early 1925, GHQ, while still trying to 
decide McSweeney’s severance pay, found it necessary to write to the retired General 
Mulcahy to inquire about the former officer’s service as GOC Air Corps in 1922. 
Mulcahy’s succinct reply suggests that he had little appreciation of McSweeney’s 
involvement in military aviation during the Civil War despite the fact that he, Mulcahy, 
had the records of the period in his possession.5
In such circumstances it is not easy to understand how O’Duffy and Hogan, 
neither of whom were on the staff of GHQ for the full duration of the Civil War or had 
expertise in air matters, could have made a valid appraisal of the effectiveness or 
otherwise of military aviation. Appropriate reflection might have indicated to them that 
Collins had demonstrated considerable faith in the intelligence value of military aviation 
in an internal security situation. The appraisal of the effectiveness of military aviation, 
apparently drafted by Hogan and endorsed by O’Duffy, was most probably based on 
inadequately informed perception.
The submission on the proposed Army Air Corps was not without progressive 
elements. It recognised that the scheme for pilot recruitment and training instigated in late 
1922 had been singularly unsuccessful and therefore outlined a scheme for the
3 D e p a r tm en t  o f  G e n e ra l  S t a f f  to R is tea rd  O ’M a o lch a th a ,  24  Jan . 1925;  R e p ly  d a te d  25 Jan . 1925,
O ff ic e r ’s pe rsonal  f i le  ( M A ,  S D R  3718) .
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recruitment of civilians that would become the cadet intake system, firstly for the Air 
Corps and eventually for the Anny generally. The case for the future ‘Army Air Corps’ 
was summarised in simple terms:
There is therefore, no alternative but to decide what is the smallest aerial unit which
would be sufficient to keep progressive thought stimulated to give our troops
a knowledge of the value of aerial co-operation, to train a small number of Infantry 
as Pilots, and for the purposes of research and watching the progress of other 
countries. After due consideration it was decided that one squadron consisting of 
155 all ranks would meet these requirements. An annual purchase of one or two 
aeroplanes of the latest design would keep the unit conversant with modem 
developments.............6
However, in the context of Army structures, and of command and control, the A nny Air 
Corps was put in a uniquely disadvantageous position. The explanatory notes on the 
reorganisation scheme as drafted extolled the merits of having the various corps 
disciplines represented in the GHQ staffs and of having corps staffs in the three 
Command Headquarters (Eastern, Southern and Western Commands) and the Curragh
7Training Camp and similarly having corps units in the brigades in each command. In 
sharp contrast the Air Corps, while designated as an army corps for the purposes of the 
1923 Defence Act, was outside the GHQ / command / brigade chain of command. There 
were to be no air staff officers in GHQ or at the territorial command level. Similarly the 
minimalist organisation proposed could not be dispersed throughout the commands or 
brigades in the manner of other service corps units. At the same time neither did it have 
the status as an independent service. The Corps’ only tenuous connection to the Anny 
chain of command was that it was to be subject to the inspection of the ‘first assistant 
chief staff officer of the Chief of S taffs department’ - a mainly administrative 
functionary apparently not requiring aviation expertise. In effect, in terms of strength,
6G enera l  O ’D u f f y ’s sc h e m e ,  ‘E x p la n a to ry  n o te s  to E x e c u t iv e  C o u n c i l ’, 1 Ju ly  1924 ,  p .36  (N A I ,  D T  
S .3442B ).
7Ibid, p . 23.
8 Ibid, p .2,
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organisation and structure the proposed ‘Army Air Corps’ was to be a corps in name 
only. Similarly, in future years, the Air Corps was never to be dispersed, either in 
squadron or flight strength, throughout the country in support of commands or brigades in 
the manner of the units of other combatant corps. For some years after the 
implementation of the establishment under Orders No. 3, which came into effect on 1 
October 1924, the Air Corps was, in effect, a tenant on an inadequately staffed aerodrome 
in a military camp garrisoned by various detachments of the 7th Brigade in the territorial 
command of GOC, Eastern Command.9 As late as 1928 ‘B’ Company 7th Battalion, 7th 
Brigade is cited as being ‘attached to Baldonnnell for garrison duties’.10
While it had been proposed that a single squadron of 155 all ranks, acquiring one 
or two new aircraft a year to keep up to date technically, would fulfil the aviation 
requirements of the Army there is good reason to believe that the authors of the scheme 
did not believe this themselves. In 1925, while making a case for substantial 
improvements to the October 1924 establishment, Major T.J. Maloney, the senior air 
officer to survive the mutiny and demobilisation processes and now OC Air Corps, 
recalled how he had originally been directed, in April 1924, to draw up a scheme of 
reorganisation based on one squadron:
I received specific instructions that the new organisation of the Corps was to 
consist merely of a maintenance party sufficient to keep aircraft and equipment in a 
serviceable condition while the existence and the future of the Corps were being 
considered.11
At the time Maloney, apparently reluctantly, recommended an organisation comprising 
about thirty-three officers, fifty-eight NCOs and 141 privates, a total of 232 all ranks and 
remarkably close to the maximum number (242) for the Air Service as recorded in June 
1923 when total Army numbers were over 50,000. In General O’Duffy’s reorganisation 
scheme Maloney’s proposal was reduced to about two thirds of the strength required for a
^Orders  N o .  3, D e f e n c e  F o rc e s  (O rg a n is a t io n )  O rd e r ,  1 O c t .  1924 ,  pp  34 — 5; S t re n g th  re tu rn s  1924  to  1927 
(M A ,  L S 8 & L S 9 ) .
10 Sgt.  B i lly  N o r to n ,  ‘Un i t  h is to ry  7 lh In fan try  B a t ta l io n  1 9 2 3 /5 9 ’ in An Cosantoir, x l iv ,  n o .  8 (Sep t .  1983), 
pp  279-85 .
11 ‘A r m y  A ir  C o rp s  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ’, O C  A A C  to  C S O  G H Q ,  17 A p r .  1925 (M A ,  D O D  R M  11).
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squadron. Maloney considered that the establishment numbers eventually decided upon 
were totally inadequate to maintain the aircraft and equipment to a standard 
commensurate with military efficiency.12 While O ’Duffy had purported to establish a 
viable air unit Maloney apparently understood that the final size and shape of the Air 
Corps had yet to be decided and that the proposal for an establishment of 155 personnel 
was, in effect, little better than a care and maintenance organisation.
Not surprisingly there were many organisational and structural inadequacies in the 
proposed Army Air Coips. The most glaring of these was the fact that it had no provision 
for communications personnel -  no signals officer, wireless operators or a switchboard 
operator for the telephone exchange in Baldonnell. In the explanatory notes the matters of 
communications and meteorological facilities services at Baldonnell were referred to 
obliquely and then only in the context of international obligations in respect of civil 
aircraft operations.13 Elsewhere in O’Duffy scheme it was recognised that a signal or 
communications facility was most essential to the Anny Air Corps and suggested the 
matter of the provision of appropriate wireless equipment, was being carefully 
considered.14 Similarly no separate provision was made for such aerodrome staff as 
would be standard on military aerodromes elsewhere -  stores, messes, canteen, security 
and administration, not to mention transport and meteorology. While such functions may 
notionally have been included in the 155 all ranks the said establishment would have 
been totally inadequate for a corps headquarters, a flying unit and the aerodrome, 
garrison and support services of a military aerodrome.
Notwithstanding the contradictory aspects of the case stated by O ’Duffy his Anny 
Air Corps proposal was sufficiently coherent to ensure the retention of military aviation 
albeit in a rather tenuous condition and in token numbers. After being approved by the 
Executive Council, and before it was put into effect on 1 October 1924, the Anny Air 
Corps establishment had, by some unseen sleight-of-hand, been amended down to 151 
all- ranks.13 It may be no coincidence that this figure matched the actual strength return
12 Ibid.
13 G enera l  O ’D u f f y ’s S c h e m e ,  E x p la n a to ry  n o te s  to  E x e c u t iv e  C o u n c i l ,  1 Ju ly  1924 ,  p p  36-7  (N A I ,  D T  
S .3442B ) .
14 Ibid,  p .38.
13 O rd e rs  N o .  3, D e f e n c e  F o rc e s  (O rg a n is a t io n )  O rd e r ,  1 O c t . 1924.
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for August 1924. Between June 1923 and August 1924 Air Service numbers had been 
reduced, from 242 to 151, by demobilisation, the mutiny and natural wastage.16
At this juncture the newly designated Army Air Corps, with a token establishment 
and some twenty-two mainly obsolete aircraft had, at best, aspirations to perform viable 
aviation functions. During the rest of the 1920s the small air unit was, as Air Corps 
folklore would suggest, little better than a publicly funded aero club. The totally informal 
manner in which flying was initiated each morning and, in particular, Senator Oliver St. 
John Gogarty’s easy access to military aircraft in 1925/27 period would support this 
notion.17
The perilous position regarding the future of the Air Service as pertained in 
1923/24 is further illustrated by the proceedings of an ‘army finance meeting’, held on 5 
June 1924, and relating to the ‘purchase of spares &c., for the air force [sic] at 
Baldonnel’:
The army finance officer referred to the fact that authority had been obtained in the 
last financial year for a sum of £3000 to be expended on these spares, but owing to 
the circumstances at Baldonnel at the time at which the authority was secured 
action could not be taken towards the purchase in the last financial year.18
The meeting was informed that Commandant Maloney, who had recently taken charge of 
the Air Service, had requested that authority be granted for the spending, of the £3,000 
withheld the previous financial year, in 1924/25.19 In effect it had originally been 
considered by higher authority that unspecified circumstances pertaining during the 
period 1 April 1923 to 31 March 1924 had rendered it wise to withhold monies 
previously authorised for the purchase of spares. The adverse circumstances probably 
included the uncertainty of Army mutiny and possibly included the considerable 
reservations of Finance regarding the necessity for the retention of military aviation in a 
reorganised and much reduced army.
16 L o ca l  S treng th  R e tu rn s ,  29  A u g .  19 2 4  (M A ,  L S9).
17 ‘N o.  1 S q u ad ro n ,  A r m y  A ir  Se rv ice ,  D u ty  o f  d u ty  o f f i c e r ’, Sept .  1924 (M A ,  M S  65 8 ) ;  U l ick  O ’C o n n o r ,  
Oliver St. John Gogarty; a poet and his times (L o n d o n ,  1981),  pp  2 2 7 -3 5 .
18 M in u tes ,  A rm y  f in a n c e  m ee t in g ,  5 J u n e  1924  ( M A ,  A /0 6 9 5 9 ) .
19 Ibid.
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With adequate signs that the retention of military aviation was not a priority with 
Finance and that GHQ was ambivalent on the matter, the withholding of authorised 
public funding may have been informally arranged between the two departments while 
awaiting the outcome of demobilisation and reorganisation. It is possible that purchase 
action was deliberately delayed until close to the end of the financial year 1923/24 in the 
belief that there was not sufficient time to spend the allotted monies while appearing to 
be supportive of the Air Service. With tentative arrangements made for the purchase and 
delivery of spares the AFO sought sanction from Finance.
For some time the Army Air Service has suffered neglect as regards the 
maintenance of the necessary air craft and at a recent meeting of the Council of 
Defence it was decided that efforts should be made to render this branch more 
efficient.20
Stating that the COS considered that it would not be practicable to obtain delivery of 
more than half of a consignment costing almost £6,000 before the end of the financial 
year sanction was sought for ‘Air craft spares and fittings up to a sum of £3000 out of the 
monies provided for the current year’.21 On 10 March 1924, the day McSweeney had 
resigned, Finance replied stating that ‘the Minister for Finance has no objections to 
spending £3000 out of existing Army funds’.22 Apparently due to the mutiny Defence did 
not proceed and did not pursue the matter again until late May 1924. The army finance 
officer then explained that when the time came to inform the Air Service that that 
sanction had been granted for the purchase of spares authorise it was found that General 
McSweeney had left the service as a result of the recent Army mutiny and that no Air 
Service officer had been appointed to replace him. Stating that the air force was then in 
the charge of a responsible officer, the AFO requested that Commandant Maloney be 
given the necessary authority.
20 A F O  to D F ,  1 M ar .  1924 (M A ,  A C /2 /2 /2 ) .
21 Ibid.
22 Sec  D F  to  A F O ,  10 M ar .  1924 ( M A ,  A C /2 /2 /2 ) .
23 A F O  to S ec  D F , 24  M a y  1924  (M A ,  A C /2 /2 /2 ) .
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The sanction for the spending of the £3000 in the 1924/25 financial year was 
renewed.24 Subsequent to negotiations with the Aircraft Disposal Company T.J. Maloney 
ordered £1931 worth of aircraft and engine spares. On the direction of Finance J.F 
Crowley and Partners, Consulting Engineers, 16 Victoria St., London, acted as some 
form of purchasing agents with Maloney ‘being associated’ ‘as technical advisor with 
knowledge of what actually was required’. Given that the firm apparently had no aviation 
expertise it is not clear what its exact function was. A cynical observer might understand 
that some fonn of agency commission was being paid by Defence, without good cause, to 
consultants who were not expert in the field.25 While £1,000 was paid to the suppliers in 
advance to ensure delivery before the August week-end the full consignment was not 
completed until December 1924.26 Before the end of the financial year Finance 
sanctioned the expenditure of a further £1,118 on airframe and engine spares. Goods to 
the value of £1,283 were ordered from various companies and eventually delivered and 
paid for.27
It is not at all clear what combination of circumstances contributed to the failure 
to expend the authorised monies in 1923/24. In the normal course of events the first 
commandment in relation to defence purchases directed that purchase action would be 
initiated early in the financial year to ensure that the materiel was acquired and paid for in 
the financial year. If conditions prior to March 1924 had not been conducive to 
expenditure on aviation spares it is not understood how the purchases could have been 
contemplated when the alleged mutinous activity was at its worst. Even had the 
circumstances been right it is probable that the goods could not have been delivered and 
paid for within the financial year. The delay prior to March 1924 appears to have been 
deliberate and to have been based on general antipathy to the survival of the Air Service 
in the reorganisation processes. After 10 March 1924 the pretext cited was that there was 
no responsible air officer available to command the Air Service. Having initiated the 
purchase action at the last available moment it is possible that it suited the Department of 
Defence that McSweeney had resigned when he did. Thereafter Defence appears to have
24 D F  to  A F O ,  13 Ju n e  1924 ( M A ,  A C 2 /2 /2 ) .
25 M in u te s  o f  a rm y  f in a n c e  m ee t in g ,  17 Ju ly  1924 ;  T .J .  M a lo n e y  to A D C ,  23 Ju ly  1924 (M A ,  A C /2 /2 /2 ) .
26 J.F. C ro w le y  to A F O ,  30  Ju ly  1924;  O C  A C  to  A F O ,  27 Sept .  1924; O C  A C  to  A F O ,  19 D ec.  1924  (M A ,  
A C /2 /2 /2 ) .
27 O C  A C  to C O S ,  31 D ec .  1924; Q M G  to  A F O  5 A u g .  1925 ( M A ,  A C /2 /2 /2 ) .
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awaited the fruits of O’Duffy’s deliberations, with the distinct possibility that no air 
element would be proposed, before deciding to proceed. A token Air Corps having been 
included in the proposed reorganisation Defence apparently no longer had difficulty in 
arranging sanction and the purchase of over £3,000 worth of spares in 1924/25.
The Army’s Air Corps policy 1924 to 1935
In 1925, having been requested by GHQ to do so, and on the basis that his previous
proposals had been reduced by one third, Major T. J. Maloney supplied a proposal for a 
new organisation and establishment. He proposed increases in personnel, from 151 to 223 
all ranks, to provide for a self contained fighting unit capable of cooperating with the 
other special services and for infantry co-operation. He also recommended that provision 
be made for the training of ten cadets as pilots, and for observers and technicians as well 
as provision for unspecified civil aviation requirements. In numerical terms the main 
increase requested was in the ‘total squadron establishment’, from the existing sixty-eight 
all ranks, to a new figure of 139 for three flights of eight aircraft each. Despite being 
instructed to make such a submission Maloney’s proposal appears to have disappeared 
without trace. In the context o f the retrenchment in Army numbers being imposed by 
Finance it is not surprising that an increase of one third in Air Corps numbers was 
unlikely to be approved at that time.
Notwithstanding the rejection of Maloney’s April 1925 proposal moves were 
apparently being made to improve organisational and policy matters. The context stated 
by the General Staff, however, does not quite ring true:
During the period under review [1923 to 1927] all endeavours were directed
towards perfecting the organisation of the corps and train suitable personnel to fill 
vacancies in future military and civilian developments. The army crisis of 1924 
gave a very serious setback to the development of the [Air] Corps. In addition, the
organisation allowed in Orders No. 3 was found to be absolutely inadequate. Very
28little progress was made until 1926.
28 U n d a te d  ‘M e m o r a n d u m  on  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  th e  fo rces  1923 -  2 7 ’ ( M A ,  M M /1 ,  A /0 8 7 6 ) .
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The above only serves to disguise the antipathy of the Army and DOD to the future of 
military aviation and the fact that little positive was been achieved in the period. Maloney 
would have said that the 1924 Establishment was designed to provide little more than 
care and maintenance. The mention of progress in 1926 is most likely an oblique 
reference to the fact that in April 1926 sixteen officers were attracted to the corps for a 
course of flying instruction. In the context of the review it was suggested that a new 
organisation ‘which had been passed by the organisation board’ would ‘allow of the 
efficient organisation of the corps’. The Army’s main aims for the Air Corps were as 
follows:
To train a sufficient number of flying officers and mechanics to man the proposed
peace-time coast defence and army co-operation units.
To create a reserve of flying officers and mechanics capable of filling appointments
9Qin future civil aviation concerns.
On achieving the above it was proposed to develop other aviation aspects for the benefit 
of the country. These briefly were the setting up a meteorological service at Baldonnell, 
the conduct of aerial photography for survey and archaeological purposes and 
cooperation with the Ministry of Fisheries. The carrying of American mails from Cobh to 
England and the continent, and the setting up of a passenger service between Dublin and
30London -  in effect the civil policy supported by Collins in 1921/22 - were also foreseen. 
The few instances of interaction with the Army in the 1920s were in the context of 
exercises in September 1925 in the Curragh area and in September 1926 in connection 
with the manoeuvres involving the Eastern and Curragh Commands. In the latter exercise 
a flight of three aircraft from No. 1 Squadron operated from the Phoenix Park in support 
of the red anny while a second flight supported the blue army of the Curragh. The main 
functions of the pilots and observers were to provide aerial observation of the opposing
29 Ibid.
30
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armies, to take oblique photographs of their dispositions as observed and to keep a
31complete record of all messages and reconnaissance activities.
However, while the General Staff appeared to be proposing the nucleus of an Air 
Corps primarily capable of coastal defence and army cooperation roles the reality was 
somewhat different. Early in 1926 the COS reminded C.F. Russell that the Minister had 
adopted a three year expansion programme for military aviation. This was to consist
39mainly of ‘the completion of one complete fighter squadron by the year 1928/29’. In 
fact six new Bristol F2b Fighters had already been purchased (at a cost of over £15,366), 
and had been delivered in October and November 1925.33 It is not clear how the two, 
apparently separate and differing plans, were to be reconciled by GHQ. In the event no 
dichotomy arose as neither plan was pursued to completion. The fighter squadron did not 
materialise and the new aircraft, the primary role of which, in RAF service, was army 
cooperation, were initially used as the advanced training aircraft for the 1926/28 ‘wings’ 
course and, much latter, in army cooperation training while coastal defence and army 
cooperation were apparently abandoned -  at least for the time being.34
The consideration of more substantive roles for the Air Corps by the General 
Staff, and the later dispatch of pilots on courses with the RAF possibly stems from 
General Hugo McNeill’s appreciation of the increasing importance of military aviation in 
defence. During the military mission to the US in 1926/27 McNeill had informal 
discussions, on air matters, with US Army Air Corps officers. He was particularly 
interested in the range of courses that might be availed of by Irish Air Corps officers. On 
his return he made observations on the benefits of the courses available in the Tactical 
Flying School. In particular he considered that courses dealing with observation, attack, 
pursuit and bombardment’ and with cooperation with ground forces and independent air 
missions would be of particular value to Irish Air Corps officers’.35 However no courses 
were availed of subsequently. It is possible the as a result of these discussions McNeill 
may have initiated the adoption of an army cooperation philosophy and have influenced
11 Obituary, ‘Commandant Maloney’, in An t-Oglach, 3 October 1925; ‘Operations Order No. 5’, Col. C.F. 
Russell, 16 Sept. 1926, P.J. Hassett papers (in possession of Capt. Eoin Hassett).
32 Council of Defence minutes, 3 Feb. 1926; COS to OC AC, 3 Feb. 1926 (MA, MS 708).
Anthony P. Kearns, ‘The Irish Air Corps; a history’ in Scale aircraft modelling, 3, no. 10 (July 1981), p. 
448.
34 Aircraft log books BF 17 -  BF 22 (AC Museum).
33 Undated ‘Report of military mission to USA, 1926-7’, pp 136-7 (MA, MM/3).
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the abandonment of the Minister’s three-year fighter squadron programme. The 
abandonment of the fighter squadron option and the informal establishment of an army 
co-operation squadron, in 1930, would support this theory.
The 18,000 plus establishment of the 1924 Army would be down to 6,545 by 
1931/32 though the Air Corps establishment would increase marginally, to 160 by 1 
December 1928 and to 214 by 1931/32.36 The initial increase was a number of 
appointments that were specifically required to facilitate the commissioning of the seven 
cadets of the 1926/28 ‘wings’ class. (See chapter 6). The later increase, that introduced a 
Workshops Branch in AC HQ, may have been in response to the maintenance 
requirements of the eight Vickers Vespa army cooperation aircraft bought in 1930 and 
1931. The purchase of these aircraft confirmed army cooperation to be the Air Corps’ 
main combat support role and the period 1930 to 1935 was dominated by training for 
same.
In the years 1929/30 and 1930/1931 a substantial investment in such aircraft was 
authorised. The Council of Defence meeting of 4 November 1929 noted that OC Air 
Corps had made a final recommendation as to the types of aircraft to be purchased;
1. 4 Army Co-operation Vickers Vespa aircraft c/w (Geared Jaguar) engine @ 
£4,500 - £ 1 8 .0 0 0 -0 -0 .
2. Equipment, wireless, camera, navigation lights, observers' instruments, 
annament and other service equipment @ £442 per machine - £1768. 0. 0.
3. One workshop tool kit Jaguar - £30 - 0 - 0 .
4. Three Avro Type 621 Training aircraft @ £1700 - £5.100 -  0 -  0.37
The meeting approved the expenditure of £24,898 and specified that the seven 
aircraft should be supplied before 31 March 1930.38 Though only one aircraft, an Avro 
621, was delivered before 31 March a total of £20,905 was spent before that date, 
indicating that the greater bulk of the purchases had been made within the designated
i() O’Halpin, Defending Ireland, p. 87; DFR 23/1929, amending Orders No. 3, 1 Dec. 1928; Peace 
establishments 1931 -  1932 (Stationery Office, 1931), pp 20-23.
37 COD minutes, 4 Nov. 1929 (MA).
38 Ibid.
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financial year. Capital expenditure, on aircraft and armament, to a total of £23,957 was 
incurred during 1930/31. The major part of this was probably the £19,768 for the 
purchase of four more Vickers Vespa aircraft.39 An important aspect of the increasing 
emphasis on army cooperation was the participation of two pilots, W.P. Delamere and 
L.T. Kennelly, as students on an Army Co-operation Course at Old Sarum, Witshire, 
from 5 May 1930 to 25 July 1930 40 Participation in the Army’s combined exercises in 
the autumn of 1933 was one of the more practical training aspects taken on at that time. A 
detachment of the 1st Co-operation squadron was placed under command to the Eastern 
Command brigade that constituted the Yellow Forces and was based at the Phoenix Park 
from 9 to 25 September 1933. The main emphasis was on the production of oblique and 
vertical photographs to accompany reconnaissance reports.41
Without a specific establishment for a dedicated squadron establishment the 
Vickers Vespas were initially operated by ‘B’ Flight of No. 1 Training Squadron of Air 
Coips Schools, initially within the 160 all ranks limit of 1928, and later within the 214 all 
ranks limit set by the peace establishments 1931/32. Eventually, in October 1934, an 
increased Air Corps establishment of 284 all-ranks provided for the ‘1st Co-operation 
Squadron [Training] Cadre’ of fifty-one all-ranks for the operation and maintenance of 
the Vespa aircraft.42
In other ways the GFIQ policy for the Air Corps in the period 1929 to 1935.was 
more enlightened than might have been expected at a time of financial retrenchment.43 At 
a time when pupil intake was very modest the older training aircraft, the Avro 504Ks and 
DH Moths were replaced with a total of seventeen Avro machines (three Avro 621 s, four 
Avro 626s, six Avro 631 Cadets and four Avro 636s). More importantly a decision was 
taken to send students on an RAF flying instructors’ course. With no evidence of prior 
consultation with the Air Corps on the matter GHQ initially indicated that it had been 
intended to send two officers, Capt. O.A.P. Heron and Lieut. A.G. Russell, to the Central 
Flying School, RAF Wittering, in February 1932. Within days it was indicated that the
39 Kearns, ‘Irish Air Corps’, p. 449; ‘Cost statement of Army Air Corps 1926/27 to 1940/41’ Annex G, 
Report and finding of the committee, 10 Jan. 1942 (MA, ACS 22/23).
40 Officers’ history sheets (MA, SDR 664; SDR 4258)
41 ‘Administrative Order No. T, 11 Sept. 1933, P.J. Hassett papers (in possession of Capt. Eoin Hassett).
42 Log books, Vespa I to VII (AC Museum); Peace establishment, 22 Oct. 1934 (in my possession).
43 Duggan, Irish Army, pp 160-5.
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second officer was to be replaced by Lieut. D.J. McKeown.44 Early in January 1932 the 
officer commanding, Major J.J. Liston, was made aware that a further change was being 
directed, apparently by the Chief of Staff.
It has been decided to send one officer of the Air Corps to attend the Central Flying 
School instructors’ course, R.A.F., Wittering, which will commence on 2nd 
February, 1932 and end on 16th April, 1932. The Officer selected to attend the 
course is [Second] Lieutenant W. Keane.45
It is not clear by whom the original proposal was initiated. The absence, from the Air 
Corps file on the subject, of correspondence indicating how the course initially came 
about might suggest that the Air Ministry and or RAF had invited the Army to avail of a 
student placement on the particular course. In the matter of student selection it is not 
obvious what influences were brought to bear in order to effect changes and the final 
decision or what appreciation GHQ had of the abilities and potential of individual pilots. 
Possibly, after informal consultation with the newly established Office of the Director of 
Military Aviation in GHQ, it was considered that Capt. Oscar Heron, an ex-RAF pilot, 
was unacceptable to the Army leadership. Similarly Lieut. A. Russell and Lieut. D.J. 
McKeown (former pupils of the 1922/23 pilot intake), may have been considered to have 
been inadequately qualified while all three may have been considered too old. The 
eventual selection of Lieut. W.J. Keane, the senior graduate from the cadet class of 
1926/28 and the student who achieved the second highest marks on the officer and cadet 
course, could be considered to have been an inspired decision. If made with such 
considerations in mind it represented faith in the more highly motivated youth of the 
Corps that would have had neither RAF nor IRA baggage. (See Chapter 6) After the 
course 2/Lieut. Keane reported that he had become a ‘B’ category flying instructor, the 
highest qualification available to him:
44 OCAC to ACS, 25 Nov. 1931; OC AC to ACS, 28 Nov. 1931 (ACF/36/8, in iny possession).
43ACS to A/DMA, 11 Jan.1932 (ACF/36/8, in my possession).
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I got third place in the examination on ground subjects, qualified as an instrument 
or “blind” flying instructor and competed in the final of the aerobatic and inverted 
flying competition for the Clarkson trophy.46
In the seven months after his return 2/Lieut. Keane ran two instructors’ courses and 
qualified a total of fourteen pilots as flying instructors. He subsequently requested 
authorisation to return to Wittering for re-categorisation.47 While Major Liston supported 
his case and requested the appropriate sanction re-categorisation did not take place 
immediately. He eventually attended C.F.S. Wittering again in June/July 1935 where he
48underwent a refresher course and was graded as an ‘Al ’ category flying instructor. 
Changes in command
On 24 July 1925 Major T.J. Maloney was replaced by Colonel C.F. Russell as Officer 
Commanding Air Corps. The reasons and circumstances are not explained. On or about 
25 July Maloney received a written directive from the COS:
Colonel Charles F. Russell is appointed officer commanding, Army Air Corps as 
from this date. You will on receipt of this communication hand over to him all the 
duties of corps commander.
Pending further instructions you will act as squadron commander.49
There was no indication of dissatisfaction with the Maloney’s effectiveness in the 
appointment. Russell may well have been appointed as a result of his satisfactory record 
in various posts. The necessity to perform functions rising from his position vis-à-vis 
civil aviation may have been a minor factor -  technically he was still Director of Civil 
Aviation. Early in 1926 Russell was the DOD representative on an 'Interdepartmental 
committee on civil aviation’ where his function was to further the Minister’s desire that
46W.J. Keane to OC AC, 9 Feb. 1933 (ACF/36/8,in my possession).
47 Ibid.
48 W.J. Keane to OC AC, 20 July 1935 (ACF/36/8, in my possession).
49 COS to Maj. T. J. Maloney, 24 July 1925, MS/613 (in my possession).
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Defence should control all aviation within the Saorstat, civil and military and to have the 
government appoint a director of civil aviation, a civilian, answerable to the Department 
of Defence.50
While Russell was only to serve about two years as officer commanding at a time 
when the Air Corps had no identified function in a peacetime Army and when its future 
was not assured he had at least one notable achievement. In fact his abilities in the area of 
air staff duties and planning may have been factors in his being recalled to the Air Corps. 
Apparently soon after his return he was tasked with the drafting of a syllabus for the 
training of pupil officers and cadets. Though he was most likely under pressure to 
produce a syllabus in time for the start of the course in the summer of 1926 he apparently 
took his time, and possibly advice from RAF sources, before completing an instrument 
that would set a very satisfactory standard for ab initio flying training for many years and 
establish a very satisfactory basis for future syllabi.51 (See Chapter 6)
In a manner similar to the termination of Maloney’s service as officer 
commanding Russell’s military service ended abruptly and without satisfactory 
explanation. He is recorded as having been appointed OC 3 Brigade, Cork, with effect 
from 1 February and as reporting there on 8 February 1927. He was appointed to the 
GHQ Inspection Staff with effect from 25 April 1927 and retired on 30 April 1927. It is 
possible that his removal from the appointment of OC AC and his subsequent retirement 
was on the basis that he no longer met the medical requirements for military flying.52
Commandant J. C. Fitzmaurice took over the duties of OC AC on 7 April 1927. 
For reasons that are not apparent he had been perfonning the duties in an acting capacity 
from 11 October 1926. He went on a general course for senior officers at the Army 
School of Instruction in October / December 1927 and achieved a mark of 81.7%. There 
is little in the official record to suggest that Fitzmaurice undertook the administrative 
responsibilities of the appointment with great enthusiasm. In fact the opposite is the case. 
In February 1928 he received a missive from the chief staff officer to the General Staff
50 COD minutes, 3 Feb. 1926 (MA).
5IC.F. Russell to CSO GHQ, 7 Oct. 1926 (MA, 2/1113); DFR 7/1927, 18 Mar. 1927; Report and findings of 
the committee, 10 Jan. 1942, XXVII (MA, ACS 22/23); Draft syllabus, 4 Nov. 1935, ACS/103/11/2 
(courtesy of School Commandant, 2006).
32 Personal file (MA, SDR 3693); Obituary, Irish Independent, 11 Mar. 1965; Personal comment, Ms 
Agnes Russell, 2 June 2004.
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reminding him of a number of files and other documents that had apparently not received 
his attention and on which replies were awaited in GHQ.53 Before and after the senior 
officers’ course much of his energies appear to have been centred on his ambition to 
achieve the first East -  West, non-stop crossing of the North Atlantic -  an interest that no 
doubt distracted him from the more mundane duties of officer commanding. In 
September 1927 he was part of the crew of the Princess Zenia that made an unsuccessful 
attempt at the Atlantic crossing.54 In April 1928 he was the second pilot on the Junkers 
W33 (Bremen) aircraft that made the first successful crossing of the Atlantic from east to 
west.55 Subsequent to this latter event he spent much time on leave of absence but was 
back on duty in time to present commissions to the successful cadets of the 1926/28 
‘wings’ class, on 5 November 1928.56
With ambitions to capitalise on his new fame the now Colonel Fitzmaurice 
submitted his application to retire on 29 January 1929, had it accepted with effect from 
on 15 February and had vacated his quarters by 15 March.57 Fie did not leave the service 
on the best of terms with higher authority. At the time of resigning he cited the poor state 
of the Air Corps and the fact that little progress had been in the previous year. Early in 
1929 he submitted a copy of his 1927 report, for 1928, on the basis that so little had 
changed it made no difference. It possibly never occurred to him that he had spent most 
of 1928 pursuing his own ambitions and business and had obviously done little to 
improve the state of his corps.58 About the same time it was reported that the Air Corps 
had come to such a point of stagnation that Fitzmaurice had ‘informed the minister for 
defence that the Air Corps as then organised was a useless organisation, costing £100,000 
to maintain. Its equipment was a collection of junk and its mechanical personnel was 
inadequate’.59 With or without the prompting of Fitzmaurice’s derogatory comments
53 CSO GHQ to OC AAC, 28 Feb. 1928 (in my possession).
34 Fennelly, Fitz, pp 135-51.
53 Ibid, pp 167-182.
36 Col. W.J. Keane, ‘The first class of cadets - 60 years ago’ in An Cosantoir, 46, no. 3 (March, 1986), p. 
10 .
37 Officer’s history sheet (MA, SDR 925).
58 Fennelly, Fitz, p. 279, citing no source.
39 Quigley, ‘Air aspects of the emergency’ in Irish Sword xix. Nos. 75 & 76 (1993-40), p. 86, citing 
ACF/564 / DOD 2/49025 (MA). The investigation report of 1941/42 put the cost of the Air Coips for 
1928/29 at £40,469.
13 5
GHQ was apparently already displaying a more progressive stance in terms of equipping 
the Air Corps for army cooperation functions in support of ground troops.
Director of military aviation
On 15 February 1929, the effective date of Fitzmaurice’s retirement, Commandant G.J. 
Carroll was appointed officer commanding and served in that appointment for a largely 
unrecorded thirty-three months at the end of which he appears to have been replaced on a 
veritable whim. He seems to have fallen into disrepute with GHQ mainly as a result of 
circumstances surrounding an accident at the Curragh on 9 April 1931. However the 
convening of a number of Courts of Inquiry in 1930, and his subsequent observations on 
the findings had already placed his judgement in such matters under examination. A 
memorandum on the subject, presented to a meeting of the Council of Defence on 23 
March 1931, found that three courts of inquiry had not been convened in the proper 
manner with the appropriate personnel and that, as a result of the investigations being 
conducted by Air Corps officers only, the relevant factors were not thoroughly examined 
and reported upon.60 Matters were brought to a head as a result the proceedings and 
findings of a court of inquiry into a crash at the Curragh on 9 April 1931 and of the 
particular circumstances in which it took place. On 23 June 1931 the Council of Defence 
considered a memorandum that commented upon the proceeding and findings of the court 
of inquiry. Without examining the precise circumstances and causes or the factors 
contributing to the accident (Vespa No.4 was apparently destroyed) the memorandum 
highlighted the fact that OC Air Corps needed no authority other than his own to send an 
aircraft to the Curragh in order to give pilots flying practice and to give air experience 
flights to officers of the Curragh Camp. It was suggested that the Quartermaster General 
might have some unspecified function in the matter.61 Examination of Air Corps Standing 
Orders indicates that the important function of the granting of authorisation to undertake 
a flight in any aircraft was not specifically provided for prior to June 1931. One of the 
more important aspects of such a function, deciding whether the weather conditions were
60 ‘Memorandum on courts of inquiry’, COD minutes, 23 Mar. 1931 (MA).
6l‘Memo on crash of Vickers Vespa No. 4 at Curragh Camp on 9/4/31’, COD minutes, 23 June 1931 (MA).
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suitable or not, was still being exercised by the aerodrome duty officer up to 1937.62 The
inference of the comments on the inquiry into the accident on 9 April 1931 was that the
officer commanding informally authorised flying to take place on the basis of the weather
«
reports of the aerodrome duty officer. On 29 June 1931, probably as a result of adverse 
comments from GHQ on the manner in which the contentious flight of April 1931 had 
been authorised and administered, a new standing order, providing for the ‘Flying 
Detail’, was drafted and issued. The order specified the manner in which the corps 
commander, squadron commander or chief instructor could detail, in writing, flying for 
training, service or test puiposes as well as the manner in which all flights would be
z  -j
recorded and administered.
The matter of the incident of 9 April 1931 was further considered at the Council 
of Defence meeting of 16 November 1931 when it was decided that none of the officers 
immediately involved in the accident could be held responsible.
... but in this case (as in the case of the crash at Foxford 2/27066) it was clear that 
the administration of the Army Air Corps leaves a great deal to be desired. While 
the present officer commanding is possibly as suitable for his position as any other 
officer within the corps it will be necessary to seek outside an officer who will 
administer the corps. The chief of staff will nominate a suitable officer.64
Within a week, on 23 November 1931, Commandant James Joseph Liston, an infantry 
officer who had been a GF1Q staff officer earlier in his career, was appointed officer 
commanding Air Coips. However it appears that this appointment was not solely related 
to the adjudged unsatisfactory administration of the Air Corps flying. The peace 
establishments of 1931/32 (authorised by the Minister, Desmond Fitzgerald in September 
1931) had re-introduced the previously unofficial appellation ‘director of military 
aviation’ which attached to the appointment of officer commanding Air Corps. It also 
established the ‘Office of director of military aviation’ in GHQ with a single appointment
62 Air Coips Routine Order 243/37, 22 Oct. 1937 amending Air Corps Standing Order 26 (in my 
possession).
63 Air Coips Routine Order No. 148, Section 54, ‘Flying Detail’, 29 June 1931 (in my possession).
64 COD minutes, 16 Nov. 1931 (MA).
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for a captain. The same instrument specified that ‘officer commanding, Air Corps’, and a 
number of other corps commanders, would ‘act on the general staff as directors when 
required’. Carroll was appointed to the office of the DMA on 14 November nine days 
before Liston was made OC Air Coips. The establishment tables specified that the OC 
Air Corps also ‘acts as director of military aviation’.65 However in the absence of a 
regulation or other explanatory instrument the authority and function of the DMA, and of 
the GHQ office, was not explained. While corps directors were, by custom of the service, 
suitably qualified officers with particular expertise in the techniques and disciplines of a 
particular army corps, this was not the case with Liston. There was apparently nothing in 
his training or experience that fitted him for either function. He was quite unsuited 
except to the extent that the authority of his rank and appointment enabled an infantry 
officer to exercise command over pilots and other officers of the Air Corps.66
The question arises as to why such an inexpert officer was appointed in this 
manner. The deliberations of the Council of Defence make it clear that it was considered 
that Carroll took the matter of courts of inquiry too lightly and that as a result courts were 
not being assiduous in apportioning blame for aircraft accidents or in assessing the costs 
to public funds. The Council of Defence appears to have viewed the authorisation of 
flying, and the convening and conduct of any resulting courts of inquiry, as 
administrative matters that could be better performed by a line officer. The drafting and 
issuing of an order providing for the ‘flying detail’ was probably required so that officers 
other than OC Air Corps could authorise specific flights. While this cleared the way for 
an inexpert officer to act as OC Air Corps it does not clarify how Liston could act as 
director of military aviation, in a capacity which presumably required appropriate 
aviation expertise. In the event Liston only held both titles for less than eight months, 
from 23 November 1931 to 30 June 1932. On I July 1932, in accordance with a minor 
amendment to the 1931/32 peace establishment, the staff appointment in the office of the 
DMA was raised to the status of commandant and Comdt. J.G. Carroll was made director
63 Peace Establishments 1931 -  1932, pp 20-3; 74; Curriculum vitae 0/1662; 0/287 (courtesy of 
Commissioned officers record office, DFHQ, 1 Sept. 2006).
66 GRO 26/1932, 29 Sept. 1932, amending peace establishments, 1931/32, with effect from 1 July 1932 (in 
my possession).
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of military aviation while the said appellation was removed from Major J.J. Liston. 
Carroll was to continue as the director until 1 April 1935.67
In the absence of an adequate body of relevant correspondence the involvement of 
the DMA in the resolution of a contentious flying matter, suggests, to a certain extent, 
how the director and his office was meant to function. During May and June 1933 night 
flying exercises were being conducted under the direction of Capt. P.J. Hassett, OC No. 1 
Squadron. The aircraft were being flown in conditions that were clear of cloud but very 
dark. Four pilots reported difficulty in performing normal turning manoeuvres while 
some had entered inadvertent spins. Recovery from such spins, at night and with very 
poor ambient light, proved difficult and dangerous. The reported incidents highlighted the 
fact that pilots had not been instructed, and were insufficiently practiced, in instrument 
flying. In addition Bristol Fighter (and other) aircraft were not adequately equipped for 
instrument or night flying while cockpit and navigation lights were also generally 
inadequate. Landing incidents about the same time also indicated that the aerodrome was 
poorly equipped for night flying, mainly in terms of the lighting of obstructions. In effect 
four officers considered that the night flying exercises detailed by OC No. 1 Squadron 
were dangerous in the particularly dark conditions and with poorly equipped aircraft. OC 
No. 1 Squadron suggested that the aircraft were no less equipped that the RAF aircraft of 
the period since 1918. He indicated that turn indicators had only recently been installed in 
RAF aircraft -  implying that Air Coips machines were not so equipped. He stated that he 
had ‘never had any difficulty in flying the machine by horizon or by occasional ground 
lights’ and that, in the past, ‘night flying was carried out under far worse conditions’.68 
The tone of the complaints, and of the squadron commander’s reply, suggest that night 
flying exercises were being carried out in meteorological conditions for which the pilots 
were not adequately prepared and for which the aircraft were inappropriately equipped.
Having been given both sides Major J.J. Liston referred the matter to the Director 
of Military Aviation. Commandant G.J. Carroll replied to the effect that he would discuss 
the matters raised with OC AC on his next visit to Baldonnel and that in the meantime
67 Curriculum vitae details, 0/1662, 0/287, courtesy of Commissioned officers records office, DFHQ, 1 
Sept. 2006; GRO 26/1932, 29 Sept. 1932.
68Capt. P. Quinn to OC AC, 1 8 May 1933; Lieut. D.J. McKeown to OC No. 1 Sqn., 22 May 1933; 2/Lieut. 
T.J. Hanley to OC No. 1 Sqn., 22 May 1933; Lieut. M.J. Cumiskey to OC No. 1 Sqn., 22 May 1933; OC 
No. 1 Sqn. to OC AC, 23 May 1933 (MA, AC/2/6/3).
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night flying should be suspended. Apparently, before Carroll could discuss the matter 
with Liston, the school commandant, who was responsible for the direction of the annual 
training of pilots, made a number of suggestions that probably pre-empted such 
discussions. Capt. W.P. Delamere’s main recommendation was to the effect that night 
flying should only take place when ‘there is a good moon and reasonable visibility, i.e. 
sufficient to allow a clear horizon in all directions’ and, secondly to the effect that if night 
flying was to take place in very dark conditions that appropriate blind flying instruments 
and instruction in instrument flying should be provided.69 In July and August of 1933 
night flying continued ‘during suitable periods of the moon’.70 While the DMA does did 
not appear to have given a formal direction on the particular matter of night flying it 
would appear that the director’s main function was to compensate for the lack of aviation 
expertise of the infantry corps commanding officer. However there is little evidence of 
the involvement of the DMA in similar technical matters while the evidence cited at the 
Air Coips investigation of 1941/42 would suggest that squadron commanders were 
assumed to have the appropriate professional expertise to adjudicate on technical areas 
outside the competence of unqualified commanding officers. (See Chapter 11)
The Capt. P.J. Hassett affair
Lieut. P.J. Hassett was a former IRA and former infantry officer. When he qualified as a 
pilot in 1928 he achieved the highest marks of the officer group on the 1926/28 course. 
During the first air firing and bombing exercises, held at Kilworth in 1932, he achieved 
the best score of the sixteen officers taking part.71 He apparently carried out a keen study 
of aviation, civil and military, and held the second civil pilot’s licence issued by the 
Saorstat Eireann.72 During the early 1930s, as lieutenant and captain, he was an energetic 
flight commander and squadron commander in No. 1 Training Squadron and later in the 
1st Army Co-operation Squadron in which appointments he had a leading role in training
69 Capt. W.P. Del am ere to OC AC, 29 May 1933 (MA, AC/2/6/3).
70 OC AC to DMA, 7 July 1933 (MA, AC/2/6/3).
^Undated ‘Tests as per DFR 7/1927’ (MA, AC/1/7/3); ‘Aerial firing and bombing, July 1932’ (MA, 
2/30989)
72 HMSO receipt for books and manuals, 23 Sept. 1930; Saorstat Eireann, ‘B ’ Licence No. 2, 1 Nov. 1930, 
P.J. Hassett papers (in possession of Capt. Eoin Hassett, Skerries).
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for the army cooperation role.73 In 1931 he contemplated retiring due to lack of 
promotion and intended going into commercial aviation possibly with Iona, the first civil 
air carrier in the state.74 He demanded an interview with the minister for defence in 
regard to securing a retirement gratuity the granting of which was apparently at the 
minister’s discretion. The minister refused point blank to allow him to retire suggesting 
that it cost the state £5,000 to train him as a pilot. The interview did, however, achieve a 
positive result for Hassett. As a fonner IRA officer with a proven good record he should, 
according to the minister, have already been promoted to the rank of captain and was so 
promoted within a month.
Arising from the vociferous nature of his dealings with GHQ and the minister, 
and the questions most likely raised by the minister regarding his promotion, Hassett’s 
name was very likely noted by the headquarters staff. In October 1931 Major J.J. Liston, 
a former GHQ staff officer, was appointed OC AC. During his introductory address at 
Baldonnell he apparently singled out Hassett when he declared that he was going to put a 
stop to officers writing into GHQ. Hassett observed that Liston continually sought 
opportunities to take disciplinary action against him.75
Notable confrontation was avoided until 1935 and then arose out of Hassett’s 
command of the Air Corps’ participation in a display in the Phoenix Park in May of that 
year. With pilots rehearsed and detailed for the display Hassett contended that Liston 
interfered in the flying arrangements to such an extent that he persuaded a number of 
pilots not to make themselves available on the day of the actual display. While the 
display was completed with a changed line-up of pilots Hassett remained convinced that 
Liston had endeavoured, and succeeded, in having officers refuse to fly in accordance 
with the flying detail. Hassett reported the matter to GHQ and tried, and failed, to have it 
formally investigated on his terms.76 Later Major Mulcahy reopened the matter in the 
context of the Air Corps investigation of 1941/42:
7Tlying log book, P.J Hassett, P.J. Hassett papers ( Capt. Eoin Hassett)
74 Personal comment, Pierce Cahill.
7:> Lt. Col. J.P. Hassett, unpublished memoir, circa 1959, Hassett private papers (in possession of Capt. 
Eoin Hassett.
76 Ibid.
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Colonel Mulcahy, in his evidence (page 585) stated “the younger officers of the 
corps refused to fly at the Phoenix Park where a public display had been arranged 
and advertised, and for which they had been detailed and had carried out some 
weeks’ practice”.77
The committee, having access to the original GHQ confidential file on the matter, found 
that Liston had been party to a discussion amongst a number of younger officers on the 
night prior to the display. However it also found that the pilots (four officers and one 
cadet) had indicated a desire to withdraw from the display on the basis of lack of 
experience but had that made themselves available the following morning only to be 
replaced by older officers on Hassetf s instructions. The committee found that the matter 
had been investigated at the time (1935) and that it had been recommended that owing to 
the peculiar circumstances surrounding the whole affair, no disciplinary action would be 
taken.78
With no determination being made at the time relations between Hassett and 
Liston apparently remained very cool. However, they were both soon to leave the Air 
Corps. Liston was replaced by Major P.A. Mulcahy on 3 June 1935 while Hassett was 
transferred to the Cavalry Corps within months. On 3 June 1935, the day that Mulcahy 
was appointed, Capt. P. J. Hassett ceased to be OC 1st Co-operation Squadron and was 
posted to the appointment of OC Technical Workshops. On 5 September 1935 he 
received orders to report to the director of cavalry four days later and was attached to that 
corps from 9 September 1935.79 While the precise circumstances of Hassetf s departure 
cannot be easily discerned, matters related to the proceeding of two courts of inquiry held 
in 1935 and his annual confident report for the period 1 January 1935 to 9 September 
1935 were pertinent. On 6 January 1936 Hassett was paraded by Mulcahy so that he 
could be given the details of the confidential report concerning that part of 1935 he had 
served in the Air Coips. Hassett took notes:
Military conduct and general compliance with regulations; Fair.
77 Report and findings of the committee, LIX,10 Jan. 1942 (MA, ACS 22/23).
78 Ibid.
79 P.J. Hassett, unpublished memoir, circa 1959, P.J. Hassett papers (Capt. Eoin Hassett).
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Suitability for present [Air Corps] appointment; unsuitable.
If not suitable recommendations for alternative employment; See results of courts 
of inquiry. This officer has been transferred to the Cavalry Corps.
Ability, executive and / or administrative; has shown good executive and 
administrative ability.
General rating; unsatisfactory.
Special note on officer of outstanding ability; [nil]
Recommendations and remarks; [nil]
Date; 6 Jan. 1936 [signed] P.A. Mulcahy, Major. Director of artillery & A/OC Air 
Corps.80
While the findings of a two courts of inquiry were cited as being the reasons for the 
unsatisfactory rating this did not afford any explanation to the subject officer. Despite 
being a witness at both courts of inquiry he was not party to either the proceedings or the 
findings of either. As an officer adversely commented upon he had not been afforded the 
right to cross examine witnesses giving evidence supporting alleged wrong-doing on his 
part. In a vain attempt to have the rating changed, or even have the basis of a bad report 
explained he wrote to an unspecified higher authority in such terms and demanded the 
withdrawal of the adverse report.81
It will be understood that the purpose of courts of inquiry, as originally conceived, 
was to investigate all manner of accidents, particularly traffic accident involving military 
vehicles, but did not specify aircraft accidents. Insofar as aircraft accidents were 
concerned, a court was usually required ‘to enquire into the circumstances surrounding 
the accident to aircraft number xx on a stated date at a stated location. The court of three 
officers, that took evidence under oath, was also asked to report on the ‘cause of the 
accident, the extent of the damage and cost of repair’ and to state whether the accident 
was ‘due to negligence on the part of any person or persons’ Witnesses were questioned 
individually in private while those who might be the subjected to adverse comment 
would not be made aware of such evidence. The court of inquiry was, at best, a quasi­
80 Handwritten copy, Annual confidential report, 6 Jan. 1936, P.J. Hassett papers (in possession of Capt. 
Eoin Hassett).
81 Copy letter, Capt. P.J. Hassett, 13 Jan. 1936, P.J. Hassett papers (in possession of Capt. Eoin Hassett).
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judicial process the proceeding and finding of which, prior to the promulgation of DFR 
A5 on 10 April 1937, were withheld from those who might be the subject of adverse 
comment. In those circumstances the findings could, in theory, be cited to state whatever 
higher authority wished them to say.82
In the case of Capt. P.J. Hassett the main court of inquiry cited was that into a 
flying accident that occurred on 2 May 1935 and resulted in the death of a young officer. 
The findings apparently resulted in the squadron commander being held partially 
responsible for the accident. Hassett insisted that the accident had happened after the pilot 
had departed from the flying exercise for which he had been detailed, in effect disobeying 
lawful orders. The second court of inquiry is understood to have concerned damage to an 
aircraft engine. There are unexplained aspects to the circumstances surrounding Capt. 
Hassett’s transfer out of the Air Coips while the factors contributing would appear to be 
broader than those pertaining to the aircraft accident and the court of inquiry. P.J. Hassett, 
as a pilot from a distinctly IRA and infantry background, was unique in that he had 
apparently embraced the aviation ethos to an extent not matched by his infantry 
colleagues or, indeed, by some of the cadets with whom he had trained. As a flight and 
squadron commander he had demonstrated considerable enthusiasm for the Air Corps’ 
anny cooperation role and for air firing. He advocated and encouraged instrument and 
night flying even though the role of his squadron did not require such disciplines and the 
aircraft were not fully equipped for same.83 To that extent he was far-sighted, enthusiastic 
and progressive to an extent that might not have been appreciated by his superiors, and 
possibly, some of his colleagues.
While the antipathy between Liston and Hassett was most likely a manifestation 
of the antipathy between GHQ and the pilot group as a whole P.J. Hassett had adopted 
the culture and ethos of aviation to such an extent that he no longer represented the 
infantry ethos that GHQ hoped to inculcate in the Air Corps. He may well have been seen 
as being disloyal to his infantry roots. It is likely that he was posted out of the Air Coips 
by higher authority as much for his newly acquired allegiance to aviation as for any 
alleged responsibility for the fatal accident of 2 May 1935. This course of action was
82Defence Order 5/1922; DFR 41/1928; DFR 55/1929; GRO 4/1933; GRO 2/1935: DFR A5, 10 Apr. 1937.
83 Files 2/30989; AC/2/6/3 (MA).
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possible because proceedings of courts of inquiry remained confidential while an officer 
had no redress under the 1923 Defence Act except in the case where the alleged wrong
84was done by his commanding officer.
In relation to the questionable reasons cited for his banishment the question arises 
as to why he was not formally charged. Had Hassett’s role, and degree of responsibility, 
been such that it warranted his being permanently removed from his chosen corps it 
might have been considered appropriate to formulate a suitable fonnal charge. It may 
have been simply that, due to the fact that that the 1923 Defence Act did not legislate 
specifically for any aspect of military aviation, an appropriate charge could not be 
framed.85 While it considered likely that the unseen finding of a secretive court of inquiry 
process was used as a pretext in order to banish a troublesome pilot officer it is possible 
that the court did find Hassett to some degree to blame for the accident. Again, in the 
absence of sight of the proceedings the basis for such a finding remains unknown. 
Related matters must, as a result, remain somewhat speculative.
While a transfer to another corps, albeit with adverse reflections on reputation and 
character, might not be seen as a very severe punishment, this was not the case. When 
Capt. P.J. Hassett was transferred permanently to the Cavalry Corps he lost eight shilling 
(flying pay) per day for the remainder of his military career -  in effect, a summary 
deduction of over £3,200. P.J. Hassett served twenty-three years in the Cavalry Corps 
and reached the rank of lieutenant colonel. Long after his death in 1959 he was 
remembered by his corpsmen as having making a valuable contribution to his coips and 
as a fine and loyal officer.86
The manner in which P.J. Hassett was treated is in sharp contrast to that of 
another flying officer who had a long and colourful career in the Air Corps and who 
eventually retired, as a lieutenant, on age grounds. In his case he was found, amongst 
other things, to be most irresponsible and undisciplined and generally unfit for his Air 
Corps appointment. It was recommended (in 1942) that he either be transferred to another 
corps or that his services be dispensed with entirely.87 In the event the officer, a 1931
84 Section 122, Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923 -1935.
83 Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923 - 1935.
86 Personnal comment, the late Col. Roger McCorley.
87 Report and findings of the committee, 10 Jan. 1942, LXIV -  LXV (MA, ACS 22/23).
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graduate of the Cadet School, Military College, served the remaining seventeen years of 
his career in the Air Corps. He was from time to time transferred out of the Air Corps and 
attached back, for example from 7 October 1935 to 18 February 1936. Though such a 
posting did not involve actually moving to another Army unit the resultant loss of flying 
pay, almost £54 in this instance, served as monetary punishment for whatever 
misdemeanour of which he was deemed to be guilty -  without burdening officialdom
o o
with the legal niceties of due process.
While the summary manner in which these two officers had been treated may 
have been interestingly similar it is the dissimilar outcome that is considerably more 
pertinent. In the first instance an obviously diligent officer flying officer appears to have 
been posted out of the Air Corps permanently in circumstances where justice was not 
seen to have been done. In the second case an individual whose competence as an officer 
and pilot was seen to be very questionable and, in fact, was considered worthy of 
dismissal, retained his commission in circumstances about which there was no dispute. It 
might be considered that P.J. Hassett was too good for the Air Corps and that the second 
officer was too bad for the Army.
The early command of M ajor P.A. Mulcahy
On 3 June 1935 Major P.A. Mulcahy, a GHQ staff officer, was appointed acting OC Air 
Corps in addition to his then current position as director of artillery. From the records 
available the rationale for this General Staff decision is not obvious. Being similarly 
situated to his immediate predecessor Mulcahy had no qualifications that might fit him 
for an air appointment and, in common with those who had appointed him would have 
had little concept of the nuances of military aviation. Later sources would suggest that the 
substantial reason for Mulcahy’s appointment was related to discipline, i.e. the perception 
that Air Corps pilot officers were undisciplined. Military Archives’ keen protection of the 
reputations of the forces and individual officers combined with the absence of case 
history relating to the disciplinary sections of defence legislation preclude objective study
88 Curriculum vitae, 0/4431 (courtesy of Commissioned officers records office, DFHQ, 1 Sept. 2006). The 
period in question was 134 days at eight shillings per day.
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of such matters. However it is very possible that understandable friction between the 
disparate pilot groupings may have been seen as signs of indiscipline. Similarly the fact 
that GHQ staff and Major Liston, and later Mulcahy, could not relate to flying officers in 
aviation terms suggests a cultural divide that was most likely interpreted by the GHQ as 
indiscipline.
A number of sources point to Mulcahy having been appointed primarily to 
impose discipline. The most obvious was the amendment to Air Corps Standing Orders 
issued on his first day in office.
The Commanding Officer expects from all officers under his command such 
undeviating support as will ensure the prompt execution of all orders he may deem
89necessary to issue for the maintenance of discipline in the corps.
That Mulcahy considered it necessary to make an order with such an emphasis on his first 
day in the appointment strongly suggests that his orders, from GHQ, were to regain and 
retain a required level of discipline -  a level that might have been perceived by GHQ not 
to have existed during Liston’s command. A similar impression comes from an unusual 
source. A brief Air Ministry intelligence summary noted that Col. P. A. Mulcahy had been 
transferred to command of the Air Corps to tighten up discipline.90 The latter opinion 
may have originated with Mulcahy himself. From June 1940 Mulcahy had an unusually 
open relationship with the British air attaché who passed all such details to London. (See 
Chapter 8) Mulcahy’s disciplinary qualities were endorsed much later by a comrade 
artillery officer who recalled that artillerymen were ‘ever proud to recall having served 
under “Muller” in his martinet days’.91
Col. C.F. Russell, who edited and published the ‘Aviation’ magazine for three 
years (1935 to 1937), expressed considerable alarm at the appointment of Mulcahy and at 
the fact that the separate position of director of military aviation, as recently held by a 
flying officer, had been abolished.
89 Air Corps Standing Orders, 1 Jan. 1929, amended Section II, 3 June 1935 (in my possession).
90 Air Ministry, Air Intelligence notes, Nov. 1940 (NA, Air 10/3990).
91 Appreciation by Col. C. M. Mattimoe in An Cosantoir, 47, no. 5 (May 1987), p.22.
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Army General Headquarters never have, and do not now understand the 
peculiarities of an air unit in regard either to its technical requirements or the
methods of air command..................Flying personnel cannot be commanded and
will have no real respect for anyone over them who is not an active flying officer.
No greater mistake could have been made, therefore, than the appointment of a 
non-flying officer to command the Air Corps’.92
Russell, believing that the minister was most likely unaware of such consideration, 
suggested that he should ‘look into the Air Corps organisation and administration, 
independent of Army General Headquarters which has proved hopelessly ignorant of the 
problems involved’.93 If GHQ or the minister were aware of Russell’s observations they 
probably ignored the advice offered. Notwithstanding Russell’s words were to prove 
prophetic. (See Chapter 11)
While J.J. Liston appears to have been more concerned with administrative 
aspects and generally left flying matters to the squadron commanders Mulcahy was more 
proactive and concerned himself greatly with air related matters. Not long after being 
appointed Mulcahy wrote to the COS stating a brief case for the abolition of the cadet 
scheme of pilot intake that had been used intermittently since 1925 and proposed that 
pupil pilots for the corps should only be recruited from the ranks of newly qualified 
Cadet School officers or from the ranks of young officers already serving in other corps 
units. His only argument, actually a statement of fact, was that Air Corps cadets were 
handicapped by having insufficient basic military training. The communication outlining 
the proposal was annotated as being approved by the minister on 16 Oct. 1935.94 
Without delay Mulcahy submitted a draft DFR that he intended would replace DFR 
7/1927, the pilot flying course syllabus. He also submitted for the approval of higher 
authority a newly drafted training syllabus for the young officers’ ab initio flying training 
course, substantially based on the earlier DFR that he was proposing to have cancelled. 
Mulcahy incorrectly stated that the change to an officer-only scheme of intake and flying
92 Col. C.F. Russell, ‘The Army Air Corps’ in Aviation i , no. 6 (June 1935), p.209.
93 Ibid.
94 OC AC to COS, 23 Sept. 1935 (MA, AC/1/7/10).
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raining required the cancellation of DFR 7/1927 and its replacement by one along the 
lines of the draft submitted.
This apparent misrepresentation of the situation should have been obvious to 
higher authority. Since 1926 several classes that included both officers and cadets, had 
received ab initio training in the flying school in accordance with the same syllabus. As 
its title suggests the ‘Syllabus of training -  pupil officers and cadets in the Army Air 
Corps’ had been specifically drafted to provide for training both categories of pupil.95 
Thus a new DFR was not required if recruitment was confined to officers alone.
The department, if they were aware of Mulcahy’s misleading assertion, did not 
dispute the point, most likely on the basis that the change in DFR would not affect other 
than the Air Corps and that the commanding officer was assumed to know what was best 
for the corps. On 21 May 1936 Frank Aiken, in his capacity as Minister for Defence, 
signed the new regulation. In accordance with paragraph three of the new DFR the 
‘Young officers’ flying training course’ was fundamentally a list of the ground school 
subjects that bore little relationship to the previous, detailed and comprehensive, ground 
syllabus. The term ‘Airmanship: Flying training’ constituted the complete definition of 
the associated practical flying.96 It was, at best, a prospectus rather than a syllabus. (See 
Appendix 6 and Appendix 7)
Having been acting officer commanding since 3 June 1935 Major Mulcahy 
commenced flying training three weeks after the signing of DFR 40/1936. Capt. T.J. 
Hanley was asked by the investigation committee some years later whether the 
commanding officer’s right to be graded as a pilot was governed by DFR 7/1927 or by 
DFR 40/1936:
D.F.R. 40/1936, he first received instruction from me on 10 June 1936. His 
instruction continued until 21/l/’37 and he flew solo on several occasions during 
this period. After 21/l/’37 he got no further instruction from me and discontinued
95 OC AC to CSO, DOD, 4 Nov. 1935 (MA, AC/1/7/10); DFR 7/1927, 18 Mar. 1927.
96 Paragraph 3, DFR 40/1936, 21 May 1936.
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solo flying. In March 1938, he received 2 hours 20 minutes instruction from Lt.
McCullagh but was not allowed to go solo.97
Hanley also stated that Colonel Mulcahy did not undergo the flying and ground school 
tests prescribed in the young officers flying course syllabus for the training of new pilots 
as issued and signed by Major P. Mulcahy on 16 Oct. 1936. He also stated that he did not 
know who had certified that Mulcahy had qualified as a pilot, engaged in flying duties 
and was entitled to draw flying pay.98 In this respect it appears that Major Mulcahy most 
likely provided his own certification to the effect that he had undergone flying training in 
accordance with DFR 40/1936 while avoiding the fact that the DFR was, in effect, only a 
preamble to the syllabus proper. In August 1936 he received notification, possibly in 
response to the said certification and his application for flying pay, that financial sanction 
had been received from the Department of Finance. He was to be paid four shillings per 
day, the pupil pilot rate of flying pay, from 3 June 1936 to 6 July 1936 -  he presumably 
went flew solo for the first time on 6 July - and at the qualified pilot rate of eight shillings 
a day from 7 July 1936." In effect, by granting Mulcahy flying pay DOD had confirmed 
him as being a pupil pilot for five weeks and as being a duly qualified pilot thereafter. 
Between 10 June 1936 and 31 March 1939 Major Mulcahy’s flying amounted to a total 
of 135 hours and 30 minutes, 40 hours and 35 minutes of which was during the financial 
year 1938/39.100 Capt. Hanley’s evidence would suggest that all Mulcahy’s flying 
between March 1938 and 10 January 1941, was as a passenger. No other officer qualified 
for the receipt of flying pay solely in accordance with the terms of the particular DFR. 
The matters of Mulcahy’s flying training, receipt of flying pay and his wearing of pilot’s 
‘wings’ was to have severe effects on pilot morale and on general esprit de corps during 
the Emergency.
97
98 Ibid.
T.J. Hanley to AC investigation, 17 Apr.1941 (MA, ACS 22/23).
Office of COS to Major P. A. Mulcahy, 27 Aug. 1936 (MA, SDR 1892).
100 Appendix No. XVIII (B), Report and findings of the committee, 10 Jan. 1942 (MA, ACS 22/23).
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Conclusion
While the reorganisation process of the post-Civil War period was somewhat 
complicated by the mutiny or army crisis there is every reason to believe that Finance and 
DOD saw no compelling reason for the retention of military aviation. The military, as 
demonstrated by General Mulcahy and by O’Duffy’s scheme of reorganisation, were 
quite ambivalent about the matter and left the matter for the decision of the Executive 
Council who approved the scheme complete with appointments for 155 all-ranks. As 
evidence of its ambivalence GF1Q pinched four appointments for use elsewhere in the 
Army establishment. Notwithstanding the roles projected for it the new Army Air Corps 
was but a simulacrum. Major T.J. Maloney’s brief on the matter of reorganisation would 
strongly suggest that the 1924 establishment was only token and temporary. Temporary 
in this instance would be ten years as it was to be October 1934 before an Air Corps of a 
headquarters and two squadrons, as originally proposed by McSweeney, got the 
appropriate sanction.
While the period 1924 to about 1929 was spent in the aviation and organisational 
doldrums a more enlightened element in GHQ saw the necessity to develop an 
operational squadron to complement the flying training school. Though the formation of 
a fighter squadron was initially decided upon, and a third of the aircraft actually 
purchased in 1926, an army cooperation squadron was eventually informally developed 
from 1930 but not formally established until 1934.
During the years 1922 to 1931 a succession of five flying officers held the 
appointment of officer commanding but none for much more than two years. There is 
little or no evidence of the individual influence of these officers in matters that could be 
construed as constituting policy -  an aspect apparently directed by DOD and the Council 
of Defence. The appointment of Major J.J. Liston as officer commanding OC in 1931, 
and, in particular the circumstances surrounding that of P.A. Mulcahy in 1935, strongly 
suggest that the General Staff were not convinced that an air officer could maintain the 
strict code of discipline expected of all officers. However it is not clear on what basis 
discipline was perceived to be the problem. Formal charging of officers was apparently 
avoided though the records of judicial proceeding remain confidential. While proceedings
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and finding of courts of inquiry are also retained it appears that these were used by GHQ 
as a disciplinary procedure during the 1930s. While the practice does not appear to have 
been very common the posting of an officer to an appointment outside the Air Corps 
resulted in pilots loosing flying pay at the rate of eight shillings per day for an arbitrary 
period of time. While the extent of formal disciplinary action is not known it is likely that 
air and army officers spoke different military languages and that efforts of Air Corps 
pilots to give expression to their particular aviation ethos and culture were interpreted as 
departures from military discipline.101
The move into army cooperation gave the Air Corps a new focus in the early 
years of the 1930s while the sending of students on the relevant RAF course was, no 
doubt, a very welcome and open-minded departure on the part of DOD. The dispatch of a 
young second lieutenant on a RAF flying instructors’ course in 1932 was a particularly 
enlightened move though it is not known where the credit for initiating such action 
should lie. The adoption of an army cooperation philosophy brought to the fore a younger 
ex-IRA, ex-infantry officer who appears to have embraced the air ethos to a greater 
extent than the Army leadership might have expected or been able to comprehend. The 
departure of Capt. P.J. Hassett from the Air Corps in somewhat obscure circumstances 
does not reflect well on the system of military justice as practiced during the 1930s. His 
posting was probably influenced by the inability of higher authority to countenance a 
military culture other than infantry.
101 The Army’s perception of the indiscipline of the Air Corps flying officer persisted through to my career 
in the Air Corps (1961-1999). From observation the perception was directly related to petty jealousy over 
the receipt, by flying officers, of flying pay.
C H A P T E R  6
Notwithstanding the fact that the Air Service had only two pilots the early stages of the 
Civil War and that one of these was very much involved with the business of setting up 
the service and in the process of buying aircraft there was a great reluctance to recruit the 
additional pilots so obviously needed. This reluctance was related solely to the RAF 
background of the only Irish pilots that were then available and to the sensitivity about 
the recruitment of any ex-British servicemen, particularly those without pre-Truce IRA 
service. Though the number of pilots had been brought up to ten, on Collins’ authority, 
by 4 December 1922 the Air Service was directed to commence pilot training. The naive 
concept of the time would have officers from the ranks of the old IRA trained as pilots 
with a view to replacing ex-RAF pilots who were, initially at least, on short term 
contracts. This basic choice, between air officers and infantry pilots, was to be the 
fundamental dichotomy that would underlie the pilot selection and training processes 
until 1945 -  and beyond. After 1924 the choice was to be between young cadets, with 
particular motivation to become military pilots and mostly recruited direct from civilian 
life on the one hand and (generally) young officers, originally awarded Army cadetships, 
from army units or as newly graduating officers, on the other. In practice, with relatively 
few young officers opting for aviation careers, officers in the latter category were to be, 
in effect, volunteers for flying careers.
This chapter will examine the conflicting influences brought to bear on the matter 
of the selection and training of army officers, mainly of the infantry corps, on the one 
hand, and cadets specifically recruited for their motivation to be pilot officers, on the 
other. Individual intakes of pupil pilots will be assessed to identify the dominant 
influences of the time and assess the extent to which the recruitment and training of pilots 
of an infantry disposition was a military priority.
From the earliest weeks of the civil war there was evidence of differences in 
culture and ethos between the pre-Truce IRA, including the evolving command of the
P U P IL  P IL O T  IN T A K E  1922 T O  1945.
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army, and the new and hastily established Military Air Service. This mutual antipathy, 
that would in time significantly influence GHQ’s perception of military aviation, was 
initially more evident at a local level. The first manifestation of this appeared very early 
in Baldonnell with the ideological and physical separation of infantry and air personnel -  
literally into separate camps - exemplified by the duplication of military functions and of 
the standard institutions of a military post. To what extent this cultural divide was based 
on the widespread antipathy, in the National Army, to all things British, in this specific 
case to ex-RAF officers, is not clear. The slow rate at which ex-RAF pilots were recruited 
to an air service that obviously needed them in the latter part of 1922, highlighted the 
great sensitivity, at all levels of the Army, about recruiting Irishmen with British military 
service but no pre-truce service at home. Such prejudices were probably frequently 
uttered but seldom recorded. A notable exception was in the context of a substantial sub­
text to the mutiny of 1924 as recorded in the inquiry of the time and in subsequent 
studies.1 J.C. Fitzmaurice, one of the ex-RAF group of officers engaged by General W.J. 
McSweeney on the authority of Michael Collins, provides a slight flavour of the 
atmosphere that must have existed in Baldonnell during the Civil War. .
.. and we Irishmen who had held His Majesty’s commissions were treated with 
great distrust by the politicians and the majority of the old I.R.A. officers...
 The then director of military intelligence debased his office by arranging the
appointments of subordinate officers on non-technical ground duties at our 
headquarters to carry out a campaign of snoopery and witch-hunting of a most 
loathsome kind.2
Fitzmaurice was singularly outspoken in regard to the relationship between the ex-RAF 
officers and the old IRA and was particularly scathing in his assessment of the character 
of the infantry officers at Baldonnell, individually and collectively, in the early autumn of 
1922. He suggested that ‘an air of hedonism prevailed the atmosphere’ amongst a group 
of officers who ‘apparently had distinguisher careers as guerrilla fighters against the
1 Maryann Gialanella Valulius, Almost a rebellion, the Irish Army Mutiny o f 1924 (Cork, 1988),passim.
~ Col. J.C. Fitzmaurice, unpublished memoir, p. 143 (Estate of the late P. Selwyn-Jones).
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Black and Tans’ and who ‘bore exalted ranks that they had apparently conferred upon 
themselves’ and regarded their appointments in the National Army ‘as a form of life 
pension’.3 In being so critical of IRA officers Fitzmaurice possibly reflected a superior 
attitude on the part of the ex-British aviation personnel of the Air Service, an attitude 
that, no doubt, did not help matters. No doubt this outspoken, superior and somewhat 
condescending attitude only served to intensify the opposition and ire of those of solid 
republican backgrounds.
Fitzmaurice, however, did not hold all old IRA officers in such low regard. He 
was particularly friendly with and admired Commandant Billy Aston, the local 
commander at Fermoy (1922/23) even though he recognised that they would most likely 
be on opposite sides in the festering unrest that would culminate in the mutiny of 1924 4 
Similarly Fitzmaurice held Colonel Michael Hogan in very high regard.5 To a large 
extent the mutual antipathy of the infantry and air groups could not be avoided. When 
Collins set out to introduce an aviation aspect to the army during the Treaty negotiations 
he had no option but to engage the services of two ex-RAF pilots. Subsequently, as the 
main action of the Civil War moved south-westwards, the decision to take on more pilots 
in order to assist McSweeney and Russell and to facilitate the sending of an attachment of 
aircraft and personnel to Fermoy, had to be taken by Collins.6 During the Civil War the 
sensitivity regarding the employment of ex-British personnel who lacked pre-Truce 
service is reflected in the manner in which the matter was reported to government by 
Collins’ successor as commander-in-chief, the then Minister for Defence General R. 
Mulcahy.
The commander in chief reported that only a limited number of ex-officers of the 
British Army had been taken into the Army, that they were Irishmen and that they 
were employed mainly in instructing capacities and in some cases in an assisting 
capacity.7
3 Ibid, pp 121-3.
4 Ibid, p. 140.
5 Ibid, p. 130-1.
6 Conference minutes, 16 Aug. 1922 (UCDA, MP, P7/49/48).
7 Provisional government decisions, PG 101, 26 August 1922 (NAI, DT, S.1302).
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It was this sensitivity to the recruitment of Ex-RAF personnel that delayed the logical 
early expansion of the air operation during the Civil War. The pilot appointments were 
not advertised in the national press but were made known by word of mouth to attract to 
the Air Service some of the Irish ex-RAF pilots. Eventually another eleven ex-RAF pilots 
were commissioned into the Air Service though a maximum of ten served in that service 
at any one time.8 The fact that all were Irish by birth appears to have made little if any 
difference to the attitude of the more republican echelons of the predominantly infantry 
Army despite the fact that a further 147 former members of the British forces were still 
serving elsewhere as officers in the Army at the time of the mutiny. No doubt a 
concentration of a dozen officers of an alien military culture and background, engaged in 
a military discipline with which a former guerrilla army could not identify, was easily 
identified as a suspect group.
The first pupil pilot intake -  officers and other ranks
The extent of difficulty experienced by GHQ dealing with the new aviation culture can be 
judged by the manner in which they sought to minimise the influence of the ex-RAF pilot 
group and the manner in which they endeavoured to put an infantry imprimatur on the 
recruitment and training of pilots from a inordinately early stage of the development of 
the Air Service. An examination of the process of pilot recruitment of 1922-23 and 
subsequent courses and of the subsequent training and careers of the individual officers 
will indicate that GHQ used its authority to promote a policy that extolled the merits of 
infantry culture while endeavouring to subjugate what was seen as an alien culture that 
was assumed to be incompatible with military discipline. On 20 December 1922, with the 
Civil War far from over and many months prior to the formal confirmation of existing 
appointments in the Air Service, GHQ issued its first written edict on any aviation matter. 
This advertised the fact that there were a limited number of vacancies for pupils in the 
aviation department of the Army and invited applications from officers between the ages 
of 18 and 23 indicating that candidates would undergo an exacting medical examination.
8 Michael O’Malley, ‘The Military Air Service 1921-1924’, Appendix 4 (BA thesis, NUI Maynooth, 
2002 ).
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Applicants were reminded to clearly understand that no rank above lieutenant would be 
granted. Applications, with the recommendation of the command GOC, were required to 
reach the Department of the Adjutant General not later than the 31 December 1922.9
It should be noted that, as already stated, the Air Service of mid-December 1922 
had no defined status in the military scheme of things. The ten pilots then in service were 
in effect employed on a contract basis having been ‘admitted on approval and if not 
satisfactory’ would have been ‘dispensed with at once’.10 The informal organisation had 
the No. 1 Squadron divided into two Flights. The operational type aircraft, the Bristol 
Fighters and the Martinsyde F.4 Buzzards, were being operated by ‘B’ Flight whose main 
focus was the air operations in the south-west with four pilots and four aircraft at Fermoy 
and a single pilot and aircraft operating out of Tralee. That left only five pilots, including 
McSweeney, at Baldonnell where the ‘A’ Flight, using the Avro 504K training aircraft 
had apparently begun pilot training pupil pilots on an informal basis as early as the 
middle of October 1922.11
While no records survive to illustrate the nature of the order directing McSweeney 
and the Air Service to undertake pilot training, or the parameters within which such a 
flying course was to be constructed, there is little doubt that the ‘A’ Flight of the single 
squadron of the Air Service of late 1922 lacked the basic prerequisites for such a task. 
The hastily established air element, still at a rudimentary stage of its development clearly 
lacked any capacity or tradition in flying training. It had no structures or adequate staffs 
to undertake instructional duties. The most basic deficiency was that of a flying school 
with a syllabus appropriate to an ab initio flying course. In this regard the most that could 
have been available to Comdt. J.J. Flynn, Officer Commanding ‘A’ Flight, No. 1 
Squadron, was a schedule of exercises or flights, gleaned from his own experience, that 
he considered should be completed by each student.
From an examination of a manuscript record of pupils and the staggered dates on 
which they started training it can be concluded that the Adjutant General was not 
inundated with applications from officers anxious to become pilots. While no 
contemporary record or nominal roll of this intake has been found it appears that the
9 General Routine Order No. 9, 20 December 1922.
10 Conference minutes, 16 Aug. 1922 (UCDA, MP, P7/B/49/48).
11 Aircraft Log Book, Avro II (AC Museum).
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students reported, and commenced training, on different dates, and that no theory or 
ground school, to support the flying programme, was taught. Of the fourteen pupils who 
apparently commenced training under the scheme at least five were non-commissioned 
personnel, who were designated as ‘flight cadets’ during training, while six others, 
holding commissioned rank, came from various Army units. The balance was made up of 
three Air Service lieutenants, Lieut. Tom Nolan, McSweeney’s first observer and two 
former NCOs who were possibly granted temporary commissions by General 
McSweeney in order to qualify to undergo the course. The fourteen pupils commenced 
flying training at various dates between October 1922 and the end of July 1923.12 While 
an early army report states that six out of a total of sixteen pupils were flying solo on 
elementary type training aircraft by the end of 1923 the basis for the latter number is not 
apparent.13
The training of Lieut. Timothy Nevin may have been typical of that of many of 
the group. He commenced training on 18 June 1923 and flew some twenty instructional 
flights with various instructors before completing his first solo flight on 12 August 1923 
after eight hours and fifty-five minutes of flying time.14 Flight cadet Daniel J. McKeown 
commenced flying in mid-July 1923 but did not fly solo until 16 December 1923 after 
almost thirteen hours of dual instruction.15 If a formal schedule of flying exercises was 
followed no such details are evident in the pilot or aircraft log books examined. Each of 
the above pupils had graduated to the service aircraft, the Bristol Fighter, by about forty 
hours flying while dual instruction made up about thirty percent of that total.
It is not obvious at what stage a pilot was considered qualified. In T.J. Nevin’s 
case it appears that he succeeded in getting his pilot’s certificate and wings in December 
1923 by which time he had between thirty and forty hours flying experience.16 However 
he died on 24 January 1924, as a result of injuries received in an accident in Bristol 
Fighter BF II the previous day, shortly after commencing training on the type.17 In D.J. 
McKeown’s case no formal end to the course of instruction is indicated in his pilot’s log
12 ‘Record of pilot intake to Air Corps’; Aircraft Log Books, Avro I; II; III; IV (AC Museum).
13 Undated ‘Memo on the development of the forces 1923-27’ (MA, MM/1).
14 Pilots Log Book, Lt. T.J. Nevin (original held by G.M. Nevin, Athenry.Co. Galway).
b Pilot’s Log Book, Capt. D.J. McKeown (original held by Mr. P. Molloy, Celbridge).
16 Nevin family papers (in possession of G.M. Nevin)
17 OC A AS report, 23 Mar. 1924 (MA, A/11270).
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book. It is more difficult to detail the rest of those who were deemed to have qualified as 
pilots from the course of 1922-24 but six would appear to be the maximum number while 
a further three qualified as observers or navigators.18 Of this number only four remained 
in service after the demobilisation, mutiny and reorganisation processes of 1924. The 
aggregate of the subsequent service of the six successful pupils was only about thirty 
years, giving an average service of five years. While the successful pilots and observers 
of this first intake apparently did no ground school subjects this deficiency was 
eventually put right. Those who remained in service after the reorganisation of 1924 
completed ground school examinations in 192519 or took ground school subjects and 
examinations in conjunction with the cadet and officer intake of 1926 that qualified in 
1928.20 It is significant that no officer, who qualified as a pilot or observer from the class 
of 1922-24, achieved a rank above that of captain in the Air Service / Air Corps while 
three of the successful pupils were killed in flying accidents during training or 
subsequently. In terms of the small number who qualified, the apparently low standard 
achieved and the brevity of subsequent service this intake must be considered a failure. 
The results serve to suggest that the decision of the General Staff to have pilots trained in 
such adverse circumstances during a civil war was irresponsible in the extreme and 
probably only justified by the prejudice towards those who had served with British 
forces. During the reorganisation process, entrusted to Eoin O’Duffy as result of the 
mutiny, this first intake of pupil pilots was the subject of adverse comment.
I am informed that although every effort was made during the past 12 months to
secure the right type of prospective pilot no satisfactory results were obtained, and
a considerable amount of time and instruction were expended without any 
2 1corresponding return.
For O’Duffy to state that every effort was made to get the right type appears somewhat 
disingenuous. The original advertisement implied that many officer volunteers were to be
18 Record of pilot intake to Air Corps (AC Museum); General Routine Orders, 1922/24; Staff Duty 
Memos, 1923/24.
Routine Order by Col. C.F. Russell, paragraph 1263, 25 November 1925 (in my possession).
20 Undated memorandum, ground school course results, circa June 1928 (MA, AC/1/7/3).
21 ‘O’Duffy’s scheme’, Explanatory notes, 1 July 1924, p.37 (NAI, S.3442B).
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interviewed, and therefore selected by the director of aviation. In the event it appears that 
about half the personnel who were accepted were from the non-commissioned ranks and 
that no selection process was applied to the fourteen applicants who eventually 
commenced flying training. In effect the first pupil pilots appear to have been volunteers 
who were not required to meet any selection criterion other than an aviation medical 
examination. The recruitment process and training regime that was followed indicates a 
total naivety on the part of GHQ in regard to the prerequisites of pilot training. It is 
considered that, had Air Service officers expressed opinions on the matter it is highly 
probable that they would have been ignored. It will be noted that C.F. Russell, who 
might have had a constructive influence on the concept of undertaking pilot training at 
such an inopportune time, had been posted to the Railway Protection and Maintenance 
Corps in mid September. The precipitous action of GHQ in ordering the training of new 
pilots so early in the formation of the air arm was clearly aimed at having the ex-RAF 
pilots train their own replacements. Had the first flying course borne the fruit expected by 
GHQ there is little doubt that most, if not all, ex-RAF pilots would have been 
demobilised as quickly as possible after the Civil War having been replaced by pilots of a 
good infantry background with the requisite pre-Truce service.
The second pilot training course 1926/28 -  cadets and officers
With the formal establishment of the Army being put into effect in October 1924 the 
Army leadership had to come to terms with an Army Air Corps that owed its existence to 
Collins’ Civil War intelligence requirements rather that to an ideologically based 
decision. In view of the failure to obtain satisfactory results, in terms of quality and 
numbers, from the first pupil intake a new approach was required. Arising out of the 
reorganisation process, entrusted to General Eoin O’Duffy in his capacity as GOC the 
forces, the need for an alternative recruitment process was recognised. Subsequently a 
cadetship scheme for the Air Corps, that would latter evolve to become the cadetship 
intake system for the Army generally, was recommended:
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While suitable candidates from the Army should get preference, it is deemed 
advisable to secure as far as possible candidates direct from school between 18 and 
21, and possessing the following qualities -  physical fitness, courage, keenness, 
decision, self reliance and intelligence.22
In a somewhat contradictory manner the same explanatory note suggested that there was 
no alternative but to train a small number of infantry as pilots.23 Towards the end of 1924 
the Department of Finance was made aware of a proposal for the employment of cadets 
for training as pilots in the Air Corps:
The necessity for the employment of additional personnel in the Army Air Corps 
has been established and the proposal that suitable candidates for the Air Service 
[sic] might be obtained by the engagement of a limited number of suitable 
unmarried young men for training has received the assent of the Minister for 
Defence.24
It was proposed that a number of young men would undergo an exhaustive course of 
training and that commissions in the Air Corps would only be issued to such cadets as 
qualify in every respect as flying officers and show other required qualities during 
training. The proposed age limit was to be eighteen to twenty-two years while cadets in 
training would wear officers’ unifonns without rank markings or any other badges. The 
proposal as forwarded to the Department of Finance for financial sanction indicated that 
while the Air Corps only had vacancies for four more officers at that time authority 
accordingly was being requested for an establishment of ten Cadets at a proposed rate of 
pay of six shillings per day. While the Minister for Finance gave approval in principle for 
the proposed cadet scheme in December 1924 he requested, in particular, details 
regarding the method of selection. In reply Defence explained several conditions that 
would attach to the proposed competition. The fact that the Defence Forces (Temporary
22 General O’Duffy’s scheme, Explanatory notes, 1 July 1924, p.37 (NA1, DT, S.3442B).
23 Ibid, p.36.
24 AFO to Sec DF, 20 Nov. 1924 (NAI, DF, S.004/383/24). The Army Air Service became the Army Air 
Corps on 1 Oct. 1924.
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Provisions) Act 1923 made no provision for the rank of cadet was circumvented by the 
decision to consider cadets as Class III privates with pay of two shillings and six pence 
per week plus the four shillings per day flying pay due to NCOs or soldiers of the Air 
Service undergoing instruction. It was also suggested that the men selected would be 
issued with officers’ uniforms, without rank markings, from stores and would be entitled 
to the privileges of officers. The final condition, to ensure a proper educational standard, 
specified that these men chosen should undergo a special examination by the Civil 
Service Commissioners.25 On 18 May 1925 the Department of Finance approved the 
revised scheme ‘regarding the employment of a certain number of cadets in the Army Air 
Service [sic]’.26
The notice advertising ‘Cadetships in the Anny Air Corps’ were carried in the 
country’s main newspapers in the last week in September and first week in October 1925 
with the closing date for the receipt of applications given as 24 October 1925. In addition 
to carrying the DOD advertisement some papers included a news item drawing attention 
to the new career opportunity for the young men of the country. The Limerick Leader, 
under the headline ‘Saorstat Army Air Coips -  cadetships’ reprinted the department’s 
substantial information sheet that accompanied the application form. This document 
presented a detailed description of the career ‘in the new art of aviation’ on offer and also 
give the major subject headings extracted from the syllabus of training that was being 
drafted by Col. C.F. Russell. Considerable detail of the course of military, ground and 
flying training that awaited the successful applicants was included with the ground school 
subjects being given particular mention. This, and other newspapers, portrayed a career 
that must have appeared, and no doubt was, very attractive to the youth of the country 
then ravaged by unemployment.27 By way of contrast another newspaper put a much 
different slant on the decision to recruit cadets for training as flying officers:
In pursuance of its policy of encouraging the development of civil aviation in the
Irish Free State the Ministry for Defence gives notice of a number of vacancies in
the Anny Air Service [sic]. Although the cadets are to be trained as flying officers
25 AFO to Sec DF, 1 May 1925 (NA1, DF, S.004/383/24).
26 DF to AFO, 18 May 1925 (NAI, DF, S.004/383/24).
27Extract from Limerick Leader, 3 Oct. 1925 (NAI, DF, S.004/383/24).
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with the Army Air Corps it is understood that the civil aspect of their training will
28take precedence of the purely military side of aviation.
This connotation, which could possibly reflect Russell’s leaning towards civil aviation, 
does not appear to reflect the intentions of the General Staff and DOD. While the new 
state was still anxious to be able to encourage civil aviation the public records of this time 
do not suggest any civil aviation context to the instigation of the first cadet class in the
forces.
Subsequent to the advertising of the cadetship vacancies some 773 application 
forms, regulations including conditions of service and syllabi of the competitive 
examination were distributed on request. Only 140 completed application forms were 
received by DOD by the closing date.29 As early as March 1925 the Chief of Staff had 
indicated that the ‘officer commanding, Army Air Service [sic]’ would be a member of a 
committee of selection but only in the capacity of a technical advisor.30
The selection board, consisting of four colonels, included Col. C.F. Russell, 
presumably acting in his capacity as a technical advisor, reported to the Chief of Staff on 
26 January 1926. The Board was apparently less than impressed with the quality of many 
of the 140 applicants. In particular they found fault with the more menial backgrounds of 
some of the applicants. They also observed that ‘candidates graded entirely unsuitable 
were those whose utter incapacity was quite apparent such as half simpletons, out-of- 
work, and those whose character was obviously of the lowest’. Some forty-five applicants 
were declared ineligible or had withdrawn their applications before 23 December 1925 
while forty-eight of the remaining ninety-five subsequently withdrew or failed to turn up 
for interview by the military selection board. With a total of twenty-nine candidates being 
rejected by the selection and medical boards only eighteen were summoned to undergo 
the Civil Service Commissioners’ examination. Only nine of the sixteen who actually 
took this examination were deemed to have achieved a pass mark and suitable for the 
award of a cadetship. The selection board attributed the poor quality of the applicants to
28 E x trac t, Irish Times, 30  S ep t. 1925 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /3 8 3 /2 4 ) .
19 A d v e rtisem en t in  An t-Oglach, iii, no . 2 0  (3 O c t. 1 9 2 5 ), p . 17; S e lec tio n  b o a rd  re p o rt, 26  Jan . 1926 (M A , 
2 /1 1 1 3 ).
30 C O S  to  A F O , 6 M ar. 1925 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /3 8 3 /2 4 ).
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the effects of unemployment and the relatively good pay for a cadet as well as the fact 
that there was no pension scheme to attract the type of man the Army needed. ! 1
While there may well have been some very poor candidates in the Air Corps 
cadetships competition in 1925/26 the subsequent actions of GHQ suggest that the 
conduct of a cadetship competition was largely a matter of going through the motions and 
that, in fact they were not necessarily disappointed with the quality of candidates. 
O’Duffy’s original recommendation had indicated that suitable candidates from the Army 
should get preference in a cadetship competition. The upper age limit had been extended 
by one year for any candidate who had six months service in Oglaig na hEireann, the 
Irish Volunteers, Fianna Eireann or in the National Forces and by two years in the case 
of any candidate who has given twelve months such service and was still serving in the 
Defence Forces on 1 January 1926.32 At least three serving personnel had reached the 
final stages of the competition while, apparently many officers who were well outside the 
age limit made known their desire to become pilots.33
While the cadet selection was completed before the end of January 1926 it was to 
be June before the flying course got under way. This delay was most likely caused by the 
Machiavellian actions of the Army leadership in regard to the eligibility of serving 
officers who did not meet the age requirements for the cadetship competition but whom 
GHQ was apparently anxious to facilitate. About a month after the selection of cadets had 
been made the Department of Defence made further representations to Finance:
In connection with the recruitment of suitable persons as pilots and observers in the 
Army Air Corps, I am informed by the Chief of Staff that the result of the recent 
examinations for cadets for this service has not quite provided the most suitable 
type of man. He mentioned that even in addition to the cadets to be selected for the 
Air Corps, applications have been received from young infantry officers who were 
desirous of training as pilots and observers. Generally speaking this type of officer 
would be under twenty-five years of age, and would only be accepted for training
11 S e lec tio n  b o a rd  re p o rt  to C O S , 26  Jan . 1926 (M A , D O D  2 /1 1 1 3 ).
32 ‘A p p o in tm e n t o f  c a d e ts  in th e  A rm y  A ir  C o rp s  -  p ro v is io n a l re g u la tio n s ’, 25 S ep t. 1925 (N A I, D F ,
S .0 0 4 /3 8 3 /2 4 ).
33D F  file  m em o , 19 A p r. 1926  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /3 8 3 /2 4 ).
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after very careful scrutiny into the bona fides of the application, and after a 
thorough medical examination. The advantages of having officers within the ranks 
of the Army trained in pilots’ and observers’ duties are obvious from a military 
point of view .34
In considering the latest proposal, particularly the passage underlined Finance consulted 
with the Civil Service Commission and observed that in two or three cases candidates 
gave suggesting that two or three of the candidates who took the Commission’s 
examination were from the army. The most telling observation was to the effect that the 
reduction in the number of eligible cadetship candidates was as a result of thorough 
sifting of some ninety applicants by the Army -  the inference being that the motives of 
the Army, in conducting the elimination process in the manner in which it did, were not 
entirely disinterested.33
In supporting the case for over-age officers neither the Chief of Staff nor the army 
finance officer suggested the reason why a significant number of infantry officers had 
expressed their interest in becoming pilots. It was probably related to the fact that the 
flying pay of a pupil pilot represented a fifty percent increase in pay while a successful 
pupil would realise a pay increase of almost ninety percent. The more attractive pay 
considerations (flying pay at four shillings and eight shillings per day) had not applied 
back in 1922 when pupil pilots had first been sought.36 It might be construed that the 
cadetship applicants had been subjected to a cull in order to denigrate the standard and to 
facilitate a case for having mature officers declared eligible to undergo a flying course. In 
response to the Finance query as to whether or not infantry officers would be exempted 
the educational test that applied to cadets, the Army Finance Officer replied:
It may be stated that it is proposed that the transfer of such infantry officers to the 
Air Corps is to be of a temporary nature, while permanent transfer, not subject to
34 A F O  to  D F , 24  F eb . 1926  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /3 8 3 /2 4 ).
35 D F  m em o , 19 A p r. 1926 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 3 8 3 /2 4 ) .
36 C o m d t. W .J. B re n n an  — W h itm o re , (E d .)  Defence Forces Army List and Directory, 1926, (A n  tO g lac h , 
1926), p . 136.
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educational test, will be conditional on the necessary technical qualifications being
37gained during the training course, as confirmed by a practical test.
In effect this somewhat obscure reply stated that officers would not have to meet the 
educational standard applying to cadetship applicants. They would only be attached to the 
Air Corps during training and that only those who passed the prescribed flying and 
ground school tests would be posted into officer vacancies in the Corps. GHQ did not 
allude to the fact that all successful officers would have army seniority over all successful 
cadets and that the revised scheme would ensure that the future leadership of the Air 
Corps would be in the hands of infantry officers with acceptable IRA service and of 
nationalist backgrounds. More importantly, the officer group, in training, would not be 
susceptible to the influence of what was perceived to be an alien culture, that of the ex- 
RAF officers, as would be the case where young and impressionable cadets were 
concerned.
It was 12 November 1926 before the Department of Finance had given approval 
for the flying training of ten officers at any one time but however stated that the original 
DOD proposal of 24 February 1926 did not clarify whether it was intended to retain such 
trainees when qualified for the purpose of filling any vacancies on its establishment’ and 
requested further information on the point.38 In replying Defence prevaricated somewhat:
I have to inform you that it is hoped some of the Officers now under training
will prove sufficiently suitable to warrant their retention as [Air] Corps Officers. It 
is, however, premature to undertake a final selection, but it is expected that the 
preliminary tests will be completed in about two months’ time, when you will be 
informed of the result.39
In the meantime the nine cadets who had reported to the Army School of
Instruction on 12 April 1926, for the basic military aspect of their course, subsequently
reporting to Baldonnell on 27 June for the flying course. At Baldonnell no less than
37D F  to  A F O , 22  A p r. 1926; A F O  to D F , 22  M a y  1926  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /3 8 3 /2 4 ) .
38 D F  to  A F O , 12 N o v . 1926 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /3 8 3 /2 4 ) .
39 A F O  to  S ec  D F , 3 D ec . 1926  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /3 8 3 /2 4 .
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seventeen officers, apparently volunteers, who had not undergone any selection process, 
were already attached to the Air Corps for instructional purposes having reported there 
prior to 4 June.40 These officers apparently varied in age from about twenty-three to at 
least twenty-six.41 They held the ranks of lieutenant, captain and commandant.42 In 
effect, while the Air Corps originally had vacancies for four flying officers in late 1924 
when the cadet scheme was first proposed, this, the second flying course, began in June 
1926 with twenty-six students. This was at a time when the Air Corps officer 
establishment provided for a total of twenty-two appointments only six of which were 
vacant at the particular juncture.43 The seventeen officers were already attached to the Air 
Corps despite the fact that Finance was not to grant the appropriate sanction until 
December 1926. On 1 June 1926 Col. C.F. Russell approved the results of a preliminary 
or assessment test, in Algebra, Geometry and English, undertaken by sixteen of the 
seventeen officers. While a pass mark of 35% had been laid down twelve officers 
achieved marks between 40% and 85%. The other four were granted a ‘Pass’ mark 
though numerical values were not recorded. The latter four officers plus another who had 
achieved 75% in the assessment test are recorded as having been returned to their original 
units within a few weeks of the start of the course. Twelve officers, including one who 
had not taken the assessment test, commenced the course proper.44
Mindful of the fact that the first flying course had been a failure both GHQ and 
the Air Corps were apparently anxious that the flying and ground school syllabus to be 
followed was appropriate to the course target of producing appropriately qualified 
military pilots. GHQ, whose staff boasted of no qualifications or expertise in any aspect 
of aviation, apparently delegated the task of drafting this syllabus to Col. C. F. Russell. 
Russell, who had been posted out of the Air Service in September 1922 and had more
recently been director of the Army Corps of Engineers, was apparently the driving force
behind the establishment of the Army Corps of Engineers approved under Orders No. 3.
40 O C  A A C  to  C S O  G H Q , 4  Ju n e  1926  (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
4lA c c o rd in g  to  h is  D e fe n c e  F o rc e s  C V  L t. P . Q u in n  w as bo rn  on 10 Ju n e  1899.
42 R e co rd  o f  p ilo t in ta k e  in to  A ir  C o rp s  (A C  M u se u m ); L o ca l s tre n g th  re tu rn , 11 Ju n e  1926  (M A ,
L S 8 /L S 9 ).
43 O rd e rs  N o .3 , D e fe n c e  F o rc e s  (O rg a n is a tio n )  O rd e r, 1 O c t. 1924 , p p . 3 4 -5 ; L o ca l s tre n g th  re tu rn s , (M A , 
L S 8 /L S 9 ).
44 U n d a te d  q u e s tio n  p a p e rs ; ‘E x a m in a tio n  r e s u l ts ’, 1 Ju n e  1926, P .J . H a sse tt p a p e rs  (in  p o sse ss io n  o f  C ap t. 
E o in  H a sse tt) ; R e co rd  o f  p ilo t in ta k e  to  A ir  C o rp s  (A C  M u seu m ).
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He had been appointed OC Air Corps in July 1925. For reasons that are not at all clear, 
but which possibly related to Russell’s superior ability and record as a pilot, commander 
and staff officer, Major T.J. Maloney had been abruptly removed from that position and 
replaced by Russell.45
While the drafting of the syllabus for the pilot training course had not been 
completed and thus had no formal status it is probable that the course commenced and 
proceeded on the basis of a current draft. Russell completed his work on the document in 
October 1926. He wrote to GHQ enclosing an amended syllabus of training, covering a 
period of two years for pupil officers and cadets. Indicating that there had been previous 
discussion on the matter he reiterated the fact that he considered that a special allotment 
of test mark should be made for the keeping of note books on lecture material. He 
indicated a certain degree of frustration arising out of his dealings with GHQ in relation 
to the drafting of the syllabus adding a manuscript note suggesting that his expertise as a 
pilot was being questioned by those with no knowledge of aviation.46
In any event the completed syllabus was eventually approved and published. On 
18 March 1927, DFR 7 of 1927, providing for the ‘Syllabus of training, pupil officers and 
cadets in the Army Air Corps’, was duly signed by the Minister for Defence and came 
into effect. This regulation, a detailed and comprehensive syllabus, was to be the only 
such regulation specific to the Air Coips ever issued by the Department of Defence. It 
laid down, in considerable detail, a two-year course divided into elementary and 
advanced stages. The sixteen ground subjects were sub-divided into appropriate areas of 
instruction and study. In addition the marking scheme for ground school examinations 
was specified while the full range of tests on elementary types o f aircraft and the other 
conditions relating to service aircraft that were to be fulfilled before a pupil officer or 
cadet was deemed qualified to wear the flying badge, were also laid down.47 (See 
Appendix 6)
In the meanwhile the course had been progressing. Eventually only seven of the 
remaining twelve pupils of the officer group achieved the qualifying standard in the 
written examinations. One of these apparently did not pass the requisite practical tests in
4;>C O S  to  M a j. T h o m a s  J. M a lo n ey , M S /6 1 3  d a te d  24  Ju n e  1925 (in  m y p o sse ss io n ) .
46 C .F . R u sse ll to  C S O  G H Q , 7 O ct. 19 2 6  (M A , 2 /1 1 1 3 ).
47 D F R  7 /1 9 2 7 , 18 M ar. 1927 .
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flying and was returned to his army unit. Only six, or 35%, of the officers who had 
volunteered for pilot training duly qualified. Of the cadet group of nine seven qualified -  
six as pilots -  double the success rate achieved by the officers. The seventh cadet 
qualified as an observer in accordance with an amended syllabus having ‘being found too 
small of stature to cany out effectively the duties of a pilot’- he could not reach the 
rudder pedals. One cadet had been discharged on medical grounds earlier in the course. 
The ninth cadet had been discharged having been found guilty of a civil charge in the 
Dublin District Court. He is recorded as being ‘dispensed with as a result of a court
48prosecution for “cheat and fraud in obtaining admission to the Army Air Corps.’” 
Apocryphal comments suggest that another person had taken the Civil Service 
Commission examination on his behalf.
With the alleged poor quality of the cadet intake implied by the Selection Board 
Report and the much lauded qualities of the mature infantry officer and the assumed 
potential value of this particular group to the Air Corps as suggested by GHQ it is of 
considerable interest to examine the examination results and make comparisons between 
the two groups of successful students. In the ground school examinations, with a pass 
mark of 50%, the officers averaged 52.4% while the cadets achieved an average of almost 
64%. The fact that the best officer achieved a mark that was only marginally better than 
the worst cadet (1005 against 1004, out of a possible 1640) indicates the difference 
between the two groups, at least in terms of ground school. In percentage terms twice as 
many cadets as officers achieved the pilots ‘wings’ standard. While the tests in flying 
were on a pass or fail basis the later course files examined indicate that those who did 
better in ground school subjects were generally the better pilots - suggesting that the 
cadets of 1926/28, individually and collectively, also graduated as the superior flying 
officers.49
Notwithstanding their better performance the cadet were, by definition, junior to 
their officer colleagues and would remain so for the remainder of their careers. One of the
48 Sec  D O D  to  S ec  D F , 27  O c t. 1928 (M A , 2 /1 1 1 3 ).
49 U n d a te d  ‘T es ts  as p e r  D F R  7 /1 9 2 7 ’, c irc a  Ju n e  1928 (M A , A C /1 /7 /3 ) ;  F ile s  A C S /1 0 3 ; A C S /1 0 3 /1 1/2; 
A C S /1 0 3 /5 /1 ; A C S /1 7 7 /1 1; A C S /1 4 /2 ; S .I. 109/1 (c o u rte sy  o f  S ch o o l C o m m a n d a n t, 200 5 ).
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successful officers of the 1926-28 flying course subsequently summarised the course as 
follows.
In accordance with a policy of changing the atmosphere at Baldonnel it was 
decided to transfer in young officers of IRA service. In 1926, under this scheme 
17 officers, of which I was one, were transferred to the Air Corps. The ex-RAF 
personnel made it difficult for us but despite this, after the two years prescribed 
course 12/14 qualified as pilots.50
While the recollection of the number of officers who qualified is wide of the mark the 
comment does tend to confirm that the basic reason for the instigation of the officer 
element to the course was to neutralise the influence of the ex-RAF element in the corps.
It should be understood that the successful officers, previously attached to the Air 
Corps were posted into appropriate appointments on reaching the pilot qualifying 
standard -  in about June 1928. In September 1928 DOD made Finance aware of the 
outcome of the cadet course (that had also finished in June) and the fact that the seven 
cadets were due to become commissioned officers. Defence reminded Finance that this 
could only happen if vacancies existed and that only two such vacancies were then 
available. The secretary, on behalf of the minister, indicated that in a recently proposed 
revision o f the Air Corps establishment there would be vacancies for an additional eight 
second lieutenants and recommended that ‘financial sanction should be accorded for the 
appointment of these cadets to commissioned rank in anticipation of sanction of the 
revised scheme of organisation’.51 Again we find the Department of Defence being less 
than frank with the Department of Finance. The necessity to commission seven cadets as 
officers, something they were obliged to do, was used by DOD to support their case for 
an increase in the establishment. This increase was made necessary by the fact that six 
army officers, now qualified as pilots, had already been absorbed into the existing 
organisation, in effect, filling the appointments for which the cadets had been recruited 
and trained. An increase of a total of thirteen pilot officers was eventually negotiated,
30 U n p u b lish e d  m e m o ir , L t. C o l. P .J . H a sse tt, c irca  1959 (in  p o sse s s io n  o f  C ap t. E o in  H asse tt) .
51 S ec  D O D  to  S ec  D F , 27  Sep t. 1928 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /3 8 3 /2 4 ) .
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approved by Finance and put into effect on 1 December 1928. Some of the additional 
appointments that were still vacant in 1931/32 were to be abolished in the establishment 
change of that year.52 In the meanwhile the cadets who had qualified for their pilots
53‘wings’ were eventually commissioned with effect from 5 Nov. 1928. From an army 
point of view the campaign had been a success. GHQ had succeeded in pulling the wool 
over the eyes of Finance and had trained six infantry officers, of an acceptable IRA 
background, and posted them into the Air Corps with the appropriate seniority to imbue 
military aviation with an infantry ethos.
Capt. M.J. O’Brien
With the commissioning of the successful cadets of the 1926/28 intake pilot training 
ceased for a number of years though some officer appointments remained unfilled. 
Thereafter no particular policy was followed in the matter of filling those pilot vacancies 
that arose. From about 1933 proposals for the establishment of an Army Co-operation 
Squadron created a specific requirement for pilots though unstructured recruitment had 
been initiated earlier. Capt. M.J. O’Brien had transferred to the Air Corps and had 
functioned as an observer from about 12 March 1929. On 23 February 1931, presumably 
on the authority of Major J. J. Liston, OC Air Coips, he commenced training as a pupil 
pilot. On 28 April 1933 he was certified as having successfully passed the pilot’s flying 
tests specified under DFR 7/1927 and that he was duly qualified in that respect.54 In May 
1933 it was reported to the minister for Finance that, while Capt. O’Brien had completed 
the flying requirements, as the only pupil officer under instruction considerable 
difficulties had been encountered in making systematic progress with his ground 
instruction and that it was necessary to request sanction to extent the course beyond the 
two year programme specified by the regulation and to continue to pay him at the rate of 
flying pay appropriate to pupil pilots. Finance approved an extension to the ground
’ ’ D F R  23 o f  1929 , e ffe c tiv e  1 D ec . 1928 ; P e a c e  e s tab lish m en t 1 9 3 1 /3 2 , (S ta tio n e ry  O ffice , 1931).
33 C o l. W .J . K e an e , ‘T h e  first c la ss  o f  c ad e ts  - 60  y ears  a g o ’ in An Cosantoir, V o l. 156, no . 3 (M a rch , 
1986), p. 10.
34O b s e rv e r ’s log bo o k , C ap t. M .J. O ’B rien  (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
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school programme and the continuation of flying pay at the pupil pilot rate of four 
shillings per day, from 24 Februaryl933 to 27 June 1933.55
The officer and cadet class of 1934/35
The first formally organised ab initio flying course since that of 1926/28 commenced in 
January 1934, with eight young officers and a single cadet as the pupil pilots. This 
occurred in the context of proposals being made for establishment of an Army Co­
operation Squadron at cadre strength within the current approved strength o f the Army:
The existing establishment provides for the Corps Headquarters, the office of the 
Director of Military Aviation and the Air Corps Schools but no provision is made 
for a tactical unit capable of co-operation in the field with other arms of the 
forces.56
DOD stated that an increase in the number of flying officers in the Air Corps could not 
be affected except by recruiting cadets for training as pilots. Sanction was requested 
for the recruitment, with the assistance of the Civil Service Commission, of ten Air 
Corps cadets.57 In view of the manner in which the Army leadership had manipulated 
the cadet and officer intake of 1926 it is of note that DOD again cited the cadetship 
method as the only viable one for pilot intake and training. In considering the matter 
Finance noted that ten (army) cadets were already provided for in the financial year 
and that, while the ‘Provisional war establishment’ included provision for ‘[Table] 
38W The Army Co-operation Squadron (in course of compilation)’, no authority 
existed in the current peace establishment for such a flying unit. The additional cost of 
£964 was also seen by Finance as a difficulty.58 A complementary opinion suggested 
that ‘the appointment of Air Corps cadets would, I think, be more useful to the Army 
than the piling up of additional numbers of infantry cadets’. It was also suggested that
55 Sec D O D  to  Sec  D F , 8 M a y  1933 ; S ec  D F  to  Sec D O D , 11 M a y  1933 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 6 0 /3 3 ).
56 Sec  D O D  to  Sec D F , 13 A p r. 1933 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 5 2 /3 3 ).
57 Ib id .
58 D F  m em o , W . D o o lin  to  E . O ’N e ill ,  24  A p r. 1933 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 5 2 /3 3 ).
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the additional funding, required for flying personnel, would not be available in the 
current financial years and that in any event a sufficiently strong case for such a 
tactical unit had not been stated by DOD. Notwithstanding these adverse comments 
Finance apparently did approve an intake of ten cadets for the Air Corps in addition to 
at least twelve allowed for the infantry.5 In August 1933 a cadetship competition was 
held and 39 candidates sat the Civil Service Commission examination though only 
nine passed to the required standard. Of these seven failed the medical examination 
and one failed to impress the interview board. The single successful candidate, Cadet 
Malachi Higgins, was to complete his Cadet School training during 1934 and 
commence flying training in 1935, with the succeeding class.
At this juncture DOD appears to have adopted two schemes of pilot selection at 
the same time. As a result of only getting one cadet DOD authorised the Army to try to 
make up a class of six pupil pilots from whatever source. They started by offering Air 
Corps cadetships to infantry cadets already in training in the Military College. Six cadets 
were found suitable but five failed the air medical examination. Cadet Lorcan J. Byrne 
was awarded an Air Corps cadetship on 5 November 1933. However he did not 
subsequently train as a pilot and was commissioned with the 6th army Cadet Class 
(1932/34).60 Cadet D.K. Johnston, who had been an infantry cadet since 14 November
1932, had his application to transfer to the Air Corps approved in November 1933 and 
was the single cadet in the 1934/35 Air Corps class.61
Also selected for this course was Lieut. A.C. Woods, whose commissioning ‘in 
pursuance of the provisions of Sections 10 and 19 of the Defence Forces (Temporary 
Provisions) Acts’ 1923-1933 was first proposed by the Minister for Defence in March
1933. This appointment was pursued by Defence despite the objections of Finance whose 
concurrence, on financial grounds, was required before such an appointment could be 
made. Finance pointed out that while the government had authority to appoint officers it 
had become the standard practice to hold open competitions in accordance with Civil 
Service Commission regulations. They also raised objections to the effect that both
39 D F  M em o ran d u m  on ‘A rm y  A ir  C o rp s ’, 16 Jan . 1934 , (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 1 6 5 /3 3 ); ‘D ire c to ry  o f  C ad e t 
S choo l g ra d u a te s ’ in An Cosantoir, X X X IX  (S ep t. 19 7 9 ), pp  2 8 7 - 93.
60‘D ire c to ry  o f  C a d e t S ch o o l g ra d u a te s ’ in An Cosantoir, x x x ix , no . 9 (S e p t. 1979), p. 288 .
61 D O D  to  Sec E C , 24  A u g . 1935 (M A , 2 /2 9 6 7 9 ).
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educational and medical standards were possibly being ignored. Finance stated that the 
minister’s proposal seemed ‘to be against general public policy’ and was ‘really a 
personal exercise of patronage by the Minister for Defence’- Frank Aiken.62 Further 
strongly worded objections by the Minister for Finance did not prevent the matter being 
placed on the agenda for the Executive Council meeting of 22 May 1933. At this meeting 
the commissioning was approved, and was published in Iris Oifigiuil, on 26 May.63 
Second Lieutenant Andrew C. Woods was posted to the Air Corps on 2 October 1933.64
About the same time Defence infonned Finance that the Minister for Defence 
had ‘under consideration the question of a scheme for the training of officers as pilots 
for co-operation squadrons in the Air Force [sic] on similar lines to that recently 
adopted in the British Air Service [sic]’ and ‘did not see any other means by which it 
would be possible to create a reserve of co-operation pilots’.
Owing to the fact that the training of this type o f pilot is particularly difficult and 
that pupils must possess an intimate knowledge of military matters, it is not 
considered feasible to create a reserve of co-operation pilots from volunteer or 
civilian sources. It is accordingly proposed to second to the Air Coips certain 
officers specially selected from other units, who would undergo training in flying 
duties for twelve months, after which period they would, if successful in their 
training, be graded as pilot officers and serve a further year with the Air Corps.65
The proposal envisaged that co-operation pilots would revert to their parent units after 
the second year and return to the Air Corps for refresher training for one month each 
year for six years thus creating an ‘efficient reserve of co-operation pilots’. DOD
requested financial sanction for flying pay for an initial four officers. The pupil rate of
four shilling a day during training, and eight shilling per day for the years as qualified 
pilots, would be paid subject to the appropriate approval. This scheme was not 
interpreted by Finance as a substitute for a cadet intake scheme but rather for one that
62 D F  in te rn a l m em o ran d u m , 31 M ar. 1933; D F  to  M F D , 13 M a y  1933 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 3 4 /3 3 ).
63 A g e n d a  o f  m ee tin g  o f  E x ec u tiv e  C o u n c il, 23 M ay  1933 ; Sec E C  to  P riv a te  Sec M F F , 25 M ay  1933; 
E x tra c t fro m  Iris Oifigiuil, 26  M ay  1933 (N A I, D F , S. 0 0 4 /0 0 3 4 /3 3 ) .
64 S ec  D O D  to  S ec  D F , 12 D ec. 1933 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 5 2 /3 3 ) .
65 Sec D O D  to  S ec  D F , 11 D e c .l  933 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 5 2 /3 3 ) .
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proposed ‘the training of members of the OTC and Volunteer Reserve as personnel for 
an Air Force Reserve’ -  a case that had apparently been mooted earlier.66 Arising from 
this initiative three second lieutenants, K.T. Curran, F.F. Reade and M.E. McCullagh, 
from various army units, were selected for flying training that commenced in January 
1934.67 Subsequently four more young officers, apparently in place of cadets not 
recruited, were attached to this class and training started on 18 January 1934. Of the 
total of nine pupils on the 1934/35 course seven, including Cadet D.K. Johnston 
qualified.68 In time, with officers not being returned to infantry units, the two schemes 
merged into each other though the full circumstances cannot be gleaned from the files.
In March 1936 Defence stated that it was not proposed to persevere with the scheme 
for ‘the formation of a reserve of Air Corps Co-operation pilots’ and that they 
proposed to affect the permanent transfers of the three pilots who qualified under the 
reserve scheme.69
The young officer and cadet class of 1935/36
With the approval of Finance and the availability of ten vacancies created by the 
fonnal establishment of the 1st Co-Operation Squadron (Cadre) with effect from 22 
October 1934 (in addition to those vacancies created by retirements since 1928), a 
further six pupils -  four direct entry officers and two cadets -  commenced training on 
1 April 1935 and qualified in March 1936.70
Syllabus changes
From June 1935 new influences would be brought to bear on the matter of the 
recruitment and training of military pilots. While the army hierarchy had paid lip service 
to the concept of cadet entry in the period from 1924 to 1934 thereafter no pretence
66 Ibid.
67 S ec  D O D  to  S ec  D F , 31 Jan . 1935 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 1 65 /3 3 ).
68 R eco rd  o f  p ilo t in ta k e  in to  A ir  C o rp s  (A C  M u seu m ).
69 S ec  D O D  to  Sec D F , 21 M ar. 1936  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 1 6 5 /3 3 ).
70 S ec  D O D  to Sec D F , 25 Ju n e  1935 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 1 6 5 /3 3 ; P e a c e  e s tab lish m en ts , 1934 (M A ); R e co rd  
o f  p ilo t in tak e  in to  A ir  C o rp s  (A C  M u seu m ).
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would be made in efforts made to reduce the possible influence of professional aviators 
on those entering the profession. This was mainly due to the subsequent actions of Major 
P.A. Mulcahy who was appointed acting OC Air Corps and DMA on 3 June 1935. As the 
director of artillery he had no qualifications, experience or training or professional 
expertise of any description in aviation matters. He had come to the Air Corps following 
an unsettled period during which Major J.J. Liston had been in command. Liston’s clash 
with one of his subordinates had resulted in both leaving the Air Corps. (See Chapter 5)
Two of the more significant matters in which Mulcahy took an interest in the 
early stages of his command were the matter of pilot recruitment and training and the 
closely related matter o f the syllabus of flying and ground instruction. In September 
1935, a few months after taking up his appointment he wrote to the Chief of Staff stating 
that ‘it was not in the best interest of the Air Corps that commissioned officers or cadets 
should be appointed to it without having sufficient training in military duties’ and that 
‘cadets should not come to the Air Corps at all’. He cited no study or statistical basis for 
such a view. In effect he was stated categorically that only officers commissioned in the 
Cadet School of the Military College could or should be trained as pilots and so 
recommended to the Chief of Staff.71 This approach can only be seen as a measure to 
ensure that pilots were primarily of an infantry persuasion and that motivation towards 
aviation was very much a secondary consideration. More importantly, by having officers 
complete their formative training in a strictly infantry atmosphere impressionable young 
men would be spared the influence of what was probably perceived as an alien culture -  
the remnants of the ex-RAF group and those former cadets of the 1926/28 class -  a very 
air-oriented rump of the officer body. Having received approval in principle Mulcahy 
infonned the COS that the decision required that the flying training syllabus as laid down 
in DFR 7/1927 be cancelled and that it be replaced by a DFR that he would draft. In 
making the latter suggestion Mulcahy was misleading -  probably deliberately so. The 
syllabus drafted by C.F Russell and in use since 1926, by its very title applied equally to 
the training of commissioned officers and cadets. A decision therefore, to train only 
commissioned officers, did not necessitate a change in the syllabus incorporated in the 
regulation.
71 O C  A C  to  C O S , 23 Sept. 1935 (M A , A C /1 /7 /1 0 ).
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After nine years it is reasonably certain that DFR 7/1927 would require amending. 
This however needed to take the fonn of revision and expansion to reflect the 
developments in aviation technology and developments in the theory and practice of 
flying as well as advances in such areas as navigation and instrument flying -  not a 
reduction to a list of general headings as represented by the new DFR. While progressive 
changes were not reflected in DFR 40/1936 they were to be incorporated in the actual
72syllabus that was to be used for subsequent ‘wings’ courses.
During the latter months of 1935, while he was negotiating with GHQ on the 
matter of a new DRF Mulcahy appears to have detailed the School Commandant to draft 
a new syllabus. This task was completed by 4 November 1935 and its receipt in GHQ 
was noted on DOD file 2/32653. The minute sheet, still attached to the original draft 
syllabus, indicates that the document had been forwarded to GHQ to be approved by 
training staff and to be designated as a training instruction (T.I.). A staff officer, Comdt. 
Earnonn Rooney, held onto the document until April 1936 before returning it to Mulcahy. 
He had made pencilled annotations which indicated small changes in wording but none of 
any substance. He indicated that he ‘had been pecking at it when its issue as a T.I. was 
contemplated’ but that his superior had indicated that the ‘document which implements 
that proposed Schools D.F.R. [40/1936]’ was not suitable for issue as a Training 
Instruction. It was suggested that ‘it could be issued by the corps simply as “Notes on the 
young officers’ course” or some such title’. He further suggested that his pecking might
73be ‘of some help to Capt. Delamere in his further attention to the matter’. This ruling, 
in the words used, was actually quite ambiguous. On one level it intimated that the new, 
and much abbreviated DFR, ( DFR 40/1936 of 21 May 1936) that was actually issued 
about three weeks later, constituted the ‘wings’ course syllabus and that the school 
commandant’s draft syllabus was simply explanatory notes to the regulation. On another 
level the Adjutant General’s branch had stated that the newly drafted school syllabus 
would have the affect of implementing the DFR. This contradiction was not apparently 
recognised and thus did not become an issue.
72 O C  A C  to  C S O  D O D , A C F /3 6 /2 4  d a ted  25  Sep t. 1936; C o rre c te d  d ra ft ‘S y llab u s  o f  y o u n g  o f f ic e r s ’ 
fly in g  tra in in g ’, 25 Sep t. 1936 (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ).
73 M em o , C o m d t. E. R o o n e y  to  O C  A C , 28  A p r. 1936 , (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
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Very shortly after receiving back the draft syllabus Mulcahy forwarded it to Capt. 
Delamere instructing him to examine it carefully. He agreed that the document could be 
issued as suggested by the Adjutant General’s branch and suggested that when the final 
document had been approved by that branch it would have the status of a training 
instruction. Delamere made a number of minor changes. The syllabus was subsequently 
typed. On 25 September 1936 Major P.A. Mulcahy forwarded, ‘for approval, the syllabus 
for the young officers’ flying training course’, to GHQ.74 In the absence of a response it 
can only be presumed that some fonn of approval was granted.
From inspection of the final draft it can be stated that the syllabus, that was to be 
used first for the young officers’ course of 1937/38, represented a significant 
improvement on that of 1927. In particular it was more comprehensive and detailed in 
defining the scope and content of both flying and ground school. It brought all ground 
school subjects and flying disciplines in line with advances in technology and flying 
techniques while specifying the Air Publications (as published by the Air Ministry) that 
should be the required texts appropriate to both flying and to individual ground school 
subjects. The qualifying standard laid down for pilots’ flying technique placed greater 
emphasis on the ability of the pilot where previously some flying tests were dictated by 
the performance characteristics of the aircraft.
The 3ld Young Officers’ Class, 1937/38.
When Mulcahy came to the Air Corps it was, like the Army generally, in the early stages 
of preparation for the anticipated emergency. Such preparation should have included an 
increase in pilot numbers. However, during Mulcahy’s first eighteen months as officer 
commanding no pupil pilot intake occurred. Mulcahy appears to have been preoccupied 
with organising the changes in intake policy, changes in Defence Force Regulations and 
in the flying course syllabus. He also took the opportunity to undergo an abbreviated 
‘wings’ course and, in five weeks, qualified for the receipt of flying pay at the rate 
appropriate to pilots completing the year long flying course. (See Chapter Five) It was 
January 1937 before the next group of pilots, the 3ld Young Officers Class, commenced
74P .A . M u lcah y  to  C S O , D O D , A C F /3 6 /2 4  d a ted  25  S ep t. 1936 (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
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training. Early that month some fourteen second lieutenants, drawn from the graduates of 
the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th (Military College) cadet classes, reported to Baldonnell for flying 
training. Prior to the commencement of the course four were rejected on the basis of a 
medical examination or interview. The rejected candidates were returned to their original
ISunits before the course proper started on 18 January 1937.
While the class was in training the rate of flying pay for qualified pilots, which 
the successful individuals had every reason to expect on qualification, was reduced from 
eight shillings per day to five shilling. DFR 7/1937, which authorised this reduction, was 
issued on 8 February 1937 and had retrospective effect to 31 October 1936. As a 
consequence the eight successful pupils of the 3rd Young Officers’ Flying Course, who 
had volunteered to train as pilots and had joined in the expectation of receiving eight 
shillings per day flying pay perceived themselves to have been wronged. The end of 
course report of the 1937 class recorded that the reduction in flying pay represented an 
inappropriate decision that had caused dissention and distraction amongst the student 
pilots during their course.76 There is no suggestion that Mulcahy had an active part in 
this reduction in pay. Flowever there is no evidence that he concurred with the opinion of 
the School Commandant or that he took any action to have the decision reversed. This 
reduction in flying pay was to have certain repercussions in the context of the 
investigation into the Air Corps carried out in 1941. (See Chapter 11) The decision 
however, may have suited the Minister for Defence. It is a matter of record that the 
minister and Mulcahy agreed that Air Corps pilots were not at all inclined to retire to fly 
with the newly established Aer Lingus -  the inference being that they were too well paid. 
Perhaps it was considered by higher authority that a reduction in flying pay might make
77pilots consider a career m civil aviation.
^ ‘C o n fid en tia l m em o , 7 Jan . 1937, A C S /1 0 3 /1 1/2 (c o u rte sy  o f  S ch o o l C o m m a n d a n t) ; R e c o rd  o f  p ilo t  
in take  to  A ir C o rp s (A C  M u seu m ); ‘D ire c to ry  o f  C a d e t S ch o o l g ra d u a te s ’ in An Cosantoir x x x ix , N o . 9 
(S ep t. 1979), p . 288 .
76 S chool C o m m a n d a n t to  O C  A C , 7 F e b .1938 (M A , A C /2 /6 /1 5 ) .
77 M in u tes  o f  ‘C o n fe re n c e  w ith  m in is te r  on S a tu rd ay  17 Ju ly  1 9 3 7 ’, A p p e n d ix  N o . I to  R e p o rt an d  f in d in g s  
o f  th e  c o m m ittee , 10 Jan . 1942 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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The short service or reserve pilot scheme
In regard to the staffing of Aer Lingus with native pilots it might be considered that the 
initiation of the short service scheme, in August 1939, represented a more substantial 
expression of the Minister’s concern, and that of Mulcahy, for the future provision of 
pilots to civil aviation. In the four year period between 3 June 1935 and the outbreak of 
war on 3 September 1939 only eight pupil pilots, who had not already been in training on 
the day Mulcahy took over, qualified as military pilots. This number represents the 
successful students of the 3rd Young Officers’ Class, originally ten in number, who were 
attached for training in January 1937. They had apparently been recruited in anticipation 
of the 50% increase in the officer establishment figure from the thirty provided for in the 
1934 establishment to the forty-five provided for in the establishment o f 1 April 1937. 
The latter establishment introduced the ‘1st Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber 
Squadron (Cadre)’ that consisted of a headquarters and a single flight totalling thirty (all 
ranks) personnel.78 The maximum number of officers permitted under the 1937 
establishment was forty-five with no distinction being made in respect o f appointments 
specifically intended to be filled by pilots, observers or line officers. Following the 
qualification of the 3rd Young Officers’ Class of 1937 there were a total of thirty-two
7Qpilots in service in 1938.
In the meanwhile, early in 1937, P.A. Mulcahy had attempted to initiate action to 
substantially increase pilot numbers in the context of making advanced preparation for 
the future expansion of the Air Corps. Noting that it had been difficult to get ten young 
officers for the 1937 class, he stressed the Air Corps’ future dependence on Cadet School 
graduates -  a dependence that was due to the policy he had initiated. He recommended 
that, in order to ensure a proper supply of pilots to the army, twenty-five cadets should be 
appointed specifically for posting to the Air Corps after they had successfully completed 
their officer cadet course. To add urgency to his request he indicated that it would be 
actually four years before such cadets will be of real value to the Anny. In response to
78 ‘R eco rd  o f  p ilo t in ta k e  to A ir  C o rp s ’ (A C  M u seu m ); P e a c e  e s ta b lish m e n ts  19 3 4 , 2 2  N o v . 1934; 
A m en d m en t 14 to  P e a ce  e s tab lish m en ts  1934 , 5 A p r.1 9 3 7  ( M A ).
79‘R eco rd  o f  p ilo t in ta k e  to  A ir  C o rp s ’ (A C  M u seu m ).
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this important proposal Mulcahy received only a verbal reply, via a telephone call, which 
he recorded rather cryptically:
Memo. C/S Staff Officer rang at 16.00 hrs 12/2/37. 15 cadets will be reserved for 
Air Corps on next lot of 30 to be appointed at once. If suitable material amongst 
those in training at College now, Air Corps will get. PAM 12/2/37. 80
As this verbal reply was not subsequently supported by written confirmation Mulcahy 
might have surmised that the subject of Air Corps pilots was not high on the priorities of 
the Chief of Staff or his staff at that juncture. If he himself was concerned it did not 
show. It was to be a further eleven month before he is recorded as next communicating 
with GHQ on the matter - suggesting that this key personnel area was not of major 
importance to him. In January 1938 he reminded the COS that he had previously 
requested the recruitment of twenty-five cadets specifically for the Air Corps and had 
been promised fifteen but was not aware that any had been appointed. He indicated that it 
would be appropriate to start another ‘wings’ course in late 1938 but that this would 
require a change of policy:
I am satisfied that the younger we get prospective pilots for training the better will
be the results. I am also of the opinion that if  we are to ensure that a requisite
number of pilots are to be available for service in the event of war, we must modify
81our present military training of cadets and concentrate on the flying training.
Mulcahy proposed that Air Corps cadets be recruited for five years service -  six months 
military training, twelve months elementary training and three and a half years advanced 
and tactical flying training -  followed by a pennanent commission or transfer to a reserve 
force. This suggestion, in the context of a previous memo to the Chief of Staff (File 
2/33692) on 28 September 1937 that proposed a reserve of 200 pilots, was the basis of
s0 H an d w ritten  m em o , P .A . M u lc ah y , 12 F eb . 1937 , A C F /5 6 4 /1  (c o u rte sy  o f  S ch o o l C o m m a n d a n t.
81 P .A . M u lcah y  to  C O S , 11 Jan . 1938 , A C F /5 6 4 /1  (c o u rte sy  o f  S c h o o l C o m m a n d a n t) .
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the short service scheme that would eventually commence in August 1939. At this stage 
Mulcahy most likely recognised that GHQ had no intention of assigning Cadet School 
graduates to the Air Corps -  for flying training or otherwise -  as it was undoubtedly 
considered that the Army’s need for such officers was paramount. Between 1937 and 
1945 the Cadet School produced some 275 graduate officers, none of whom were posted 
to the Air Corps until the Emergency was over and demobilisation was in progress.83
Three months later, apparently not having received written replies to his 
communications of 10 February and 28 September 1937 and 11 January 1938, Mulcahy 
suggested to the COS that it would be appropriate to start a ‘flying training course’ in 
September 1938 and requested an early decision on the matter so that appropriate new 
regulations could be drafted. The Chief of S taffs response was to request a copy of the 
letter of 11 January 1938. At best he had forgotten about the matter and at worst he was 
ignoring it. Subsequently, apparently arising from verbal exchanges with the Assistant 
Chief of Staff, Mulcahy submitted a detailed draft regulation for ‘short service 
commissions -  Air Corps’.84 While the final details of the scheme, and the conditions of 
service of the cadets, were still to be worked out Defence outlined the proposal to 
Finance in October 1938.
I am directed by the acting Minster for Defence to state that he has had under 
consideration the question of augmenting the officer personnel of the Air Corps for 
the twofold purpose of providing sufficient pilots for the extra aircraft now on
o c
order and creating an adequate reserve of this class of officer’.
The correspondence went on to state that a scheme had been prepared to provide for the 
appointment of officers to ‘short service commissions in the Air Corps’. The service 
conditions provided for six months as cadets followed by thirty months as officers with a 
possible extension of a further two years and a further seven years on the Reserve. The 
payment of gratuities, apparently to provide for adaptation to civilian life - possibly not in
82 Ib id .
83 ‘D ire c to ry  o f  C ad et S ch o o l g ra d u a te s ’ in An Cosantoir x x x ix , N o . 9 (S e p t. 1 9 7 9 ), pp  2 8 8 -8 9 ; R e c o rd  o f  
p ilo t in ta k e  to  A ir  C o rp s  (A C  M u seu m ).
84 O C  A C  to C O S , 19 A p r .1938, A C F /5 6 4 /1  (c o u rte sy  o f  S c h o o l C o m m a n d a n t) .
85 S ec  D O D  to  Sec D F , 19 O ct. 1938 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 9 3 /3 8 ) .
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aviation - were also provided for in the scheme. Permanent commissions would be 
granted in a certain limited number of cases. While the scheme was proposed in the 
context of unspecified immediate needs the requirement to build up a substantial reserve 
of pilots received greater emphasis:
It is estimated that a reserve of 300 pilots will be required and it is hoped to 
eventually reach this figure under the proposed scheme. For the moment however, 
it would not be possible to cater for more than 20 cadets every eighteen months and 
it is desired to commence the scheme on this basis at an early date.86
In practice, while 300 pilots might eventually have been trained, Finance calculated that 
Defence’s target of a reserve of 300 pilots could not be achieved. This was due to the fact 
that successive intakes of officers would go off the reserve after ten years at which stage 
numbers would level out at 100. In fact with the traditional failure rate of about one third, 
for which Finance did not allow, an active reserve of 100 was unlikely ever to have been 
achieved.87 The Department of Finance, in studying the financial and other implications 
compared the proposed scheme very favourably with that operated by the RAF about that 
time but considered the intended gratuity structure to be too generous. However it was 
also observed that ‘one result of the proposal would be the regular infiltration of the new 
blood of youth which is particularly desirable in an air force’. Finance perceived the civil 
aviation aspect of the scheme as being very important;’s interpre
It is a further advantage that after their three or five-year period of initial service 
there will be a steady turn out of competent flying men to take their places in any 
civil commercial flying enterprises that may be expected to develop in this 
country.88
Noting that during the recent international crisis, authority had been granted for the 
purchase of thirty-five new aircraft that had committed the State to an immediate and
86 Ib id .
87 D F m em o  d a ted  25 O ct. 1938 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 9 3 /3 8 ) .
88 W . D oo lin  to  M F F , 10 N o v . 1938 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 9 3 /3 8 ) .
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considerable expansion of the Air Corps’ Finance considered that a shot! service scheme 
was preferable to permanent expansion.89 In conveying the minister’s approval in 
principle to the proposed scheme DOD suggested that proposed gratuities be reduced to 
£200 when retiring after two years commissioned service and £300 after five. It was also 
stated that ‘the minister would also like to receive an assurance that the Army authorities 
have available a ground force of mechanics, fitters etc. adequate to maintain sufficient 
aeroplanes for the training scheme contemplated’.90 After a delay of five months the 
Minister for Defence mentioned to the Minister for Finance, at a meeting on 14 April 
1938, that ‘the matter of a scheme for the appointment of officers to short term 
Commissions in the Air Corps was still under consideration by the Department of 
Finance’ intimating that a reply was outstanding. Sean MacEntee subsequently reminded 
Aiken that approval in principle had been granted back in November 1938 and that 
amendments to regulations, and clarification on certain other points, was awaited from 
DOD and that Finance had not yet heard from Defence.91 Apparently ignoring the 
contacts between the two ministers, but adopting a degree of urgency not previously 
obvious, DOD immediately wrote to Finance enquiring about their opening submission of 
23 November 1938.
I am directed ....to refer to the proposed scheme ....for short service commissions 
in the Air Corps, and to state that as the need for additional officers for the Air 
Corps is now one of the utmost urgency the minister proposes that this department 
will arrange for the recruitment of the cadets 92
To expedite the selection procedure Defence proposed to dispense with the customary 
Civil Service examination for cadet entry and to accept, for interview and consideration 
by a ‘military selection board’, candidates between the ages of seventeen and nineteen 
years with Leaving Certificate (Pass) or Matriculation and those, up to the age of twenty- 
three years, with a university degree. The secretary, DOD also indicated that the
89 Ib id .
90 S ec  D F  to  Sec D O D , 23 N o v . 1938 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 9 3 /3 8 ) .
91 M F F  to  M F D , 17 A pr. 193 9  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 9 3 /3 8
92 Sec  D O D  to  S ec  D F , 19 A pr. 1 939  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 9 3 /3 8 ) .
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necessary personnel and equipment, including machines, would be available to cope with 
the training of twenty cadets while the erection a new Cadets’ Quarters building costing 
£17,000 was being arranged by the Commissioners of Public Works.93
Between May 1938 and the initiation of the scheme in August 1939, and with no 
obvious sense of urgency, much correspondence was directed by the Air Corps to GHQ / 
DOD apparently responding to verbal queries on the matter of the conditions of service to 
apply to the short service commission scheme. The main points at issue were the length 
of commissioned service, the age limits and the level of gratuity to be paid on transfer to 
civilian life. While the Air Corps recommended four and a half years of commissioned 
service to ensure an adequate level of flying training and experience before transfer to the 
Reserve, DOD insisted on thirty months with a possible extension of two years. DOD 
insisted on an entry age limit of seventeen to nineteen. This factor, as the Air Corps 
predicted, was to eventually restrict the number of cadets in the first class recruited to less 
than the approved number of twenty. DOD fixed the gratuity at £200 after two and a half 
years and £300 after four and a half years commissioned service. In its approach to the 
short service scheme DOD apparently took notice of the conditions pertaining to a similar 
scheme offered by the RAF. Eventually the influence of Finance decided the more
94contentious points.
On 8 November 1938 a draft peace organisation was submitted by Mulcahy who 
stated that the organisation or establishment was that required for an Air Corps consisting 
of a Depot, School and three operational squadrons. He also stated that, as it would not be 
possible to procure or accommodate the complete personnel at the present time he was, at 
the COS’s request, suggesting the numbers that could be recruited in 1939. He suggested 
that the organisation being proposed for the Air Corps School was only sufficient to train 
one elementary flying course of twenty pupils and that the School establishment would 
have to be increased further to allow another class of twenty to start immediately after the 
previous one had completed the elementary stage. The squadrons he proposed were 
reduced to training cadre status as greater numbers could not be accommodated in
93 Ib id .
94 O C  A C  to  C S O  D O D , 10 M ay  19 3 8 ; 16 M a y  1938 ; D ra ft re g u la tio n , 27 Ju n e  1938: O C  A C  to  C S O , 30  
N o v . 1938; D ra ft re g u la tio n , F eb . 1939 ; R A F  a d v e r tis e m e n t, c u ttin g  from  u n id e n tif ie d  n e w sp a p e r , 
A C F /5 6 4 /1  (c o u rte sy  o f  S c h o o l C o m m a n d a n t) .
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Baldonnell or trained over the following twelve to eighteen months. The peace 
establishment of 14 April 1939 did not increase the instructional capacity of the Air 
Corps Schools. The 1940 war establishment, however, practically doubled the size of the 
Schools and allowed for a second intake of twenty pupils once the previous class had 
completed the elementary stage of training.95
With conditions of service for cadets still the subject of correspondence OC AC 
infonned the COS that ‘we have taken delivery of our new training aircraft and are in a 
position to start the training of the first class’.96 During the early summer of 1939 the 
details of conditions of service and necessary amendments to regulations worked out 
between Defence and Finance. The cadetships were eventually advertised in the Irish 
Press and Irish Independent on 1 June 1939. Due to the age restriction and the fact that 
the closing date, 24 June 1939, was prior to the promulgation of the Leaving Certificate 
results for 1939 only forty-two applications were received (from Leaving Certificate 
graduates of 1938). Twenty-five of these were deemed ineligible on education or age 
grounds or both. Two candidates failed to turn up for medical and interview while three 
more of the last seventeen failed the medical examination leaving twelve at the interview
97stage.
The interview board was made up of five Air Corps officers including Major G.J. 
Carroll. Major Carroll was at this time seconded to Aer Lingus Teoranta as general 
manager.98 His presence on the interview board emphasised the fact that the longer-term 
aim of the short service scheme was to provide pilots for civil aviation, in effect, Aer 
Lingus.99 One of the twelve interviewed was found unsuitable. The successful candidates 
were attested on 16 August 1939 and commenced flying training on 21 August 1939 - 
just days before to outbreak of war.100 Early in 1940 the 1939 short service class 
completed the first term of military flying training and, having been deemed suitable for
93 P .A . M u lc ah y  to  C O S , 8 N o v . 1938  ( A C F /5 6 4 /1 , c o u rte sy  o f  S choo l C o m m a n d a n t) ;  T ab le  3 3 P , 1939
p e ac e  e s tab lish m en t; T a b le  3 6 W , 1940  w a r  e s ta b lish m e n t (M A ).
6 O C  A C  to  C O S , 29  M ar. 1939 ( A C F /5 6 4 /1 , c o u rte sy  o f  S ch o o l C o m m a n d a n t) .
97 O C  A C  to  C O S , 28 Ju n e  1939; C O S  C o n v e n in g  o rd e r, 15 Ju ly  1939 , A C F /5 6 4 /1  (c o u rte sy  o f  S choo l
C o m m a n d a n t..
98 B e rn a rd  S h a re , The flight of the Iolar; the Aer Lingus experience 1936 — 1986 (D u b lin , 1986), p. 34.
99 It is u n d e rs to o d  th a t all tw e lv e  in te rv ie w  b o a rd s  fo r  th e  sc h e m e , th a t en d ed  w ith  th o se  in te rv iew ed  in 
1960, in c lu d e d  a se n io r  A e r  L in g u s  p ilo t. C a p t. A .A . Q u ig ley  (1 9 4 0  sh o rt s e rv ic e  in ta k e )  w as th e  A er 
L in g u s  re p re se n ta tiv e  at m y  in te rv ie w  in O c to b e r  1960 .
100 S ch o o l C o m m a n d a n t to  O C  A C , 23  Ja n . 19 4 0 , A C F /5 6 4 /1  (c o u rte sy  o f  S ch o o l C o m m a n d a n t) .
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commissioning, approval was granted by Finance on 22 February 1940.101 The eleven 
cadets were commissioned at Baldonnell on 12 April and nine successfully completed 
flying training by 1 August 1940.102
The 1940 Short Service Class
In the meanwhile, while seeking financial sanction for a further intake DOD advised that, 
with the new accommodations being built, it was opportune to commence arrangements 
for an intake of twenty, and that to ensure a ‘bigger field of choice’ the age bracket 
should be expanded to seventeen to twenty-one years and to twenty-three for university 
graduates’.103 In due course a second class, of twenty cadets, was recruited and 
commenced training on 7 May 1940. The recruitment, with this class, of an over-age 
candidate with seventy hours military flying training with the Italian Air Force, was also 
approved by Finance.104 In due course a total of twenty-six cadets from these two classes 
received shorts service commissions with twenty -  three qualifying as military pilots.
The Sergeant Pilot Class 1943/45
In 1943, based mainly on a recommendation of the investigation committee and still
under the aegis of the short service scheme, a class of thirty-one other ranks commenced
training to become sergeant pilots. These were selected, by interview, from ‘seventy-five 
candidates with the requisite qualifications’.105 The course file indicates that class A 
comprised fifteen personnel -  twelve recruited for the first time and three with previous 
anny service. Class B was made up of four Air Corps privates and twelve privates from 
Army units. The course ran from November 1943 to 22 December 1945 with twenty 
pupils qualifying.106 This number of NCO pilots was twice that provided for in the 1943 
establishment and in the subsequent establishment of 1946. With the war over and any
101 Sec D O D  to  Sec D F , 19 F eb . 1940 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 9 3 /3 8 ) .
102 O IC  R e c o rd s  to  A d j. E . C o m d , 4  A p r. 19 4 0 , A C F /5 6 4 /1  (c o u rte sy  o f  S ch o o l C o m m a n d a n t) .
103 S ec  D O D  to  Sec D F , 10 N o v . 1939  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 9 3 /3 8 )
l04D F  to  Sec D O D , 30  A p r. 1940  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 9 3 /3 8 ) .
,C5Sec D O D  to  Sec  D F , 9 M a y  1952  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 4 /0 0 9 3 /3 8 ) .
106 C h ie f  In s tru c to r  to  S ch o o l C o m m a n d a n t, 9 Ju n e  1944 , S e rg e an t p i lo ts ’ c o u rse  f ile  (c o u rte sy  o f  S chool 
C o m m a n d a n t) .
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perceived emergency well in the past GHQ reverted to the army officer intake system as 
first suggested by Mulcahy back in 1935. The 4th Young Officers class had been selected 
and had commenced training by July 1945. While it marked a return to the officer-only 
intake policy it did not however mark the end of the short service scheme. This was 
subsequently resurrected, at Aer Lingus’s request, with nine further classes, with ninety- 
three cadets, being recruited between 1953 and 1961.107
A comparison between the numbers of pupil pilots recruited and training in the 
period October 1922 to December 1937 and the numbers recruited and trained in the 
period 1939 to 1945 is most revealing. During the earlier period, by means of seven 
generally poorly organised intakes, sixty-four pupil pilots commenced flying training 
with about two thirds were successful. During the Emergency, by way of a carefully 
organised short service scheme, three intake classes totalling sixty four pupil pilots 
commenced training and again approximately two thirds were successful. No more than 
in the case of the training initiated during the Civil War it is debatable whether it was 
wise to undertake such a significant training commitment during the emergency. 
However, unlike the situation that pertained in 1922/23 the training of pilots, in terms of 
aircraft and instructor resources, appears to have had priority over operational 
considerations during the Emergency.
Conclusions
While the Army leadership may have had sensitivities about the recruitment of ex-RAF 
pilots, as authorised by Michael Collins, in the 1922/23 period they had little or no 
influence on the matter. Thereafter GHQ would endeavour to ensure that, initially at least 
officers of suitable IRA background would fly the State’s military aircraft. In his regard 
however the first intake, of a non-descript collection of young officers and other rank 
volunteers, was almost a total failure in that it produced six poorly qualified pilots and 
did not achieve the aim of replacing the ex-RAF group of officers.
107 A e r  L in g u s  to  L t. C o l. W .J . K e an e , 7 Ju n e  1951 (in  m y p o sse s s io n );  R e c o rd  o f  p ilo t in ta k e  to  A ir  C o rp s , 
(A C  M u se u m ). C a d e t M ic h ae l O ’M a lle y  w a s  th e  last to  tra in  and  q u a lify  u n d e r  th is  sch em e .
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While O’Duffy’s scheme of reorganisation introduced the concept of cadet entry 
it also permitted the powers that be to train as pilots older officers with acceptable pre- 
Truce IRA service and infantry values. The latter intake could only have been intended to 
ensure that ex-IRA, and not ex-RAF, pilots would be a dominating influence over the 
future leadership of the Air Corps. The intake of seventeen officers in addition to the nine 
cadets, at a time when only four to six vacancies existed in the Corps, was a cynical 
manipulation of the situation on the part of GHQ to ensure the primacy of the infantry 
ethos.
During the 1930s, while no cohesive intake policy was ever expounded the 
preference of GHQ in the matter of pilot intake for the Air Corps was to have newly 
qualified (Cadet School) army officers trained as military pilots. The underlying 
philosophy was based on the assumption that such pilots would not be required to operate 
other than in a battlefield reconnaissance role of the type that had evolved during the 
1914/18 war (and which would be out of fashion by the WWII) and that only officers 
trained in the Military College would be able to understand the nuances of infantry tactics 
and operate army cooperation aircraft in the required manner. However this intake 
method was abandoned for the period 1938 to 1945. GHQ apparently had little time for 
consideration of the Air Corps’ pilot requirements approaching the Emergency and 
apparently considered that Cadet School graduates were much too valuable a military 
commodity to waste on the flying of aircraft. With no more officers being made available 
for flying training after January 1937 P.A. Mulcahy eventually proposed the short service 
scheme in April 1938. All concerned, including Mulcahy, displayed a remarkable lack of 
urgency regarding the matter of expanding pilot numbers approaching the Emergency. 
The first short service class, that was planned to commence with twenty pupils, 
eventually provided only nine trained pilots. The delay, until August 1939, in initiating 
this scheme strongly suggests that the aim of the scheme was to have sufficient civil 
pilots available after the war rather than to supply military pilots for the Emergency. 
There is nothing in the relevant correspondence (of the Air Corps, GHQ, DOD or 
Finance) or in the proceedings of the investigation of 1941, to suggest that the provision 
of pilots for the Emergency was a military priority of primary importance. This, to a large 
extent is borne out by the fact that, unlike previous intakes, GHQ handed over the
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selection procedure to the Air Corps -  apparently on the basis that short service officers 
would not be expected to have long term careers in the Army and that it was up to the 
Corps to select their own temporary officers. The resumption of the officer intake system 
immediately after the Emergency serves to confirm the civil aviation emphasis of the 
short service scheme operated from 1939 to 1945.
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CHAPTER 7
A V IA T IO N  P O L IC Y  A N D  P L A N N IN G  1935 -  1940
Despite the absence of any substantial ideological argument for its retention the Army 
Air Service survived the demobilisation and reorganisation processes of 1923/24 and the 
machinations of the army mutiny of the spring of 1924. It is doubtful if the establishment 
of 1 October 1924, a headquarters of eighty-three all ranks and a single squadron of sixty- 
eight, could be deemed to constitute an Army Air Corps. The records of the time suggest 
that this was in fact a provisional establishment that would require further consideration 
and appropriate expansion before being considered viable. While McSweeney and 
Maloney had, in their turn, insisted that a viable air element should have consisted of a 
minimum of two squadrons it was to be 1934 before such a situation came about. In the 
meanwhile the minister’s proposal, for the establishment of a fighter squadron of 
eighteen aircraft by 1928/29, had been initiated and abandoned. The Council of Defence 
had replaced this concept with one based on developing an army cooperation squadron 
and succeeded in purchasing, and taking delivery of, eight Vickers Vespa aircraft by May 
1931. While the 1st Army Co-operation Squadron (Cadre) was not formally established 
until 22 October 1934 an increased number of maintenance personnel in the headquarters 
element had facilitated the primary preoccupation of the early 1930s i.e. training for an 
anny aviation role in support of ground troops. While the appointment of Major P.A. 
Mulcahy was seemingly influenced by the perception of a necessity for greater discipline 
the aviation related decisions and actions of his seven and a half years term as OC Air 
Corps were to have major consequences. Not least important of these was the decision to 
initiate the purchase of Avro Anson aircraft, a process that was set in train within weeks 
of his appointment. The acquisition of medium range general reconnaissance aircraft 
indicated a considerable departure from the role of support for ground formations then 
being provided by the Vespas of the cooperation squadron.
This chapter endeavours to establish and examine the nature of the air policy - to 
the extent that such a policy could be deemed to have existed - and the aviation aspects of
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the defence strategy devised and proposed by the General Staff. It will be necessary to 
identify the role played by P.A. Mulcahy, who was apparently assumed a policy function 
by the default of his superiors. A significant aim will be to identify and evaluate 
Mulcahy’s emergency preparations and planning in terms of organization, aircraft, 
personnel, training and aerodromes. These assessments will be made in the context of the 
Army’s defensive policy and planning that were developed in parallel with, though quite 
separate from, the Government’s defence strategy which appears to have been developed 
in close harmony with the United Kingdom (See Chapter 8). A major aspect of the 
organisation proposed by Mulcahy and eventually endorsed by GHQ / DOD by way of 
the war establishment of 1940, was a move away from traditional army aviation roles 
towards those commensurate with an aviation element of air force status.
Fundamental Factors
The period between the reorganisation of the Army in 1924 and the ‘Emergency’ was 
characterised by a number of unsuccessful efforts on the part of the Army’s General Staff 
to have the government declare a policy in relation to external defence.1 While air 
defence was not a major consideration it did have at least one significant advocate. 
Colonel M.J. Costello later summarised his concerns of the early 1930s:
Some time in 1930 this matter of policy as to the future development was under 
discussion and I endeavoured at the time to obtain a decision as to the amount of 
money which would be available annually for the development of the Air Corps 
and to have the policy which would govern its development settled. The net result 
of these discussions was that it could not be said in advance what sum of money 
would be available from time to time for the Air Corps, nor could anything definite 
be obtained on the question of policy than a general decision that there would be an 
Air Corps.
1 P. Y o u n g , ‘D e fe n c e  and  th e  n ew  Irish  s ta te , 1 9 1 9 -3 9 ’ in Irish Sword x ix  (1 9 9 3 -9 4 ) , p p  l-\0,passim.
2 M .J. C o s te llo  to  A C  in v e s tig a tio n , 18 F eb . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
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This general position in effect reflects the original decision, taken during the 
reorganisation process of 1924, to retain a token Air Corps and would appear to confirm 
the proposition that, as the Army was not in receipt of a definitive defence policy, the Air 
Coips, as a very minor army corps, was unlikely to have its peace or wartime roles and 
functions defined. While the consideration of air defence matters was to remain a 
minority concern for the Army leadership Costello would continue to demonstrate his 
belief in the necessity to develop a properly equipped and trained Air Coips to be part of 
a substantial conventional defensive force. Costello’s proposals for a greatly expanded 
Air Corps will be discussed in the context of the ‘suicidal defence planning’ of the 
period.3
A somewhat different assessment of the Army’s defensive responsibilities was 
reflected in a comprehensive study of the question of defence policy in the context of 
future hostilities in Europe and warned of the ramifications of such an event for the 
internal and external defence considerations for the country. This assessment was 
contained in a document produced by Colonel Dan Bryan of the GHQ intelligence staff in 
1936.4 It was directed primarily against the ‘utter insanity’ of a group of senior officers 
who were ‘talking extensively about a military war against the British and the successful 
manner in which such a war could be waged’.5 Bryan suggested that Saorstat Eireann, 
relying solely on its own resources, could not wage war with any reasonably strong state 
except for a very limited period. Munitions and all manner of military equipment and 
supplies would soon become exhausted. In contrasting the strategic position of Ireland 
during World War I and its future position it was suggested that the development of new 
weapons such as aircraft and submarines had made the protection of naval bases more 
difficult and, in effect, greatly enhanced the strategic value of Irish harbours on the 
North, West and South coasts. In the military aviation context Bryan indicated a certain 
level of ignorance in respect of the considerable number of inland aerodromes and 
airfields developed by the British War Office during World War I, indicating that he was 
unsure whether they were used for training or local defence. He did, however, correctly
T h eo  F a rre ll, ‘P ro fe ss io n a liz a tio n  and  su ic id a l d e fe n c e  p la n n in g  by th e  Ir ish  A rm y , 1 9 2 1 -1 9 4 1 ’, in  
Journal of strategic studies,xx\, n o . 3 (S e p t. 1998), p p  6 7 -8 5 , p a ss im .
4 ‘F u n d a m en ta l F a c to rs  a ffe c tin g  S a o rs ta t d e fe n c e  p ro b le m ’, M a y  1936  (M A , G .2 /0 0 5 7 ).
3E. O ’H a lp in , Defending Ireland, p . 136, c it in g  ‘F u n d a m e n ta l fa c to rs ’ .
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deduce that several coastal air stations had been developed for the US Naval Air Service 
and were used in support of anti-submarine warfare. In context of possible future 
hostilities Bryan considered what air force measures would be required:
Under the circumstances generally assumed... it is quite certain that even more 
extensive air forces than during the 1914-1918 period would have to be located on 
or near the Irish coasts. Reconnaissance, patrol, anti submarine duties would have 
to be undertaken.... Because of the more serious threat it would also probably 
become necessary to employ aircraft on reconnaissance for possible raiding forces, 
and to provide fighter aircraft to deal with hostile air attacks on shipping off the 
Irish coast and other centres situated on the coast.6
The above measures were identified by Bryan in the context of Britain’s defensive 
interests and needs and the likely aviation roles that would require to be performed in the 
maritime areas to the north, west and south of Ireland, presumably by British aircraft 
from British bases in the vicinity of treaty ports as provided for by the Anglo-Irish treaty 
of 1921. It was also suggested that the British would expect certain Saorstat Eireann 
military aviation to undertake some poorly defined defensive measures:
Great Britain would also expect that the Saorstat should undertake the aerial 
activities necessary for purely local Irish coastal control and defence. In areas used 
by the British fleets or on the main trade routes, her attitude to Irish activities would 
probably depend on the general relations and degree and nature of Saorstat co­
operation and in particular on the capacity of Irish air forces to undertake such 
functions.7
6 ‘F u n d am en ta l F a c to rs ’, M a y  1936  (M A , G .2 /0 0 5 7 )
7 Ib id .
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Army planning for war
The period from 1936 to the start of the war was characterized in GHQ by a considerable 
level of planning and preparation for the training and equipping of a large conventional 
field army.8 In September 1936, in the context of a greater realisation at Government 
level of the country’s military inadequacies expansion programme was put forward in the 
context of the situation stated in ‘fundamental factors’ regarding the defence of the 
country. The plan was to complete existing units of the Defence Forces in the shortest 
possible period as a basis for the development of a long term defence policy. The 
programme mainly proposed a major expansion, and in the case of the Air Corps, a major 
increase in personnel numbers was envisaged. In addition to providing for the equipping 
of the six brigades of a notional war establishment the scheme called for major 
improvements in air defences that envisaged the establishment and development of no 
less than nine squadrons of fighters and light bombers at a capital cost, in this area alone, 
of £2.1 million. While considering that the existing Air Corps was minuscule and really 
only an adjunct to the field troops it was proposed that Air Corps numbers be increased 
by 200 officers and 1,200 men in an expanded air service or air force - in effect, more 
than quadrupling the current strength The scheme included provision for about 
approximately 100 aircraft organised in nine Squadrons and for the construction of three 
aerodromes, in addition to Baldonnell, while the capacity of Baldonnell, in terms of 
buildings and accommodation, would have to be doubled. Capital expenditure, on aircraft 
and miscellaneous stores amounting to £883,000 and on aerodromes and other buildings 
costing £665,000, came to a total of £1,548,000 while annual recurring expenditure was 
predicted to be £431,100.9 Such expenditure should be viewed in the context of total 
defence spending, in the financial year 1936/37, of £1,373,257 and a total of £73,426 
actually spent on the running of the Air Corps for the same period.10
Whether the Army leadership appreciated it or not such a proposal was nigh on 
impossible even if the Government had immediately authorised the expenditure and the
8 T h eo  F a rre ll, ‘P ro fe ss io n a liz a tio n  an d  su ic id a l d e fe n c e  p la n n in g  by  th e  Irish  A rm y , 1 9 2 1 -1 9 4 5 ’ in 
Journal of strategic studies, x x i, n o . 3 (S ep t. 1998), pp  6 7 -8 5 , p a ss im .
9 ‘C o m p le tio n  o f  e x is tin g  d e fe n c e  u n i ts ’, C O S  to  M F D , 22  S ep t. 193 6  (U C D A , M a c E n te e  p a p e rs , P 6 7 /1 9 1 ).
l0D u g g an , Irish Army, p . 165; A n n e x  G , R e p o rt an d  f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942  (M A , A C S  
22 /2 3 ).
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expansion in personnel. Such an expansion would have called for upwards of 150 new 
pilots -  an impossible target in the context of the existing miniscule training capacity and 
the output of the training squadron since 1922. It is doubtful if the General Staff had 
considered at any length the practical aspects of, in effect, creating an Air Force starting 
from a minimal situation. Notwithstanding the urgency that the Army endeavoured to 
generate, and their warnings regarding complacency about the international situation, the 
submission to Government made in late 1936, in the context of ‘fundamental factors’, 
made no impression. Finance argued that there would be no war and that if there were, 
and if Ireland were invaded, defence against the superior force of a major power would 
be futile. The Government viewed national defence in tenn of Anglo-Irish relations and 
saw no need for a major expansion to form a conventional defence force.11
The development of an Army / DOD air defence strategy
As early as 1935 the first indication, suggesting that the Air Corps, whether under the 
direction of GHQ or simply with its acquiescence, was examining an air role other than 
one falling within the remit of army aviation, appears. On 1 July 1935 two flying 
officers, Commandant G.J. Carroll and Captain W.P. Delamere, accompanied by Mr. 
R.W. O’Sullivan, the Air Corps civilian assistant aeronautical engineer, attended the 
Society of British Aircraft Constructors exhibition and display at Hendon. The main 
purpose of the visit was to familiarise the Air Corps with the state of design and 
development of new aircraft of all types as well as engines, armament and various aircraft 
equipment. Among the matters subsequently reported upon were the rapid improvements 
in aircraft development included the movement towards cantilever monoplane aircraft, 
closed cockpits, retracting undercarriage, supercharging as well as increased engine 
power and significantly enhanced performance in terms of altitude and speed. The Air 
Coips personnel particularly noted that ‘in the twin engine class the type which had most 
interest for us was the Avro 652A coastal reconnaissance and bombing aircraft’.12 The 
reasons for interest in this particular aircraft, a civil passenger aircraft still in the process
11 O ’H a lp in , Defending Ireland, p. 139. S ee  a lso  T h e o  F a rre ll ‘P ro fe ss io n a liz a tio n  an d  su ic id a l d e fen c e  
p la n n in g ’.
12 S .B .A .C . D isp la y  re p o rt ,  17 Ju ly  / 8 A u g . 1935 (M A , A C /1 /9 /9 ) .
196
of development for military applications, are not obvious. The Army’s emphasis, first 
espoused in O’Duffy’s reorganisation scheme and subsequently reiterated in the context 
of the establishment of the 1st Army Co-operation Squadron, was on the necessity to 
perfect the associated skills and techniques of traditional close reconnaissance and 
cooperation with ground troops. It may be the case that the General Staff recognised that 
future hostilities, whether the country was involved or not, would necessitate the prior 
development of some capacity for general reconnaissance and had requested assessment 
of appropriate aircraft.
Notwithstanding the existing emphasis on the army support aspect of the Air 
Corps the Army estimates for 1936/37 included provision for £15,000 for the purchase of
• • 1 3 *two twin-engine long distance reconnaissance and bombing aircraft. In his case 
supporting the proposed purchase OC Air Corps stated that such an aircraft had been 
subject to evaluation for a number of years and that the Avro 652A Anson met all the 
requirements of the Air Coips specification for such an aircraft with the exception of 
target towing for anti-aircraft artillery. Mulcahy recommended the purchase of two 
aircraft that were required for training in aerial navigation, long distance and coastal 
reconnaissance and for ‘wireless, bombing and gunnery’. They were to cost £7,800 each 
with an additional £500 for unspecified additional equipment. Mulcahy suggested that the 
balance of £1,600, not provided for in his initial estimate, could be met by foregoing the 
purchase of two elementary trainers on the basis that he had no immediate plans to 
undertake the training of additional pilots.14
The aircraft were duly purchased and taken on charge on 20 March 1937. While 
they had been purchased for navigation training and long-range patrol, the aircraft were 
not fitted with any form of direction finding equipment -  even when the appropriate 
modification was made available by the manufacturers. Similarly no ground direction 
finding facilities were available to the State’s military aircraft. These deficiencies were to 
severely limit the effectiveness of reconnaissance operations during the Emergency. Two
13 Q M G  to  O C  A C , 1 A p r. 1936 , e s tim a te s  1 9 3 6 /3 7  (M A , A C /2 /2 /7 ) .
14 O C  A C  to  Q M G , 1 A u g . 1936 (M A , A C /2 /2 /7 ) . A  c la ss  o f  p u p il o ff ice rs  w as re c ru ite d  in D e c e m b e r 
1936  and  c o m m e n c e d  fly in g  tra in in g  in  Ja n u a ry  1937 .
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more Ansons were taken on charge on 19 January 1938 followed by a further five on 2 
February 1939.15
In the meantime the 1934 establishment had been amended by the addition of a 
second service squadron, the ‘1st Reconnaissance and Medium Bombing Squadron 
(Cadre)’ with effect from 1 April 1937. This consisted of a headquarters and a single 
flight providing for only thirty personnel - six flying officers, eight NCOs and sixteen 
privates. The establishment did not provide for navigators (observers), wireless operators 
or gunners. Bearing in mind that Mulcahy had, in effect, justified the purchase of four 
(and eventually nine) Avro Anson aircraft on the basis of a requirement for training in 
aerial navigation and long distance and coastal reconnaissance as well bombing and 
gunnery, the combination of poorly equipped aircraft and an inappropriately structured 
training cadre having only six pilots and only thirty personnel in total, was ill equipped to 
train and prepare for the coastal patrol role it was soon to undertake. (See Chapter 10) 
The addition of this new training cadre brought the total Air Corps establishment up to a 
total of 399 all ranks -  forty-five officers, ninety-one non-commissioned officers and 263 
privates.16
The minister’s priorities
On Saturday 17 July 1937 Major P.A. Mulcahy was summoned to the office of the 
Minister for Defence, Frank Aiken, where they discussed general aviation matters. 
Mulcahy gave the minister a verbal report on progress in the Air Corps under his 
command. However the meeting did little to clarify the position regarding military 
aviation strategy or policy and where the Air Corps might stand in the anticipated 
emergency. Mulcahy recorded the principal points discussed:
He agreed with me that a definite policy of [army] expansion, to take place over a 
period of years, must be laid down before satisfactory Air Corps expansion could 
make any headway. He stated that he hoped to get such a policy agreed to before
13 K e a rn s , ‘Irish  A ir  C o rp s ’, p . 4 4 9 ; p . 4 5 9 ; R e p o rt an d  f in d in g s  o f  th e  co m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942 (M A , A C S  
2 2 /2 3 ) , p a ssim .
16 A m e n d m e n t 14 to  P e a c e  e s ta b lish m e n t, 1934 , 1 A p ril 1937 (M A ).
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long, but that as such a policy entailed very heavy financial commitments, it was a
• * 17matter that could not be decided upon m a hurry.
In his position as OC Air Corps Mulcahy might have been expected to emphasise the 
necessity of expanding the Air Corps but appears to have chosen to totally subordinate 
the Air Corps to an Army policy that had yet to be formulated. Perhaps sensing the 
minister’s priorities, Mulcahy gave tacit agreement to the minister’s belief that military 
aviation had distinctly lesser priority than land forces in the context of preparation for the 
expected emergency. Seemingly the minister’s main air concern was in the area of civil 
aviation:
He realised the difficulty of procuring and training pilots for civil air companies 
and favours training some of our apprentice-mechanics as NCO pilots with a view 
to supplying the companies’ demands. He realises that this will take quite a long 
time and as the present officer pilots are unwilling to resign their commissions and
accept jobs with the civil companies, he is inclined to consider detailing serving
18pilots for short periods of duty with civil companies.
In effect the discussion introduced the concept of the secondment of military pilots to Aer 
Lingus and the parallel proposal of developing a short service pilot training scheme, 
again for the benefit of Government sponsored civil aviation. While no firm decisions 
were taken the tone of the discussions makes it abundantly clear that, with European war 
looming, the minister for Defence and the OC Air Corps considered that the aircrew 
requirements of Aer Lingus (established just a year earlier) took precedence over the 
plans and preparation for the employment of military air resources in time of war. The 
leisurely fashion in which the short service scheme was eventually established underlines 
the civil aviation emphasis of that scheme. The discussion also clearly indicated that
17 ‘C o n fe re n c e  w ith  m in is te r  on  S a tu rd ay  17 Ju ly  1 9 3 7 ’, A p p e n d ix  N o . l ,  R e p o rt an d  f in d in g s  o f  the  
c o m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
18 T U . ' J
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financial costs would be a major consideration that would greatly influence decisions 
relating to air defence generally.19
Notwithstanding the lowly priority of military aviation the minister and Mulcahy 
gave some consideration to the matter of expanding the number of aerodromes. They 
agreed that ‘about four more military aerodromes should be established’ but that due to 
the heavy expenditure involved ‘it would have to be considered when the general Air 
policy was being considered’. Mulcahy explained his priorities:
In this connection I emphasised the necessity of being able to state that we would 
send a squadron to Aerodrome X. in say 1939 and a Squadron to Aerodrome Y. in
say 1941, so that arrangements could be made to make these places suitable for
20occupation before these dates.
This was to prove a prophetic statement. As will to be discussed later, when an air 
detachment was sent to Shannon in late August 1939, this requirement, to have 
aerodromes prepared well in advance, will be seen to have been completely overlooked. 
The last matter agreed between the minister and Mulcahy was fundamental:
He asked me had we considered the question of sea planes versus land planes for 
our purposes. I stated that we had not considered this matter in any detail, but that it 
was my opinion that we were committed to the continued use of land planes. He
o  1
stated that that was his opinion too.
Notwithstanding agreement on this basic principle Mulcahy was subsequently to be 
detailed by the Minister to buy amphibious aircraft and to operate them out of 
Shannon. It is not easy to reconcile the minutes of the conference of 17 July 1937 with 
the Army plans for an expanded and better-equipped Air Corps as proposed in 
September 1936. On the one hand Mulcahy had agreed with the Minister that Air 
Corps expansion could be postponed pending the expansion and equipping of the
19 Ib id .
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ground forces and on the other he was cooperating with General Staff in their planning 
for expanded military aviation required for conventional defence against possible 
invasion. As suggested by other commentators it would appear that Army planning 
was based on the policy the Army wished the Government would endorse while the 
Government, in keeping with its rapprochement with Britain, saw no urgency in 
regard to preparations for, in this instance, conventional air defence.
The General S taffs Air Corps proposals of 21 March 1938
On or about 28 September 1937 P.A. Mulcahy had proposed ‘a general scheme for the 
Air Corps’ that apparently incorporated the principles of the Army plan of September 
1936. On 22 March 1938, prior to which he had had meetings with Col. Liam Archer and 
Col. M.J. Costello regarding Air Corps expansion, Col. Mulcahy received a secret 
memorandum from Colonel Costello who was acting on behalf of the General Staff.22 
The memorandum contained considerable detail on the previously agreed outline plan for 
the expansion of the Air Corps and requested his submission providing ‘estimates of the 
capital and maintenance costs’ for its implementation. The ACS outlined the rationale for 
the expansion:
We have neither the financial nor industrial resources to create a large Air Force 
and the demands on the available resources which will be made by Land Forces 
including Anti-Aircraft Units are such as to require the modification of your 
proposals for the expansion of the Air Corps as presented by you to Colonel
Archer At the same time it is possible that a situation may arise in which it
would be necessary for us to expand rapidly and in which the necessary machines 
and other equipment would be available. It is, therefore, proposed to organise and 
maintain the framework for such expansion to a strength approximate to that 
outlines by you.23
21 P .A . M u lc a h y  to  A C  in v e s tig a tio n , 22 Jan . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
23 A C S  to  O C  A C , 21 M ar. 1938 , A p p e n d ix  11, R ep o rt and f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942 (M A , 
A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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The General Staffs proposal provided for one first line squadron of pursuit machines for 
the defence by air of Dublin to fundamentally act as a deterrent to bombing attacks. It 
was suggested that this squadron should be at full strength and be fully equipped at all 
times and have available reserves of aircraft, equipment and personnel. It was proposed 
to locate a coastal patrol squadron at Shannon. This squadron’s main role would be 
patrols of the coastline and include spotting for coastal defence artillery, to attack enemy 
vessels and to function in cooperation with marine coastal patrols. It was also intended to 
have flying boats based at Shannon Airport on a permanent basis and to have an 
unspecified number of bases around the coast as well on inland lakes and at harbours. A 
further element was proposed in the form of a half squadron of reconnaissance and 
medium bomber aircraft to be based in Dublin. While the numbers and types of aircraft 
for each squadron were not specified GHQ, paradoxically, proposed to duplicate the 
number of aircraft in order to maintain the squadrons at full strength at all times and to
94provide for training.
In order to provide the necessary flying officers it was suggested that Mulcahy’s 
scheme for the recruitment of short service officers would be put into effect in addition to 
the training of officers of the Volunteer Reserve. In the event of an emergency it was 
proposed that a considerable proportion of the fitters employed in the motor trade would 
be made available for technical duties. In regard to aerodromes the General Staff intended 
to maintain Baldonnell as a permanent station and Fermoy, Oranmore and Gormanston as 
temporary camps. The most puzzling aspect of the plan was the proposal to organise and 
train, including the ‘first line units’ a total of four pursuit, four coastal patrol, two 
reconnaissance and medium bomber squadrons and the necessary infrastructure 
organisation and ground organisation. As had been the case with the scheme 
recommended to Government in September 1936 this expansion plan did not specify the 
status of the additional units or how, when or in what circumstances they might be 
raised.25
24 Ib id .
25 Ib id .
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Mulcahy was apparently encouraged by what he later stated he had interpreted as 
constituting a ‘statement of policy’.26 In response to GHQ’s request he submitted figures 
of estimated expenditure under four main headings. Under the heading of transport he 
listed a total of fifty-five air support vehicles, in addition to eleven already in hand or 
ordered, at an estimated additional cost of just over £39,000. Under general stores, listing 
aircraft among a wide range of aviation equipment, he suggested provision be made for 
twenty-six pursuit aircraft at a total cost of £182,000. The context suggests that the 
Gloster Gladiator was the type proposed. The Air Corps had taken delivery of four on the 
March 1938 while a further four were included in the 1938/39 Army Estimates.27 The 
latter four aircraft were never delivered. .
Twenty coastal patrol aircraft, of an unspecified type, were to be provided for at a 
total cost of £300,000. He allowed £100,000 for an additional ten reconnaissance and 
medium bombers, apparently Ansons, costing up to £10,000 each. Four transport 
aircraft and four anti-aircraft artillery target towing aircraft were to cost an additional 
£68,000 and twenty training machines another £40,000. No less than 150 parachutes, 
costing £10,000, were also required. The total cost of a long shopping list of aircraft and 
associated ground equipment, excluding the £50,000 worth already in stock or on order, 
was estimated at £822,300.28 A fuel reserve for six months, estimated on the basis of a 
very ambitious 200 hours per aircraft, was predicted to come to a total of 500,000 gallons 
while no estimate of cost was made.29 An estimate for the annual cost of fuel, oil and
30ammunition came to £69,650.
The March 1938 expansion plan and Mulcahy’s estimate of the expenditure 
required to support it were rendered irrelevant by subsequent staff action at GHQ level. 
This was clarified by Col. Costello some three years later in the context of his 
explanation, to the committee of investigation, of the rationale for the scale and scope of 
his proposal. He first explained that he had earned out his planning on the assumption 
that ten million pounds was being made available, on the authority of the minister, for 
capital expenditure on the Army over a number of years and that ten percent of that
26 P .A . M u lc a h y  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 22  Jan . 1941 (M A , A C S  22 /2 3 ).
7 A p p e n d ix  N o . I l l  (B ), R ep o rt an d  f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
78 A p p en d ix  N o . I l l  (C ), R ep o rt and  fin d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
29 A p p e n d ix  N o . I l l  (J ) , R ep o rt an d  f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m itte e , 10 J a n .1942 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
,0 A p p e n d ix  N o . I l l  (K ), R e p o rt and f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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would be made available for the expansion of the Air Corps. He proposed to buy the 
aircraft to equip two and a half squadrons -  a pursuit squadron to consist of thirteen 
aircraft, a reconnaissance squadron and a coastal patrol squadron that would have ten 
aircraft each while reserves of the same magnitude would be in place to ensure that all 
squadrons could be maintained at maximum aircraft strength at all times. He assumed all 
the aircraft required to equip one of each type of squadron would be purchased 
immediately to ensure against rising costs and to ensure homogeneity of equipment 
during a period when aircraft were undergoing rapid change.31
Costello proposed that the Air Corps, which would include only forty permanent 
pilot officers, would be expanded by the raising and training of three quarters of all 
personnel on a reserve basis. This was to include 104 short service flying officers who 
would be recruited directly into the Air Corps and trained as pilots before returning to 
civilian life after a maximum of three and a half years in service. One hundred officers of 
the Volunteer Reserve were also to be recruited directly into the Coips to undergo a one- 
year flying course. The plan also suggested that technical personnel would come from the 
existing boy apprentice scheme supplemented by a number of graduates of the technical 
schools. While the absence of a civil aircraft industry was recognized Costello considered 
that retiring reserve pilots need not necessarily be absorbed into flying positions but that 
unnamed industrial concerns, besides civil aviation, could absorb a considerable 
proportion of aircrew. A central aspect of Costello’s scheme for expansion of military 
aviation was the assumption that the Air Corps would be able to avail of the results of the 
development of infrastructure for civil aviation by the Department of Industry and 
Commerce. He assumed, wrongly, as was later to be demonstrated, that this development 
would provide the Air Corps with aerodrome facilities at Limerick and Cork, and
32possibly at Galway and provide a flying boat base at Rineanna / Shannon.
He secondly explained how the plan had been submitted by the then COS to the 
minister, Frank Aiken, who had accepted it. Subsequently it was circulated to the 
officers, including the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General and Col. Liam
31 C o s te llo  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 18 Feb . 1941 , (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
32 Ib id .
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Archer, Director of Intelligence, who attended General Staff meetings but none of them 
concurred. Costello explained what followed:
The next that I heard about it was that during Mr. Aiken’s absence the late Colonel 
O’Higgins and Colonel Archer were instructed to prepare an alternative scheme. The 
then Chief of Staff, with some of his staff officers had a meeting with the Taoiseach, 
as a result of which the late Colonel O’Higgins was directed to prepare an entirely new
33scheme without reference to the one approved by Mr. Aiken.
At the second of a series of meetings with the Taoiseach, Costello, who apparently had 
not been at the first, ‘asked specifically if the scheme had been abandoned and was 
informed that it had been’ abandoned. The Chief of Staff added that the scheme ‘did not 
have the approval of any responsible officer’.34
The flying boat option
The GHQ proposal to operate flying boats in a coastal patrol role was of very recent 
origin. On 14 March 1938 Mulcahy had requested clarification from the COS on the 
matter stating that he had only recently been made aware of the plan and that it had been 
directed that the proposal should now be considered by the Air Corps. No doubt mindful 
of the fact that the minister had agreed, on 17 July 1937, that the operation of flying boats 
was not a consideration for the Air Corps, he sought clarification as to the advantages 
accruing from such a decision and the specific duties of such a unit.35 In the absence of 
an immediate response and mindful of the fact that the (civil) Airport Construction 
Committee, of which he was a member, was due to meet on 29 March 1938 he outlined 
some of the infrastructural implications of basing a squadron at Shannon. Mulcahy 
suggested that the airport committee dealing with the question should be made aware 
that, in making decisions on the locations of airport buildings, adequate provision should
33 Ib id .
34 Ib id .
33 O C  A C  to  C O S , 14 M ar. 1938 , A p p e n d ix  N o . IV , R ep o rt an d  fin d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942 
(M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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be made for military exigencies - ‘22 officers, 43 NCOs, 144 men, squadron offices,
36stores, workshops, hospital, photographic section, etc.’
While it is not obvious was action was taken by GHQ and or DOD in relation to 
accommodation and facilities at Shannon, or what Mulcahy was authorised to seek at the 
meeting of 29 March, there is no evidence that any building works, specifically for the 
Air Corps, were incorporated in the Department of Industry and Commerce’s plans for 
the development of Shannon Airport. It must be presumed that there was no Department 
of Finance or government authority with regard to military facilities at Shannon. In the 
meanwhile Mulcahy’s position on seaplanes appears contradictory. While the records of 
the period indicate that he was not in favour of seaplanes in July 1937 and had, in March 
1938, in effect been detailed to develop such a capability, he subsequently stated that ‘in 
1937 my idea was to have seaplane reconnaissance at the Shannon’.37 These statements 
cannot all be right and is not clear how or why the latter statement could have been made.
The Committee of Imperial Defence advice
The rationale, for the outline plan for an establishment consisting of two and a half first 
line units, including a flying boat unit, becomes clearer when one examines the advice 
offered by the British Committee for Imperial Defence in January / February 1938. 
Apparently in the context of a request, from Dublin, for guidance in regard to defence 
strategy and expenditure CID forwarded a paper suggesting that Eire only be required to 
spend £1.4 million in capital expenditure on defence plus a recurring total annual defence 
expenditure of about two million pounds to build up adequate air and land defences. The 
proposals, made on the assumption that the United Kingdom and Eire would be allied in 
resistance to a common enemy will be seen to assume a major significance when one 
compares them with the 1939 peace establishment and the war establishment of May 
1940 and with the eventual numerical strength and disposition of the somewhat token 
level of air resources actually raised for the emergency. In regard to shore-based air 
forces the CID indicated as follows:
36 O C  A C  to  A C S , 26  M ar. 1938, A p p e n d ix  N o . V , R e p o rt and f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942  
(A C S , 2 2 /2 3 ).
37 M u lc ah y  to  A C  In v e s tig a tio n , 21 Jan . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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It is understood that the air force of Eire is in a fluid state but that the intention is to
organize it into three squadrons on a volunteer basis  it is suggested that as the
forms of attack are limited to seaborne raids, and possibly long range air attacks 
from shore bases on the continent, two of these squadrons should be equipped with 
a type of aircraft suitable for general reconnaissance and bombing and should be 
stationed in the south and west of Eire ........  the third should be equipped with
. 3 8fighter aircraft and should be stationed in the vicinity of Dublin.
The CID recognised that the organisation of such squadrons and their equipping with 
modern aircraft would involve a considerable increase in the appropriation for the 
maintenance of air forces in Eire. While suggesting that economies were available to Eire 
if she exercised her rights as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and 
engaged the Air Ministry as a purchasing agency it was indicated that the capital costs of 
a general reconnaissance squadron, with nineteen Blenheim aircraft, and with the 
addition of ground equipment, general stores, spares and mechanical transport costing 
£15,000, would come to a total of about £290,000 with an annual expenditure of £77,000 
for maintenance and personnel. While indicating that the newly developed Spitfires or 
Hurricanes were the appropriate fighter aircraft to acquire the CID calculated the cost of a 
fighter squadron on the basis of nineteen Gladiators, a much less potent and slower 
biplane. Nineteen Gladiators and appropriate stores were estimated to cost £119,000 with 
annual maintenance and personnel costs of £63,000. The total capital cost of equipping 
three squadrons came to £714,000 with annual maintenance cost, including that of 
personnel, of £217,000. In addition to land-based aircraft the CID recommended that 
£500 be spent on facilities for mooring twelve flying boats at Bantry and that the flying 
boats would be operated for trade protection purposes. No estimate was made of the 
capital and maintenance expenditure associated with flying boats.39
It is of interest that, of the £1.4 million of capital expenditure that the CID had 
recommended for equipping the whole Army, in excess of half was aimed at the
38 ‘E ire : e s tim a te  o f  d e fen c e  re q u ire m e n ts ’, C ID , F eb . 1938 (U C D A , M a c E n te e  P a p e rs , P 6 7 /1 9 2 ). T h e  
e n d ix e s  to  th is  d o c u m e n t a re  d a ted  21 Jan . 1938.app i
39 Ib id .
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development of air resources. In any event the CID recommendation, which was 
perceived by the Army leadership as a relatively modest level of spending on land and air 
defence, was used by the initial recipients of the said advice, the government, to 
undermine the more ambitious and expensive Army plans for a well equipped 
conventional force for the defence of the country. Despite the relatively modest level of 
spending suggested by the CID and, while the British advice regarding air defence will be 
seen to be reflected in later establishments, the commensurate level of expenditure was 
unlikely to be approved by Finance. In the context of an evolving government defence 
strategy it is suggested that defence preparations remained more symbolic than 
practical.40
The chief of staffs proposals -  21 May 1938.
The UK advice regarding flying boat facilities at Bantry appears to have caught the eye 
of the Minister for Defence, Frank Aiken. Mulcahy subsequently recalled that ‘we had no 
seaplane base at which to base seaplanes and the minister insisted we should have 
seaplanes’.41 This new interest in flying boats was to be reflected in the next major Army 
/ DOD submission forwarded to Government on 21 May 1938. The Army was continuing 
its planning for an expanded force, of almost 50,000 all ranks that included the Air Corps, 
on the basis of a conventionally equipped field army. The Air Coips aspect of this plan 
appears to have been an outline version of that forwarded to Mulcahy (for the calculation 
of the cost) on the same day. In addition to a main proposal for a field army of 25,605 
that included the equipping of four reinforced infantry brigades, DOD recommended that 
the Air Corps be expanded to a total of 1,500 all ranks and no less than ten operational 
squadrons. The proposed expanded corps was depicted as follows:
Air Corps.
1 Fighter Squadron )
1 Flying Boat Squadron ) 1st Line.
40 O ’H a lp in , Defending Ireland, p . 141.
41 P .A . M u lcah y  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 22  Jan . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
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Vi Reconnaissance Squadron, organised without machines.
3 Fighter Squadrons.
3 Flying Boat Squadrons.
1 Vi Reconnaissance Squadrons
Total: 1500 all ranks.42
The proposal, made in the context of organisation alone, made no provision for such 
important aspects as aircraft types and numbers or for the posting of air elements to 
aerodromes yet to be developed. While the plan depicted the breakdown of numbers in 
Army formation no such distribution of personnel between the various air squadrons was 
given -  just a grand total of 1,500 all ranks. With only two squadrons depicted as ‘1st 
Line’ the precise status of the other formations remained obscure, particularly when it is 
considered that no Air Corps reserve existed and that civil aviation provided practically 
no scope for any form of reserve or auxiliary aviation. It would appear that only two front 
line, permanent squadrons were contemplated and that the balance would be dependent 
on authorised future expansion. However, the roles of the proposed ‘1st line’ squadrons, 
as implied by the nomenclature did not fit in with the existing two squadrons, one 
nominally an army cooperation squadron and the other a reconnaissance squadron being 
equipped with Anson aircraft.
While the Chief of Staffs May 1938 proposals for Army expansion included, 
without adequate argument, an ill-defined expansion of the Air Corps it also indicated 
how an additional £150,000, out a sum £600,000 sanctioned by the Government, would 
be spent on military aviation. In regard to the Air Corps allocation of £150,000 it was 
proposed spend £30,000 on four fighter aircraft, £40,000 on two reconnaissance and 
medium bombers, and £60,000 on six advanced training aircraft. The proposals to spend 
£600 on fifty sets of flying clothing and £1,800 on thirty parachutes suggest a more 
modest and possibly more realistic assessment, on the part of the General Staff, as to 
what level of personnel and expenditure would be seen as appropriate by the Department 
of Finance. A significant provision was that of £1500 for ‘temporary hutments for 40 
cadets’, suggesting that proposals for a short service pilot scheme were still in preparation
42C O S  to  M F D , 21 M ay  1938 (U C D A , M a c E n te e  p ap ers , P 6 7 /1 9 3 (2 )) .
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despite the rejection of the Costello plan of March 193 8.43 The itemised list of proposed 
expenditure on the Air Corps actually came to £149,000. At this juncture in 1938, while 
GHQ continued to plan for Army and Air Corps expansion there existed no concept of a 
national defence policy and therefore no Government approved policy, strategy or plan 
for military aviation.44
Aircraft purchases
The £150,000 earmarked for military aviation translated into proposed capital 
expenditure of £75,000 for each of the financial years 1938/39 and 1939/40. As the 
capital expenditure in 1937/38 had totalled £46,636 the £75,000 represented a 63% 
increase in capital expenditure for each of the following years. In the event however the 
full amount was not spent over the two years. While £80,250 was spent in 1938/38, 
mainly on new aircraft, only £61, 980 was spent in 1939/40 -  again mainly on aircraft. 
The shortfall in spending over the two years was probably due to the failure to secure 
delivery of the second batch of Gladiators. Had these been purchased the Air Corps 
would have been overspent by approximately £20,000.45
With regard to the selection of aircraft for individual squadrons the die was fairly 
well cast. In 1936/37 two Avro Ansons had been purchased. Two more were bought in 
1938/38. In the context of completing a reconnaissance and medium bomber squadron of 
sixteen aircraft a further twelve Ansons were ordered. Five of these were delivered in 
February 1939 while the remaining seven were embargoed by the UK authorities as they 
were about to be delivered in September 1939.46
In a similar fashion the main equipment of Fighter Squadron was decided by the 
purchase, in 1937/38, of four Gloster Gladiators. At the time eight aircraft had been 
ordered but only four were released by the Air Ministry. While the purchase of this 
aircraft, the last biplane fighter type to enter service with the RAF, probably made sense 
in 1938 the machine was already being rendered obsolescent by the development of the
43 C O S  to  M F D , 21 M ay  1938 (U C D A , M a c E n te e  p a p e rs , P 6 7 /1 9 3 (4 )) .
44 P e ter Y o u n g  ‘D e fe n c e  and  th e  Irish  s ta te  1 9 1 9 -3 9 ’ in  Irish Sword x ix , N o s  75 & 76 (1 9 9 3 -4 ) , pp  1-10, 
passim .
45 E s tim a te s , 193 8 /3 9  (M A , A C /2 /2 /1 1 ; E stim a te s  1 9 3 9 /4 0  (M A , A C /2 /2 1 8 ) .
4<’ K e a rn s ,’ Irish  A ir  C o rp s ’, p . 445 .
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Hurricane and Spitfire fighters. Subsequently eight more aircraft were ordered for 
delivery in 1939 but were not received.47 While it is possible that this was due to a UK 
embargo it might alternatively have been as a result of the cessation of production in 
1938.48 An additional six aircraft, Westland Lysanders, the standard British army 
cooperation aircraft, bought because advanced training aircraft could be not purchased, 
were put on the strength of Fighter Squadron.49 As a result Fighter Squadron (Cadre), 
designated to be equipped with twenty two fighter aircraft, was to enter the Emergency 
with three obsolete fighters as its main equipment (Gladiator No. 23 had been crashed 
and written off on 20 Octoberl938). It also had six close reconnaissance aircraft and a 
miscellany of other aircraft that were even more inappropriate to the task.50 (See Chapter 
10) With approval for the short service pilot scheme it was necessary to buy new 
elementary training aircraft - Miles Magisters. These cost about £22,500 which was paid 
out of the 1938/39 provision. A further five Magisters, costing about £11,250 were 
bought in 1939/40.51
Walrus coastal patrol aircraft
To equip the proposed coastal patrol squadron cadre the minister’s direction to purchase 
seaplanes was put into effect in early 1939. It is not clear that any great thought was put 
into the selection process and in all probability cost was the most important criterion. 
Three Supermarine Walrus aircraft, single-engined amphibian machines, were bought 
and delivered by 4 March 1939.52 This was just prior to formal approval of the 
establishment of the cadre of fifty-one personnel that included six officers, seventeen 
non-commissioned officers and twenty-eight privates that was authorised with effect 
from 14 April 1939.53
47 Ib id , p .4 5 9 .
48 K .J. M e ek o m s, E .B . M o rg an  (ed s), The British aircraft file; British militaiy and commercial aircraft 
specifications 1920-1949 (T o n b rid g e , 1994), p . 2 5 5 .
49 C o m d t. M . S h eerin  to  A C  in v e s tig a tio n , 23 Jan . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
3(3 ‘F ig h te r  S q u ad ro n ; In te rn a l o rg a n iz a tio n ’, 16 D ec . 1 9 4 0  ( in  m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
3,1 K earn s , ‘Irish  A ir  C o rp s ’, p. 4 5 9 ; E s tim a te s  193 8 /3 9  (M A , A C /2 /2 1 1 ).
3_ K earn s , ‘Irish  A ir  C o rp s ’, p .449 .
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The suitability of the Walrus as a coastal patrol aircraft can be gauged from the 
outcome of a number of flights carried out in May 1939. Apparently as part of the 
process of introducing the type to service, surface and air reconnaissance of Bere Haven 
[sic] and Lough Swilly was carried out with a view to alighting in the vicinity of the forts. 
Test flights for assessing the suitability of Castletownberehaven as a seaplane base were 
carried out on the 12, 20 and 22 May when that location, as well as the cooperation of the 
artillery personnel and their launch, was apparently found to be satisfactory. The 
minister himself went on the flight on 22 May though the purpose of his visit to Bantry 
Bay, or its outcome, is not indicated. While operating into and out of 
Castletownberehaven appears to have been reasonably satisfactory in the weather of May 
1939 the same cannot be said for Lough Swilly. The waters around the forts (Dunree and 
Lenan) were found to be very suitable for alighting and anchoring. A sheltered beach at 
Fort Dunree was too soft to allow the amphibian to come ashore while the western aspect 
at Fort Lenan meant that it was an exposed anchorage at practically all times. With the 
test flights concentrating on two major inlets in the month of May 1939 the report did not 
give an overall assessment of year-round flying boat operations in Atlantic waters. Nor 
was the Walrus tested on rivers and lakes. However it seems probable that the Walrus 
was not at all suited to operate in the waters of the south-west, west and north-west of 
Ireland even in the benign weather conditions of summer. It is even more probable that 
their use, even in the most shelters waters, was totally out of the question under winter 
conditions. It would appear from Mulcahy’s evidence to the investigation committee that 
the three Walrus aircraft were bought to be used as training aircraft while he paid lip 
service to the Minister’s wishes regarding their potential to operate off coastal waters.54
Government strategy
During the immediate pre-war years it is very strongly suggested that while the Army 
was planning for the expansion, training and equipping of a substantial field army to 
defend the country against invasion, from Britain in particular, the government, while
34O C  A C  rep o rt to  C O S , 24 M ay  1939 (M A , A C /2 /8 /1 ) ;  P .A . M u lc a h y  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 21 Jan . 1941 
(M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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maintaining de Valera’s neutral stance, was taking defence advice from Britain and 
planning a cooperation strategy that would concentrate on intelligence and counter 
intelligence. This situation was, of course, indicative of the belief that no government, in 
the first twenty years of the state, considered that it had the complete loyalty of the 
Army.35 The separate defence strategies appear not to have been reconciled even after a 
series of at least six meetings of the committee on emergency measures held between 7 
September and 14 October 1938. These meetings, apparently all chaired by de Valera and 
attended by representatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Defence, External Affairs, 
Finance, Industry and Commerce and the Taoiseach, were arranged to discuss measures 
necessary to take in the eventuality of a European war in the context of the defensive 
priorities set out in de Valera’s memorandum for the government dated 6 September 
1938.56 The circulation of this memorandum would appear to be the first occasion on 
which the government had made known its broad defensive policy or strategy for the 
expected emergency. In the circumstances the Army might have recognised that their 
planning for a large conventional arm was at considerable variance with de Valera’s 
priorities regarding neutrality and cooperation. (See Chapter 8)
Organisation
While the Army continued to advance their grand plan the rejection of the Costello Air 
Corps proposals of 21 March 1938 was confirmed by de Valera at the second of the 
above meetings while a Colonel O’Higgins was directed to prepare an entirely new 
scheme without any reference to that approved by Mr. Aiken. The Chief of Staff had 
ruled that Major Mulcahy was the responsible officer and that his advice would have to 
be followed. Costello later recalled that the new scheme was prepared by O’Higgins and 
in so far as it related to the Air Coips it consisted of proposals submitted to him by 
Mulcahy and that, in effect, the opinions of other GHQ staff officers were not invited.57 
Mulcahy’s advice, in the form of draft establishment tables based on the then current
5:>E u n an  O ’H a lp in , ‘A rm y  p o lit ic s  and  so c ie ty  in in d e p e n d e n t  Ire la n d  1 9 2 3 -1 9 4 6 ’ in T .G . F ra se r  and K e ith  
Je ffrey  (e d s .) , Men, women and war: historical studies, x v iii (D u b lin , 1993), p. 159.
36 F ile  m em o s d a te d  20  S ep t., 11 O ct. and  18 O c t. 1938  (N A I, D T , S .1 0 ,8 2 3 ). M in u te s  o f  th e se  m e e tin g s  
d o  no t a p p ea r  to  su rv iv e .
57 C o ste llo  to A C  In v e s tig a tio n , 18 F e b . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
213
peace establishment, was forwarded as the establishment required for a corps consisting 
of a depot, a flying school and three service squadrons. He justified the cadre status and 
strength of Coastal Patrol Squadron on the basis that only one flight could be established 
in the first year. Similarly the other squadrons had been reduced to cadre strength on the 
grounds that the required personnel could not be trained or accommodated in the 
following twelve to eighteen months.58 The latest proposal, which came into effect as the 
1939 peace establishment on 14 April 1939, departed from Costello’s concept of an Air 
Corps organised, recruited, and trained mainly on a reserve basis and with a total strength 
of 1,500 all ranks. Instead, the new establishment provided for increased permanent 
establishment consisting of sixty-three officers, 150 non-commissioned officers and 351 
privates, a total of 564 all ranks or a 41% increase on the that of 1 April 1937. Only two 
and a quarter operational squadrons were provided for, all apparently to be based at 
Baldonnell Aerodrome, and all designated as training cadres.59 However, it is of note 
that, while Costello credited Mulcahy with providing the advice to Colonel O’Higgins 
and GHQ in the drawing up peace and war establishments, Mulcahy himself, in his 
evidence to the investigation committee of 1941, insisted that he considered that the Air 
Corps had been prepared for the Emergency on the basis of Costello’s policy 
recommendations alone, (see Chapter 11)
As with all previous establishments no specific aircraft types or numbers were 
designated for individual squadrons. The selection of aircraft types, based on perceived 
training and operational requirements, was usually decided by a technical selection 
procedure at Air Coips Headquarters. His involvement in the assessment of the Avro 
Anson suggests that the selection of aircraft was a principle function of the chief 
technical officer, Commandant G.J. Carroll. The number of aircraft, in operational 
squadrons in particular, appears to have been a function of the amount of money Finance 
were prepared to spend in the particular financial year.
The formulation of the peace establishment of 1939 was apparently only an 
interim measure leading to a much larger war establishment. As late as 26 June 1939 
GHQ was planning for such an establishment to include three operational squadrons,
’8 O C  A C  to  C S O  G .l  B ra n c h , D O D , A C F /5 6 4  d a ted  8 N o v . 1938  (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
59 P e a ce  e s tab lish m en t, 1939 , A ir  C o ip s  tab le s  29  P to  34  P  (M A ).
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based on the existing training cadres, operating no less than fifty-four aircraft. The 
Fighter Squadron was to have twenty two aircraft and was to ‘be employed in the defence 
of Dublin’. The Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber Squadron was intended to operate 
sixteen aircraft for ‘coastal patrol duties and special duties as necessary’ while the 
Coastal Patrol Squadron would operate another sixteen aircraft and, as the name suggests 
be ‘required for the patrol of the coast’.60 It should be noted that, as discussed above only 
twenty-two aircraft in total had been specifically purchased for three first line units in 
preparation for the Emergency. A total of nine Avro Ansons had been purchased for the 
Reconnaissance & Medium Bomber Squadron. Three Supermarine Walrus aircraft, less 
than a fifth of the notional establishment, were purchased for the Coastal Patrol 
Squadron. Four Gloster Gladiators, when delivered in March 1938, were assigned to the 
Army Cooperation Squadron which was re-designated as Fighter Squadron in April 1939. 
Six Westland Lysanders, erroneously purchased as advanced training aircraft in July 
1939 were also assigned to Fighter Squadron. (See Chapter 11)
Aerodromes
In the pre-war planning for the possible expansion of the Air Corps the study and 
consideration of the occupation of aerodromes other than Baldonnell appears to have 
been uncoordinated and inconclusive. On 17 July 1937, in his discussion with the 
minister, Mulcahy had agreed that about four more aerodromes should be established for 
a future emergency situation.61 Mulcahy had requested that a programme for the 
occupation of four aerodromes should be agreed well in advance of their eventual 
occupation and use. Costello’s expansion plan of 21 March 1938 proposed that one and a 
half squadrons would remain at Baldonnell while a coastal patrol squadron would be 
stationed at Shannon Airport.62 He erroneously assumed that the Department of Industry 
and Commerce would develop various civil aerodromes that would be available to the
60 ‘ M e m o ra n d u m  on  A rm y  re -o rg a n is a tio n ’ , 2 6  Ju n e  1 9 3 9 , q u o ted  in R e p o rt an d  f in d in g s  o f  th e  co m m itte e , 
V III (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) . T h is  re p o rt is p a g in a te d  in R o m a n  cap ita ls .
61 ‘C o n fe re n c e  w ith  m in is te r  on  S a tu rd a y  17lh Ju ly , 1 9 3 7 ’, A p p e n d ix  N o . I, R e p o rt an d  F in d in g s , 10 Feb . 
1942 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
62 A C S  to  O C  A C , 21 A p r. 1938 , A p p e n d ix  N o . II, R e p o rt and  f in d in g s o f  th e  c o m m itte e  (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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Air Corps in emergency times thus saving DOD the relevant expense and providing some 
operational flexibility.63
In April 1938 Mulcahy supplied the General Staff with an outline of the living 
accommodations required at Baldonnell, Shannon Airport, Midleton, and Oranmore, a 
former British airfield of the 1919 to 1922 era, while indicating that it would be required 
that Gormanston be maintained. He made no estimate of the necessary financial provision 
for aeronautical facilities at Shannon but suggested that provision should be made for 
‘living accommodation, including married quarters, for twenty-two officers and 186 
Other Ranks’ as well as workshops, hangars for twenty aircraft, slipways and 
administrative buildings.64 In December 1938 some £300,000 was apparently earmarked 
for the development of two aerodromes other than Baldonnell.65 In relation to such 
monies Defence made a case to Finance that reflected indecision and lack of coordination 
on the part of the General Staff and DOD. The department sought the provision of funds 
for the provision of additional accommodation for a reconnaissance and medium 
bombing squadron stating that while it was proposed to detach it from Baldonnell it had 
not been decided where the squadron would be located. DOD detailed the particular 
requirements at such a station:
The necessary accommodation will include the provision of four hangars with 
runways; a new building to house 175 officers and mMen; storage and office 
accommodation; wireless, photographic and medical huts; quartermasters and 
barrack services stores; petrol tanks; dining, cookhouse, recreational and 
gymnasium facilities; married quarters for 4 officers, 10 non-commissioned officers 
and 20 men; a transport shed for vehicles; and light, water and sewage facilities.66
The sanction of the Minister for Finance for the spending of an estimated £135,000 was 
sought ‘for inclusion in the 1939/40 estimates for public works and buildings’ with the 
actual works to be carried out under the direction of the Commissioners of Public Works
63M .J. C o s te llo  to  A C  In v e s tig a tio n , 18 F eb . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
64 O C  A C  to  A C S , 21 A p ril 1938 , A p p e n d ix  III (A ), R e p o rt and  fin d in g s  (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
65 D F  m e m o  d a te d  6 F eb . 1939 (N A I, D T , S. 11 ,1 0 1 ).
66 Sec D O D  to  S ec  D F , 17 D ec . 1938 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 0 9 /3 9 ).
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at a location to be notified later.67 In April 1939 Defence renewed their request in respect 
of provision for additional accommodation for an Air Corps reconnaissance and bombing 
squadron stating that it was proposed to locate the proposed accommodation at 
Gonnanston Camp. It was stated that it was the minister’s desire that the provision of the 
necessary accommodation should be regarded as a matter of extreme urgency and that 
sketch plans and a revised estimate of the total cost of the project would be forwarded as 
soon as possible.68 The revision of the works and the estimates was made necessary by 
the fact that Gormanston, like Baldonnell a former RFC/RAF training depot station, was 
showing the effects of twenty years of neglect.69 Consideration, by the Department of 
Finance, of a revised estimate of £165,000 for the reinstatement of Gormanston was 
delayed due to difficulties with security of tenure. Due to the fact that much of the lands 
of the aerodrome were held on a yearly tenancy it was suggested that it would be 
necessary to obtain a more secure tenure before incurring any expenditure on the 
proposed new works and the Minister’s sanction was sought for entering negotiations 
with the owner.70 In July 1940 it was recorded that Defence had directed OPW, in 
September 1939, to defer plans for building works at Gormanston.71 This decision was 
probably related to an operational decision, apparently arrived at in the latter days of
72August 1939, to send an Air Corps reconnaissance detachment to Shannon post haste. 
There was to be no full-time use of Gormanston by the Air Coips during the emergency.
The net effect of all discussions and consideration of the development of 
aerodromes was that the combined efforts of General Staff and the Department of 
Defence resulted in the development of no new facilities for the specific use of military 
aviation in the coming emergency. This situation is in stark contrast to that pertaining to 
the development of the civil aerodromes. In October 1941 the OPW, quoting from a 
statement of expenditure and commitments to 30 Sept. 1941, reported that the state had 
invested some £607,248 in the development of Collinstown (Dublin Airport) and a
67 Ib id .
68 S ec  D O D  to  S ec  D F , 19 A p r. 1939  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 0 9 /3 9 ).
69 H a y es , RAF and US NAS, p . 85.
70 S ec  O P W  to  S ec  D F , 4  Ju ly  19 3 9 , (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 0 9 /3 9 ).
71 S ec  O P W  to  S ec  D F , 19 Ju ly  1940  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 0 9 /3 9 ).
72 O C  A C  to  C O S , 29  A ug . 1939 (M A , A C /2 /9 /1 2 ) .
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further £495,585 in the development of Shannon.73 This level of expenditure (in excess of 
£1.102 million), prior to the construction of concrete runways at either location, can be 
compared with the £1,119,296 that the Department of Defence calculated was the total 
cost of running the Air Corps from 1 April 1926 to 31 March 1941 -  an average of 
£74,619 per annum.74 This emphasis on the development of civil aviation facilities, 
despite the on-going emergency, strongly suggests that the concept of air defence was 
somewhat irrelevant in the Government’s overall strategy -  something that was later be 
emphasised by the extreme parsimony of Finance when dealing with the provision of 
facilities for the Air Corps at Rineanna (Shannon) during the early years of the 
Emergency. (See Chapter 10) In the same context it can be concluded from the amount of 
money spent on new and permanent buildings at Baldonnell between 1935 and 1946 
(£153,262) that it was Government policy to minimise the expenditure on facilities at 
other locations that might be occupied only on a temporary basis -  or not at all.75
The start of the Emergency
At the start of the emergency the Air Corps was notionally functioning under the 1939 
peace establishment (564 all ranks). Recruitment of privates was apparently permitted 
within the strength provided for by the war Establishment that would not get Department 
of Finance sanction until May 1940. On 20 September 1939, about three weeks into the 
Emergency, Mulcahy replied to a verbal query from the CSO at DOD in a very matter of 
fact fashion. He stating that, ‘in accordance with your telephone instructions of today, I 
give herewith a general report on the Corps’. The report suggests that, in terms of 
personnel and training, and notwithstanding the considerable notice of the outbreak of 
hostilities, the Corps was unprepared for the most basic wartime role. The position in 
regard to pilots was particularly stark. Only thirty-three of the forty officers on strength 
were pilots and the twenty-seven of these assigned to flying units (Schools and three 
squadrons) comprised less than 23% of the number provided for in the war establishment.
73 O P W  m e m o , 31 O ct. 1941 (M A , 2 /7 2 4 6 5  p a rt III).
74 ‘C o s t s ta te m en t o f  A rm y  A ir C o rp s  1926 /27  to  1 9 4 0 /4 1 ’ , A n n ex  G to  R ep o rt and  fin d in g s  o f  th e  
c o m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
73 M ic h ae l O ’M a lle y , ‘T h e  O ff ic e rs ’ M ess  and  o th e r  w o rk s  o f  W .H . H o w ard  C o o k e  a t B a ld o n n e ll 
A e ro d ro m e ’, A p p e n d ix  A  ( u n d e rg ra d u a te  essay , N U I M a y n o o th , 2001).
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While eleven pupil pilots commenced flying training on 21 August 1939 no new pilots 
had been trained and qualified since January 1938. The training of eleven rear gunners 
and observers had only commenced in March 1939. Eleven wireless operator mechanics, 
for duty in Anson aircraft which had first been taken on charge in March 1937, were only 
in training since June 1939. Four of the best of the class, still only partially trained, were 
already flying on patrols out of Rineanna by the beginning of September 1939. The delay 
in initiating the training of gunners and wireless operators was caused by the fact that the 
1937 peace establishment did not provide for such trades. Mulcahy reported that, in 
addition to fifty-seven mechanics being trained under the boy apprentice scheme, 
‘approximately 60 recruits are being trained in trades in the Depot’ but that ‘the material
76is not good and not more than 50% are expected to be satisfactory’.
Mulcahy cited establishment and strength figures in tabular form to illustrate the 
extent to which the Air Corps was under-strength vis-à-vis the War Establishment. He 
showed that the corps had only 47% of the total numbers to be permitted by the war 
Establishment that was to become effective in June 1940. The position in regard to 
officers, specifically pilots, was particularly stark. Total pilot numbers came to 28% of 
the June 1940 provision. The position relating to the pilots in the combined operational 
squadrons was even more alarming. While the war establishment was to allow for 101 
pilots a total of only eighteen, or less than 18%, were serving with the three squadrons on 
30 September 1939. This however was offset somewhat by the fact that the aircraft 
strength was about 41% of that allowed. The overall (all-ranks) positions of the 
individual squadrons were little better than that of the officers. The Fighter Squadron had 
ninety-three personnel compared with an establishment figure of 233 -  less than 40%. 
The Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber Squadron, a detachment of which was already 
patrolling the west coast out of Rineanna / Shannon had 116 all ranks (or about 44%) 
against a war establishment figure of 265. Coastal Patrol squadron, with a strength of 
twenty-two versus an establishment of 273, could hardly have been termed even a token 
unit. In this latter regard it will be remembered that it had been the minister’s original 
intention to have a seaplane squadron based in Shannon. What was in existence in 
September 1939 no doubt fell well short of that originally envisaged.
76 O C  A C  to  C O S , A C F /6 3 1  d a ted  2 0  S ep t. 1939 (in  m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
219
Conclusions
In the context of preparation and planning for the raising of a conventional three-service 
force for the defence of the country the General Staff foresaw the necessity of preparing 
plans for the expansion of the Air Corps. The agent of this process was to have been 
Colonel M.J. Costello who rightly recognized that, if the Army was to have an air 
dimension commensurate with a realistic conventional defence of the country, that such 
an element should be appropriate to the air mission in terms of organisation, personnel, 
equipment and training. Costello’s plan of March 1938 was bold in its scale and concept 
being predicated on capital expenditure in the order of one million pounds. He had a 
vision of an Air Corps having a nucleus of three permanent squadrons and a capacity to 
expand to ten operational squadrons and 1,500 personnel in time of war. However this 
expensive option was never going to get Department of Finance or government approval. 
In fact it did not even get the approval of his peers.
In achieving the approval of the Minister for Defence for his scheme, Costello 
appears to have incurred the wrath of the General Staff who, in effect, deemed him not to 
be a responsible person for the purposes of planning in the matter of the state’s military 
aviation. Instead the General Staff placed their faith in Major P.A Mulcahy who had 
achieved dubious aviation qualifications subsequent to being ordained Director of 
Military Aviation in addition to his appointment as Officer Commanding in 1935. The 
first significant development under Mulcahy was the assessment and purchase of Avro 
Anson aircraft. It is not at all clear what considerations influenced the decision to 
evaluate medium range reconnaissance aircraft at this juncture. It is possible that at this 
early stage the General Staff foresaw, based on observation of the reconnaissance carried 
out during the Great War and the concept indicated in the ‘fundamental factors’ 
document, the necessity to develop a general reconnaissance capability for coastal areas. 
The purchase of Ansons indicates the beginnings of a significant ideological shift, in 
terms of Air Corps roles and functions, from those of an army air corps to those of air 
force status. However the aircraft, and thus the air power capacities of the three 
rudimentary squadrons eventually raised, were not destined to assume air force status.
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In terms of organisation the Air Corps entered the Emergency, under the 1939 
peace establishment, with three under-strength squadrons of training cadre status -  in 
effect the training element of the scheme proposed by Costello. However due to the 
apparent failure to set training goals and the actual failure to train adequate aircrew, 
including pilots, observers, gunners and wireless operators the Air Corps of the early 
Emergency lacked adequate numbers of skilled personnel in practically all key areas. 
These inadequacies were exacerbated by an unstructured aircraft selection and purchase 
programme that equipped the Corps with, at the very best, second rate aircraft for 
potentially front line operations -  and in inadequate numbers. There is no evidence that 
the twenty-two aircraft acquired for service squadrons in the 1937/39 period were 
purchased because of their suitability for intended roles, but rather because they were the 
aircraft available at the time and because only token amounts of monies were made 
available by Finance by direction of government.
One of the more significant shortcomings entering the Emergency was in the 
number of pilots -  only thirty three compared with a notional establishment of sixty in 
1939 peace establishment) and no less than 140 under the 1940 war establishment. The 
small number of pilots did not concern Mulcahy or the General Staff prior to the 
Emergency. There is little doubt that the short service scheme was instigated, and 
continued during the Emergency, with the assumed future needs of civil aviation in mind.
The compromise represented by a token level of manpower and a token level of 
second or third rate aircraft left the Air Corps in a limbo. Notionally it had a defensive 
role in accordance with Army thinking while it had no stated or implied function under 
the State’s strategy of cooperation with the British, while neither strategy was expressed 
in any form that might have clarified what constituted military air policy in time of war or 
emergency. The uncoordinated consideration and general indecision in the matter of the 
development of military aerodromes appears to have been indicative of the fundamental 
differences between the Government and the Army in terms of an overall defence policy. 
The state’s emphasis on the development of Shannon and Dublin Airports while 
minimising expenditure on military aviation appears to confirm the government’s 
continuing priority to be civil rather than military aviation -  even in time of national 
emergency.
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CHAPTER 8
GOVERNMENT DEFENCE STRATEGY AND 
ANGLO IRISH COOPERATION, 1938 - 1943
Though Colonel M.J. Costello had, as early as 1930, endeavoured to have the General 
Staff declare some form of air policy and indicate the nature of air resources likely to be 
raised for defensive purposes, the Army leadership could progress no further than 
accepting the broad principle that the Defence Forces should have an air corps -  without 
any concept of what such an organisation might constitute. During the early 1930s the 
role implied by the organisation and aircraft was that of army aviation in support of 
ground forces. Costello brought the matter of air policy to the fore again in the context of 
the planning for the raising of a large conventional force in preparation for the defence of 
the country in the context of a European war. He envisaged that a force of ten squadrons 
could be deployed in the form of limited air power in support of a conventional defence 
of the state against external attack. This, the Costello plan of 21 March 1938, which was 
contingent on a significantly enlarged organisation, a broadened training programme and 
a major increase in spending on aircraft and other equipment, was not to materialise. The 
level of funding required, that realistically was never going to be approved by Finance, 
would have produced three operational squadrons with air force roles, if not status, and 
created a reserve structure to facilitate expansion to the required ten squadrons. When this 
plan was abandoned on Government instructions responsibility for planning for the 
Emergency devolved to Major P.A. Mulcahy. The organisation established, and resources 
acquired under Mulcahy’s influence, though broadly based on the Costello proposals, fell 
well short of forming a viable air element. In effect, having earlier abandoned the role of 
army cooperation and later failing to equip and train adequately for future air force tasks, 
the Air Corps of late 1939 fell between two stools. At the same time the Minister for 
Defence appears to have reflected the government’s indifference in the matter of military 
aviation by putting such preparations, except for the possible use of coastal patrols, in 
abeyance. In a similar manner to the reorganised corps of 1924 the Air Corps of 1939 
was very much an inadequately manned, equipped and trained token force.
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Against the above background this chapter aims to identify the Government’s 
strategy for the security of the state -  a strategy that that was to dictate a minimalist 
approach to defensive preparation in terms of ground forces and that resulted in the 
establishment of a token military aviation element. This assessment will be done in the 
context of the assistance and advice gleaned from the British in 1938/39 that appears to 
have lead to the formulation of a largely passive defence strategy by de Valera’s 
administration. The state’s emergency strategy will be seen to place a premium on 
relatively passive defence measures such as intelligence and counter-intelligence, coast 
watching and air and naval intelligence and censorship measures which would appear to 
have been planned in a maimer commensurate with the interests of the UK. Also to be 
examined is the manner in which the pre-war London / Dublin cooperation on defensive 
preparations translated into north / south military cooperation centred on the 18th Military 
Mission during the Emergency. In a military aviation context the liaison activities of the 
UK air attaché and the extent of the cooperation given him by Col. P.A. Mulcahy will be 
examined in the context of the cooperative, though cautious, political and military 
atmosphere of the early years of the Emergency. While the Department of External 
Affairs closely monitored the inter-army contacts it will be suggested that the unofficial 
air attaché, appointed in early June 1940, appears to have been afforded great scope for 
an unknown level of intelligence activity in addition to his official liaison duties with the 
Air Corps
Initial Anglo-Irish contacts
From the time of the 1938 negotiation leading to the return of the Treaty ports the British 
maintained an ambition to have the use of these major naval anchorages in the event of 
war.1 As a result the period between the Anglo-Irish agreement of 1938 and the outbreak 
of war was marked by a considerable number of contacts, both in person and written, 
between the Irish and British administrations. Even though these contacts, on matters 
relating to defensive planning, were mainly at the level of senior civil servant as war 
approached military contacts also took place. At the time of the 1937 Imperial
1 R o b e rt F isk , In time of war, Ireland, Ulster and the price of neutralityl939-45 (D u b lin , 1 9 8 4 ), p .4 0 .
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Conference (14 May to 15 June 1937) UK ministers approved of talks being held with 
representatives of Eire, regarding food matters, on similar lines to those held with 
representatives of other dominions at the conference. 2 Informal contacts appear to have 
started about November 1937 when some informal discussions took place between Sir 
Henry French and John Dulanty, the Irish high commissioner in London, and suggestions 
for talks between officials of the two Governments were incorporated in a note 
transmitted by Mr. Dulanty to the Eire government. The Dominions Office credited this, 
and a second note, with prompting de Valera to propose more formal discussions between 
the two governments.3 The DO quoted de Valera’s communication of 24 November 
1937:
This being the case, the government of Saorstat Eireann are [sic] satisfied that 
piecemeal discussion between civil servants on the economic and other aspects of 
the situation that would arise in the case of a major war can achieve no useful 
purpose until some prior understanding in principle has been reached between the 
two Governments.4
While the exact nature of the understanding reached is not indicated it appears that no 
substantive contacts took place until August 1938. As early as February 1938 however it 
had been indicated that discussions on matters of common defence interest would 
eventually involve contacts between military officers. On 9 February 1938 Joseph 
Walshe, secretary of the Department of External Affairs, reported that he had met with 
Sir H. Batterbee (UK Dominions Office) and three members of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, Colonels Hollis and Lunn and Wing Commander Frazer, in London on 
3 February. Referring to the three officers he stated that he found them cold and aloof and 
that they gave the impression that they were at the meeting because they had been 
ordered to do so and that they could not come to terms with the fact that they were no 
longer responsible for the defence of Ireland. ‘I am earnestly hoping that when our
2 ‘E ire  co -o p era tio n  in d e fen c e  m a t te r s ’, H .F . B a tte rb e e  to  S ir H o ra c e  W ilso n , 29  A u g . 1938 (N A , 
C A B /1 0 4 /2 3 ).
3 S ecre t D O  m e m o ran d u m , ‘E ire  an d  d e fe n c e  p re p a ra tio n s ’, 3 S e p t .1938 (N A , C A B /1 0 4 /2 3 ) .
4Ib id , q u o tin g  p a rag rap h  5 o f  de  V a le ra  d isp a tc h  o f  24  N o v . 1937 .
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military colleagues meet these officers they will not have the same cause to freeze up as I 
had.’ 5
Food supplies in time of war
The high commissioner was, as a matter of course, in frequent contact with the 
Dominions office in particular. However the first meeting of departmental officials, on 
the broad subject of preparation for war, resulted from a secret memorandum concerning 
the supply of food and feeding stuffs to the United Kingdom in time of war. The 
memorandum from the UK Food (Defence Plans) Department had originally been 
received by External Affairs in November 1937 and was referred to Defence on 19 
August 1938, following a query from Sir Henry French in July 1938, in effect reminding 
the Irish Government that no response had been made to his original note and asking 
whether suggestions made by him for a discussion were now acceptable.6 DEA, after this 
delay referred the matter to Defence:
The minister for External Affairs [Mr. de Valera] considers that a stage has been 
reached in our relations with Great Britain at which such informal conversations 
might take place he would accordingly be grateful if the minister for Defence 
would be good enough to appoint a representative or representatives of his 
department who would be ready to attend a discussion on this matter at a very early 
date with a view to holding the meeting suggested in the British memorandum .7
In referring the matter to Defence External Affairs pointed out that that it was the 
intention of the United Kingdom Government to establish complete control of imports 
and exports of the principal foodstuffs immediately on the outbreak of war and that that 
level of control in the UK would imply similar control in Eire owing to the country’s 
position as an exporter of foodstuffs to Great Britain and as an importer of foodstuffs 
from that country. The tables that accompanied the British memorandum emphasised the
3 ‘D e a r  P re s id e n t ’, J .P. W a lsh  to E. de  V a le ra ,  9 Feb.  1938 ( U C D A ,  de  V a le r a  p a p e r s ,  P I  50 /2 1 8 3 ) .
6 Sec D E A  to Sec D O D ,  19 A u g .  1938 ,  q u o t in g  U K  c o r re s p o n d e n c e  f ro m  N o v .  1937  (M A ,  S.49 ) .
7 ‘F o o d  supp l ies  d u r in g  t im e  o f  w a r ’, Sec D E A  to  Sec D O D ,  19 A u g .  1938 ( M A ,  S. 49) .
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latter point well. The first table, showed the total imports of certain principal foodstuffs 
and chief countries from which they had been imported. It quoted the average figures for 
the years 1933 and 1934 from Free State statistics. The figures indicated that the amounts 
of staple foods such as wheat, flour, maize, sugar, tea, coffee and other commodities and 
emphasised fact that the greater bulk came from or through Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. The second table showed the average production and exports of the principal 
foodstuffs of the Irish Free State during the years 1933-35 and main countries to which it 
was sent. The second table was even more emphatic. It demonstrated the almost total 
dependence of the country on Britain and NI in terms of the exportation of foodstuffs of 
all types. The figures showed that between ninety and one hundred percent of Irish 
exports of such principal commodities as live animals (cattle, sheep and pigs), various 
meats, milk and other dairy products and other commodities were exported to Britain and 
Northern Ireland.8 External Affairs endorsed the British suggestion that an informal 
exchange of views should take place between officers of the Food (Defence Plans) 
Department and representatives of Ireland relating to the common interests of the two 
countries in Eire’s imports and exports of food and foodstuffs.9 In the event, when the 
meeting took place ten days later Defence was not represented while the file on the 
matter closes with the nomination of the QMG and the contracts officer to represent DOD 
- suggesting that the Government treated the matter as a political rather than a defence 
issue.
At a meeting with Sir H.F. Batterbee on Saturday 27 August 1938 Dulanty 
indicated that de Valera was very concerned about the international situation and 
intended sending over three senior officers, Mr. Walshe, Mr. Leydon, and Mr. Twomey, 
to discuss co-operation in matter of control of foods in the context of a possible 
emergency. Dulanty stated that ‘it was most important, of course that the visit should be 
kept most secret’. Dulanty also enquired about the possibility of his attending meetings of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence as an observer. He indicated that he had had some 
discussion on the matter with de Valera but had been given no formal instructions in the 
matter. Batterbee suggested that the request would most likely get favourable
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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consideration from the U.K. Government but that such a request should be initiated by de 
Valera. Batterbee understood that Mr. De Valera might personally be inclined to favour 
the proposal but that opposition was likely to come from Frank Aiken, minister of 
Defence.10 Batterbee felt sure that Lord Stanley would be in favour of all measures that 
would entice the Irish administration to take part in discussions on Commonwealth 
defence matters but that the matter was one for the Prime Minister. While there was 
much subsequent correspondence on this latter aspect and the British had no major 
objection it is not clear that Dulanty ever attended this important defence forum.
In the context of discussions on food plans Mr. MacLean, representing H.L. 
French, was exhorted to ‘give the Eire representatives all the information possible and to 
do everything in his power to encourage further talks. ’ 11 On the following Monday, 29 
August, two officials, Leydon, of the Department of Industry and Commerce and 
Twomey, of the Department of Agriculture, accompanied by Dulanty, attended a meeting 
in London with representatives of Food (Defence Plans) Department, the Board of Trade, 
Dominions Office and the CID. The Irish representatives asked a number of questions as 
to the plans of the Food Department and they were supplied with answers. Subsequently, 
at a meeting with the Food Department, Board of Trade, Petroleum Department and 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Irish representatives were given further information on 
United Kingdom plans for control of food and raw materials in time of war and also the
1 9proposed a scheme for the control of merchant shipping.
In the absence of minutes indicating the specific questions that had been put by 
the Irish, or what precise information was given, it is not possible to assess the precise 
intent of the U.K government in the matter of food supplies. The meetings of late August 
1938 and the correspondence dealing with Irish imports and production and exports of 
the mid-1930s, may have been intended to remind de Valera how greatly dependent the 
country was on food trade with the UK and how vulnerable the country was in so far as 
the UK could influence the importation and exportation by the IFS of food and food 
stuffs. Similarly the level of control of shipping that could be exercised by the UK in the 
event of war was possibly explained.
10 Secre t  m e m o r a n d u m ,  H .F .  B a t te rb ee ,  29  A u g .  1938 (N A ,  C A B  104/23) .
11 S ir  H a r ry  B a t t e rb e e  to Sir H o ra c e  W il so n ,  29  A u g .  1938 (N A ,  C A B  104 /23) .
12 Secre t  m e m o r a n d u m ,  ‘E ire  an d  d e f e n c e  p r e p a r a t io n s ’, 3 Sep t .  1938  (N A ,  C A B  104/23).
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Censorship
About the same time the Irish Government had been involved in discussions on other 
aspects peripheral to defence policy. Acting on instructions of the government, conveyed 
by M. Moynihan, secretary to the Executive Council, T.J. Coyne, acting principal officer, 
Department of Justice, proceeded to London on 28 September 1938 to engage in 
discussions on censorship on behalf of the Department of Defence. A certain degree of 
urgency is indicated by the fact that the visit was arranged without the usual prior 
sanction of the Minister for Finance.13 In London T.J. Coyne had separate discussions 
with Major Stephenson representing the Controller of Posts and Telegraphs Censorship 
and with representatives of the Admiralty, Air Ministry, and Board of Trade. He 
introduced himself and outlined Eire’s position on censorship:
At our first meeting I explained that the purpose of my visit was to ascertain, 
without prejudice to the decision that might eventually be arrived at (a) what 
measures the British authorities would like us to take in regard to censorship in Eire 
in the event of it becoming necessary to institute a general censorship in Great 
Britain as a result of an outbreak of war in which the United Kingdom was involved 
and (b) what the censorship policy of the United Kingdom was likely to be in time 
of war with regard to direct and transit ‘closed’ mails to and from this country. 14
In regard to the first matter Coyne was informed that, in an emergency situation, Britain 
expected Eire to take censorship measures as close as possible to those that pertained in 
Great Britain. He was also informed that the British did not propose to exercise any 
censorship over mail going to, or coming from, third countries. Fundamentally the 
situation was that the War Office took the view that that censorship in Great Britain 
would be ineffective unless there were similar and compatible censorship arrangements 
in Eire.15
13 Sec D O D  to  Sec  D F ,  15 N o v .  1938 ( M A ,  S.67) .
14 T.J. C o y n e  to Sec  D O D ,  4  O c t .  1938 ( M A ,  S.67) .
15 Ibid.
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Petrol rationing
Following the Munich crisis of September 1938 the U.K. Petroleum Department had 
correspondence and discussions with the Irish Department of Industry and Commerce as 
a result of which the Irish Government agreed that, in the event of war they would 
introduce a scheme for the rationing of motor spirit broadly the same as that pertaining in 
Great Britain. In September 1939 de Valera’s Government also agreed to the transfer of 
seven tankers, which had been registered in Dublin, to the British flag. Subsequently, 
after only four weeks of petrol rationing, the Department of Supplies proposed that the 
level of rationing, that included a reduction of two thirds for private cars, was far too 
drastic. In a six-page submission the Irish department cited, amongst other affects, the 
fact that motor car assembly had practically closed down with the loss of 700 jobs and 
that the loss of revenue would amount to £580,000 per annum. This was the equivalent to 
seven pence in the pound on income tax. Also the garage industry had lost 1,600 jobs. It 
sought to have importation of motor spirit restored from about 66% of pre-war 
requirements to 90% of same.
The Petroleum Department noted that Eire was dependent on the UK for oil 
supplies and, thought it was not obliged to do so, that Eire had sought the approval of
H.M. government for the introduction of rationing on a reduced scale. It was considered 
that, as a deteriorating tanker situation had caused the depletion of UK stocks that these 
had to be made good rather than being further depleted. It was also felt necessary to 
maintain the principle whereby all countries of the Empire should share the sacrifice 
equally. Citing also the foreign exchange implication of oil purchase the Petroleum 
Department advised against a reduction in rationing in Eire. The Treasury agreed with 
the latter reason for rejection. While a final decision is not reflected in the 
correspondence a draft response advised discussion on the matter with a compromise 
level of rationing in mind while recognising the Eire Government’s difficulties and 
emphasising those o f Britain. 16 Subsequent comment indicating that ‘the petrol ration for 
those involved in essential services was miserly’ and that ‘for the ordinary citizen it was
lb D e p a r tm en t  o f  S u p p l ie s ,  D u b l in  to P e t ro le u m  D e p a r tm e n t ,  17 N o v .  1939; P e t ro le u m  D e p a r tm e n t  to  DO , 
22  Dec. 1939; T r e a s u r y  to  D O ,  5 Jan .  1940; D O  draft  m e m o ,  16 Jan .  1940 (N A ,  D O  3 5 /1 0 6 7 /4 ) .
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non-existent’ would suggest that Britain did not compromise. 17 It might be considered 
that de Valera’s government had been a bit hasty and naïve in agreeing to the same scale 
of rationing as the UK without knowing exactly what was entailed. Similarly the handing 
over of control of tankers at such a critical juncture appears naïve. However given the 
economic control available to Britain de Valera probably had no alternative.
Preparations for war and intelligence contacts
A significant aspect of the contacts between the British and Irish, coordinated by the high 
commissioner, was a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for various British 
papers, documents, memoranda and progress reports regarding preparations for war. This 
request was prompted by the receipt, by the Irish Government, of two documents relating 
to British emergency legislation and by informal contacts between Dulanty and the South 
African representatives in London through which Dulanty became aware that the other 
Dominions were in receipt of information and guidance that was not available to the Irish 
Free State. On 30 August 1938 Joseph Walshe was in London and forwarded a letter for 
Sir Harry Batterbee in which he asked that the Irish government be supplied with copies 
of the Government War Book, the third report of the War Emergency Legislation 
Committee and eight other secret or highly confidential documents or reports relating to 
contingency planning for war. He also requested copies of all defence documents that had 
already been supplied to Canada and South Africa. He also requested documents dealing 
with air raid precautions, censorship and espionage.18 Later the same day Walshe 
approached Major General Ismay of the CID, who had been forewarned about the request 
for documents, on the said matter. Batterbee and Ismay subsequently exchanged notes on 
what was obviously a very sensitive issue. Ismay had pretended to Walshe that he was 
not aware that Walshe had already made a request to Batterbee ‘for a cartload of 
promiscuous documents’. He explained his approach to the problem:
17 B e rn a rd  Share ,  The emergency; neutral Ireland, 1939-45 ( D u b l in ,  1987),  p. 55.
18 J.P. W a lsh e  to H .F .  B a t te rb ee ,  3 0  A u g .  1939  (N A ,  C A B  1 0 4 /23 ) .
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.... But I think I persuaded him that the Eire authorities ought to give a good deal 
of consideration to the precise problems which they wished to study before 
embarking on a wholesale collection of documents, many of which it would merely 
be a waste of their time to read. 19
Ismay had explained to Walshe that the UK’s defensive preparations were of a much 
larger range and scope than those of Eire and had been built up over a considerable 
period years. He suggested that the Eire authorities should concentrate on essentials such 
as coastal defence, counter espionage, protection of vulnerable points, censorship, food 
supply and distribution, fuel supply and distribution, and war emergency legislation. In 
accepting this explanation Walshe asked for further advice as to how best to choose the 
documents pertinent to his government’s requirements. Ismay suggested that firstly the 
UK might give the Eire defence authorities a general idea of the field covered by UK 
defensive preparation and secondly that the Eire authorities might decide which particular 
aspects of the wider defence problem they required to study. The third and final step 
suggested was a consultation process on an Irish provisional list of documents followed 
by the supply o f selected relevant material. This approach met with Walshe’s approval 
and, ‘as a very special favour’ he was given ‘a copy of the preface and table of contents 
of the Government War Book’. He did not get the latest document, which included 
reference to a very secret emergency scheme which had just been formulated, but the 
previous and less sensitive edition. Inskip and Batterbee understood from Walshe that it 
was because they had previously sent certain CID documents that de Velera had sent 
officials to London to discuss the food plans and other aspects of co-operation. As a 
result they considered that Britain had a better chance of securing de Valera’s full 
cooperation by displaying the maximum confidence in him by giving him an insight into 
the preparations necessary for war.20
Counter-espionage was a particular defensive aspect that Colonel Ismay 
recommended to Mr. Walshe, who in turn indicated to Batterbee that it was a matter that 
he would like to tackle immediately. On 31 August 1938 a meeting on this matter was
19 M a j .  G en .  I sm a y  to  H .F .  B a t te rb ee ,  3 0  A u g .  1938 (N A ,  C A B /1 0 4 /2 3 ) .
20 Ibid.
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held at the High Commissioner’s office where Dulanty and Walshe had discussions with
Capt. Guy Liddell, head of counter-espionage in MI5 throughout the war. While details
of this meeting are not available Capt. Liddell is recorded as preparing a memorandum
that reflected that the discussions had been very satisfactory and indicated a desire on the
21part of the Irish authorities to co-operate fully with the intelligence agencies in Britain.
In early September 1938 de Valera himself was in London and had separate 
discussions with Sir Thomas Inskip, the British Attorney General, and the Duke of 
Devonshire of the Dominions Office. If he was concerned about the progress of various 
secret or confidential meetings that his officials were having with representatives of 
several different government departments he did not reveal it and appears not to have 
referred to the broad defensive and military considerations that were being explored on 
his behalf about that time. In fact he appears to have ignored military and defensive 
matters while confining his attentions to the broad political aspects relating to the 
relationship between Eire and the UK Government vis-à-vis partition and the six counties 
of Northern Ireland. British accounts of discussions with de Valera on 8 September 1938 
indicate that de Valera had been offered a copy o f the war book, a secret manual of 
instructions for the military authorities in the preparation for the outbreak of hostilities. 
De Valera is reported as being reluctant to accept the offer because its scope was 
unnecessarily wide for Eire and because he was not very anxious to have a document 
which it was important to keep secret. He also indicated that he was very much in the 
dark about how the limited resources at his disposal could be best used. Inskip 
expressed the opinion that if the UK became involved in war de Valera was sure that the 
first instinct of the government of Eire would be to keep out of it.22
This account of de Valera’s reported attitude to the matter of the war book is not 
consistent with the position indicated by Walshe’s written request, for copies of a 
considerable number of sensitive documents including the war book, made just nine day 
earlier. Assuming, as we must, that Walshe, on 30 August 1938, was acting on the 
instructions of de Valera the position indicated in Inskip’s report of his conversation with 
de Valera suggests that Irish prime minister may have wished to distance himself totally
21 D O  m e m o r a n d u m ,  ‘E i re  and  d e fe n c e  p r e p a r a t io n s ’, 3 Sep t .  1938 (N A ,  C A B  104/24);  E u n an  O ’H a lp in ,  
(ed .)  MI5 and Ireland, 1939 — 1945; the official history (D u b l in ,  2 0 0 3 ) ,  p. 22.
■" F isk ,  In time of war, p. 69 ,  c i t ing  m in u te s  o f  In sk ip  /  d e  V a le ra  m ee t in g ,  8 Sept.  1938 (N A ,  F O  800 /310) .
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from purely military and defensive considerations, concentrating on political matters safe 
in the knowledge that his Government departments, particularly External Affairs, had 
such aspects under control. An alternative interpretation, to the effect that his 
departmental secretary was acting on his own initiative, would suggest engagement with 
the British, on sensitive military matters, that had no political authorisation. Whatever 
the true position it is curious that two British files referring to such a sensitive matter 
should reflect such conflicting positions vis-à-vis war planning documents, a matter 
central to the discussions between the two countries and central to the Eire’s preparation 
for the expected emergency.
Following the meeting of 8 September with de Valera the CID was still anxious to 
progress the matter of the defended ports and suggested that de Valera be asked to 
‘authorise immediately the dispatch of the necessary defence experts to discuss this 
question with the appropriate experts here’.
It is understood that in accordance with arrangements previously discussed, it is 
contemplated that it would be possible to arrange that civilian experts should come 
from Dublin to London to consult with the appropriate authorities here as to 
defence measures. . . .23
The British also indicated that they would welcome the attendance of Defences Forces 
experts in London but recognized that the express authority, from de Valera, who was 
then in Geneva, would be required.24 Flowever with de Valera unavailable contacts 
between Eire and the United Kingdom did continue. On Thursday 15 September 1938 the 
high commissioner and General Ismay of the CID discussed various defensive matters. 
Dulanty reported that the table of contents of the war book had been given to the 
authorities in Dublin and that they had made known the selection of the UK’s most recent 
papers that they wished to study. Ismay indicated that copies of documents, dealing with 
the Oil Board, the Principle supply officers committee and censorship and so forth, that 
dealt with the problems that would be of interest to Eire, had been put aside. It was
23 M e m o r a n d u m ,  c i rca  8 Sep t .  1938 (N A ,  C A B  104/23).
24 Ibid.
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suggested that the Eire authorities were welcome to these reports but that they would 
‘merely find them confusing, since they would be in the position of a layman (I expressed 
this as tactfully as I could), who was presented with the last chapter of a technical treatise 
without any explanation of the basis’. He explained further:
I suggested that it would be most useful for the Eire authorities to know the general 
principles on which our scheme had been prepared: in other words what they 
should have was not the most recent progress reports but ... some of them at least 
10 years old.25
Ismay showed Dulanty some more recent reports so that the latter could be convinced, 
and appreciate, that such documents were not relevant to the rudimentary state of Irish 
preparations for war. Dulanty agreed that the older documents and papers would be more 
appropriate and was given copies. While Ismay and his colleagues were trying to ensure 
the cooperation of the de Valera administration the tone and content of the record of the 
British position vis-à-vis Irish knowledge of UK defensive matters makes it obvious that 
they did not trust the Irish with details of the most up to date information.
Dulanty said that he would show the papers to the Staff in Dublin, and that he 
would then like to bring one or two military officers to London to discuss them in the 
context of their relevance to the Irish situation. It was suggested by Ismay that 
departmental officials had a large part to play in early preparations for war. In response to 
Ismay’s query, as to what Irish government departments might be represented at meetings 
to start with one at the Committee of Imperial Defence, Dulanty indicated that 
representatives the Department of Justice and the secretary to the cabinet might be sent 
over.
In the course of our conversation, Mr. Dulanty told me in confidence that we would 
find Irish military officers and civilian officials very anxious for full co-operation 
with us, but that the minister for Defence was just the other way, and would
25 S ec re t  m e m o r a n d u m ,  15 Sept .  1938 (N A ,  C A B /1 0 4 /2 3 ) .
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probably be critical of Mr. de Valera for having been too forthcoming in these 
matters.26
On his return from Geneva de Valera apparently gave authority for further contacts on 
defence matters. On 11 and 12th October 1938 John Dulanty and Joseph Walshe held a 
general discussion on the defence of Eire with representatives of the CID and of the 
Dominion Office in London who made a summary report:
Mr. De Valera is very interested in defence matters. The discussions were very
rambling since the delegates had no specific questions they wanted to put, but they 
seemed to find the talks useful in bringing to their notice all the new problems and 
points of view which had obviously never occurred to them before. Mr. Walshe had 
not studied defence at all, it seems to see, but he is clearly most anxious to get their 
whole defence arrangements put on a proper footing. He repeatedly emphasised 
that the whole basis of their preparations would be that they would co-operate with 
us.
I gathered that their military authorities had never thought out the defence problem 
at all. They have carried on with a small land force, organised for a purpose which 
they are not quite clear about themselves, ever since the I.R.A. rebellion was 
repressed after the truce in 1922. Now some of their people are approaching the 
problem of providing defences for the country rather like a boy buying firecrackers. 
They think it would be nice to have a packet of this and a packet of that, but for
27what purpose they are not quite clear.
From an Irish point of view the main aim of the discussions was to assure the British that 
de Valera was proposing co-operation and that, in the event of hostilities, Eire would be 
most likely to fight in support of the United Kingdom rather than against. The discussions 
provided the Irish delegates with much advice on the preparations necessary for war. It
r i b i d ' i h27U n s i g n e d ‘N o te  o f  d isc u ss io n  on d e fen c e  w ith  M r.  D u la n ty  an d  Mi'. W a lsh e  on l l lhand 12th O c to b e r  
1 9 3 8 ’, 13 Oct .  1938 (N A ,  C A B  104/23) .
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was suggested that the Irish formulate their defensive ideas in a memorandum taking 
Chapters I and II of the Instructions for the preparation of defence schemes as a guide.
The question of advice and help to them was discussed between us a great deal. 
They asked me to give my frank opinion as to the best way in which they could use 
our offered help. I told them that the best way would probably be to as New 
Zealand, for example, had done, and for them to take a loan of one or two officers
from us to help them through their early stages Mr. Walshe thought it would
not be at all impossible to “smuggle in” one of our experts for a while to help them, 
but he did not go into the matter in detail at all.28
The CID suggested that alternatively Irish defence experts should come over to London 
for discussions but should have their defence problems formulated and on paper before 
hand. Arising out of the meetings the UK representatives fonned opinions about the Irish 
military:
This [latter] topic led to the question of their senior serving officers. Practically none 
of these men are of any education at all. I gathered that the brightest of them was a 
man called [M.J.] Costello, who has some military training in America. He is about 
35, but might not, for political reasons, rise to the highest positions of responsibility in 
the army. Mr. Walshe told me that some o f their younger officers, aged about 28-30 
were of good education....It is quite clear that the outlook of the defence services in
29
Eire at present is really that of the guerrilla leaders who are still their backbone.
It is considered that there was more to the meetings of the 11/12 October 1938 than is 
reflected in the four-page report subsequently placed on a secret cabinet file. The tone 
and content suggest that the thoughts of someone other than Walshe and Dulanty are 
reflected in the summary. Walshe struck the British as being uninformed in military 
matters while Dulanty, based in London, might be considered well removed from military
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
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matters also. It is considered that the recorded insights into Irish military matters, 
particularly to the fundamental military ideology of guerrilla leaders, may have come 
from an Irish military source. It is suggested that this possible military source, who 
might have represented the guerrilla ideology of yore, was Colonel Liam Archer. 
Contemporary records indicate that Archer went to London on 10 October 1938, and 
place him there, not just for the two days in question, but also for 13 October, and 
indicate that he returned to Dublin on the 14 October 1938. DOD had requested Finance 
as follows:
I am directed by the minister for Defence to state that, on the instructions of the 
Taoiseach, Colonel Liam Archer proceeded to London at very short notice on two 
occasions recently on business of a confidential nature. The periods of the visits 
were from the 10lh to the 14lh October 1938 and from the 4th to 611' ultimo.30
It is significant that Archer was in London, on the days of the defence discussions, on de 
Valera’s authority and acting on his specific instructions. Published accounts of the 
events of the period suggest that Archer’s discussions and contacts with UK officials
31were solely in relation to intelligence and counter intelligence matters. However 
attendance at such meetings would not necessarily preclude his attendance at informal 
meeting, also attended by Walshe and Dulanty, on the periphery of defence related 
discussions. In the context of discussions on Irish defence matters, where the main Irish 
delegates were not fully au fa it with military matters, it would appear desirable that a 
senior military officer be available. While Archer’s main preoccupation may have been 
related to intelligence matters he may well have had a broader brief from de Valera and, 
though not attending formal meeting, may have acted as a military advisor at informal 
discussions. A subsequent summary report by Archer, dealing with the general subject of 
cooperation with the UK during the Emergency, while it does not relate to this particular 
period, suggests that Archer was the main go-between in the context of north -  south
30 Sec  D O D  to Sec  D F , 10 D ec.  1938 (N A I ,  D F ,  S . 105 /0048 /38) .
31 E. O ’H a lp in  (ed .)  M15 and Ireland, 1939-1945; the official history,(D u b l in ,  2 0 0 3 )passim ; N ige l  W es t  
(ed .) ,  The Guy Liddell diaries, Vol. 1: 1939-1942 ( A b in g d o n ,  2 0 0 5 ) ,passim.
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military cooperation from 1940 to 1945.32 While it is possible that Archer only met UK 
intelligence personnel in October 1938 it is considered most unlikely that he would be in 
London on the particular days and not represent de Valera’s views in the context of the 
military aspects of preparation for war and Anglo-Irish military co-operation.
Possibly the last contacts between the Irish and British in the latter part of 1938 
was the second visit to London, from 4 to 6 of Novemberl938, made by Col. Liam 
Archer. He was again acting on de Valera’s instructions.33 While the specific purpose of 
this visit is unknown, Archer may have been sent to discuss some more specific aspects 
of defence applying to Eire, as suggested by the British at the meetings of 11/12 October. 
It is, however, equally possible that he was engaged on intelligence business. Archer’s 
last known pre-war visit to London took place as late as 25 August 1939. He was 
engaged on similar confidential business as that authorised by de Valera in October and 
November 1938.34 While the nature of his latest duty in London is not known, it may be 
no coincidence that within days of the visit, on 30 August 1939, a detachment of Air 
Corps personnel and aircraft was dispatched to Rineanna (Shannon) without notice, 
planning or preparation. The specific, though unrecorded, mission of this detachment was 
the patrolling of the south and west coasts in an intelligence role.35 It is not clear whether 
this precipitous action was taken as a result of a British request, initially to Archer, or 
represented a gesture on the part of de Valera to replace the maritime intelligence value 
of the treaty ports.
Military contacts
Mention of one of the earliest and most unusual Anglo Irish military contacts, some time 
in 1937, comes from the biography of an Irish officer who had served with the RAF:
1 ‘S u m m a r y  o f  co n tac ts  with fo reign  a rm ies ,  Bri t ish  -  Irish m il i ta ry  re la t io n s  and  c o n ta c t s ’. Col .  L. A rch er ,  
c irca  M a rch  1944 (M A ,  S C S /1 4 ) .  (H e rea f te r  ‘A r c h e r  s u m m a r y ’)
33 Sec  D O D  to Sec D F ,  10 D ec.  1938 (N A I ,  D F ,  S . 105 /0 0 4 8 /3 8 ) .
34 Sec  D O D  to Sec D F , 30  Sept.  1939 (N A I ,  D F ,  S . 105 /0 0 4 8 /3 8 ) .
35 C ap t.  W .J .  K e a n e  to O C  S. C o m d . ,  12 A pri l  1940, A p p e n d ix  N o .  X X II ,  R e p o r t  and  f in d in g s  o f  the  
co m m i t te e ,  10 Jan . 1942 (M A ,  A C S  22 /23) .
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I don’t know whether it would be a good thing to mention a visit of an Irish 
Republican Air Force squash team to play the Aldergrove team. It was certainly a 
great success from a liaison point of view. It paved the way for a welcome for
-3/-
Aldergrove officers going down to Dublin for international rugby matches.
While this visit is not mentioned elsewhere there is no reason to doubt that it took place. 
Such contact, at a sporting level in the mid-1930s, does seem unusual. In all probability 
Major P.A. Mulcahy was on the Air Corps team. Squash, which he took up on being 
posted to Baldonnell, was apparently about the only thing he had in common with the
T 7
flying officers of the Air Coips.
Archer’s meetings with British officials were not the only official and confidential 
contacts between the two countries at a military level in the pre-war months. On 26 April 
1939 Major Sullivan (Army) and Commandant W.P. Delamere (Air Corps) accompanied 
by the two senior engineers of the Post Office, Monaghan and O ’Neill, visited London. 
They were received by Squadron Leader McEvoy of the Air Ministry and attended a 
meeting held at G.P.O. Headquarters, in the context of the proposed inclusion of Eire in 
the U.K. Air Raid Warning System.
Major Sullivan explained that along the eastern coast of Eire, to a depth not yet 
decided fighter sectors and observer groups would be set up on the English model 
and air raid warning districts also would be established. The personnel for the 
observer groups would be drawn from the civil guard [sic] which would also be 
responsible for those duties in connection with air raid warnings which in the 
United Kingdom are performed by the chief constables. The Irish fighter command 
would be near Dublin and would be equivalent in status to a fighter group in this
"3 0
country.
36 D o u g  Stokes,  Wings aflame; the biography of Group Captain Victor Beamish DSO and bar, DFC, AFC 
(L o n d o n ,  19B5), p. 56.
37 Pe rso n a l  c o m m e n t ,  the  late Lt.  C o l .  P. O ’Sul l ivan ;  A p p re c ia t io n  by  Col.  C .M .  M a t t im o e  in An Cosantoir 
Ixvii,  no. 5 ( M a y  1987),  p. 22.
38 ‘Ex trac t  f rom  G .P .O .  f i le ’, 30  M a y  1939 (N A ,  A i r  2 /5129) .
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The question of obtaining efficiency in observer communications was discussed at length 
on the basis that UK practices would suit Eire just as well. However the small number of 
telephone lines and the prevalence of many two-line and three-line telephone exchanges 
throughout Ireland were identified as being detrimental to efficiency. In order to append 
the proposed Irish system, which should consist of about four or five warning districts, to 
the English system and still leave the Irish system in Irish control, it was proposed that 
only Dublin should receive warning messages issued from Fighter Command RAF. The 
Irish representatives promised to contact the UK representatives when the number and 
layout of warning districts in Eire was known.39 In the event an Irish air raid warning 
system of the kind envisaged was not put in place and therefore not connected to its 
British equivalent.
In July 1938, following a visit to London in connection with the purchase of 
aircraft, Major P.A. Mulcahy had recommended to GHQ that authority should be sought 
for flying officers to visit RAF and civil flying schools. While outline financial sanction 
had been received on 10 September 1938 he considered that it necessary to confirm the 
sanction and complete the visit well in advance of the start of the training of the short 
service commission pilots’ .40 The visit eventually took place between 4 and 14 February 
1939. The two officers, Capt. W.P. Delamere (who was promoted commandant on 6 
April 1939) and Lieut. K.T. Curran, concentrated on elementary, intermediate and 
advanced training schools and subsequently briefly visited two operational squadrons. 
During their two day visit to the de Haviland Elementary Flying Training School they 
were briefed by the chief flying instructor on the latest instructional methods and flying 
techniques employed in ab initio training. They observed flying training in progress and 
noted the use of the Link trainer, at a very early stage of the fifty hour course, as an 
introduction to instrument flying. Before proceeding to the intennediate school they were 
supplied with copies of several official publications and instructional notes.
That evening, on arrival at Stow-on-the-Wold they were met by a squadron leader 
and the CO’s car. They were driven to Little Risslington where a special meal was 
provided in the Officers’ Mess at 22.00 hours. Once more the CFI was their host on their
39 Ibid.
40 O C  A C  to C O S ,  18 N o v .  1938 (M A ,  A C /2 /6 /1 6 ) .
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two day visit to No. 6 Flying Training School. This intermediate squadron had forty-eight 
pupils, divided into three squads, for a fifty hour flying course. The major emphasis was 
on instrument flying and the use of a Link trainer while cross countries flights of up to 
200 miles were also important. The two officers had a discussion with Group Captain ab 
Ellis on matters concerning RAF training and on the proposed Air Corps short service 
course. The group captain considered the Link trainer to be the best piece of instructional 
equipment ever invented.41 He arranged for the supply of all publications, notes and 
orders that could be spared. At the same station Squadron Leader Day conducted a visit 
to the Advanced Training Squadron where pupils arrived with 100 hours flying and 
completed a further fifty. The emphasis was on camera-gun flying practice, photography, 
navigation and night flying - all in preparation for the gunnery and live bombing of the 
last fortnight of the course. They concluded their visit with a review of ground instruction 
facilities and the ground aids to air gunnery training. The visiting officers were duly 
impressed with their reception:
A point of interest at this station was the fact that our whole trip appeared to have 
been carefully organized. No time was lost going from one place to another, and 
each officer picked us up in turn and appeared quite prepared to give us any 
information we asked for.42
While the above comment was relevant to their reception at training establishments 
similar comment could not have been made about their visits to two operational 
squadrons. Having arrived there the previous night Delamere and Curran visited RAF 
Tangmere at 09.00 hours on 13 February 1939. The station commander, Group Captain 
F. Sowery, and OC No. 43 Fighter Squadron were not available. The report indicates that 
they got a perfunctory overview of 43 Squadron, conducted by Flying Officer Hull, 
during the morning. The squadron, that had eighteen Hurricane I aircraft, concentrated on
41 T h e  L in k  w as  th e  first  in s t ru m e n t  and rad io  aid  sy n th e t ic  tra iner .  O r ig in a l ly  in v e n te d  in the  U S  in 1929 
th e  first L ink  t ra iners  arr ived  in the  U K  in 1936. O n e  w a s  in s ta l led  in B a ld o n n e l l  in 1940  an d  a n o th e r  in 
R in e a n n a  the  fo l lo w in g  year.  See R o s in a  B ro w n ,  ‘F in d in g  th e  m is s in g  L i n k ’ in Aeroplane, 1 Sep t .  2 0 0 4 ,  pp  
85-8.
42 ‘R e p o r t  o f  visit  to  R A F  t ra in ing  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s ’, C ap t.  W .P .  D e la m e re  a n d  L ieu t .  K .T .  C u rran  to O C  A C ,  
17 Feb .  1939 (M A ,  A C  2/6 /16) .
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initial and advanced training of fighter pilots, instrument flying and air firing while a 
Link trainer was also in use. The squadron pilots were forbidden to perform aerobatics -  
presumably to prolong the fatigue life of the aircraft. It was noted that the aircraft were 
equipped with radio telephony and oxygen.
In the afternoon they visited No. 217 Squadron and again, in the absence o f the 
squadron commander, were conducted around by a junior officer, Flying Officer Bool. 
No. 217 General Reconnaissance Squadron had twenty-four Avro Anson I aircraft but 
was due to be equipped with Lockheed Hudsons. The most interesting comment was to 
the effect 75% of the squadrons training was in navigation. To this end they had a fully 
qualified navigation officer on the strength of the unit. They also commented on the 
youth of the flight commanders who, with about two years squadron service appeared to 
responsible for the whole training of the younger pilots.
It is notable, from the tone and content of the report, that Delamere and Curran 
got first class attention from the senior personnel of the training establishments. As well 
as getting detailed briefings and considerable insight into the business of flying training, 
they were supplied with all manner of relevant publications, manuals and instructional 
material. By way of contrast their visits to two operational squadrons at Tangmere, 
admittedly of secondary importance to the staff of a flying school, were conducted in a 
single day and while they gleaned some very important information they were only 
afforded an overview of the workings of operational squadrons by more junior personnel. 
While the unavailability of more senior personnel may have been a coincidence it may 
have been a manifestation of the reserve and confidentiality observed by the Air Ministry 
and the RAF where current operational matters were concerned. Subsequently, despite 
the representations of the High Commissioner it was not possible to obtain copies of 
manuals, such as Tactics of shore based aircraft and Air fighting tactics, dealing with 
operational matters.43
43 Ibid. J a m es  J. H a i le y  re co rd s  tha t  A n s o n s  re m a in e d  in se rv ice  w i th  N o .  217  S q u a d r o n  until  D e c e m b e r  
1940 w h en  they  w e re  rep laced  by  B e au fo r t  I aircraft .
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Government defence strategy
As early as 6 September 1938 de Valera had initiated action that suggests that he was 
formulating what could be interpreted as a broad defensive strategy. He proposed to ‘the 
government for consideration the question of measures which it is necessary to take in 
preparation for the eventuality of a European war’. He suggested that ‘among the matters 
that would require immediate attention in the event of war’ were the following.
1. Supplies of food and other essential commodities and the regulation of external
trade.
2. Censorship, counter-espionage, control of communications and publicity.
3. Coast watching.
4. Financial and monetary policy
5. Control of transport.
6. Military measures.
7. Air Raid precautions.
8. Protection of vulnerable points, such as Government Buildings, the Shannon
Hydro-Electric Works, etc.
9. Alternative accommodation for Government and staffs.
10. The safeguarding of important documents.
11. The safeguarding of works of art, etc.
12. Legislation.44
In the context of ongoing discussions between the two countries one is struck by the 
similarity between the listed defensive measures or planning areas and the titles of UK 
planning documents (as requested by Walshe) and the particular war plans subjects on 
which Walshe had been advised Eire should concentrate.45 This similarity assumes 
greater significance when one examines the history o f the Emergency and reviews the 
actual ‘Emergency’ measures taken by de Valera and Aiken. In the context of that history
44 ‘M e m o r a n d u m  for  the  G o v e r n m e n t ’ , 6 Sept .  1938 (N A I ,  D T ,  S . 10823).
43 J.P. W a lsh e  to  H .F. B a tte rb ee ,  30  A u g .  1938; I sm a y  to  B a t t e rb e e ,  30 A u g .  1938 (N A ,  C A B  104 /23 ) .
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it is suggested that the above memorandum, in effect, constituted Government strategy 
for the period and that the contacts, advice and the various official publications received 
from the UK greatly influenced and informed that strategy.
de Valera placed greatest emphasis in the first three preparatory measures. He 
suggested that it was very urgent that emergency legislation and regulation should be 
drafted so as to enable the government to deal with a war situation. In the context of 
subsequent emphasis on various intelligence aspects, including a substantial level of 
military cooperation with the UK during the emergency, and of the government’s 
relatively lowly opinion of military measures it could be concluded that that this 
particular memorandum, in effect, constituted the government’s defence strategy. De 
Valera proposed that it was necessary to consider whether the general supervision of the 
preparatory measures should be entrusted to a committee of government or to a 
committee of heads of departments who would act as a general co-ordinating and 
supervising body responsible to the government or a government committee. In 
recommending that one committee should consist of the secretaries of the Departments of 
Agriculture, Defence, External Affairs, Finance, Industry and Commerce and An 
Taoiseach, he suggested that the first task would be to arrange the preparation of an 
emergency book of instructions as to the steps to be taken by the various departments in 
an emergency. While a committee of heads of departments would carry out planning, co­
ordinating and supervisory functions the executive functions would fall to the existing 
departments of State.46
It is of considerable interest to note the three strategic areas on which de Valera 
placed greatest importance. On the other hand the placing o f the matter of military 
measures at number six would suggest that given the spirit of cooperation between the 
two countries, purely military defensive matters were not of paramount importance. The 
most intriguing subject on the list -  at number three -  was the matter of coast watching. 
Not only was it considered to be of major importance but apparently was not considered a 
defensive or military measure. In tenns of the complete defence of an island state it might 
have been considered that coast watching was an essential aspect of early warning of
46 Ibid.
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invasion and essentially defensive in character. In this particular case, as will be seen 
later, the term had a different connotation. (See Chapter 10)
Wartime military cooperation
While the very public antagonism between de Valera and Churchill might suggest that 
the state was totally at odds with the UK throughout the Emergency it is now generally 
recognised that there was a considerable degree of cooperation, particularly between the 
respective headquarters staffs at Dublin and Belfast. During the pre-war phase of 
cooperation the important contacts were at senior civil servant level while the wartime 
contacts and coordination were to be predominantly military to military. The bones of 
this cooperation are laid bare by Col. Liam Archer in his ‘summary of contacts with 
foreign armies’. However, being equally economical with word and fact, this report had 
to be revised and expanded upon in 1947 so that the post-war Army leadership could 
understand what actually had gone on. Archer observed that liaison had existed between 
the British War Office and GHQ on security and counter-espionage matters from 
September 1938 and that a British naval attaché had been appointed as early as October
1939. The Childers report cites the first military to military contacts in the context of the 
perceived threat of invasion following the then recent German invasion of Holland and 
Belgium:
On 23 May 1940, Colonel A rcher and Mr. Joseph W alsh ............. was [sic]
sent to London to make contact with the British War Office in order to discuss with 
the British authorities steps to co-ordinate our respective defence measures against 
a German invasion of Ireland’ ,47
The report went on to outline the visit of Archer and Walshe to London, their arrival into 
a conference at the Dominions Office being attended by senior officers of the British 
Army, Navy and Air Force and the resultant visit to Government Buildings in Dublin of
47 A rc h e r  su m m ary ,  c irca  M a rc h  1944 ,  ( M A ,  S C S /1 4 ) ;  ‘N o te s  on  th e  or ig in  a n d  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  con tac ts  
w ith  Bri t ish  A rm y  1 9 4 0 - 1 9 4 5 ’, Lt.  Col .  R .A .  C h i ld e rs ,  17 Oct .  1947  ( M A ,  S C S /1 ) .  (H e rea f te r  ‘C h i ld e rs  
r e p o r t ’).
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Col. Clarke and two other British officers on 24 May 1940.48 While the above is the 
official Irish account contemporary records suggest that Archer may have been in the UK 
for some time prior to the DO meeting of 23 May 1940. On 20 May 1940 Cecil Liddell, 
head of the Irish section of MI5 reported to the CID on events:
I have written to Archer as you suggested. In the meantime you may perhaps care 
to know what moves have been made recently. After the meeting the other day 
which Sir Vernon Kell attended, I saw Walsh[e] at Dulanty’s office. He was quite 
unacquainted with the [illicit] wireless [interception] situation and asked me to 
discuss it with Archer when I saw him at Droitwich where he was undergoing a
49cure.
At about five o’clock on 15 May 1940 Cecil and Guy Liddell arrived at Droitwich and 
met Archer at his clinic. While they had intended discussing wireless related matters the 
invasion of Holland had brought to their attention the possibility of something similar 
happening in Eire. Arising from their concerns and encouraged by Archer’s positive 
reaction to the suggestion of some form of staff talks in case existing Irish forces proved 
to be inadequate in an invasion situation, the Liddell brothers brought the idea of military 
staff talks to the Dominions Office. There they were informed that the two governments 
had been thinking along similar lines.50 Arising from the military discussions, in London 
on 23 May and in Dublin on 24 and 25 May 1940 liaison contact between the military, 
north and south was initiated on a quite informal basis. The Army’s meetings with their 
northern counterparts were closely monitored by civil servants while some more sensitive 
matters were referred for ministerial approval.51
A major aspect of the cooperation was the completion of a series of 
questionnaires provided by the British. The first concerned the technical aspects of the
48 Ibid. See  also R. Fisk, In time of war, pp  233-36 .
49 Cecil  L iddell  to C ID ,  20  M a y  1940  (N A ,  C A B  1 04 /184) ;  O ’H a lp in ,  MIS and Ireland, p .53 .  A  fi le  in 
M i l i ta ry  A rc h iv es  tha t  is c a ta lo g u e d  as ‘no t  o pen  to  th e  p u b l i c ’, D O D  ‘2 /9 2 1 4 0 ,  M ed ica l  t rea tm e n t ,  
e n g a g e m e n t  o f  Dr.  T .J .  O ’R e i l ly  in th e  case  o f  C o l .  L ia m  A r c h e r  and  o th e r s ’, su g g e s t s  that  A r c h e r  m ay  n o t  
h a v e  been the  on ly  o f f ice r  u n d e rg o in g  s o m e  fo rm  o f  cu re ,  a p p a re n t ly  at p u b l ic  e x p en se ,  d u r in g  the  
E m e rg en c y .
50 C eci l  L iddell  to C ID ,  20  M a y  1940  (N A ,  C A B  1 0 4 /1 8 4 ) ;  W e s t ,  The Guy Liddell diaries, p. 79.
31 A rc h e r  su m m ary ,  M a r  19 4 4  ( M A ,  S C S /1 4 ) ;  C h i ld e r s  r e p o r t , 17 O c t .  1947  ( M A ,  SC S/1 ) .
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wireless broadcasts carrying details of foreign aircraft movements as reported by Air 
Defence Command. A report accompanying a copy of the first completed questionnaire 
suggests that the meeting of 25 May 1940 concentrated on providing Squadron Leader 
Potter of Aldergrove with aeronautical information on Baldonnell, Collinstown and 
Foynes and other locations suitable for the operation of aircraft. It also provided 
armament and wireless details relating to Walrus, Anson, Lysander and Gladiator aircraft. 
The details provided on Foynes actually pertained to the Air Corps station at Rineanna. 
The Irish representatives, Gen. McKenna and Col Archer, were unable to provide much 
detail without consulting others by telephone -  a process that prolonged the Saturday 
afternoon meeting. British were infonned that Baldonnell was fully equipped but, with 
due cause, were sceptical. At that time the British had every right to be sceptical about 
Baldonnell as an airfield for possible use by modem fighter aircraft. Air defence 
consisted of the machine gun posts only just being installed. There was no anti-aircraft 
artillery while half the aerodrome was permanently staked to discourage aircraft landing.
52
Communication with aircraft was by wireless telegraphy only. Aspects not noted 
include the absence of hard surface runways while the small area of the aerodrome would 
have precluded the dispersal of aircraft. It had no meteorological station or even a 
remote-reading anemometer. The most glaring inadequacy was the absence of a direction 
finding service for military aircraft.
Subsequent questionnaires concerned the organisation, disposition and equipment 
of the Defence Forces as well as details of communications, infrastructure and resources 
and other strategic considerations. The return of a completed questionnaire was 
occasionally delayed until political approval was given on matters the Army considered 
to be politically sensitive. Childers observed on the care taken when supplying military 
information to the UK:
The answers were to be supplied on un-crested paper and were to be related to the 
questions only by paragraph number. Every care was to be taken that in the event of 
their capture by the Gennans, their actual origin could not be proved.53
51 ‘R ep o r t  re  m o v e m e n ts  on 25. 5. 4 0 ’, 27  Ju n e  1940 ;  ‘R e p o r t  N o .  1 11 J u n e  1940 (N A ,  A i r  2 /5 1 2 9 ) .
33 ‘F irs t  q u es t io n n a ire  on  p la n s  fo r  a id ’, C h i ld e rs  re p o r t ,  17 O c t .  1947 ( M A ,  SC S /1 ) .
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The chronology apparent in the layout of the Childers report suggests that the first real 
staff conferences involving the two armies took place in June and July 1940. The first 
was at Headquarters British Troops Northern Ireland on 3-5 June and the second in the 
Irish Army’s Plans and Operations Branch on 1 -  3 July. The conferences agreed a plan 
for the evacuation of Dublin, a plan for military routes to be used by the British Army in 
a move southwards and many important aspects relating to a combined defence against a 
German invasion of Eire.
The most valuable outcome was undoubtedly the fact that for the first time the two 
staffs had sat down together to consider a joint problem. They had opportunities 
also, of informal talks together during reconnaissance and over meals.54
Notwithstanding the exchange of military papers relationships between the military 
forces north and south were somewhat fraught during the spring and early summer of 
1941. This reflected the lack of trust at Government level and was exacerbated by the 
presence of at least one representative of External Affairs at military staff meetings in 
Dublin. Fundamentally the level of military cooperation was restricted by a reserved and 
cautious approach insisted upon by the Irish Government. In addition the Irish Army felt 
that the British refusal to supply armaments was based more the necessity to keep the 
Army weak due to distrust of de Valera rather than on an inability to supply.55 Two 
aspects of the north / south cooperation took more tangible forms. At Carton House, 
Maynooth a dump of 250,000 gallons of motor spirit was stockpiled for use by UK troops 
coming south to defend against a German invasion. Another anti-invasion action was the 
preparation, for demolition, of the bridges across the Shannon. This action was to protect 
the British right flank as they moved south.56
The appointment of General Franklyn as GOC BTNI in June 1941 proved to be a 
turning point in the relations between the two armies and indeed, the two countries. He 
visited Dublin on 16 to 18 June 1941 and although the Chief of Staff was not pennitted
54 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 A rc h e r  su m m a ry ,  c irca  M a r c h  1944  ( M A ,  S C S /1 4 ) .
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by the Taoiseach to accompany him on a tour of the country the Army felt that they had 
convinced him that the Irish Army would fight any invading force with determination and 
loyalty. This, and a further visit by Franklyn on 10 December 1941, helped to improve 
relations with the 18th Military Mission while Franklyn is credited with influencing the 
better supply of arms from the UK .57
Mulcahy and the air attaché
The Archer summary and the Childers report outline a succession of contacts, between 
British and Irish headquarters staffs, that were carefully monitored by officials of 
External Affairs. In contrast however the activities of the air attaché were apparently not 
subject to the same scrutiny. The appointment of a military (army) attaché had been 
discussed by Col. Clarke with Joseph Walshe in Dublin on 24/25 May 1940 and the latter 
had indicated if was put forward by the U.K. Government it would be acceptable 
provided that the appointment was suitably disguised and that the officer wore civilian 
clothes. Subsequently the Air Ministry suggested that, if effective assistance was to be 
rendered by the RAF in an emergency, it was most desirable that an air attaché should 
also be appointed.
In the context of attachés and military liaison the matter of wireless 
communications was of primary concern. The UK authorities were prepared to supply a 
wireless set for direct communication between Dublin, Northern Ireland H.Q and the 
Service Departments in the UK. Flowever, as the three stations had to be operated by the 
same service a decision had to be made as to whether the equipment and the British 
operating staff would be located at the UK representative’s office or be attached to Eire’s 
Defence HQ .58 Subsequently a point-to-point wireless net, linking Army Headquarters, 
Belfast, the Air Ministry and station A.A. Dublin to the HQ of 75 Operations Wing (NI) 
was set up. This net was part of the organisation of an Irish fighter group being proposed 
in the context of the air defence of Eire.59 However there is some doubt about the actual
37 ‘F irst  q u e s t io n n a i re  on p lan s  fo r  a id ’, C h i ld e r s  rep o rt ,  17 Oct .  1947 (M A ,  SC S /1 ) .
38 C y p h e r  te le g ra m  to  M a f fe y ,  28  M a y  1940  (N A ,  A i r  2 /5 1 2 9 ) .
3,U n d a te d  w ire le s s  ne t,  ‘W /T  O rg a n isa t io n  - c o m m u n ic a t io n s  A b b o t ’, c irca  J u n e  1940 (N A ,  A i r  2 /4601) ;  
'P r o p o s e d  lay o u t  fo r  Irish f ig h te r  g r o u p ’, A M  to A O C ,  F ig h te r  C o m m a n d ,  11 Ju ly  194 0  (N A ,  A i r  2 /5 1 8 5 ) .
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use and the efficacy of the Dublin station. On 27 June 1940 a meeting was held at 
Kinnaird House on the matter of communications with Ireland in case of an emergency 
situation. The meeting was informed that the air attaché possessed a transmitting set 
which had not yet been used as it was desired to keep its existence secret and that it 
would be used should the normal land line (telephone and telegraph) direct to the 
Dominions Office break down’. An outline plan was agreed:
It was finally agreed that an alternative set for Sir J. Maffey should be established 
in a friendly house in or near Dublin which Sir J. Maffey must arrange and that Col. 
Vivian [of MI6] should, as soon as possible, produce one set with two trained 
operators. The necessary arrangements with the Irish government should be made 
on the level of staff talks, and / or with Col. Archer.60
It appears that the air attaché’s wireless was in place and in use as early as 11 July 1940. 
On that date ‘Station A.A.’ was sent a cypher message from the Air Ministry, directing 
certain action to be taken by Lywood, and to which Lywood replied by telegram -  
presumably in order not to make a wireless transmission that might be detected by the 
Irsh Army.61 This apparent early use of Lywood’s wireless does not fit in with the view 
that the equipment was not manned until August unless, as a trained pilot, Lywood 
himself received and recorded the coded message. Two Special Intelligence Service 
personnel, who were understood to be wireless operators, were attached to the air 
attaché’s staff as domestic servants in August 1940. However is suggested that it 
subsequently came as a surprise to the British representative’s office to learn that the men 
considered themselves accountable to SIS and that the radio did not work.62 Given the 
concern regarding good communications between Dublin, Belfast and London it might be 
assumed that this matter was soon put right.
60 ‘M e m o r a n d u m  o f  m e e t in g ’, 27  Ju n e  1940  (N A ,  C A B  104 /184) .
61 C o d e d  w ire le s s  m e s sa g e ,  A  M  to  S ta tion  A .A .  11 Ju ly  1940; C y p h e r  te le g ra m ,  L y w o o d  to A M ,  13 Ju ly  
1940  (N A , A i r  2 /5129) .
62 E. O ’H a lp in ,  ‘A s p e c t s  o f  in te l l ig e n c e ’ in Irish Sword, x ix  N o s .  75  & 7 6  (1 9 9 3 /4 ) ,  p. 64; O ’H a lp in  (ed.)  
MIS and Ireland, 1939 — 1945; the official history (D u b l in ,  2 0 0 3 ) ,  n o te  3, p .  21 ,  c i t ing  D O  130 /4  and D O  
130/14  (N A ).
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Meanwhile by 29 May 1940 the appointment of both military and air attachés had 
been agreed with Dublin with Walshe insisting that neither attaché would wear military 
uniform or use military rank.63 The UK having reluctantly agreed to the conditions, the 
air attaché, Wing Commander Lywood, left for Dublin via Holyhead on Monday 3 June
1940. Given the urgency of the situation ‘M r’ R.G.W. Lywood got down to business 
immediately. Arising out of his first meetings with Foreign Affairs, GHQ and the Air 
Corps he submitted a detailed first report to his UK superiors:
June 4th, 1940, I was introduced to Mr. Walshe, Minister of External Affairs [sic], 
who subsequently arranged an introduction to Col. Archer, director of military 
intelligence. The discussion was of a very general nature, but I gathered that they 
wished my liaison with the Air Corps to be carried out as inconspicuously as 
possible.
June 6th. [I was] introduced to Col. P.A. Mulcahy, chief of Air Corps [sic], by 
Walshe. It was suggested at this interview that I should be introduced to other 
members of the Air Corps as a civilian from the Air Ministry who was attached to 
the British Representative’s Office to assist them in obtaining aircraft spares’ .64
It was explained that his identity should not be disclosed lest junior personnel with 
contrary political opinions might misconstrue his presence in Dublin and deduce that the 
UK was exerting undue pressure and interfering in Irish affairs. In this respect he was, no 
doubt, referring to some of the ex-IRA pilot group who would still retain anti-British 
views. After a very open and frank introductory meeting Col. Mulcahy drove Lywood out 
to Baldonnell. Following a brief tour of the installation had a lengthy discussion on Air 
Corps matters. Mulcahy apparently regaled Lywood him with accounts of his past 
activities in the service of Eire -  presumably his part in the Civil War on the pro-Treaty 
side. Mulcahy commenting on the country’s determination to resist invasion by any 
outside force stating that ‘the country would rise up and tear limb from limb any 
invaders’. Mulcahy gave Lywood a briefing memorandum on Air Corps organisation.
63 C y p h e r  te le g ra m ,  M a f fe y  to D O ,  2 9  M a y  1940  (N A ,  A i r  2 /5129) .
64‘R e p o r t  N o .  l ’ , R .  L y w o o d ,  11 Ju n e  1940 (N A ,  A i r  2 /5 1 3 0 )  T h e  a sso c ia ted  ap p en d ix es  are da ted  20 M ay  
1940 s u g g e s t in g  tha t  th ey  h a d  b e en  p re p a re d  well  in a d v a n c e  o r  fo r  the  in fo rm a t io n  o f  o thers .
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Lywood considered that the whole Air Corps could be considered to be a training cadre 
because training was continuous in all units. Lywood later got six attachments. These 
dealt in detail with subjects of ‘fuel’, ‘radio’ and ‘aerodromes’ as they pertained to both 
military and civil air installations of the country and ‘ammunition’ ‘personnel’ and 
‘aircraft’ as particular to the Air Corps.65
On the following day Lywood resumed his familiarisation visit to the Air Corps 
and observed basic flying and navigation training in progress. He remarked on the 
similarity with that conducted in the RAF but considered flying discipline to be more 
relaxed. In the afternoon he was brought on a reconnaissance flight of ‘existing 
aerodromes and possible landing grounds’ at the Curragh, Foynes, Rineanna, 
Ardnacrusha, Kildonan and the Phoenix Park with Mulcahy standing behind him in the 
Anson pointing out everything of interest. Lywood subsequently commented on the 
extent of the obstructions to aircraft landings that existed at the main military and civil 
aerodromes. He also reported on the ground defences of Baldonnell and Rineanna and 
made no comment, adverse or otherwise. He did however suggest that the air ammunition 
and bomb holdings were inadequate except for the briefest o f aerial engagements. In 
general it could be stated that Lywood received a most complete briefing on, and a 
comprehensive oversight of the state of military aviation in June 1940. In this regard it is 
of interest that he was introduced by the secretary of the Department of External Affairs 
and not, as might be expected, by an officer of the intelligence staff. It could be surmised 
that GHQ had little regard for the liaison and intelligence aspects of military aviation and 
placed no strictures on Mulcahy or the attaché. Alternatively the Department of External 
Affairs may have wanted Lywood to be able to function without stricture. In any event it 
appears that neither department considered it necessary to monitor Lywood closely.66 
Similarly it is significant that neither Archer nor Lt. Col. Childers, in their summary 
reports on the Emergency, gave any account of the activities of the air attaché while the 
liaison on army matters was recorded in detail.67
63 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 T h e  C h i ld e rs  rep o rt  o f  17 Oct.  1947 re fe rs  to  n o  less th a n  fou rteen  ‘t a b s ’ o r  or ig ina l  e x p la n a to ry  
d o c u m e n ts  tha t  w e re  n o t  re le a sed  to  m e  in M i l i ta ry  A rc h iv es .
2 5 2
Lywood met Mulcahy again at Baldonnell on 14 June 1940. The tone of his report 
seemed to suggest that Mulcahy understood that, in the event of invasion by Germany, 
the RAF would constitute the substantially greater part of air support to ground forces. 
Mulcahy indicated that he was ‘anxious to have some idea as to the nature and extent of 
assistance from [the] United Kingdom that can be expected’. Lywood indicated that, with 
the assistance then being given in France, he could not predict:
Regarding an aerodrome to be placed at the disposal of [the] R.A.F. in [the] event 
of assistance being asked, for operating from and to be used as a possible storage 
for fuel, bombs and ammunition for R.A.F. aircraft, Col. Mulcahy understands this 
to be Baldonnell, though I gather this was by no means definite.68
Lywood’s comments on this question appeared to favour a location other than Baldonnell 
but he indicated that the selection might depend on the type of RAF aircraft and the 
balance, between Irish and British, of the eventual command structure. Mulcahy also 
raised questions on matters he might well have dealt with before the outbreak of 
hostilities - such as the camouflage of Air Corps aircraft and of military aerodromes and 
the very limited supplies of 100 octane fuel available in the country. In regard to army 
cooperation Lywood formed the opinion that, while some training had been carried out 
on Army manoeuvres, ‘very little work of this kind’ had actually been done. Lywood was 
interested in the conduct of reconnaissance o f both land and sea areas - presumably in 
view of British suspicions about alleged IRA and German activities. Fie reported, without 
comment, on what appears to have been a mediocre capacity for general reconnaissance:
Land [reconnaissance is] combined with training navigation flights over most of 
Eire. Any special information in the light of intelligence reports to hand [sic] are 
communicated to crews and are the subject of special attention on such flights. 
When necessary a special reconnaissance [flight] is ordered.69
'R e p o r t  N o .  2 ’ , R .W .G .  L y w o o d  , 18 Ju n e  1940 (N A ,  A ir  2 /5130) .
69 Ibid
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Lywood was also brought up to date with regard to the coastal reconnaissance being 
carried out by the R. & M.B. Squadron detachment at Rineanna.
Sea reconnaissance has now been abandoned. 3 of 9 Anson aircraft were lost
carrying out this duty.................Col. Mulcahy considers that the system of “coast
watches” organised around the coast is carrying out effective work and that in
view of the small number of aircraft he has now available he does not feel justified 
in using them for this particular duty. 70
Mulcahy and Lywood discussed and agreed a system of visual and wireless telegraphy 
signals to be used by RAF aircraft crossing the Eire coast or land frontier in the event of 
the Irish government requesting air assistance. These were copied for the approval of the 
Air Ministry and RAF. The tone and content of Mulcahy’s contribution to the discussion 
suggest that he understood that assistance from the RAF was practically guaranteed while 
he believed that he would get up to three hours notice of an attack. Arising out of his 
latest visit to Baldonnell Lywood was asked by Mulcahy to hasten the delivery of aircraft 
spares and equipment to the Air Corps In view of his supposed role he felt obliged to
71request that the Air Ministry take effective action to expedite matters.
In response to Lywood’s first report the air intelligence division of the Air 
Ministry suggested that the Irish authorities be advised that the two most likely points for 
a German invasion were the Curragh and the Foynes / Rineanna area. The Curragh was 
considered vulnerable, even if the Army reserve there had not been committed elsewhere, 
because it had not been obstructed against aircraft landing and German airborne troops 
had superior firepower to Irish infantry. Similarly the Foynes / Rineanna area was seen as 
being vulnerable because it was not adequately defended. It was considered that the 
capture of two stocks of aviation fuel, at Foynes and Rineanna / Shannon would be a key 
German objective.
Regarding the second report and the extent of assistance that might be expected 
the Air Ministry suggested that few German aircraft would be intercepted en route,
70 Ibid.
71 R .W .G .  L y w o o d  to  A M ,  17 Ju n e  1940 (N A ,  A i r  2 /5130) .
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particularly if attacking by night. The extent of direct support would be limited by the 
fact that the enemy would be well ensconced before assistance was called for by the Irish 
authorities. They did not envisage occupying any existing aerodromes but suggested it 
would be necessary to identify aerodromes sites for RAF fighter squadrons on the South 
East and East Coasts and that Lywood might be able to collect information on suitable 
areas. The Air Ministry also suggested that Col. Mulcahy was being extremely optimistic 
in believing he would get three or four hours notice of invasion. The British expressed 
disappointment with the decision to terminate programmed coastal patrols out of 
Rineanna.
It is felt that the abandonment of sea reconnaissance is a great error. The coast ... 
contains many bays where a vessel might discharge personnel and small arms and 
even vehicles....suggest .... that they should recommence coastal reconnaissance 
 of bays and inlets for suspicious craft.72
In October 1940 Lywood arranged for Air Commodore T.N. Carr, AOC RAF NI, to visit 
Dublin specifically to meet Mulcahy and to establish a personal liaison with him. Carr 
subsequently reported to his superiors in London:
The visit was a definite success and I was most cordially welcomed by Colonel 
Mulcahy. He showed me over the aerodrome at Baldonnel and also the
headquarters of the Observer Corps I discussed at length with Colonel
Mulcahy the state of his aircraft and the readiness of the Eire air force for active 
service. He agreed that as a factor in the defence o f Eire it could .... be ignored.
73The pilots are very keen but only half trained owing to lack of aircraft.
Arising out of the visit the RAF considered that it might be possible to come to a 
mutually satisfactory arrangement with the Irish Government. It was hoped to get the 
Air Corps to build aerodromes where the RAF wanted them at the price of some
v  D i re c to r  o f  p lans ,  A M ,  to R .W .G .  L y w o o d ,  6 Ju ly  1940  (N A ,  A i r  2 /5130) .
73 T .N .  C a r r  to A M ,  14 Oct.  1940 (N A ,  A ir  2 /5130) .
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obsolete aircraft - on the basis that Mulcahy would accept almost anything on which 
the pilots could get some flying.74 The Air Corps and the Corps of Engineers selected 
and developed an airfield at Rathduff, Golden, Co. Tipperary ostensibly for Air Corps 
use. However the contemporary record makes it clear that it was intended as an RAF 
forward airfield for use in the event of Gennan invasion. Though Lywood had a 
similar brief it is not clear that he was involved with the selection of either, Gaybrook 
County Westmeath, that was not developed, or Rathduff that was. The development of 
Rathduff included arrangements for the acquisition, at short notice, of Summerfield 
tracks. This metal paving, designed to stabilise soft ground, was to be provided by 
RAF NI as and when required to cater for the higher tyre pressure of the more modem 
fighters or Wellington bombers.75 (See Chapter 10)
While Rathduff appears to have been ready for RAF emergency use before the 
end of 1941 the British authorities were very tardy in supplying training or recently 
obsolete aircraft. It was to be February 1943 before six ex-RAF Miles Master II 
training aircraft, of 1938 design, were released. Similarly it was the latter part of 1943 
before the British supplied six Hawker Hurricane Mk. I fighter aircraft. These were 
followed by four more in February / March 1944. The Hurricanes had been withdrawn
76from service having been superseded in RAF fighter squadrons by the Mk. II.
Despite the whole-hearted cooperation of Mulcahy Lywood appears to have
77 nfunctioned in a more covert manner in gathering information from civilians. While 
Lywood’s main duty was to establish liaison and promote goodwill with the Eire Air 
Corps he also had tasks on which he was directed that it was not appropriate to refer 
reports ‘to the authorities in Eire’. As early as July 1940 Lywood had been directed ‘to 
make extensive reconnaissance to identify sites suitable as landing grounds of possible 
use to an enemy or the RAF. He was advised that if he was too busy to do so the 
necessary reconnaissance could be conducted by two or three officers travelling in 
civilian attire. He advised against this suggestion.78 In view of the whole-hearted
74 Secret  m e m o  to  C A S ,  16 Oct.  1940 (N A ,  A i r  2 /5130) .
75 O C  A C  to  C O S ,  13 O c t .  1941; O C  A C  to  C O S ,  17 Oct.  1941 (M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 4 ) .
76 K e a rn s ,  ‘A ir  C o r p s ’ p. 459 ;  Hailey ,  Squadrons of the RAF, pass im
77 O ’Halp in ,  ‘A sp ec ts  o f  in te l l igence ,  Irish Sword x ix ,  p. 64.
7S C y p h e r  m essa g e ,  A M  to S ta tion  A .A . ,  11 J u n e  1940; L y w o o d  to  A M ,  13 J u n e  1940; A M  m in u te ,  12 June  
1940  (N A , A ir  2 /5129) .
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cooperation of Mulcahy and the Air Corps in many matters, including the 
development of forward airfields, it is not clear why Lywood had to carry out 
reconnaissance in respect of possible landing grounds. O’Halpin’s observations 
regarding the covert activities of Lywood and others would seem to confirm his role in 
Ireland to be primarily that of an intelligence officer.79 Coinciding with the receding 
threat of invasion Lywood left Ireland early in 1942 and was replaced by Wing
Commander Begg who, with Pryce’s replacement Brigadier Wodehouse, was
80appointed an attaché on an official basis.
Conclusion
A main aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate the level of cooperation between 
the two administrations on defensive preparations. With the Irish Government as the 
main beneficiary the number, variety and nature of the contacts, both personal and 
written, between the Irish and British administrations during the period 1937 to 1939 
suggest that de Valera needed cooperation with the UK almost as much as the latter 
required a cooperative and non-belligerent neighbour. It is not clear why de Valera 
accepted war preparation advice from the UK rather than task his own administration 
-  including the Army. He possibly realised that the state had no tradition in such 
matters while the Army harboured an excessively belligerent attitude that tended, 
initially at least, to preclude military cooperation with the United Kingdom. In any 
case de Valera’s administration did not entirely trust the Army and its leadership.
With the wartime use of the treaty ports in the back of their minds the British 
did all in their power to encourage the maximum level of discussion and cooperation 
on defence and related matters. As a result, by supplying a considerable array of older, 
but still useful planning documentation, the UK appears to have greatly informed the 
Irish government and significantly influenced the shape of defence strategy and plans 
for war as well as ensuring that the largely passive defence measures subsequently put 
into affect were compatible with those taken in the UK. Despite the initial aggressive
79 O ’H a lp in ,  ‘A sp ec ts  o f  in te l l ig e n ce ’, p. 64.
80 C h i ld e rs  report ,  17 Oct .  1947 ( M A ,  SC S/1 ) .
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stance of the Army, in the absence of funding conducive to mounting a robust defence 
against invasion, the Army was to have little option but to conduct its activities in a 
manner commensurate the cooperative stance and passive defence strategy laid down 
by Government.
A similarly important aim has been to indicate the scale of cooperation
between military officers both before and during the Emergency, particularly during
the first two years. While Col. Archer’s pre-war contacts with UK his counterparts 
were to presage a more substantial level of cooperation on intelligence matters during 
the Emergency the nature of the instructions received from de Valera, on general 
military cooperation, is a matter for conjecture. The not insignificant level of pre-war 
military contacts prepared the way for level of wartime north I south military 
cooperation that could not have been predicted.
It is significant that the matter of liaison between the respective defence forces
on air matters was left to the discretion of Col. P.A. Mulcahy. Wing Commander
R.W.G. Lywood, as an unofficial air attaché, appears to have made the maximum use 
his assumed role as an Air Ministry representative. In the context of the time, with 
aircraft spares and military supplies being withheld from a cooperative Air Corps, it 
might be considered that expediting supplies for the Air Corps would have been his 
primary liaison function rather than the charade it actually was. The detail of 
Lywood’s reports suggests the fullest cooperation from Mulcahy who in turn appears 
to have withheld few secrets in order to acquire, in particular, training aircraft. In his 
liaison role, between those preparing the RAF defence of Eire, and the Army and Air 
Corps, Lywood appears not to have been monitored to any great extent by either 
External Affairs or the intelligence branch of the Army. Such leeway apparently gave 
good scope for whatever other intelligence duties he was expected to perform.
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CHAPTER 9
SUPPORT SERVICES
General O’Duffy’s reorganisation scheme of 1924 suggested aerial fighting, bombing and 
reconnaissance as the essential elements of military aviation’s main role of cooperating 
with the army. However the Air Corps of the mid-1920s, to the extent that it was capable 
of performing any army aviation role, was probably only capable of a modest level of 
reconnaissance, the more fundamental role that had evolved during the war of 1914-18. 
Reconnaissance had been the Civil War role and was the primary function of the first 
operational squadron that was eventually formally established in 1934.
In 1924 O’Duffy’s scheme did not adequately highlight the deficiencies in 
wireless communications, meteorology and transport that had become apparent during 
the Civil War. However he did indicate the necessity to establish wireless and 
meteorological services but only in the context of civil aviation and the state’s obligations 
under the International Commission for Air Navigation. Aviation communication was 
mentioned as a function of the Signal Coips but its development was not seen as an 
immediate army priority but rather a problem to be addressed later. As a result no 
communications personnel were included in the formally established Air Corps of 1924 
while aircraft are not known to have been fitted with wireless telegraphy sets until about 
1932.
Similarly the requirement to have meteorological information available for the 
safety and accuracy of aviation was recognised but again only in the context of civil 
aviation. Though the 1924 establishment provided for an Air Corps meteorological 
officer no officer was so qualified and no meteorological reporting and forecasting 
services, civil or military, were developed by the state while the country’s observation 
stations were to remain the responsibility of the Air Ministry until 1936.
This chapter will examine the development of the three main support services to 
aviation -  meteorology, communications or signals and air traffic control (ATC) during 
in the period 1922 to 1945 in the context of their applicability to military aviation. It will
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be contended that, while the Air Corps had an understandable professional interest in 
such matters and had varying degrees of involvement in their establishment, these 
principle support services to aviation were established primarily for the benefit of civil 
rather than for military aviation. It will be suggested that the development of a national 
meteorological service, despite the state’s international obligations, took an inordinately 
long time particularly as the Air Service / Air Corps had a requirement for such a service 
right from the beginning in July 1922 and that there was a modest level o f civil aviation 
in Ireland prior to the advent of Aer Lingus in 1936. An aspect of this delay will be the 
somewhat reluctant participation of the military, including the Air Corps in the process of 
starting a meteorological service
It will also be asserted that, while the Air Corps had an expanding requirement for 
various communications services during the 1930s, the services provided by the 
independent Signals Corps, particularly in the critical early year or so of the Emergency, 
fell well short of the scope and standard required. The signals aspect will be examined in 
the context of the technical advances and of the application of wireless telegraphy, radio 
telephony and direction finding services to the developing air navigation techniques that 
were required for coastal reconnaissance in particular. It will be demonstrated that the 
civil aviation communications and direction finding services provided in Baldonnell / 
Collinstown and at Foynes / Shannon were far superior to those available to the Air 
Corps at the start of the Emergency and that the latter improved little thereafter. In the 
matter of direction finding in particular even the RAF was provided with superior 
services on Irish soil.
The development of support services should be appreciated in the context of their 
application to aviation, both civil and military. Such services, particularly meteorology 
and wireless communications, would have evolved in step with the evolution o f military 
aviation. As such, these services came to be supplied by aerodrome authorities for the 
benefit of all aircraft using a particular aerodrome. The independence granted to 
individual military aviation units (squadrons) by the widespread availability of aviation 
communications and meteorological reporting and forecasting stations became an 
essential aspect of the mobility and flexibility of developing air power. Though not 
strictly speaking a support service this study includes consideration of relevant aspects of
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air navigation due to its close association with, and dependence on air communications 
and direction finding.
Meteorology
For reasons that are not clear it was to be 1964 before a properly organised, staffed 
and equipped meteorological station was established at Baldonnell to provide hourly 
meteorological observations on a twenty-four hour basis. And it was even later before 
a forecaster was part of the staff there. Weather observations, during daylight hours 
only, had been supplied since 1941 by service personnel.1 From 1964 the twenty-four 
hour service has been provided by the civilian staff of the Meteorological Office, 
under the aegis of the Department of Transport and Power and its successors. This 
development was mainly influenced by the purchase of search and rescue helicopters 
in late 1963, the start of SAR operations and the formal establishment of the Search 
and Rescue Flight (Air Corps) the following year.2 This situation had taken an 
inordinate time to evolve.
A fully equipped observation station, not a forecasting station as suggested in the 
O’Duffy scheme of reorganisation, had existed at Baldonnell up to May 1922 as a 
standard facility on an RAF aerodrome. Four times a day it had provided the standard 
meteorological observations as the long-established observation stations, at Yalentia, 
Birr, Malin Head and Roche’s Point, that were to remain under British management until 
1936.3 The Air Service of 1922 had no capacity to make meteorological observations 
and had no access to a forecasting service. Though the observations taken in the Phoenix 
Park under the supervision of the survey blacksmith would have been of limited use to 
the new air organisation it was recommended that the staff of the Meteorological Office 
should be put at the disposal of the Air Service and that a trained observer should be
'F r a n k  C lab b y ,  ‘T h e  M e t .  O f f i c e  at B a l d o n n e f ,  u n p u b l i s h e d  p a p e r ,  14 N o v .  1986 (in m y  p o ssess io n ) .
'A n d y  R o c h e ,  ‘T h e  A i r  C o r p s  a n d  the  M e teo ro lo g ica l  S e r v i c e ’ in L isa  Sh ie lds  (ed .) ,  The Irish 
Meteorological Service; the first fifty years 1936 -  1986 (S ta t io n e ry  O ff ice ,  1987),  p p  82-4;  Lt.  Col.  M . 
O ’M al ley ,  ‘In the  b e g in n i n g ’ in C ap t .  D av id  S w an  (ed .) ,  Irish Air Corps; celebrating 30 years of helicopter 
operations 1963 — 1993 (D e f e n c e  F o rc e s ,  1993),  p p  3-4.
3 A p p e n d ix  2, R e p o r t  on  m e te o ro lo g ic a l  se rv ice s ,  6 Ju ly  1925 ( M A ,  M S /4 1 8 ) ;  Sh ie ls ,  The Irish 
meteorological Service, p. 1.
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appointed and put in charge with immediate affect.4 In August 1922 it was reported that 
the Department of Agriculture, that had apparently take over responsibility for 
meteorology, had arranged for the observations of the Ordnance Survey station to be 
passed to Baldonnell by telephone by 10.30 hours each day. It was recognised that the 
records of one station were not of great value. It was also reported that the 
Meteorological Office in London had been requested to send copies of its observations, 
special reports and maps to Baldonnell each day.5
As a result of this request the Air Service was soon in receipt of the 07.00 hour 
and 13.00 hour telegraphic forecasts addressed daily to the officer commanding, 
Baldonnell Aerodrome. However, in May 1923, the Air Ministry informed the AFO that 
the ministry was then incurring charges for the telegraphic and telephonic services 
relating to the transmission of meteorological information to Baldonnell and that the 
annual transmission cost to the new state would amount to about £205.6 Subsequently the 
army finance officer was informed that transmission of the forecasts had been 
discontinued with effect from Tuesday, 19 June 1923.
An amount of £44. 7. 4. has been expended on this service in respect of the period 
1 April 1923 to 18 June inclusive, and I am to enquire whether you are prepared to 
accept this amount as a charge against the vote of your department.7
The AFO, under the mistaken impression that the meteorological stations were funded by 
the Irish state, suggested that the cost of transmitting meteorological information could be 
more than offset against the financial value of the meteorological reports from stations in 
the west of Ireland and requested that the Air Ministry agree to waive the charged The 
Air Ministry responded stating that the meteorological information was free but that the 
transmission costs were payable and pointed out ‘that the cost of the services rendered by 
the meteorological observers at the various Irish stations was borne, not by Saorstat
4 C ap t .  J .A . M c N a m a r a  to C - in -C ,  25 Ju ly  1922 ( U C D A ,  M P ,  P 7 /B /4 9 /2 9 -3 0 ) .
5 M in i s te r  fo r  A g r ic u l tu re  to  C - in -C ,  10 A u g .  1922 ( U C D A ,  M P ,  P 7 /B /1 0 /1 6 ) .
6 A M  to M F D ,  4 M a y  192 3 ,  (N A I ,  F IN /2 9 7 6 ) .
7 A M  to  Sec  D O D ,  30  J u n e  1923)  N A I ,  F IN /2 9 7 6 ) .
8 A F O  to S ec  A M ,  18 Ju ly  1923 (N A I ,  F IN /2 9 7 6 ) .
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Eireann but by Air Ministry votes.9 However, with no obvious reference to the Army or 
the Air Service, the AFO only sought financial sanction for the initial account having 
apparently decided to terminate receipt of the meteorological forecast service on the basis 
of cost. The account was subsequently settled by Defence with the approval of the 
Department of Finance.10
In 1924/25 an interdepartmental committee considered the arrangements for the 
collection and distribution of meteorological observations made in the Saorstat and the 
possible establishment of a meteorological service. Acting Major T.J. Maloney, then OC 
AC, was nominated as the main DOD representative with Liam Archer (OC Signals) as a 
joint representative. Having sought direction from the Chief of Staff Maloney was 
infonned that the Army had, in effect, no interest in meteorology. 11 Notwithstanding, in 
his contribution to the committee Maloney emphasised the strategic importance of 
meteorology to ground forces that had been demonstrated during the recent war. He noted 
that the modem tendency was for states to place meteorological services under the 
defence or war departments and to assign its management to a military aviation service. 
He emphasised the increasing importance of weather forecasts in the context of aircraft 
flights of the order of 200 miles or more. Though not placing great stress on the necessity 
for synoptic meteorology and forecasting in the Air Corps context he did suggest that the 
headquarters of such a service should be at Baldonnell.12 The committee’s report 
recommended that a meteorological service should be established in the country.
That so far as synoptic meteorology is concerned the existing [British] machinery 
of forecasting should not be duplicated, but efforts... should be directed towards 
establishing a system of local forecasts based upon a study of the general forecast 
in relation to local and geographic and meteorological conditions. 13
9 A M  to Sec D O D ,  9  A u g .  1923 (N A I ,  F IN  2976) .
10 A F O  to Sec D F ,  28 A u g .  1923;  Sec  D F  to  A F O ,  31 S ep t .1 9 2 3  (N A I ,  F IN /2 9 7 6 ) .
11 T .J .  M a lo n e y  to  M S ,  2 Ju n e  1924; M S  to  T .J .  M a lo n e y ,  6 J u n e  1924 (M A ,  M S /4 1 8).
U n d a te d  ‘ M e m o  on th e  co n s t i tu t io n  an d  o rg a n iz a t io n  o f  a m ete o ro lo g ica l  d e p a r tm e n t ’ by M a jo r  T.J. 
M a lo n ey ,  c irca  M a y  1925 (M A ,  M S /4 1 8 ) .
13 M e m o r a n d u m ,  R ev .  W .  O ’R io rd an ,  c irca  3 O c t .  1935 ,  q u o t in g  ‘R e p o r t  o f  in te r -d ep a r tm e n ta l  c o m m i t te e  
on m e te o ro lo g y ’, 7  M a y  1925 (M A ,  2 /2 7 1 7 5 ) .
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Notwithstanding the fact that Baldonnell was the sole aerodrome in the state for both 
military and civil aviation no specific recommendation was made to locate there the 
meteorological facilities required by international agreement. With no organisational 
changes forthcoming the Air Corps’ involvement with meteorology was to remain largely 
theoretical for some time. Though the 1924 establishment provided for a meteorological 
officer no officer was so qualified. An Edward Cannon made an unsolicited application 
to the Air Corps for such a post in August 1925. By return of post he received a copy of 
R.G.K. Lampfert’s Meteorology which he was requested to review . 14 On the basis of the 
handwritten review supplied to A/Major T.J. Maloney, by now reduced to squadron 
commander, No. 1 Squadron, it was considered that Mr. Cannon’s knowledge of synoptic 
meteorology was insufficient to justify his employment. ‘He might find employment in 
the state meteorological service, the formation of which is being awaited. ’ 15
At about this time the Air Corps’ approach to an appreciation of the actual 
weather conditions was rather basic. On a daily basis the Duty Officer was required ‘to 
test the air, and render a short report to the squadron adjutant as to weather conditions, 
and suitability or otherwise for flying’ . 16 The report of Lieut. T.J. Prendeville on 30 June 
1925 was probably typical. He reported that the air at 500 feet was gusty and bumpy and 
at 1,500 feet it was just bumpy while, at ground level, the wind was ‘ SW 15-20 mph’ . 17
In June 1928 the International Commission for Air Navigation requested the 
General Staff to supply details of the meteorological facilities and services available at 
Free State aerodromes. The specific questions, as to what observations were made at 
Baldonnell and the other sources of weather data available, were referred initially to Air 
Corps Headquarters and by the acting Officer Commanding, Comdt. G.J. Carroll to Rev. 
W.M. O’Riordan, M.Sc. C.F. Father Bill, was the only person on the station who had a 
good working knowledge of meteorology and was recognised as the Air Corps’ authority 
on the subject until 1936.18 He reported that observations of barometric pressure, wet &
14 E. C a n n o n  to O C  A C ,  18 A ug .  1925 ,  A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  p o sse s s io n .
13 Ibid,  ‘M in u te  shee t  N o .  I ’ l l  Sept .  1925.
16 S ta n d in g  o rd e r ,  ‘D u t ie s  o f  du ty  O ff ice r’, Sept .  1924 ( M S /6 8 5 ,  M A ).
17 ‘D u ty  O f f i c e r ’s r e p o r t ’, 30  Ju n e  1925 (M A ,  M S /6 8 5 ) .
18 A /O C  A C  to  C S O  D O D ,  21 Ju ly  1928; O C  A C  to  R ev .  W .  O ’R io rd an ,  9 M a r .1 9 3 6  (A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  
p o ssess io n ) .
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dry bulb (relative humidity) thermometers, and maximum and minimum thermometers 
were taken daily at Baldonnell by the Air Officer on a daily basis. He suggested that, as 
the instruments were unreliable, not of the proper type and not properly mounted, the 
observations were of little or no value. He also reported that the daily weather reports of 
the Meteorological Office, London were being supplied to Baldonnell but being sent by 
post they arrived one to three days late. As a result these reports were of use for 
instructional purposes only. His conclusion was blunt and factual:
I would respectfully point out that the international commission’s enquiry is 
regarding facilities available in the aerodromes of the Irish Free State and it will be 
seen that there are no such facilities whatsoever of a reliable nature.19
In the 1928/29 estimates £200 had been sanctioned for the equipment of a first class
station but apparently had not been expended. In 1929 £48 was sanctioned for the
20purchase of meteorological instruments for the training of officers of the Air Corps. 
One of the principal instruments purchased was a mercury barometer that was delivered 
to Baldonnell on 15 July 1930. The instrument subsequently began giving inaccurate 
readings due to air leaking into the vacuum and returned to the manufacturers in London 
in June 1931. The manufacturers could find no fault with it so it was returned to service 
only to be found, in October 1931, to under-read by five millibars. After inconclusive 
inspection of the instrument by the Jesuits at Rathfarnham Castle, and its return to 
Baldonnell, the tube was found to be cracked, apparently due to accidental damage in 
transit. After repair in Dublin the instrument was deemed to be functioning normally 
during the summer of 1933 but in need of calibration and certification that could only be 
carried out in London. In late October 1933 the barometer was brought to the National 
Physics Laboratory in London by Commandant J.G. Carroll. However, when about to be 
collected in November, it was reported by the high commissioner to have been found to
19 R ev .  W .M .  O ’R io rd a n  to A /O C  A C ,  30  Ju n e  1928: A /O C  A C  to  C S O  D O D ,  2 Ju ly  1928 (A C F /3 3 8 ,  in 
m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
20 Sec  D O D  to S ec  D F ,  25 N o v .  1929; Sec D F  to  Sec  D O D ,  27 N o v .  1929 (N A I ,  D F ,  S .0 0 8 /0 0 7 6 /2 9 ) .
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have the original vacuum problem .21 Due to unexplained delays the necessary repairs 
were not completed until June 1936 with the account for £3. 18s. 6d. being settled in 
August of that year.22 It would appear that much bureaucratic lethargy, and most likely 
the indifference of OC AC or his subordinates, had contributed to this inordinate delay.
By 1930 the Air Corps was receiving the 07.00 hours Air Ministry forecast by 
telephone at about 10.00 hours - with no mention of the cost.23 By February 1931 this 
arrangement had apparently been terminated as it was reported that since the previous 
February the wireless station at Baldonnell did not have the appropriate equipment to 
take the 09.10 hours Air Ministry weather report transmitted from Rugby.24 At the end of 
that year it was reported that the daily weather report from the Air Ministry had been 
received throughout the year -  in written form. As these reports were being forwarded 
through the Secretary of the Department of Defence they were being received several 
days late, a situation that had more recently been remedied.25 In 1932 arrangements were 
made to receive occasional weather reports on request, from the British station at 
Valentia, County Kerry. While the reports were free, to obviate transmission expense to 
the Air Ministry, the Air Corps messages requesting special reports were sent on a reply 
paid basis.26 While difficulties with the receipt of weather reports and forecasts were 
frequent in the early 1930s there was no evidence of any adverse effect on the conduct of 
flying.
The 1931/32 peace establishment made provision for a meteorological instructor 
and for a single observer of private rank. Lieut. J.P. Twohig was made responsible for 
the recording of meteorological observations at Baldonnell. With his untimely death in 
September 1933 Rev. W. O’Riordan took over the task of making and recording the daily 
weather observations and, when pilot training courses were in progress, also acted as the 
instructor in meteorology theory. He did not consider himself competent to give practical 
instruction in it the subject. He also advised that, while he was very willing to assist in
21‘M e m o r a n d u m ,  K e w  b a r o m e te r ’, 12 D e c .  1933 (N A I ,  D F ,  S .0 0 8 /0 0 7 6 /2 9 ) .
22 Sec D O D  to Sec D F ,  18 A u g .  1936; Sec D F  to Sec D O D ,  21 A u g .  1936 (N A I ,  D F ,  S .0 0 8 /0 0 7 6 /2 9 ) .
23 L ieu t .  J.P. T w o h ig  to O C  A A C ,  20  M a r .  1930  (A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  p o ssess io n ) .
24 O C  A C  to A r m y  Signal C o rp s ,  D O D ,  31 Ju ly  1931 ( A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  p o ssess io n ) .
23 D M A  to D O D  25 Jan. 1932 (A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  p o ssess io n ) .
26 D S to  D M A ,  16 N o v .  1932; D M A  to  V a len t ia  O b se rv a to ry ,  24  Feb .  1932; M .T .  S p e n c e  to  D M A ,  2 6  Feb.  
1932; D M A  to  A C S ,  7 M ar .  1932 (A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  p o ssess io n ) .
266
various ways concerning meteorology, he suggested that a duly qualified meteorologist 
should be on the staff of the aerodrome to provide weather forecasts.27
In July 1935, when about to go on leave, Fr. O’Riordan wrote to the adjutant, for 
the information of the commanding officer, to the effect that his understudy, Pte. James 
Flavin, the ‘Meteorologist (private)’ of the 1934 peace establishment, would also not be 
available to make the once-daily observations due to other duties. He suggested that this 
brought into focus the question of having a permanent meteorologist appointed and 
intimated that he would like to discuss the matter with the commanding officer. On the 
same day, apparently responding to this information, the newly appointed OC, Major 
Mulcahy, directed a pupil pilot to take over the observation duties and to consult the 
Chaplin with regard to making himself familiar with the work. Two days later Fr. 
O’Riordan wrote to the adjutant, Capt. D.J. Muiphy, in effect reminding the commanding 
officer that he had suggested that he was anxious to discuss the whole matter of 
meteorological observation. He emphasised the shortcomings of the situation pointing out 
in particular that a full range of observations, that would be of assistance to pilots, needed 
to recorded much more frequently. Though he disagreed with the concept of the 
observations being taken over by a pupil pilot he referred the young officer to the 
Observer’s Handbook for full and complete instructions. The adjutant studied the five 
relevant files reflecting the history of meteorology since 1922 and discussed the matter
with the chaplin. He recommended to Major Mulcahy that a committee of investigation
28be appointed to report on the matter.
Later in 1935 Fr. O’Riordan penned a substantial paper on the subject of 
‘Meteorological facilities for pilots in the Free State’ stating that there were, in effect, no 
such facilities. He pointed out that Northern Ireland had at least one properly equipped 
weather station, at Aldergrove, and that if the Free State wanted to establish itself as the 
terminus for transatlantic flights, it was imperative that the state provide similar facilities. 
‘It should not be forgotten that Saorstat Eireann has definite international obligations in
27 O ’R io rd an  to A d j t .  A C ,  23 July  1935;  O ’R io rd an  to  O C  A C ,  1 M ar .  1934; O ’R io rd an  to O C  A C ,  16 
M a r .  1934 ( A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  possess io n ) .
28 R ev .  W . O ’R io rd an  to C apt.  D .J .  M u rp h y ,  23 Ju ly  1935; O C  A C  to O C  A C  D e p o t ,  23 Ju ly  1935; R ev .
W .  O ’R io rd an  to C apt.  D .J .  M u rp h y ,  25 Ju ly  1935;  C apt.  D.J.  M u rp h y  to O C  A C  27  Ju ly  1935 (A C F /3 3 8 ,  
in m y  p o ssess io n ) .
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this matter’ in accordance with the International convention for air navigation. These 
obligations were particularly in respect of climatology, or historic weather records, 
current weather reports for synoptic purposes and short or long term forecasts for 
specified areas.
Quite apart from these international obligations, there is a definite obligation on the 
govennnent of the Saorstat to provide meteorological facilities for its own military 
and civilian pilots. The need for these facilities has not been appreciated as it might
29up to the present.
He reviewed the proceedings of the inter-departmental commission which had been set 
up by the Minister for Education eleven years previously. He restated the terms of 
reference, and the four principal conclusions of the earlier study and indicated that no 
steps had been taken to give effect to its recommendations. Fr. O’Riordan, indicating that 
expert advice was available from academics in Dublin and from the senior officials in 
Cahirciveen (Valentia Observatory), suggested the establishment of a meteorological 
service consisting of four or five main stations and a large number of observer stations. 
While he considered that the question of meteorological services was not applicable only 
to the Department of Defence he suggested that any scheme should include locating a 
trained meteorologist at Baldonnell as well as extra meteorological equipment and 
appropriate radio facilities on a twenty-four hour basis.
The meteorologist would be trained in forecasting and would preferably be a 
civilian. He would need a staff of two or three at least. One of his duties would be 
the issuing of forecasts to military pilots as required.30
He recommended that all the existing equipment at Baldonnell could be used but that a 
number of additional instruments would have to be obtained - at an added cost of about
2'; U n d a ted  m e m o r a n d u m ,  ‘M e teo ro lo g ic a l  faci l i t ies  for p i lo ts  in the  F ree  S ta te ’, R ev .  W .  M. O ’R io rd an ,  
c irca  3 Oct.  1935 (M A ,  2 /2 7 1 7 5 ) .
30 Ibid.
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£500. This sum was to have included £200 for an anemometer (to measure and record 
wind velocity). In conclusion he stated that a broad view should be taken of the matter as 
not alone were lives at stake -  those of citizens of the Saorstat and visitors -  but also the 
honour of the country.31
Mulcahy forwarded the submission to the Chief of Staff complete with a brief 
covering letter. He stated that he had earlier had discussions on the subject with Fr. 
O’Riordan and with Tom Morley of Valencia Observatory:
As a result of these talks I asked Fr. O’Riordan to prepare a memorandum under 
certain headings so as to assist me in drawing up a report on the matter. As his
32memorandum is so admirable I send it complete.
He suggested that the subject should be taken up without delay by the Department of 
Industry and Commerce and that the said department should be reminded of its
■ 33responsibilities in the matter of meteorological services.
In view of the indirect exchanges between Mulcahy and the chaplin and the 
fact that the file (ACF/338) reflects no personal contact one has to be somewhat 
sceptical about the manner in which Mulcahy, in effect, claims some credit for the 
proposals formulated by the chaplin. In his submission O’Riordan had cited the loss of 
an aircraft on a flight from the US to Ireland in unknown weather conditions as his 
reason for highlighting the absence of meteorological services in the Free State. He 
had made no reference to specific discussions with Mulcahy and Morley. While 
Mulcahy gave the proposal his general endorsement he made no reference, as he might 
have done as DMA, to the specific needs of military aviation. Mulcahy, if he had 
adequately appreciated the needs of military aviation, might have availed of the 
opportunity to emphasise that Baldonnell, as the state’s only military aerodrome and 
the civil airport for Dublin and the state at that time, had an immediate and urgent 
need for such a service and for an appropriate meteorological station on the
31 Ibid.
32 M a j .  P .A .  M u lc ah y  to  C O S ,  4  O c t .  1935 (M A ,  2 /27175) .
33 Ibid.
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aerodrome. His subsequent correspondence with Fr. O’Riordan would suggest that 
Mulcahy did not appreciate the relevance of meteorology to military aviation and, at 
best, only saw the matter in the context of civil aviation.
On 15 October 1935 Major . J.P. Cotter, director of signals, having been given a 
copy of Fr. O’Riordan’s report and Mulcahy’s covering letter by the Chief of Staff, 
visited Baldonnell to discuss meteorology.34 Following discussions between Cotter, OC 
AC and Fr. O’Riordan the COS established an Army committee on meteorology under 
the chairmanship of Cotter with Comdt. J.G. Carroll, a flying officer, Mr. R.W. 
O’Sullivan (Aeronautical Engineer) and Rev. Fr. O’Riordan, all of the Air Corps, as 
members. Their brief was to cooperate with the inter-departmental committee in 
establishing a meteorological scheme for the Saorstat and to investigate ‘all aspects of 
meteorology as they affect military activities in this country’ .35 On 4 November 1935, for 
reasons that are not clear, only Cotter and Fr. O ’Riordan attended a preliminary meeting 
held at Baldonnell in preparation for a conference to be held in the Department of 
Industry and Commerce the following day. Some months later, subsequent to a number 
of meetings of the inter-departmental committee Fr. O’Riordan felt obliged to write to the 
commanding officer:
Since I was present at the conferences on the question of meteorological services in 
November last, I have been under the impression that it was intended to provide a 
fully equipped and staffed meteorological station at Baldonnell before the cross­
channel air services started. Now, however, I hear rumours to the effect that part of 
the duties of Lieut[enant]s Cumiskey and Stapleton will be the issuing of weather 
reports to the pilots of these Services.36
He went on to point out that not only were the two named officers not adequately 
qualified for the intended duties but that no one on the station was. Lest he be held 
responsible in view of the fact that he had been lecturing on meteorology to Air Corps
34 F ile  m em o ,  P.A. M ulcal iy ,  16 O c t . 1935 (A C F  338 ,  in m y  p o ssess io n ) .
’’ ‘D ep ar tm en ta l  C o m m it te e  on M e te o r o lo g y ’, C O S  to  C o m d t .  G . C arro l l ,  31 Oct .  1935 (A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  
p o ssess io n ) .
36 O ’R io rd an  to O C  A C ,  8 M ar .  1936 (A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
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pilots and pupils for some time he disclaimed any responsibility for the fitness of the two 
officers mentioned for the duty of issuing weather reports in the absence of a 
meteorological station. He reminded OC AC that the instruction he had given over the 
years was purely of a theoretical nature aimed at giving pilots an elementary knowledge 
of the principles of meteorology.37 The inferences in Fr. O’Riordan’s latest note went far 
beyond the matter of the competence of two pilots, then being groomed for positions as 
control officers. It appears that following an unknown, but apparently small, number of 
meetings of the inter-departmental committee held in November 1935 Fr. O’Riordan was 
no longer party to the discussions. It also appears that the military contributors to the 
main committee had no concept of the application of meteorology to army or air activities 
and therefore made no special representations on the matter of establishing a 
meteorological station at Baldonnell.
As it transpired, no station, for civil or military use, was to be established at 
Baldonnell during the four years that the civil air services operated to and from that 
location. In fact it was to be over thirty year before Baldonnell would have a 
meteorological station with a forecaster on the staff. It could be inferred that the military 
influence at the inter-departmental committee, most likely conveyed by Major Cotter, 
was very negative in character and that the case for a station at Baldonnell, as proposed 
by O’Riordan but not supported by Mulcahy, was not projected. Mulcahy’s response to 
Fr. O’Riordan’s latest, and apparently last communication on the matter, was terse and 
dismissive and contrary to the tone of his fulsome endorsement of the latter’s submission 
of October 1935.
 The fact that any responsibility might rest with you is not at all apparent.
A job has to be done and I am using the materials available. I am quite aware that 
the officer personnel here are not expert in meteorological matters but have got to 
control this end of the [civil air] service and not only the two officers whom you
38mention but, all officers will have to take on the job of control officer.
37 Ibid.
38 O C  A C  to Rev. W . O ’R io rd an ,  9 M ar.  1936 ( A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  p o ssess io n ) .
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He informed the chaplin that his efforts in the matter of meteorology were much 
appreciated and that he was confident of having his assistance again if and when 
required.39 This response, insofar as it actually dealt with the matter of the duties of 
control officers, ignored the fundamental fact that Baldonnell was not to have a 
meteorological station despite it status in civil and military aviation, and also implied that 
the chaplin’s assistance was unlikely to be required by Mulcahy. While Fr. O’Riordan 
acted as meteorological instructor to the 1937 'wings’ course there is no record of him 
offering, or being asked for, further assistance or advice on matters of policy during the 
remainder of Mulcahy’s command.
The Meteorological Service was established in December 1936 and took over the 
management of the existing stations from the British on 1 April 193 7 .40 With no station 
being established at Baldonnell and, with the station planned for Dublin Airport yet to be 
put in place (in 1939) area forecasts for Baldonnell, taking into account local conditions, 
would not have been available. Civil and military pilots would have had to rely on 
interpretation of the general forecast available from Foynes from 1937.41 The apparently 
negative attitude o f Mulcahy, possibly reflecting a similar attitude in GHQ, can be 
understood in the context of an Army leadership that displayed no understanding o f the 
strategic importance of meteorology to ground operations. They probably saw military 
aviation as an army ground forces matter that did not require knowledge of meteorology. 
However it is not easy to understand why Mulcahy was so reluctant to accept advice on a 
highly complex matter from one who knew. The somewhat indirect exchanges with Fr. 
O’Riordan strongly suggest that Mulcahy did not seek or welcome advice in matters that 
were clearly outside his comprehension.
A golden opportunity, to have appropriate meteorological facilities established, 
having been passed up in 1936 little progress appears to have been made subsequently - 
before, during or after the Emergency. From as early as June 1937 financial sanction for 
the supply and installation of a remote-reading anemometer at Baldonnell, as originally
39 Ibid.
40 D e rm o t  O ’C o n n o r ,  ‘A  b r i e f  h is to ry  o f  the  M e te o ro lo g ica l  S e r v i c e ’ in L isa  S h ie ld s  (ed .)  The Irish 
meteorological Service; the first fifty years, 1936-1986 (D u b l in ,  1987),  p. 1.
41 L isa  Sh ie lds  (ed.),  The Irish meteorological service; the first fifty years (D u b l in ,  1987),  passim.
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recommended by Fr. O’Riordan, was in place.42 However, as late as 24 May 1942, with 
an obvious lack of urgency on the part of the Air Corps leadership and with evidence of 
bureaucratic lethargy in various Army offices, the equipment had still not been installed 
by the Corps of Engineers or even supplied by the Meteorological Service.43
From October 1943 the taking of observations at Baldonnel was put on a more 
formal basis by arrangement with the Meteorological Service. While the three military 
meteorologists provided by the 1943 Establishment also performed aerodrome control 
duties their primary responsibility was the taking of meteorological observations. These 
were apparently taken twice a day and made available to the meteorological service on 
the latter’s Forms 7440 and 7441.44 Early in 1944 R.W. O’Sullivan, the Air Corps’ 
(civilian) aeronautical engineer, forwarded a brief case, supporting a proposal for the 
installation of a proper meteorological station at Baldonnell, for the consideration of OC 
AC, Maj. W.P. Delamere.
The present arrangement consists of telephone communication with the Dublin 
Airport at Collinstown by means of which information based on an analysis of the 
general weather situation and on observations at Collinstown is used to prepare a
daily weather chart at Baldonnel It takes no account of local conditions at
Baldonnel 45
He pointed out that the local conditions at Baldonnell were very different to those at 
Collinstown due to the effect of the proximity of the Dublin / Wicklow hills on the 
amount and height of cloud and the wind speed and direction in particular. He suggested 
that the Director of Meteorological Services would generally be in favour of the idea on 
the basis that an increase in personnel was pending. However Major Delamere did not
42 C O E  to O C  A C ,  21 Jan. 1942 (M A ,  A C /2 /4 /6 ) .
43 File  m em o ,  24  M a y  1943 (M A ,  A C /2 /4 /6 ) .
44 A ir  C o rp s  e s tab l i sh m en t ,  29  M ar .  1943 (M A );  ‘B a ld o n n e l  -  W in d  a n a ly s i s ’, 1 Ju ly  19 4 4  -  30  Sep t .  1948 
(in m y  po ssess io n ) ;  F i le  m e m o ,  1 Oct.  1943 ( A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  p o sse s s io n ) ;  M a r ty  K e a n e ,  ‘T h e  w e a th e r  
o bse rva t ion  n e tw o r k ’ in L isa  S h ie lds  (ed .) ,  The Irish meteorological service; the first fifty years (D u b l in ,  
1987),  p. 26.
43 ‘M e te o ro lo g y  in the  A ir  C o r p s ’, R .W .  O ’S ull ivan  to O C  A C ,  12 F e b .1944 ( M A ,  A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  
possess ion) .
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agree. He annotated the submission to the effect that he had discussed the matter with the 
director and that it was not opportune to put forward a case.46 He was probably correct as 
later that year it was reported that additional personnel were not being recruited and that 
some meteorological personnel were being moved from Dublin Airport to Shannon 
resulting in a reduction in the standard of service available to the Air Corps.47 From 1 
February 1945 there was no duty forecaster at Dublin Airport. In the meantime
48arrangements were in place for the Air Corps to receive special forecasts from Foynes.
There is an intriguing post script to the pre-war failure to establish a 
meteorological office at Baldonnell. From the tone and content of later correspondence it 
is not clear why such an office was not actually established in 1939. In 1957 the then 
Officer Commanding, Col. P. Quinn, in the context of dwindling numbers of military 
meteorologists, made a detailed and well argued case for an appropriately staffed 
meteorological office at Baldonnell. In order to substantiate the case being made Col. 
Quinn referred to DOD files and correspondence going back to 1945, 1942, 1939 and 
193 7.49 The submission was initially referred to the director o f plans and operations in 
GHQ.
This matter, as far as can be seen, was first raised in 1939 (C.R. File S/91) and 
again in June 1945 when the Dept. Of Defence on the recommendation of the then 
Chief of Staff wrote and asked the Dept, of Industry and Commerce to allot one 
meteorological officer to the Air Corps to act as instructor and forecaster.50
In its reply dated 27 July 1945 Industry and Commerce indicated that the Minister for 
Finance, as long previously as 1939, had granted sanction for the recruitment of one 
meteorological officer and four assistant officers for Baldonnell. It was stated, 
paradoxically, that the appointments could not be filled at the time because of staff
46 Ibid.
47 A .H . N a g le  to O C  A C ,  28  Oct.  1944 (A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
48 A .H . N a g le  to O C  A C ,  15 Jan .  1945 (A C F /3 3 8 ,  in m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
49 ‘M e teo ro lo g ica l  p e rso n n e l  in th e  A ir  C o r p s ’, O C  A C  to  A C S ,  24  Ju ly  1957 ,  D O D  2 /9 3 2 4 7 .  D O D  file  
2 /9 3 2 4 7  had  been  o p e n e d  in 1945. It w a s  still  in use  w h e n  e x a m in e d  by m e  in th e  ear ly  1990s .
30 T.J . G ra y  to Sec  D O D ,  29  A ug .  1957, q u o t in g  S ec  I &  C  to Sec D O D ,  27  Ju ly  1945 ,  D O D  2 /9 3 2 4 7 .
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shortages but that one officer and two assistants could then (1945) be appointed. While 
the military agreed with the 1945 proposal Industry and Commerce did not make the 
appointments and GHQ apparently did nothing about it.51
Nothing in the military correspondence of 1957 suggests that either the Army or 
the Air Corps were aware of the financial sanction dating from 1939 while the 
Department of Industry and Commerce appears to have been remiss in not pursuing the 
recruitment of the personnel authorised in 1939, and again in 1945. Similarly Defence 
could be faulted for not pursuing the matter when made aware in 1945. It is however, 
curious that the Air Corps general file on meteorology, (ACF/338), contains no 
correspondence for the period from 9 March 1936, when Fr. O’Riordan was ‘dismissed’ 
by Mulcahy, until after the appointment of the latter’s successor in December 1942.
The beginnings of air traffic control
From as early as September 1924 the functions of an aerodrome control officer were the 
subject of a daily roster. Initially those duties went well beyond the basic one that 
specified that the ‘duty officer’ ‘will ensure that both the landing “T” and wind vane are 
correct and that the aerodrome is clear of all obstructions during flying’
At about 9 am he will test the air, and render a short report to the squadron adjutant
as to weather conditions, and suitability or otherwise for flying He will be
responsible for ...warning of pilots, observers and pupils for flying duties, and 
detailing of machines in comiection with flying for the day.52
Air Corps standing orders of 1927 defined the duties of the air officer in slightly different 
terms. In addition to testing the air he had to record his observations regarding the 
weather in the commanding officer’s daily weather log book at 09.00, 14.00 and 17.00
51 Ibid.
32 ‘D u t ie s  o f  du ty  o f f i c e r ’, Sept.  1924 (M A ,  M S /6 8 5 ) .
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hour.53 The following year these duties were considerably widened to include those 
relating to the arrival and departure of civil aircraft transiting the Irish Sea. Apart from 
the sending, by telephone, of arrival and departure messages the air officer had particular 
alerting responsibilities in the event of an aircraft being over due. In effect the Air 
Officer, on a daily basis, monitored the conduct of civil aviation and performed the 
related various administrative functions on behalf o f the Department of Industry and 
Commerce.54 It should however be appreciated that civil arrivals and departures were rare 
happenings in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In fact they were so rare that the events 
were often mentioned in the newspapers of the time.55
At some time between October 1931 and June 1935 the aerodrome control officer 
had been relieved of the responsibility of making the decision relating to the suitability of 
the weather for flying and for any arrangements relating to the organising of flying - this 
task having apparently been transferred to the orderly officer in 193 5.56 However his 
responsibilities relating to the safe operation of the aerodrome were further clarified to 
the effect that sheep and cattle should be removed from the landing and take off area of 
the aerodrome when flying was imminent or in progress. In 1937 the duties relating to the 
control of civil air traffic remained substantially the same as those of 1928 while the 
alerting procedures relating to overdue aircraft were brought up to date. For reasons that 
are not clear, as late as 1937, no wireless telegraphy set existed at Baldonnell for civil 
aviation communications with the corresponding station in the UK, Seaforth radio 
station.57
33 ‘D u t ies  o f  a ir  o f f ice r ’, A p p e n d ix  J, S ta n d in g  O rd e r s  fo r  B a ld o n n e l l  A e r o d r o m e ,  1 Feb .  1927, P.J. H asse t t  
p r iva te  p a p e rs  (in p o ssess io n  o f  C ap t .  E o in  H assse t) .
34 ‘A m e n d m e n t s  to  S ta n d in g  O rd e rs  fo r  B a ld o n n e l l  A e r o d r o m e ’, 1 Jan .  1928 ,  P.J. H a sse t t  p a p e r s  (in 
p ossess ion  o f  C ap t  E oin  Hasset t) .
31 Baldonnel; Dublin ’s civil airport 1919 -  1939 (Ir ish  A i r  L etter ,  1989) ,  p a ss im .
36 Sec tion  32, A i r  C o ip s  S tand ing  O rd e rs ,  1935 (in m y  p o s s e s s io n )  .
37 C o rp s  R o u t in e  O r d e r  2 4 3 ,  a m e n d in g  Sec tion  26 ,  A i r  C o r p s  S ta n d in g  O rd e r s  1935, 2 2  O c t .  1937  (in m y 
possess ion ) .
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More formal air traffic control
In the meantime the Departments of Defence and Industry and Commerce had had the 
matter of the training of personnel in civil air transport control duties under consideration 
in the context of preparations being made for a state-sponsored civil air service based at 
Baldonnell. The department decided that while the existing military personnel could also
58do civil control duties it was preferable that they should undergo specialist training. In 
pursuance of this matter DOD requested that the high commissioner in London be asked 
to make enquiries as to the conditions under which three officers might, as soon as 
possible, attend a course of instruction at Croydon, then London’s civil airport.59 The 
high commissioner replied to the effect that the Air Ministry did not provide such courses 
at Croydon or elsewhere but that they would facilitate extended visits for familiarisation 
purposes. The Dominions Office had indicated that the Air Ministry was prepared to take 
two officers, one at a time for a fortnight each, starting on 1 January 1936. Return visits 
would be possible and no fees were payable.60
Subsequently the two flying officers made a report on the ‘course of instruction- 
Croydon Airport’ that commenced at 11.00 hours on 13 January 1936. They confirmed 
that there had been in fact no formal system of instruction but were satisfied that they had 
come away from Croydon with a complete knowledge of the system of control in use 
there. Devoting most of their attention to the operation of the control tower they had 
observed the work of the control office, meteorological office and the communications 
department. The ‘W/T and R/T station’, with ‘four powerful transmission and receiving 
sets’ was the major component of the communications department. Wireless telegraphy, 
using the ‘Q Code’ of the era, appears to have been the predominant means of 
communication with aircraft while the methodology and extent of the use of radio 
telephony is not clear. They noted the inter-relationship between the various departments
58 Sec  D O D  to Sec  D E A ,  9 N o v .  1935 ( M A ,  A C /1 /1 /2 7 ) .
59 Ibid.
60 H C  to  Sec D E A ,  5 D ec .  1935 ( M A ,  A C /1 /1 /2 7 ) .
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and the records kept and obtained a supply of the special forms used in communications. 
They also visited the Air Ministry and obtained a number of useful publications.61
Subsequently the duties of aerodrome control officer were performed by 
individual officers on a daily basis as detailed. Until the transfer o f the Aer Lingus 
operation to the new Dublin Airport in January 1940 the task was predominantly one of 
facilitating the safe conduct of civil aircraft into and out of Baldonnell.62 The Air Corps’ 
1939 peace establishment put this assistance in air traffic control on a more formal basis 
by providing two lieutenants for civil aviation duties.
In the meanwhile, with Aerodrome Control at Baldonnell being carried out by any 
and all flying officers, the emphasis in control matters changed. The development of the 
flying boat base at Foynes gave rise to the necessity for air traffic control personnel at 
that location which, in effect, took precedence over the requirements of Baldonnell (and 
later Dublin Airport) prior to and during the Emergency. From 1936, until he retired in 
1948, Capt. E. F. Stapleton from the Air Corps, was attached to the Department of 
Industry and Commerce as a ‘control officer’. He commenced duty at Foynes in August 
1937 and was transferred to Shannon Airport on 3 January 1946.63 During the Emergency 
period Stapleton was a pennanent fixture on the control officer roster that required six 
officers to man the two control positions at Shannon Airport -  Foynes.64 By January 1944 
no less than nine flying officers had spent extended periods of duty at Foynes performing 
functions that apparently took precedence over the flying duties for which they had been 
trained and appointed. It was to be 1964 before a military air traffic control section, with 
officers solely trained for the specific function, was established in the Air Corps.65
By way of summary it can be stated that the original responsibilities the duty 
officer of 1924 evolved little until October 1931 when the control and signals aspects 
of civil aviation began to take precedence over military considerations. With the 
imminent start of scheduled civil air services from Baldonnell the requirement to
61 L ieu t .  E .F. S tap le ton  and  L ieut .  M .J .  C u m is k e y  to  A /O C  A C ,  3 0  Jan . 1936, A C /  1/1 /27, M A .
62 C o rp s  S tan d in g  O rd e rs ,  1935 ,  a m e n d e d  2 2  O c t .  1937 (in m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
63‘R e co rd  o f  C on tro l  O ff ice rs  - F o y n e s ’, 5 Jan .  1944 ;  c h ie f  con tro l  o f f ice r  to  O C  A C ,  4 Jan . 1946 (in m y  
possess ion ) .
‘Con tro l  o ff ice rs  -  r o s te r ’, A u g u s t  1943 (in m y  p o s s e s s io n ) .
63 P e te r  T o r m e y  a n d  K ev in  B y rn e ,  Irish Air Corps; a view from the t o w e r  (D e f e n c e  F o rces ,  1988),  p. 25.
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adopt more formal civil procedures precipitated the familiarisation visit to Croydon in 
1936. The new knowledge acquired was soon essential to the trans-Atlantic aircraft 
using Foynes. During the Emergency ATC support of civil operations at Baldonnell, 
Dublin and Foynes became a fixed task for the Air Corps while pilots’ flying duties 
apparently became a secondary consideration.
Communications or signals
During the Civil War the absence of appropriate air-to-ground and ground-to-air 
communications was evident and had a detrimental effect on the conduct of 
reconnaissance operations and on delivery flights from the UK. While the Air Service 
had an aviation wireless officer his duties were probably confined to providing standard 
army communications. Even though the particular need for air communications had been 
commented upon, the opportunity presented by the Army reorganisation scheme of 1924 
to establish a Signal Corps element appropriate to the needs o f military aviation, was 
passed up. While the 1927 syllabus of training for pupil pilots required instruction in 
wireless (theory) and in buzzing (wireless telegraphy -  W/T) no provision was made for 
aviation signals personnel until the peace establishment of 1931-1932.66 The Department 
of Defence signals unit then included provision for two W/T instructors, one lieutenant 
and one corporal, who were attached to Air Corps Schools for the instruction of pupil 
pilots in receiving and transmitting in Morse code.67
Throughout the army cooperation training regime of the early 1930s the emphasis 
put on communication by W/T was most notable. A mobile W/T station had been used at 
Kilworth in 1932 (and presumably also at the air firing practices of 1933 and 1934) for 
communication between pilots and the ground observers who provided information as to 
the accuracy or otherwise for the guidance of individual pilots. This service was observed 
to be an essential aspect o f such exercises.68 W/T communication, backed up by visual 
signals and message dropping, was also an essential aspect of successful artillery
66 D F R  7 /1 9 2 7 ,  18 M ar .  1927.
67 P e a c e  e s ta b l i sh m en ts  1 9 3 1 -1 9 3 2 ,  ( S ta t io n e r y  O ff ice ,  1 9 3 1 )  p. 22 .
68 O C  A C  to  D ire c to r  o f  T a in in g ,  27  A u g .  1932 (M A ,  2 /3 0 9 8 9 ) .
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cooperation at this time and of early exercises conducted with the Cavalry Corps.69 The 
emphasis on the use of Wireless Telegraphy in the context of army cooperation training 
contrasts with the situation at Baldonnell where training aircraft were not equipped with 
wireless equipment and where no ground station existed for the routine military aviation 
traffic. In effect policy in air communications matters, distinctly biased towards the needs 
of the army, was still being laid down by GHQ through the aegis of the Director of 
Signals or his equivalent -  just as had been the case in 1922.
By the time that civil operations were being planned for Baldonnell in 1936 
(while Dublin Airport was being planned and built) the situation was slightly better 
though the aerodrome was still poorly equipped even for military aviation. The only 
aviation communications facility available was a military W/T station with a range of 
fifty miles while the aerodrome was not equipped for night flying. However the 
Department of Defence and GHQ facilitated all developments required to equip the 
aerodrome for civil aircraft operations. In fact Colonel O ’Higgins of GHQ is quoted as 
having informed the Department of Industry and Commerce, and the Post Office 
authorities, that ‘while the civil airport was at Baldonnell the needs of military flying and 
wireless would be subordinated to those of the civil air service’ .70 In due course the 
state’s first civil radio station for aviation comm unication was installed and inaugurated 
at Baldonnell to coincide with the commencement of civil air services by Aer Lingus in 
May 1936. The start of the service was announced by statutory instrument:
As from Wednesday, 20 May 1936 a new radio station, providing a radio­
communication and direction-finding service available to all aircraft, will be 
brought into operation at Baldonnel aerodrome, Co. Dublin.71
While the notice suggests that the radio station was for the use of all aircraft, civil and 
military, the station provided both W/T (Morse code) and radio telephony (R/T - two-way 
voice communication) facilities, including a direction finding service, for civil aircraft
69 ‘T ac t ica l  exe rc ise ,  A i r  C o rp s ,  25  Ju ly  1932 ( M A ,  2 3 0 9 8 9 ) ;  ‘A i r  p a tro ls ,  S e p te m b e r  1 9 3 3 ’, 21 A ug .  1933, 
P.J.  H a sse t t  p a p e r s  (in p o sse s s io n  o f  C apt.  E o in  H asse t t ) .
70O  h A l lm h u ra in ,  Aviation communications ser\>ice 1936 — 1986, p p  10-12.
71 D e p a r tm e n t  o f  In d u s t ry  an d  C o m m e r c e ,  Civil  A v ia t io n  N o t ic e  N o .  3 o f  1936, 15 M a y  1936.
280
only. Military aircraft continued to proceed in accordance with the traditional visual 
ground signs displayed on the aerodrome. In the context of military communications in 
the period 1938 to 1941 the standard of airborne W/T and R/T equipment, and of the 
corresponding ground equipment, as well as the non-availability of a dedicated military 
direction finding service, were all to impact adversely on the efficacy of aircraft 
operations and indeed on the morale of individual pilots. (See Chapters 10 & 11)
The investigation of 1941/42 provides a review of the Air Corps signals matters 
from 1936 to the end of 1941. The most telling remark was not any aspect of the evidence 
given but rather the opening question put to Capt. P.J. Murphy (AC Signal Company, 
1936/39; AC HQ signals staff officer, 1939/43 andAC Signal Company, 1943/45), on 30 
January 1941, some sixteen months into the Emergency. ‘We understand the position is 
that we are gradually building up a signal service within the Air Corps? ’ 72 Murphy 
answered in the affirmative. In the context of the time the admission that the 
communications facilities for the Air Corps were still being gradually built up can only 
be seen as an admission of failure -  failure to provide adequate facilities on the first day 
of the Emergency some sixteen months previously. Muiphy added that when he had 
arrived into the Signal Company at Baldonnell in 1936 there were practically no aircraft 
equipped with radio. Equipment was gradually acquired and the Air Corps radio service 
was built up. Except for the five most recently acquired Ansons it had been quite difficult 
to equip the aircraft with radio as most of the radio equipment was only acquired from the 
UK in dribs and drabs. By the end of 1940 some sixteen aircraft (six Ansons, three 
Walrus, I Hawker Hind and six Lysanders) had been fitted with wireless telegraphy 
equipment which operated on medium and short wave frequencies and required a 
wireless operator as part o f the crew. The Lysander, fundamentally a battlefield 
reconnaissance aircraft, had the same type of medium to long range wireless as that fitted 
to the Ansons. Similarly the Hind, like the Gladiators and Lysanders designated by 
Mulcahy as fighter aircraft, was fitted with a W/T wireless. In the context of aerial 
combat and the fighter operations of the time the use of W/T sets was as impractical as it 
was antiquated. It is apparent that the Hind and Lysanders of 1940 should have had the
72 C o m m it te e  o f  in v es t ig a t io n  to C a p t .  P .J .  M u rp h y ,  3 0  Jan .  1941 ( M A ,  A C S  22 /23) .
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same R/T set as was fitted to the Gladiators of the same squadron even though neither 
was a fighter in the accepted sense.
The three Gladiator (fighter) sets operated on short wave only. At some unknown 
date, apparently not later than October 1938, these aircraft were fitted with T.R. 9B radio 
telephony sets providing two-way voice communication. For fighter aircraft such 
equipment would have been essential to the performance of its intended combat role. The 
ground station for this radio consisted of the transmitter and receiver salvaged from 
Gladiator 23 that had crashed on 20 October 1938. The T.R 9B radio, used in conjunction 
with this underpowered ground station gave an operating range of ten miles or less. The
73same aircraft radio in RAF use afforded a range of thirty-five miles.
Notwithstanding the fact that the first aircraft that required a radio operator, the 
first two Avro Ansons, had been in service since 20 March 1937 the training of operators 
did not commence until after 14 April 1939. This situation arose because the recruitment 
and paying of wireless operator mechanics (WOMs) had not been provided for in the 
1937 peace establishment.74 Mulcahy had anticipated that, as had traditionally been the 
case, the Signal Corps would post qualified operators into the newly created vacancies. 
Probably due to general demand for such skilled personnel, and despite making 
representations to GFIQ, and to the Signal Corps, trained operators were not forthcoming. 
As a result the training of men as wireless operators for Air Corps aircraft did not 
commence until June 1939.
The training of operators was not the responsibility of the Air Support Company 
(Cadre) Signal Corps but that of Capt. P.J. Muiphy, the signals staff officer in AC F1Q. 
When it did get under way training was provided for only eleven men even though the 
1939 peace establishment allowed for a total of nineteen wireless operators in the service 
squadrons. Such was the urgency to complete, what should have been a twelve month 
course in the fastest possible time that OC AC instructed Murphy that the instruction was 
to be curtailed to the actual operating of the W/T sets. The delay and defects in wireless 
operator training were highlighted by Murphy in the context of the posting of
7j C ap t.  P.J.  M u ip h y  to  A C  In v e s t ig a t io n ,  30  Jan .  1941 (M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) ;  A n n e x  N o .  I l l  to O p e ra t io n s  
O rd e r  1 /1940 ,  28 M a y  194 0  (M A ,  E D P  1/1); ‘F ig h te r  S q u a d ro n  -  In te rna l  o rg a n is a t io n ’, 16 D ec.  1940 (in 
m y  p o sses s io n ) .
74 A m e n d m e n t  14 to P e a c e  e s tab l i sh m en t ,  1934, 1 A pr .  1937 (M A ) .
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Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber Squadron to Rineanna, apparently with the 
minimum of notice, on 30 August 1939:
Shortly afterwards, on the outbreak of war, owing to the lack of qualified operators 
in the Air Corps, in order to enable patrols to be carried out from Rineanna I had to 
go as one of the two qualified operators and between use we took four of the best
pupils for a period of six months and I carried them on all flights for the
purpose of training them. When they were sufficiently trained to carry out 
communication on patrol, I was recalled to Baldonnel to take up my normal duty as 
Air Corps Signal Officer.75
In effect these four pupil operators, who had the theory and technical aspect of their 
course suspended, were flying on operational missions within three month of 
commencing training. Subsequently they achieved the required standard of operator skills 
by way of on-the-job training during operational missions patrolling the south and west 
coasts in wartime and North Atlantic winter conditions. By January 1941 the Air Corps 
Signal Officer was able to report that some eighteen men had been trained as wireless 
operators for service as aircrew though only one could be graded as a 1 ^  Class Operator. 
This low standard was attributed directly to the fact that his instructions were to train a 
certain amount of raw personnel to operate sets in the shortest possible time and to 
eliminate the technical training. By this time the war establishment of 1940 allowed for a 
total of forty-five wireless operators. As a training objective this number would appear to 
have been unattainable given the fact that Air Corps did not have an establishment
76provision of training personnel and the meagre progress made since June 1939.
In January 1941 it was reported that the position regarding the range of airborne 
and ground R/T reception improved greatly with the acquisition of a more powerful 
ground transmitter. This development was related to the fact that back in September 
1940, due to the fact that it had not been possible to get delivery of a satisfactory ground 
installation from commercial sources, the director of signals had accepted the offer of a
7:1 C ap t.  P.J.  M u r p h y  to A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  30  Jan .  1 9 4 1 (M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
76 Ibid; W a r  e s tab l i sh m en t ,  1940  (M A ) .
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Thomas Murphy, an amateur radio enthusiast (or radio ham), to demonstrate radio 
equipment which he had built. It was demonstrated for test purposes with the possibility 
of the equipment being purchased or rented. The equipment was a transmitter of 
Murphy’s own design and manufacture built mainly of commercially available 
components but including a small number of parts sourced through the Signal Corps. On 
18 and 19 September 1940 extensive tests were carried out on the transmitter installed at 
Baldonnell using Gladiator and Hind aircraft fitted with the T.R 9B R/T set. A number of 
flights, by day and by night, as far north as Dundalk and as far south as Camsore Point 
and at altitudes between 1,000 and 12,000 feet, were carried out with very satisfactory 
results. The test results provided ‘reliable communication both ways from the plane to the 
ground and from the ground to the plane up to about 40 miles dependent on the altitude 
of the aircraft. The satisfactory results achieved with Murphy’s amateur transmitter were 
only possible because a very good receiver was loaned by Lieut. A.C. (Andy) Woods, an 
Air Corps flying officer and radio enthusiast, to his friend Thomas Murphy.77 One of the 
pilots involved in the tests, Capt. T.J. Hanley, suggested that ground-to-air 
communication was possible out to sixty or seventy miles and recommended that this 
could be achieved using a transmitter with an output of 2,000 watts or more and a good 
type of receiver. 78 When it is considered that the radio sets used for the tests were those 
produced by (apparently well qualified) amateurs, the question arises as to the 
commitment of the Signal Corps to air communications. It could be surmised that the 
Signal Corps, under the influence of GHQ, saw as its primary function the provision of 
W/T communication services as appropriate to the army cooperation function and 
concentrated on this to the detriment of those communications commensurate with air 
force roles, particularly that of the Fighter Squadron. Similarly the technical competence 
of the Signal Corps could be questioned. It might be considered that the Signal Corps 
should have had, and used, the requisite technical expertise to manufacture and install a 
ground transmitter and receiver sets to a specification appropriate to the R/T requirements 
of the Air Corps. In theory they should have been better placed that Thomas Murphy to 
do so.
77 C apt.  P. J. M u r p h y  to  A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  30  Jan . 1941 ( M A ,  A C S  22 /23) .
78 C ap t.  T . J. H a n le y  to  A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  23 Jan . 1941 (M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
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Deficiencies in the preparedness of the Air Corps Company, Signal Corps, whose 
main responsibility was the maintenance and operation of ground stations, for both air 
and army purposes, was also highlighted when, on the outbreak of war, a 24 hour watch 
on ground stations was introduced. This was only possible at Baldonnell and Rineanna by 
using the wireless operators, who had been being trained as aircrew by and for the Air 
Corps, as operators of the ground station wireless sets. This continued until April or May 
1940.79 In effect the Signal Corps, having failed to provide or train wireless operators for 
the Air Corps similarly failed to provide adequate wireless operators for its own ground 
stations and, initially at least, had to rely on partially trained Air Corps operators to carry 
out the most fundamental Signal Corps responsibilities required at military aerodromes.
Navigation.
The purchase of Avro Anson reconnaissance aircraft in 1937, 1938 and 1939, a total of 
nine aircraft, strongly suggests the development of at least a medium range coastal 
reconnaissance capability. To what extent P.A. Mulcahy appreciated the necessity of 
advance the requisite level of air navigation is not clear. Whereas army cooperation 
called for the fundamental disciplines of map reading and dead reckoning (DR) 
navigation, longer range reconnaissance with the Anson put a greater emphasis on the 
third basic element of navigation, the fixing of position by means of the plotting of 
position lines on appropriate navigation charts. In 1937/38 a young pilot, Lieut. Jim 
Devoy, was nominated to undergo two courses of training in navigation with the RAF. 
As with previous courses with the RAF, the army cooperation course of 1930 and the 
flying instructor’s course of 1932, the records do not show how this came about. It is 
contended that the Air Ministry or RAF had offered a place on each course gratis. Devoy 
summarised his participation on the courses.
I completed two navigation courses in England in 1937 and 1938 at the RAF
School of Navigation, Mansion. The first was known as the short navigation course
79 C apt.  P.J. M u r p h y  to A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  30  Jan .  1941 ( M A ,  A C S  22/23) .
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and the second as the specialist navigation course. I qualified in both courses. The 
short course is approximately equivalent to the civilian 2nd class navigator’s 
certificate and the standard of the specialist’s course is approximately equivalent to 
the standard civilian 1st class navigator’s certificate.80
Having completed one course of three months duration and a second of six and a half 
months duration, Lieut. Devoy was employed as the navigation instructor in Air Corps 
Schools. On his return from the more advanced course, in July 1938, he had 
recommended the running of a course of navigation for as many officers as possible. He 
continued to press his superiors on the matter and was eventually asked to make a written 
submission for the attention his CO. In April 1939 Devoy made his commanding officer 
aware of the unsatisfactory level of navigation equipment available to pilots while stating 
that that navigation, as part of all pilots’ training, was in effect grossly neglected. In 
particular he was very dissatisfied with the general standard of practical navigation. He 
went on to respectfully suggest that he be instructed to arrange a short course in 
theoretical and practical navigation for the R & MB Squadron and another for the Army 
Co-operation Squadron. Emphasising the importance of meteorological information to 
the safe navigation of aircraft he recommended the appointment of a meteorological 
officer, the receipt of the short wave coded reports and forecasts from Rugby and the 
purchase of a list of recommended navigation equipment.81 Shortly afterwards he was 
instructed to run a very short navigation course. When he requested a greater length of 
time to cover a greater amount of an intended syllabus he was told that additional time 
could not be spared. As a result he drew up an abbreviated syllabus based on the time 
available. Even then the practical navigation aspect was not completed.82
By the beginning of July 1939 the school commandant was able to report on the 
results of the short navigation course conducted in the period 5 June 1939 to 3 July 1939. 
The course had been conducted for nine pilots of the thirty-three pilots then in service. 
Noting that attendance on the whole was good he reported that general military duties,
80C apt.  J. D e v o y  to A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  2 0  M a r .  1941 (M A ,  A C S  22/23) .
81 ‘N a v ig a t io n ’, Lt. J. D e v o y  to  O C  A C ,  21 A p r .  1939, A p p e n d ix  X V II  (A),  R e p o r t  and f in d in g  o f  the 
c o m m i t te e  (M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
82C apt.  J. D e v o y  to A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  2 0  M a r . 1941 (M A ,  A C S  22/23).
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such as Orderly Officer, had caused some interruption. Despite Devoy’s earlier 
recommendation regarding adequate supplies of navigation equipment it was very 
limited, especially mathematical tables and instruments. For reasons outside the control 
of the school the flying programme had been considerably reduced, mainly due to an 
unspecified number of special flying missions and tyre trouble. While the programme 
called for nine flights each for pupils to practice practical navigation only four each were 
actually completed. While good progress was reported in terms of more advanced 
instruction in interception problems and elementary instruction in continuous navigation 
out of sight of land it was observed that the officers could not be considered to be 
qualified navigators.83 In brief a somewhat abbreviated and basic course was further 
abbreviated and had been run for just over one quarter of the qualified pilots in the Corps. 
To judge from the brevity of the course, lack of equipment and insufficient practical 
navigation, a small proportion of the flying officers of the Corps had achieved a very 
modest level of proficiency where a significantly higher standard for all should have 
achieved.
The question arises as to why it took until June 1939 to initiate navigation 
training. Had the two RAF courses become available because of an initiative on the part 
of Mulcahy, or on the part of pilots who might conceivably have influenced him, it is 
probable that the newly qualified officer would, on his return, have been immediately 
tasked to instruction in navigation for the maximum possible number of pilots. In the 
circumstances however it is probable that the places on the course were made available 
by the UK authorities gratis and that a pilot was nominated and sent with no particular 
thought as to how he might subsequently be employed. Bearing in mind that Devoy had 
to prompt Mulcahy into authorising a navigation course, it seems probable that the 
commanding officer had little or no appreciation of current navigation practice or of its 
application to the operation of reconnaissance aircraft such as the Avro Anson. With an 
instructor duly qualified in navigation to the specialist level applying in the RAF it is not 
obvious why Mulcahy did not immediately proceed to have all pilots trained to at least 
the basic standard, and those of the R & MB Sqn. to a somewhat higher standard
x3 W .P . D e lam ere  to  O C  A C , 7 Ju ly  1939 , A p p e n d ix  X V II (B ), R ep o rt and f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m itte e , 10 
Jan . 1942 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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commensurate with the range and intended role of the Anson aircraft. Devoy himself 
would have settled for the position where all pilots would be trained to the lower 
standard, that equivalent to the civil 2nd class navigation certificate.84
When asked by the investigation committee if the fullest use had been made of a 
qualified navigation instructor Mulcahy proceeded to mislead the committee:
He has been engaged as an instructor in the school both flying and navigational and 
I considered that it was more important that he should be available to the Schools 
than that he be employed elsewhere.85
Stating, in effect, that it was not possible for Devoy to carry out advanced courses in 
navigation for service pilots apparently satisfied the committee. The members were not 
aware of the actual situation. Between January 1938 and August 1939 no pupil pilots 
were in training in the flying school. Devoy was not involved in flying instruction or 
navigation training with pupil pilots as implied by Mulcahy and would have had ample 
time to train and qualify many pilots to an acceptable standard. It is somewhat ironic that 
the ‘wings’ course syllabus, drafted by W.P. Delamere, and authorised and signed by 
Mulcahy in September 1936, specified the Air Ministry Manual o f Air Navigation of 
1935 as the reference text for instruction in air navigation. This manual should have been 
a more than adequate guide as to how to proceed in navigation training for the expected 
emergency.86 It is doubtful that Mulcahy, who had received no ground school training of 
any description, was familiar with this essential text. In his ignorance of air navigation, 
and of its application to long range reconnaissance, he apparently saw no need for 
navigation techniques more advanced than the map reading applicable to army 
cooperation.
84 C ap t. J. D ev o y  to A C  in v es tig a tio n , 20  M ar. 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
83 P .A . M u lc ah y  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 24  O ct. 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
86 C o rre c ted  d ra ft sy llab u s . Y o u n g  o ff ic e rs  fly in g  tra in in g  co u rse , 25 Sep t. 1936 (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ); A ir  
P u b lica tio n  1234, Manual of air navigation, V ol. I, (H M S O , 193 5),passim.
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Direction finding services
As already stated an aviation communications service, with a direction finding service as 
an aid to the safe navigation of civil aircraft, had been operated at Baldonnell since May 
1936. From July 1937 similar services were made available at Ballygireen, Co. Clare, 
complete with two direction finding stations, for transatlantic traffic approaching the 
Shannon / Foynes area while the Foynes seaplane base itself also had a DF station to 
facilitate aircraft landing in the river estuary. At Ballygireen the Marconi DFG10 medium 
wave direction finder was suitable for use by military aircraft such as the Ansons 
equipped with W/T wireless sets while the DFG12 short wave station was compatible 
with the R/T equipment of fighter aircraft.87 The Baldonnell medium wave DF station 
could only be used by those aircraft, mainly reconnaissance types, fitted with W/T sets. 
While this DF facility was intended specifically for the use of civil aircraft Air Corps 
pilots could avail of the service at such times when it was not engaged with civil traffic. 
The Air Corps use of the civil DF stations at Baldonnell and Ballygireen was mainly in 
the context of Anson and Walrus aircraft transiting between Baldonnell and Rineanna / 
Shannon.
With the operation of the Baldonnel civil DF station only available between 09.15 
and 17.00 hours, and the available service severely curtailed within those hours the 
availability, or more correctly the non-availability, of dedicated direction finding services 
for military navigation purposes was to become a somewhat confused and contentious 
issue during the first fifteen months of the Emergency. In April 1939 Lieut. Jim Devoy 
had recommended that at least two direction finding W/T stations be installed in selected 
locations as essential aids to the safe navigation of military aircraft.88 The matter had 
been the subject of (unseen) correspondence from the Director of Signals to OC AC on 
24 February 1939 and vice versa on 5 April 1939. Later that year a board of officers was 
assembled by order of the COS to investigate the proposal put forward by the director of 
signals to purchase four (G.12, short wave) Direction Finding sets -  a proposal
87 C a rm e lla  C o rb e tt, ‘H is to ry  o f  th e  se rv ice  1 9 3 6 -1 9 8 6 ’ in Sean O ’ h A llm h u ra in  (ed .) , Aviation 
Communications Service 1936 -  1986 (D e p a rtm e n t o f  C o m m u n ic a tio n s . 1986), pp  6 -17 .
88‘N a v ig a t io n ’, L ieu t. J. D e v o y  to  O C  A C , 21 A p ril 1939 , A p p e n d ix  X V II(A ), R e p o rt a n d  f in d in g  o f  th e  
c o m m itte e  (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
2 89
apparently agreed between himself and OC Air Corps. The board, comprised of staff 
officers of GHQ, questioned Major Gantly as to the necessity for four stations and as to 
whether the type proposed was the most efficient that could be procured. He was also 
asked whether he had satisfied himself and the OC AC that such installations would meet 
the direction finding requirements by day and by night. Gantly explained that four 
stations, to be erected at Baldonnell, at the Curragh for the training of Signals Corps 
personnel, and at Athlone and Cork was the minimum to cover the needs of the Air Corps 
and the training of personnel. The board was very sceptical about the Signals proposal 
and commented on the fact that relevant correspondence between Signals and the Air 
Corps was not available to it. The board commented on a main proposal:
The chairman drew Major Gantly’s attention to the proposed locations of the 
stations on the map and the limited effective range of direction finding in Ansons, 
Lysanders, and Walrus (70 miles) and Gloster (35 miles) and pointed out that the 
erection of stations at Baldonnel, Curragh, Athlone and Cork would appear to leave 
many parts of the country uncovered.89
In particular the board considered that Athlone was an unsuitable location due to the 
nature of the topography, the proximity of the Radio Eireann’s transmitter and the 
distance from the west coast. It was considered that if four stations were essential and 
could be justified, locations at Baldonnell, Galway, Sligo and Cork should be examined 
instead of those originally suggested. On 16 December 1939 the board discussed the 
matter with Mulcahy who specified the Air Corps’ requirements:
(1)3 S.W. D/F sets were considered sufficient for Air Coips requirements.
(2) He was aware of the limitations of S.W. D/F especially at night, nevertheless 
he was satisfied that the installations were an urgent necessity.
(3) Medium wave D/F sets were not suitable for erection in the vicinity of 
military aerodromes; masts cause considerable obstruction and would not cater
89 R ep o rt to  C O S , 22  D ec. 1939 (M A , A C /2 /8 /4 ) .
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for all types of aircraft. The whole tendency in Wireless was development of 
S.W.
(4) He had no objection to courses of instruction for Signal Corps personnel being 
carried out at Baldonnel so as to obviate the need for a training station at the 
Curragh.
(5) He did not favour a homing device in military aircraft. There was no room in 
fighters for receivers, and loop aerials in fighters or bombing aircraft could not 
be permitted. The system would demand erection of masts on aerodromes to 
which there would be the same objection as in the case of medium wave D/F 
installations.90
It is not at all easy to understand the position taken by Mulcahy as it suggests the absence 
of any genuine commitment to improving communications and direction finding facilities 
for military aircraft. His objection to having medium wave DF at military aerodromes, in 
effect to both Baldonnell and Rineanna, appears to be almost contrived. With the 
existing DF facilities available at the two aerodromes dedicated almost exclusively to the 
use of civil aircraft medium wave DF might have been seen as a distinct requirement at 
both for W/T equipped aircraft while short wave DF was also required at Baldonnell for 
the use of fighter aircraft equipped with RT equipment. The positioning of large aerial 
arrays at a small aerodrome such as Baldonnell, if  the will was there, should not have 
been an insurmountable problem. With the civil DF stations at Ballygireen and Foynes 
inappropriately located a DF station was required at Rinanna for navigation and for bad- 
weather approaches to landing. However it appears that neither Mulcahy nor his signals 
officer recognised these points.
Similar comments could be made about Mulcahy’s dismissal of the obstructive 
nature of ground installations connected with the transmitters to serve airborne direction- 
finding loop aerials. While the number of ground transmitters compatible with such 
homing devices as loop aerials, normally fitted to aircraft like the Anson, was limited 
Mulcahy’s objection to the concept of loop aerials in Ansons could only be considered
90lbid.
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spurious and ill-informed. In his evidence to the investigation Capt. T.J. Hanley 
highlighted the position regarding loop aerial for Anson aircraft:
The modification to have the loop aerial installed on Ansons was issued by A.V. 
Roe on 23/11/38, Anson modification No. 214. On 7/1/39, the modification was 
passed to OC Workshops, to requisition the material. This was not done as OC 
Workshops got instructions [from higher authority] not to requisition them.91
Higher authority in this instance could have been Comdt. P. Quinn, OC Air Corps Depot 
but was more likely Col. P.A. Mulcahy.
On 16 December also the Air Corps Signals Officer was interviewed by the board 
and reported on the unsatisfactory nature of the results of test conducted to test the 
DFG12 short wave DF set at Ballygireen. Errors of up to 11 ‘A degrees were reported 
from daytime tests while ‘at night on one occasion he was unable to get any bearing’. 
When questioned as to the reported ‘perfection of a mobile S.W. D/F set in France’ 
Murphy indicated that he had read about it in the technical literature but could offer no
■ • •  92opinion on it.
When the board recalled the director of signals it pointed out that tests did not 
justify the purchase of the DFG12 short wave set and that OC AC now only required 
three DF stations. It was suggested that his original submission supporting a case for four 
DF stations was still unsatisfactory. More importantly it was indicated to Major Gantly 
that a serious view was being taken of the fact that a DFG12 set had been delivered to the 
North Wall -  apparently its purchase had not been properly sanctioned. In his defence of 
the test results Gantly stated that the tests carried out were only for calibration purposes 
and that errors detected would be taken into account when communicating with aircraft. 
In this latter regard it is suggested that the director of signals was on unsafe ground. The
DF tests described by Lt. P.J. Muiphy appeared to concentrate on the track between
Rineanna and Baldonnell. It is not possible to calibrate the accuracy of a direction 
finding station on the basis of a single direction or bearing. A properly conducted
91 C ap t. T .J . H an ley  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 23 Jan . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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calibration test would entail a flight or series of flights and the recording of many bearing 
around a full compass rose around, in this case, Ballygireen. Such compass bearings 
would necessarily have to be taken when the aircraft was over known geographic points 
so that the DF bearing can be compared with the known bearing of the particular point. It 
is most doubtful that such calibration could produce a trustworthy compensation table 
capable of correcting errors of up to eleven and a half degrees.
Gantly accepted that a DF station at the Curragh could be dispensed with but that 
it should be installed elsewhere so that the country could be covered as far as possible 
especially having regard to illicit transmitters. Despite his previous position favouring 
four stations suitably situated the chairman of the board ‘suggested that having regard to 
all factors in the case two installations would be sufficient’, one at Baldonnell and one in 
the Cork area. Gantly reluctantly accepted this suggestion on the understanding that he 
would not be held responsible if two proved to be inadequate. After further discussion on 
the merits of short wave DF sets for the detection of illicit radio transmitters the board 
formed the opinion that two short wave DF sets together with the services of the [civil] 
station at Ballygireen would be ample and recommended accordingly.93
Given the final decision it appears that the various parties may have been at cross 
puiposes. The decision suggests that the board was primarily interested in DF as an aid to 
locating illicit transmitters while Mulcahy was, somewhat half-heartedly, pursuing DF 
stations for air navigation purposes. It is perplexing to note that no recommendation was 
made in respect of the short wave DF set that had presumably been purchased by DS on 
his own initiative. More perplexing is the thought that ‘two short wave direction finding 
sets’ had been apparently been purchased in January 1940, but were still Tying in the 
stores of the Signal Corps’ two years later.94
During 1940 the position regarding DF services, at Baldonnel in particular, did 
not improve much and the matter of the poor service available to military aircraft drew 
the attention of the Capt. T.J. Hanley (R &MB Sqn. at Baldonnel, later OC CP Sqn.) in 
early January. He reminded OC AC that the Aer Lingus service was shortly due to move 
to the recently developed Collinstown (Dublin) Airport, that as sufficient DF facilities
93 Ib id .
)4‘R e p o rt and  F in d in g s  o f  th e  C o m m itte e ’, 10 Jan . 1942 , L IV  (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
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and staff are already available at Collinstown he suggested that the DF station and staff at 
Baldonnell were surplus to civil needs. He stated a substantial case to prevent the civil 
DF station being closed down, which had been the previous plan, and to have it and its 
Posts and Telegraphs staff taken over as a dedicated military facility. He argued that 
every effort should be made to preserve the safety of aircraft in service stating
... any personnel or equipment which exist in this country and which we think is 
necessary to preserve those aeroplanes should, not only be put at our disposal, but 
should if necessary be seized by military authority. The DF Station and staff at 
Baldonnel come into this category.95
Hanley was dismissive of the concept of the possible installation of a short wave DF 
system.
I desire to state that during the last previous three years I have had made a 
considerable study of D.F. systems for navigation and approach purposes. 1 have 
read any British or American book which I could buy or borrow on the subject of 
D.F. and one and all agree that short wave D.F. inside distances of 300 miles is 
most unreliable.96
And, quoting from his own experience of the tests conducted in June 1939, gave witness 
to that assertion.97 It is not clear how Mulcahy reacted to these recommendations but 
pencil annotations on the letter suggest that he agreed with the general thrust but would 
stop short of recommending the military seizure of civil aviation facilities. On 17 January 
1940 the acting CO suggested that until such time as a military short wave station was 
installed at Baldonnell the existing civil DF, which would continue to function as a stand­
by for emergency civil use after the transfer of air services to Collinstown, might, with
53 ‘C iv il m ed ium  w av e  D F  s ta tio n  at B a ld o n n e l’, C ap t. T .J . H a n le y  to  O C  A C , 6 Ja n . 19 4 0  (M A , A C /2 /8 /4 ) .
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the cooperation of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs be used to train Signal
98Company or Air Corps wireless operators in DF procedures.
In due course Posts and Telegraphs responded to the proposal as forwarded by 
DOD. They indicated that the Baldonnel DF was still required, during the normal hours 
of the service of the Collinstown station, for emergency purposes only. The PO also 
stated that it was anticipated that the Baldonnell DF receiver would be required at 
Shannon Airport in a few months. Permission was granted to allow Air and Signal Corps 
personnel become familiar with procedures and to use the station for give DF bearings to 
military aircraft subject to conditions. The main condition specified that while civil 
aircraft were in flight on the cross-channel service in either direction that the training of 
army personnel should be suspended. The receiver at Baldonnel could only be tuned to 
the military frequency when there was no civil aircraft on the cross-channel service. The 
final condition stated that training and DF facilities could only be provided while the Post 
Office operator was in attendance so that, if DF services were required after normal hours 
of operation, prior arrangements should be m ade." Having been asked to specify the 
times at which a DF service and training facilities would be required Mulcahy confirmed 
that the service would be required during normal Air Corps duty hours and stated that he 
appreciated that Civil Aviation must receive priority from the D.F. station.100 While this 
arrangement might have appeared satisfactory in terms of the potential availability of DF 
bearings on the Air Corps medium wave frequency, it must be seen in the context of two 
civil cross-channel flights in each direction each day -  a situation that would have 
obviated such services for large parts of the standard day. In regard to operator training 
the Signal Corps apparently failed to supply additional personnel to train in DF procedure 
and it fell to the Air Corps to supply a small number of wireless operators who had to be 
withdrawn from flying duties.101
While the withdrawal from service, and the removal, of the Baldonnel DF station 
had been anticipated it continued to remain in service, ft was intimated once more in 
October 1940 that as the services at Dublin Airport were then well established the
98 A /O C  A C  to  D S , 17 Jan . 1940 (M A , A C /2 /8 /4 ).
99 D ep t. P &  T  to  D O D , 4 M ar. 1940  (M A , A C /2 /8 /4 ).
100 O C  A C  to  D S , 26 M ar. 1940 (M A , A C /2 /8 /4 ).
101 C ap t. P .J. M u rp h y  to  O C  A C , 19 A p r. 1940 (M A , A C /2 /8 /4 ) .
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question of the closing down of the DF station at Baldonnel for civil purposes was being 
considered and the views of the Air Corps on the matter were requested.102 Mulcahy, 
replying through the office of DS, stated that, as it was the only DF facility at Baldonnell 
it was required, in bad weather, for aircraft of the R. & M.B. Squadron and for the 
training of young pilots in the use of DF during instrument flying practice. He insisted 
that the DF continue to be made available for military aircraft when necessary and 
indicated that in the event of the PO staff being withdrawn Army personnel would have 
to take over the operation of the Station’.103 With the director of signals apparently not 
responding to the latest regarding the possible closure of the DF station OC AC was sent 
a reminder on the matter by Industry and Commerce and was asked for his views on the 
continued use of the station for civil stand-by purposes. 104 Having consulted two of his 
staff officers (Comdt. D.V. Horgan, Operations Officer; R.W. O’Sullivan, civilian 
aeronautical engineer) and OC AC Signals Company (Capt. M. Egan) Mulcahy 
recommended ‘that the DF station should be retained for civilian purposes as an 
alternative to Collinstown’ on the basis that ‘the latter could be rendered useless by 
enemy action’.105 The net result of this apparently perverse recommendation was that the 
Baldonnell DF station continued in its traditional civil aviation role until 5 September 
1941 106 ¡1 might have been considered that the DF station could have been transferred to 
military control much earlier on the basis that it could revert to civil use in the unlikely 
event of the Collinstown station being destroyed. It is significant that despite the agitation 
on the part of the pilots who required a proper DF service OC AC and his headquarters 
staff could not be convinced that such a service, under military control, was essential.
Notwithstanding the reluctance of AC HQ to take over the station it appears to 
have become more accessible for military use. Arising out of increased use those 
primarily concerned with the quality of the service and most familiar with its limitations, 
Lt. A.C. Woods and Capt. T.J. Hanley, endeavoured to have action taken to improve on 
the cumbersome and slow method of transmitting bearing to military aircraft. As there
102 D ep t, o f  I &  C to  O C  A C , 8 O ct. 1940, (M A , A C /2 /4 /2 9 ) .
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being no military transmitter co-located with the DF station the operator had no direct 
method of transmitting bearing information to the requesting pilot. The bearings were 
first sent by land line telephone to the Air Corps wireless station for transmission to the 
requesting aircraft, thus imposing an unacceptable delay. Lieut. A.C. Woods proposed 
two alternative wireless solutions that would speed up the process greatly - particularly 
for the benefit of aircraft as they get closer to the station. Capt. Hanley endorsed the 
observations and recommendations of his operations officer and suggested that if the
107system could not give four bearings per minute it should be changed without delay.
The very next day the tenuous position regarding the use of the station for military 
purposes was demonstrated by an incident, and its aftermath, involving the unauthorised 
us of the civil facility by the military. On the morning o f 21 November 1940 Anson 42 
was flow by Capt. T. J. Hanley to Rineanna. Acting on instructions, he was conveying a 
medical officer on a brief visit to the R. & M. B. Squadron detachment there. Having 
checked the weather forecast prior to his departure at 11.00 hours he indicated to the Air 
Corps Signal Officer that he would require DF assistance on his return, the time of which 
depended on the length of medical officers stay in Rineanna. At about 16.00 hours the 
aircraft left Rineanna in good flying conditions but encountered bad weather just west of 
Baldonnell. With cloud at 500 feet, fog at ground level, visibility of about 400 yards and 
the conditions getting rapidly worse it was essential that DF assistance be requested.108 
In the meanwhile Lieut. A.C. Woods, Operations Officer, CP Squadron had established 
that the aircraft had left Rineanna and that it would not reach Baldonnel until about 17.30 
hours and observing that the weather at Baldonnell was deteriorating to the extent that the 
aircraft would require DF services. He also established that the Post Office staff had 
closed down the station at 16.15 hours, the usual time. As Capt. M. Egan (OC Air Coips 
Signal Company) had indicated that he did not know what might be done Woods 
ascertained that 2/Lieut. Sinnott (Signal Officer, Fighter Squadron) knew how to operate 
the equipment and suggested that Sinnott be allowed to operate the station with the safety 
of the aircraft crew as the primary consideration. With the agreement of Capt. Egan
l07L ieu t. A .C . W o o d s  to  O C  C P  S q u a d ro n , 20  N o v . 1940; O C  C P  S q n . to A C  S ig n a ls  O ffice r , 20  N o v . 1940 
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Lieut. Woods and Lieut. Sinnott gained access to the DF station with the caretaker’s 
cooperation. The DR station was opened at 16.45 hours and, in the period from 16.56 to 
17.35 hours, Lieut. Sinnott passed bearings to the incoming aircraft. At 17.35 hours the 
aircraft made a safe night landing in poor weather conditions and the station was closed 
three minutes later.109
Two days later Capt. P.J. Murphy submitted a report to OC AC giving a brief 
outline of the circumstances relating to the use of the DF station. He did so, not by way of 
complaint but rather to highlight the urgent necessity for having satisfactory DF facilities 
available to aircraft whenever necessary.110 Without waiting for written reports or 
explanations on the matter Major Mulcahy wrote to the commanding officers of the two 
relevant units.
I am informed that, on the evening of 21st instant. 2/Lieut. Sinnott of your unit 
entered the Post Office D.F. Station and operated the station in the absence of the 
Post Office DF operator.
You will inform this officer that his action was irregular.111
He also reminded OC Fighter Squadron that the DF station closed down at 16.15 hours 
and that it was only with the permission of the Post Office that DF facilities could be 
made available thereafter. On the same day Mulcahy communicated in similar terms to 
OC CP Squadron reprimanding Lieut. A.C. Woods except that his actions were 
considered to be most irregular.112 Apparently no effort was made to establish why the 
AC Signals Officer, a member of Mulcahy’s staff, had failed to ensure that the DF station 
remained open after 16.15 hours.
Woods was to express his dissatisfaction with the implications of his commanding 
officer’s reprimand when explaining the matter to his squadron commander, Capt. T.J. 
Hanley, who had been the pilot of the aircraft. He detailed all the circumstances and,
109 D F  sta tio n  log , 21 N o v . 1940; L ie u t. A .C . W o o d s  to  O C  C P S q n ,  29  N o v . 194 0  (M A , A C /2 /4 /2 9 ) .
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while accepting that his action was considered irregular, justified his action on the basis 
of the safety of the aircraft and crew:
I take full responsibility for my actions in this case, I accept responsibility for both 
Capt. Egan and 2/Lt. Sinnott, as these officers, knowing me to be a flying officer of 
experience agreed with me. I must confess that if  a similar situation were to arise
i n
again, I would still feel it my duty to do the same thing.
Due to his being indisposed it was to be early January 1941 before Capt. T.J. Hanley 
could address the issue. He first confirmed that he had, as directed, made Lieut. Woods 
aware of the CO’s displeasure regarding the irregular use of the DF station. As pilot of 
the aircraft he made a comprehensive report on all pertinent aspects of the flight and the 
incident. He confirmed that the Corps Signals Officer had stated that he would arrange 
D.F facilities, would fly on the aircraft to Rineanna in order to carry out an inspection 
there and would act as Radio Operator on the flight. Having encountered the adverse 
weather conditions in the Baldonnell area Hanley stated that he was most thankful for the 
D.F. assistance and that he had not been aware that the regular operator was not on duty. 
He also stated that he would expect no less from Lieut. Woods or any other officer left in 
charge. He reminded OC AC that when he (Mulcahy) had been flown from Rineanna to 
Baldonnell on 9 December 1940 the DF station was also manned by Air Corps personnel 
in circumstances similar to those of 21 November. He was openly critical of his CO;
This bears out my statement that any officer with a sense of responsibility will have 
no compunction to ensure the safety of an aeroplane and its crew. To me the 
deplorable part of the situation is, that officers who do their obvious duty in such 
circumstances are admonished by their superiors, and all because no proper DF 
facilities exist at Baldonnel for Air Corps aeroplanes. The question of providing 
proper facilities for the Air Corps has now been going on for years without result, 
and these irregularities would not occur if (a) The DF station were handed over to
1,3 L ieu t. A .C . W o o d s  to  O C  C P  S q n ., 29  N o v . 1940 (M A , A C /2 /4 /2 9 ) .
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the Air Corps or (b) Post Office operators were stationed at Baldonnel where one of 
them would be at all times available.114
While not couched in personal terms this robust endorsement of the actions taken by 
Woods was, in effect, a considerable criticism of Major Mulcahy and his lack of empathy 
with pilots and the aviation culture. In November 1940 Capt. Hanley had already taken 
matters a stage further when he wrote to the Minister complaining about the failure of the 
Air Corps to purchase vacuum pumps, essential equipment on Anson aircraft.115 The 
highlighting of such matters was a manifestation of the frustration of the pilot body in 
general having regard to the standard of aircraft and other equipment as well as training 
and support services.
Folklore accounts of the 1939/41 period suggest that the pilot body was at 
loggerheads with its commanding officer and that pilots were threatening to remove their 
pilot’s wings because the CO wore wings to which he was not, as they saw it, entitled. 
The above critical correspondence would have been received by Colonel Mulcahy on 10 
January 1941, on the same day that the Chief of Staff had convened an ‘investigation into 
the effectiveness, organisation, equipment, training and administration of the Air Corps’. 
The convening of this investigation was made necessary by ‘the evidence of 
demoralisation, in some cases inefficiency and stagnation, and the inadequacy and 
unsuitability of equipment’. The committee concluded as follows:
The confidence of a large number at least of the junior officers of the Air Corps in 
Colonel Mulcahy has, through one cause or another, been hopelessly 
undermined.116 (See Chapter 11)
As stated above the investigation committee, on 30 January 1941, was able to comment 
favourably on the fact that the signal service within the Air Corps was gradually being 
built up, implying a considerable improvement of an earlier position. Notwithstanding,
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the situation illustrated by the evidence on signals matters suggests that the unsatisfactory 
states of communications and direction finding services were large contributors to the 
demoralisation of the pilots and central to the distrust that existed between them and their 
commanding officer in the latter part of 1940.
However to fully appreciate the poor situation regarding these services it is necessary to 
compare the communications services available to civil aviation - the cross-channel and 
trans-Atlantic services - and those available to military aviation on 3 September 1939. 
Baldonnell civil airport had both W/T and R/T transmitter and receiver sets of the 
appropriate frequency and power to serve the Irish sector of the cross channel air route. In 
addition it had a medium wave DF station to assist navigation and approach to the civil 
airport.117 These facilities were to be duplicated at the new Collinstown airport by 
January 1940. The Foynes / Shannon area was very well provided with the 
communication appropriate to the flying range of the trans-Atlantic flying boats using 
them. Ballygireen had three transmitters and receivers covering a broad spectrum of 
frequencies appropriate to long range communication. It also had one short wave and one 
medium wave DF station. At Urlanmore there was a short wave transmitter / receiver for 
point-to-point communication with Botwood, Newfoundland, Canada - over two 
thousand miles away. This wireless was remotely controlled from Ballygireen. Foynes 
itself had a single transmitter / receiver and a medium wave DF for air traffic 
approaching and departing the seaplane base.118
At the same time the military aerodrome at Baldonnell had a medium wave W/T 
transmitter and a receiver giving a range of fifty or sixty miles. In addition the 
aerodrome had a transmitter / receiver set, salvaged from an aircraft, operating on short 
wave and limited to a range of five or ten miles -  and no DF station. Rineanna had a 
mobile radio car that had insufficient range to maintain contact with aircraft any further 
than sixty miles away -  and no DF facility.119
The quality of communications generally, and direction finding facilities in 
particular, which were available to the Air Corps is in shaip contrast to those available,
117 D e p t. I &  C , C iv il A v ia tio n  N o tic e , N o . 3 o f  1936 , 15 M ay  1936
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on Irish soil, to the RAF during the emergency though it is not clear when these facilities 
became available. Towards the end of the war the UK Government noted a number of 
facilities it feared could be withdrawn by de Valera in uncertain circumstances:
There are two Post Office wireless stations (operated by Southern Irish personnel) 
on Southern Ireland territory, one at Valentia and the other at Malin Head; these are
used as direction finding beacons by our aircraft the withdrawal of the facilities
would be a serious loss.120
Similarly when listing the ‘facilities obtained from the government of Eire during the
war’ the Dominions Office acknowledged ‘the use by United Kingdom ships and
121aircraft of two wireless direction finding stations at Malin Head’. Although the end
of the war prevented its construction, de Valera had given the UK authorities
permission to build and operate a radar station, for use in its campaign against German
submarines in the North Atlantic, in the same compound on Malin Head. Had it been
built the UK authorities had agreed with Col. Liam Archer (by then Assistant Chief of
Staff) that it would have been passed off as a ‘radio lighthouse’ or a ‘glorified marker
122beacon’ for the guidance of aircraft.
Conclusions
The question arises as to what influence the development of the support services of 
meteorology, air traffic control and signals had on the Air Corps by late 1940. During 
the 1920s while the Air Corps was somewhat anxious to obtain appropriate weather 
forecasts at no stage did pilots get exercised by the matter while no great urgency was 
given to the matter of having a meteorological station at Baldonnell. While the 
national Meteorological Service was eventually established this was purely to coincide 
with the commencement of a civil air service to the United Kingdom. Though the air
120 A p p e n d ix  to re p o rt by S ir F in d la te r  S te w a rt, 18 M ar. 1944 (N A , P R E M  /3 /1 3 3 /3 ) . 
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service operated from Baldonnell from May 1936 to January 1940 the fact that a 
station was not established at Baldonnell appears almost contrived. Fr. W. M. 
O’Riordan M.Sc. and R. W. O’Sullivan, aeronautical engineer, had clear views as to 
the relevance of meteorology to military aviation. However Major Mulcahy attached 
no importance to the subject and most likely acted in a manner detrimental to the 
setting up of a meteorological station at Baldonnell. The position of the pilot body is 
perplexing. Given Mulcahy’s attitude to Fr. O’Riordan, who was the expert on the 
manner, it is quite possible that pilots were dissuaded from voicing opinions and that 
early in Mulcahy’s command they may have been in awe of a known disciplinarian.
As with meteorology the air traffic control function was developed specifically 
for civil aviation and initiated in 1936. Air Corps officers performed this function at 
Baldonnell on behalf of the Department of Industry and Commerce until early January 
1940 and thereafter at Dublin Airport. The same duties were performed at Foynes 
from August 1937 to January 1946. There is no evidence that the emphasis on civil 
ATC had any detriment influence on the conduct of military aviation except to the 
extent that many flying officers were rostered for civil ATC duties for longer or 
shorter periods during the Emergency -  suggesting that the provision of services to 
civil aviation had great priority than had air defence.
As the civil air service was being initiated in 1936 an appropriate wireless and 
direction finding service was established at Baldonnell for the sole use of civil aircraft. 
While the Signal Corps had traditionally provided W/T services for the army 
cooperation role function the new squadrons of the late 1930s would have required 
communications technically appropriate to air force roles. The evidence suggests that 
the Signal Corps, the independent arbiter of what was appropriate in tenns of Air 
Corps communications requirements, totally failed to identify such requirements, did 
not keep abreast with modem developments and, as a result failed to develop systems 
appropriate to the implied roles of military aviation. In view of the ease with which 
two amateurs, Thomas Murphy and Lieut. Andy Woods, provided and demonstrated 
how R?T could be provided, it is not easy to understand why the Signal Corps could 
not have manufactured a ground station appropriate to the needs of fighter aircraft.
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Similarly the failure of the Signal Corps to research and develop direction finding 
services is perplexing.
Mulcahy’s failure to ensure the equipping of aircraft and aerodromes with 
appropriate navigation facilities can only be understood in the context of his lack of 
expertise and knowledge that put him, literally, on a different frequency to the flying 
officers. The contrast, between the substantial communications resources put in place 
for commercial civil aviation (at Baldonnell, Dublin, Foynes, Ballygireen, and 
Urlanmore) and the rudimentary facilities that existed at Baldonnell on 3 September 
1939, could not have been starker. The ultimate irony regarding communications, 
though the Air Corps pilots would not have been aware at the time, was the fact that 
the RAF had the use of far superior direction finding facilities on Irish soil during the 
Emergency.
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CHAPTER 10
THE AIR CORPS’ EMERGENCY
Notwithstanding the approach of the outbreak of hostilities in the late summer of 1939 
neither the Army nor the government had definitive plans made, or even in preparation, 
for the defence of the country. The Army’s initial concept, of a conventional three service 
(army, air & naval) force mounting a conventional defence of the country, did not 
materialise due to the lack of Government approval and the necessary sanction of 
Finance. An integral part of such a defence, the Costello Air Corps proposals of 21 
March 1938, had been stillborn. The 1939 peace establishment, essentially the three 
cadre-strength training squadrons of Costello’s plan, in terms of aircraft types and 
numbers, equipment and personnel, fell very short of the prerequisites for the effective 
functioning of three operational squadrons purporting to perform at an air force level of 
air power and airmanship.
In the meanwhile the government’s covert strategy of cooperation with the UK 
while remaining neutral, reflected Finance’s belief that the country could not and should 
not mount a military defence o f its territory. As presaged in discussions between the 
minister and Major Mulcahy in 1937 military aviation was yet to be assigned a role in the 
security of the country. As a result a token level of funding, that dictated that the three 
operational squadrons o f 1939 which notionally might have comprised a total of fifty- 
four aircraft of three modem types, actually consisted of thirty obsolete machines of 
seven different types with minimal defensive or offensive capability. In keeping with the 
state’s parsimonious approach to air defence generally no aerodrome other than 
Baldonnell was prepared for use during the Emergency. Given the basic nature of it 
support services, particularly meteorology, communications and direction finding 
services, Baldonnell’s state of preparedness as a military aerodrome was itself highly 
questionable.
The following chapter initially examines the general deployment of officers, 
predominantly pilots, which appeared to reflect the priority given by the state to civil
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aviation before and during the Emergency. Of major importance was the decision to 
deploy an Air Corps reconnaissance detachment to Rineanna (the future Shannon 
Airport) before the outbreak of war. The establishment of a base there and its operation 
during the early months of the Emergency will be examined in detail. It will be contended 
that the reconnaissance effort at Rineanna had run its course by June 1940. The air 
aspects of the more acute emergency situation that arose in May 1940 will be assessed in 
the context of Army plans for defence against IRA-assisted German invasion. In 
particular the role of the Fighter Squadron will be examined in the context of the plan for 
the air defence of the Dublin region and of Mulcahy’s apparent reversion to army 
cooperation as the preferred general role for the Air Corps. In the context of the plan for 
the defence of Dublin it will be contended that the Air Corps’ pretence at air defence had 
totally evaporated by the end of 1940. However, sundry other activities, those connected 
with civil aviation and those connected with Irish -  British cooperation in air matters, 
was to prolong the usefulness of the Corps long after the degradation of its operational 
capabilities had been exposed.
The pilot officer situation
The Air Corps entered the Emergency on the basis of the 1939 peace establishment that 
provided for sixty-three officers, 153 NCOs and 351 privates, a total of 567 all ranks. 
While the strength on 20 September 1939 (512) represented over 90% of that permitted 
many had only recently been recruited and were untrained while there were significant 
deficiencies in the key disciplines of a technical corps. The main personnel shortages 
were in pilots, wireless operators, fitters, riggers and armament artificers -  in effect in 
those occupations essential to the operation of military aircraft. The pilot numbers, at 
thirty-three, was a little over 50% of the notional establishment figure and less than a 
quarter of the number that was to be permitted by the 1940 war establishment. This 
number included the commanding officer, Major P.A. Mulcahy whose qualification as a 
pilot back in 1936 was highly suspect and who was not authorised by the school
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commandant to fly on his own after March 1938.1 Notwithstanding the paucity of pilots 
only one class of pilots had trained and qualified under Mulcahy’s command. In 1938/39, 
with GHQ unwilling to post newly commissioned officers for flying training and with 
Mulcahy only displaying moderate concern about initiating the short service scheme 
there was no perception of an overall pilot shortage or within individual squadrons. 
Indeed it is of particular note that Comdt. G.J. Carroll and Capt. T.J. Hanley spent much 
of 1939 in the employ of Aer Lingus. Both had returned to the service by 1 September 
1939. While Hanley served from June 1939 to March 1945 Carroll (chief technical 
officer and second-in-command) returned to Aer Lingus on 23 October 1939 and, except 
for brief periods in 1940 and 1941 spent the greater part of the Emergency away from the
-y
Air Corps on half pay.
During the first sixteen months of the Emergency pilots were employed on the 
basis of about one third between AC HQ and Schools, one third between R & MB and CP 
Squadrons and one third with Fighter Squadron. The training cadre status of the three 
squadrons indicates that the squadrons were not considered capable of performing to an 
operational standard.3 While pilot numbers increased with the qualification of twenty- 
three young officers in 1940/41 the squadrons were never to achieve anything like full 
strength in flying officers under the 1940 war establishment. However this deficiency 
never became a critical factor. As will be explained the manifest deficiencies in aircraft 
performance and numbers, and in squadron operational capabilities, far exceeded any 
disadvantage represented by low pilot numbers. After 1940 the matter of pilot numbers 
was no longer even of academic interest except to the extent that flying instructors had to 
be withdrawn from the service squadrons from time to time to ensure the progress of the 
short service scheme in Schools.4 Paradoxically it was the training of pilots for civil
1 O C  A C  to  C O S , A C F /6 3 1  d a te d  2 0  Sep t. 1939 (in  m y p o sse s s io n ); ‘R e co rd  o f  p ilo t in take  in to  A ir  C o rp s ’ 
(A C  M u se u m ); T .J . H a n le y  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 17 A p ril 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
" O f f ic e r ’s h is to ry  S h e e t 0 /2 8 7 ,  c o u rte sy  o f  C o m m iss io n e d  o ff ic e rs  re co rd  o ffice , D F H Q  ; T .J . H a n ley  to 
A C  in v e s tig a tio n , 12 N o v . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ); O C  A C  to  O C  E . C o m d ., A C F /4 9 5 /1  d a ted  2 Jan . 1946 
(in  m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
3‘A p p o in tm e n ts  O f f ic e rs ’, 5 M a y  1939 ; O C  A C  to  C O S , 20  S ep t, 1940; ‘F ig h te r  S q u a d ro n  in te rn al 
o rg a n is a t io n ’, 16 D ec . 1940; ‘O rg a n isa tio n  c h a r t’, R  & M B  S q n ., 14 Jan . 1941; ‘C o asta l P a tro l S q u a d ro n ’ 
D ec . 19 4 0 ; ‘C o rp s H Q , W o rk sh o p s  an d  D e p o t’, 18 D ec . 1940 ; ‘A ir  C o rp s  S c h o o ls ’, D ec. 1940 (in  m y 
p o sse s s io n ) .
4 O C  A C  to  C O S , A C F /6 3 1 d a te d  20  S ep t. 1939 (in  m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
3 0 7
aviation that appears to have had greater priority than any other Air Corps activity during 
the emergency. (See Chapter Five)
The deployment of individual officers during the Emergency indicates that the Air 
Corps’ mandate to support civil aviation had priority over military missions. This is 
evident in the record that shows that, during the period July 1937 to December 1944, 
seventeen officers were seconded to civil aviation air traffic control (at Foynes, 
Collinstown, Rineanna / Shannon, and Baldonnell up to January 1940) for periods 
ranging from one month to five years. These duties removed pilots and observers from 
operational duties for extended periods. Similarly flying instructors were taken from 
instructional duties. Capt. P. McCormack, an aeronautical engineer and pilot, carried out 
ATC duties for nineteen months in 1943/44 to the neglect of his responsibilities as the 
officer in charge of Workshops in Maintenance Unit. As early as December 1943 six 
officers were seconded to Industry and Commerce for an ATC course. Of these three 
were appointed to civil ATC and had retired by November 1944. As late as January 1945 
four pilots were still detached from their units on loan to civil ATC while the last one 
remained so detached until January 1946.5
Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber Squadron
On Tuesday 29 August 1939 OC AC received a verbal instruction from the Chief of 
Staff, possibly by telephone, as a result of which he immediately replied:
In accordance with your instructions of today the Shannon airport will be occupied 
by the Reconnaissance Squadron (Cadre) tomorrow.... The following matters are 
required to be arranged immediately....authority to use the labour camp at the
airport...[the] Department of Industry and Commerce to be notified Southern
Command to be instructed to facilitate... in regard to armed guard, supply of
s‘O u tlin e  o f  se rv ice s  re n d e re d  b y  A ir  C o rp s , m ilita ry  an d  c iv il p e rso n n e l to  C iv il A v ia tio n  D e p t .’ , 1 Ju ly  
1937 to  31 D ec. 1944 (M A , E D P 2 3 /3 ); R e co rd  o f  co n tro l o ff ic e rs  at F o y n e s , 1937 to  2 Jan . 1946, 
A C F /5 0 3 /2 ; U n d a ted  lis t, ‘O ff ic e rs  a p p o in tm e n ts ’, 1943 e s ta b lish m e n t (in m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
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bedding [and] rations, medical officer and medical orderly to be attached...
arrangements to be made for mass ....on Sundays.6
Mulcahy also requested that a previous arrangement, for the refuelling of military aircraft 
by Irish Shell, be approved by the QMG and renewed. He also requested that a telephone 
line be installed at the squadron commander’s headquarters. He requested the return of a 
workshop lorry that had originally been purchased for the Air Corps but which had been 
transferred to the Supply and Transport Corps some years previously. While this was 
considered essential to the servicing of aircraft, literally in the field, there is no record of 
its return. That the Air Corps got the minimum notice is confirmed by Colonel Mulcahy 
in his evidence to the investigation committee in late 1941. In response to assertions 
made by a number of officers that they had no training or experience in maritime 
reconnaissance Mulcahy explained:
It must be bome in mind that sea reconnaissance was sprung upon us and that we
n
moved to Rineanna to carry out coast reconnaissance at 48 hours notice.
While Mulcahy’s response to the verbal order suggests that he got only twenty-four hours 
notice, in the military tradition, he may well have received a warning order the previous 
day. The timing of the detachment, in the absence of any previous military preparations, 
strongly suggests that the decision to occupy Shannon had only just been taken -  not by 
the Chief of Staff but by the government. While the Government may have discussed the 
matter with the Chief of Staff it seems highly unlikely that Mulcahy was consulted on the 
matter or that the ability of the Air Corps to undertake a viable maritime reconnaissance 
role, in the North Atlantic in winter weather conditions, was given much consideration.
While much correspondence survives to illustrate administrative aspects of the 
detachment there is a great paucity of material relating to operational matters. The most 
obvious deficiency is that of a written order authorising and establishing the detachment 
and stating its mission. In an organisation that was hide-bound by written orders and
6 O C  A C  to  C O S , 29  A u g . 1939 (M A , A C  2 /9 /1 2 ).
7 M u lc ah y  to  A C  In v e s tig a tio n , 23 O ct. 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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regulations the absence of a written order in this instance must be taken as deliberate. 
While the original decision may or may not be related to Archer’s visit to London on 25 
August 1939 it is certain that the posting of an Air Corps detachment to Shannon / 
Rineanna on 30 August 1939 had little to do with national defence and much to do with 
British-Irish cooperation. Subsequent records relating to Air Defence Command support 
the contention that the role of this detachment, whose ‘instructions were to carry out 
coastal patrols of our territorial waters from Lough Swilly along the west and south 
coasts to Wexford Harbour’, was as part of the intelligence gathering machine that 
included over eighty look-out posts of the Coast Watching Service, some 759 Garda 
stations and a small number of military posts, that observed and recorded aircraft and 
shipping movements during the Emergency.8 This contention is well supported in the 
context of subsequent British consideration of Irish demands for aircraft spares on the 
basis of the reconnaissance patrols which the Air Corps was carrying out and the reports 
on German submarine activities the country was then furnishing to the UK/'
The question however arises as to what influences were brought to bear to bring 
about such a precipitous decision. Mulcahy was apparently informed on 28 August 1939 
almost a week prior to the signing of the Emergency Powers Order, 1939 and the 
declaration of war by the UK. The detachment had taken place almost immediately. On 
or about 30 September the minister for Defence stated that it had been found necessary to 
send Archer to London, on 25 August 1939, on business of a similar confidential nature 
to that first authorised by de Valera in October 1938.10 Accepting that Archer’s original 
visit to London, from 10 to 14 October 1938, was related to intelligence and counter 
intelligence matters it seems not unreasonable that business of a similar confidential 
nature, in August 1939, would relate to intelligence matters.11 In this instance, with de 
Valera withholding use of the treaty ports, it is possible that the resulting lack of air and 
naval intelligence became an urgent matter for the UK in the context of its own defence. I 
suggest that, while it might not have been the main reason for Archer’s latest visit to
8 ‘R e p o r t’, W .J. K e an e  to  O C  S. C o m d , 12 A p r. 1940 , A p p e n d ix  N o . X X II, R ep o rt and  fin d in g s  o f  th e  
co m m itte e , 10 Jan . 1942 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ), (h e re a f te r  K e a n e  re p o rt, 12 A pr. 1940); A ir  D e fen c e ,
O p e ra tio n s  O rd e rN o . 1 /1 9 4 0 , 25  M ay  1940 (M A , E D P  1 /1). U n d a ted  ‘K ey  to  a ir and m arin e  in te llig e n ce  
sp ec ia l m a p ’, G .2  B ran ch , G H Q  (in  m y  p o ssess io n ).
9 F ile  n o tes , J.E . S te p h en so n , 3 M a y  1940 (N A , D O  3 5 /1 0 7 8 /3 ) .
10 Sec D O D  to  Sec  D F , 3 0  S ep t. 1939 (N A I, D F  S .1 0 5 /0 0 4 8 /3 8 ).
1 'E . O ’FIalpin (ed .) , MI5 and Ireland, 1939-1945; the official history (D u b lin , 2 0 0 3 ), p. 22.
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London, these matters were possibly raised by the British and that the Irish government 
was subsequently requested to post a reconnaissance element to Rineanna. Alternatively 
the matter may have been raised and arranged at a diplomatic level. Whatever the exact 
circumstances within five days of Archer’s last pre-war visit to London the decision had 
been taken and the detachment was in position.
The detachment
An Air Corps detachment of 3 Ansons and 2 Walrus aircraft arrived at Rineanna on the
Table 10.1 Establishment and Strength - R & MB Squadron detachment, Rineanna.
R & MB Squadron. Officers NCOs Privates Total Aircraft
1937 Establishment (Cadre)12 6 8 16 30 Not
specified
Proposed —26 March 193813 22 43 144 209 Do.
Proposed-2 1  April 193 814 22 [62] [124] 208 Do.
1939 Peace Establishment. 
(Cadre)
17 32 61 110 Do.
1940 War Establishment. Less 37 72 156 265
‘[72 O/Ranks] not to raised’15 37 48 108 193 16
Average strength 1939/ 40 11 10 65 86 [9]
Attached personnel 1 6 6 13
Total 16 12 16 71 99
12 A m e n d m e n t 14 to  1934  e s tab lish m en t, 1 A p r. 1937 (M A ).
13 O C  A C  to  A C S , 2 6  M ar. 1938 , A p p en d ix  N o . V , R e p o rt and  fin d in g s  (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
14 M aj. P .A . M u lc a h y  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 21 A p r. 1938 , A p p e n d ix  N o . 1 1 1(A ) (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ). T h e  
f ig u res  in b ra ck e ts  a re  e s tim a te d .
b  1940 W ar e s ta b lish m e n t (M A ).
16 K e an e  rep o rt, 12 A p r. 1940  (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
17 T h e  n in e  A v ro  A n so n s  w e re  d is tr ib u te d  b e tw een  R  & M B  S q n , C P  Sqn . and A C  S c h o o ls .
31 1
Strength, R & MB Sqn. 10 19 74 103 6
14.1.1941
Attached, Sigs, Cav, Arty 18 5 8 40 53
Baldonnell -Maintenance. 19 1 6 14 21
Total 16 27 114 157
evening of Wednesday 30 August 1939. The Air Corps personnel consisted of eleven 
officers (ten pilots and a signals officer cum W/T instructor) and seventy-seven other 
ranks. The attachment of a medical officer and three other ranks brought the total on the 
first day of occupation to ninety-two all ranks. This total should be noted in the context of 
the R & MB Sqn. that had a notional establishment of 110 all ranks - seventeen officers, 
thirty-two non-commissioned officers and sixty-one privates. As such the squadron was 
not equipped to function without such garrison services as catering, guards, 
accommodation, recreational facilities and sundry stores. Within days of arriving a pilot 
officer was detailed to report to Foynes for ATC duties while an officer, six NCOs and 
thirty men of 1st Battalion reported for Garrison duties but were apparently not placed 
under Air Corps’ command.20 During the first seven months, when the operation was at 
its most intense, the average strength of the detachment, including attached personnel, 
was less than one hundred. Even after the transition to the 1940 War Establishment the 
strength of the air element was just above 50% of the permitted 193 while the number of 
pilots was marginally above 25%. Rather than being kept at a maximum possible 
strength, within the limits of current Establishments, it might be considered that the 
Rineanna detachment was actually kept to the minimum.
The aerodrome
It will be appreciated that Shannon Airport was still at a very early stage of its 
development as a civil airport for trans-Atlantic air services. In August 1939 it could best
18 S tren g th  re tu rn , ‘T h e  A ir  C o rp s  R in e a n n a ’, 14 Jan . 1941 (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ).
19 K e an e  rep o rt, 12 A p r. 1940  (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
20 A d m in is tra tiv e  d iary , 3 0  A u g ; 1 Sep t. 1939 (in  m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
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be described as a mile square of recently reclaimed marsh. Its only buildings were about
thirteen timber Nissan hut style buildings -  the Labour Camp - that had housed the labour
21force who had carried out the drainage work during the period from 8 October 1936. 
Basic aeronautical facilities, such as telephones, aeronautical communications, direction 
finding station, meteorological station and night flying equipment, that should exist on 
any military aerodrome well before the arrival of an operational squadron, were not 
available. The major deficiency was that of an aircraft hangar. In its absence aircraft had 
to be picketed in the open for the first nine months while a marquee and tents, without 
duck-boards, were used initially to store spares and other materiel.22 To protect aircraft 
from the elements some were returned to Baldonnell while makeshift covers were made 
for others using material salvaged from a barrage balloon that had been shot down by the 
squadron.
It was to be 22 September 1939 before DOD contacted Finance with regard to the 
provision of covered accommodation for aircraft that, of their very nature, were never 
intended to be parked in the open at night or in inclement weather. Defence emphasised 
the necessity to arrange the erection of a hangar as quickly as possible indicating that 
aircraft and instruments were subject to rapid deterioration. Consideration had been given 
to the question of dismantling the ex-RAF hangars at Fennoy and re-erecting them at 
Rineanna. The idea had been dropped on the basis of the dilapidated state of the hangars 
and the fact that they were required for the accommodation of Southern Command 
troops. While consideration was also given to the erection of temporary canvas hangars 
the department opted for a new and permanent hangar as the solution to the problem. 
Flaving been in contact with Messrs Thomas Thompson of Carlow, and ascertaining that 
that company had sufficient stocks of steel to build a suitable hangar, Defence had the 
director of engineers draw up a specification in consultation with the firm. The sanction 
of the Minister for Finance was sought, ‘as an emergency measure for placing an order’ 
for ‘the complete structure (including electric light)’ that could ‘be erected at a cost not 
exceeding £10,000’.24
21 Shannon Airport, 50 years of engineering, ¡937-1987 (A e r  R ian ta , S h an n o n , 198 7 ), passim.
“  R in an n a  a d m in is tra tiv e  d iary , 1 S ep t. 1939 (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
23 K e an e  re p o rt, 12 A p ril 1940 (M A , A C S  22 /2 3 ).
24 Sec D O D  to Sec  D F , 22  Sep t. 1939; D F  file  m em o , 29  S ep t. 1939 (N A I, D F , S. 0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ) .
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About a week later Finance had considered the proposal and directed the Office of 
Public Works to take charge of the project. Under the instructions of Defence OPW was 
to place the contract with Thompsons, without the customary tendering process, and to 
supervise the completion of the contract.25 Having studied the drawings and specification 
proposed by Thompsons the OPW identified several deficiencies in the design. They 
considered that the structure would need to be strengthened for erection in such an 
exposed location and that the provision for natural lighting was inadequate. It was also 
thought that the roof and walls, of galvanised corrugated iron, would allow extremes of 
heat and cold and cause excessive condensation. They concluded that the structure was of 
a type which could only be justified by the emergency situation. The OPW also noted the 
absence of adequate provision for site works and that the Air Corps would require some 
sort of apron in front of the hangar that would add a further £1,000 to the cost. The 
OPW’s preferred option was for a pennanent hangar of better construction and costing as 
much as £22,000 but which would not be ready until July or August 1940. As the Air 
Corps had indicated that such a delay was unacceptable the OPW indicated that they had 
arranged with Thompson & Sons Ltd. to proceed at once with the erection of the hangar. 
The OPW sought sanction for a total of £12,100 to cover the cost of the hangar and the 
apron.26 An official of the Department of Finance considered the proposal to be 
unattractive but, recognising that action had to be expedited to provide shelter for the 
aircraft, provided the required sanction.27 After further exchanges of views on the matter 
of the cost of the apron Finance sanctioned the expenditure of £500 for the apron, £200 
for site works and a total of £11,100 for the provision of a hangar.28 The contract for the 
erection of a military hangar, costing £10,988, at Shannon Airport, Co. Clare, was placed
29with Thompsons of Carlow without a competition by specific direction of Finance.
The development of military accommodations must be seen in the context of the 
simultaneous development of the civil airport, a project that apparently had had greater 
priority. The ‘Airport Committee’, no more than any other agency, did not know what the 
medium to long term policy of the DOD might be and was concerned about the provision
25 S ec  D F  to  S ec  O P W , 30  Sept. 1939 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ) .
26 Sec O P W  to  Sec D F , 25 O ct. 1939 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ).
27 D F  file  m em o , 3 N o v . 1939 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ) .
28 Sec D F  to Sec O P W , 3 1 0 c t .  1939; Sec  D F  to  Sec  O P W , 4  N o v . 1939 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ) .
2 ,‘E x trac t from  list o f  c o n tra c ts ’, O P W  to D F , 16 Jan . 1941 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ).
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of some form of accommodation for its own administrative purposes. The committee was 
endeavouring to take a decision regarding the spending of £1,800 on temporary huts in 
1940 and £18,000 to £20,000 on more temporary accommodation in 1941 and subsequent 
years or the construction of a first phase of a permanent building to cost about £45,000. 
They considered that there would be no temporary accommodation problem during the 
Emergency if the Air Corps could be got out of the labour hutments which they had taken
• 30took m August.
Meanwhile OPW had included £2,000 in its estimate for 1940/41 on the basis that 
the hangar works would not be completed before 31 March 1940 and that retention on the 
main contract (£550), the cost of the apron (£1,000) and contingencies (£450) would 
come to that amount.31 In February DOD sought £250 in addition to the £500 already 
sanctioned for the apron area. They also indicated to Finance that it would be necessary 
to provide a water supply and sewage system as well as drinking water and water for the 
washing of aircraft.32 Financial approval for an additional £250 was received in March.33 
The matter of a water supply was further addressed by OPW in the context of a new 
water main which is being laid between the well in the military camp and the new civil 
buildings then being built. It was suggested that a water connection be made to the 
hangar. However, rather than have mains sewage, it was recommended that an elsan toilet 
closet similar to those available in the military huts, be installed in the hangar. The water 
and sewage proposals, costing £100 each, were put forward as something inexpensive.34 
The OPW received sanction for the required £200 by return of post.35 Subsequently OPW 
sought and received financial sanction for further £88 spent on the apron, £75 for a 
sealing coat on the apron surface and £48 for the installation of two winches to facilitate 
opening and closing of the heavy hangar doors.36 The water connection and sanitary 
works, originally estimated at £200, eventually cost £282. 8s. Od and was duly 
sanctioned.37
3(1 A irp o rt co n stru c tio n  co m m itte e  to  Sec I &  C , 26  O ct. 1939 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ) .
31 O P W , ‘A n n u a l e s tim a te  1940-1941  ’ (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ).
32Sec D O D  to  Sec D F , 26  F eb . 1940  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ).
33 D F  to  O P W , 11 M ar. 1940 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ).
34 Sec O P W  to  Sec D O D , 11 A pr. 1940  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ).
35 Sec D F  to  Sec O P W , 11 A p r. 1940  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ).
36 Sec  O P W  to  S ec  D F , 4 M ar. 1941 ; S ec  D F  to  S ec  O P W , 25 M ar. 1941 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ) .
37Sec D F  to  Sec O P W , 4  Ju ly  1941 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 7 /0 0 2 4 /3 9 ).
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While additional huts were built by March 1940 living conditions were poor for 
officers and other ranks alike. Further modest expenditure was incurred during 1941 and 
1942 as more hutments were built to provide for additional army troops as the aerodrome 
assumed the status of an outpost of the Southern Command.38 The measured, and belated, 
expenditure on facilities for the Air Corps at Rineanna during the Emergency might be 
contrasted with the substantial investment, at least £1.1 million, made in developing
39Dublin and Shannon at about the same time.
The aircraft
The detachment arrived in Shannon / Rineanna with three Avro Anson 1 aircraft out of a 
full complement of nine, and the two Walrus amphibian aircraft (out of three delivered in 
March 1939). The number of aircraft at Rineanna at any one time was not significant as 
the aircraft had to be returned to Baldonnell for servicing after only twenty hours flying 
or for anything other than minor repairs. Air Corps folklore recalls that many aircraft 
were rotated on Saturdays and Mondays so that some married personnel could return to 
their families in the Dublin area at week-ends. The number of aircraft was kept to an 
absolute minimum due to the lack of shelter and the damage done to aircraft and 
instruments by the high relative humidity. In effect the R & MB Squadron at Rineanna 
and the CP Squadron at Baldonnell were run as flights of a single squadron operating 
from the same pool of aircraft.40
The Avro Anson Mk. I, or Avro 652A, was a military development of a six seat 
commercial aircraft and had gone into service with the RAF in March 1936 having been 
produced to a specification for a general coastal reconnaissance aircraft. It was a twin- 
engined monoplane with a fabric covered metal fuselage and wooden wings and had a 
maximum range of 790 miles and a cruising speed of 158 mph.41 In RAF service before 
the war the Anson was primarily used in a variety of training roles, such as twin-engined 
conversion, reconnaissance, bombing and navigation. Well into 1940 a small number of
38 ‘A c co m m o d a tio n  R in e a n n a ’ (M A , F ile  A C /2 /9 /1 2 ) .
39 O P W  m em o , 31 O ct. 1941 (M A , 2 /7 2 4 5 6  p a rt III).
40 K e an e  rep o rt, 12 A p r. 1940 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
41 K .J. M e e k o m s , E .B . M o rg an  (ed s), The British aircraft specifications file; British military and 
commercial aircraft specifications 1920- 1949 (T o n b rid g e , 1994), p . 213 .
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squadrons were operating the type in an inshore coastal reconnaissance role at various 
locations around the UK but only until such time as the production of aircraft such as the 
Lockheed Hudson, Blenheim and Whitney facilitated their withdrawal from front line 
service. As early as the summer of 1939 Hudsons, that had much superior speed, range 
and endurance, had begun to replace some of the Ansons of ten Coastal Command 
squadrons. Thereafter Ansons reverted to training or were used for inshore search and 
rescue duties.42
The operation
Considering the secrecy surrounding the original decision and operational matters 
generally it not surprising that little is known about the actual mission and the manner in 
which it was undertaken. Coastal patrols had begun on 31 August 1939 after Captain T.J. 
Hanley had explained the purpose and details of patrol to all officers. The first patrol was 
forced to return owing to bad weather conditions. On the same day the squadron 
commander, Captain W.J. Keane visited Foynes meteorological station to make 
arrangements for 06.00 hours and 14.00 hours weather forecasts to be relayed via the 
telephone in the Civic Guard barracks on the airfield. Subsequently arrangements were 
made to three hour forecasts by telephone five times each day. Similarly arrangements 
were made with Ballygireen radio station, which was located six miles north of Rineanna, 
with particular reference to the availability of its civil Direction Finding service for use if 
and when the said station was not busy with trans-Atlantic traffic using Foynes.43 The 
basic nature of the facilities at Rineanna was emphasised by an incident in early 
September.
Lt. Ryan, when returning from patrol found it necessary to land in [the] dark, as
[the] landing light in [the] machine (A45) had been removed. An emergency flare-
4_ J.J. H a iley , Squadrons of the Royal Air Force (T o n b rid g e , 1985), passim; R a y  S tu r tiv a n t, The histoty of 
Britain's military training aircraft (Y e o v il, 198 7 ), p p  7 7 -8 7 ; M ic h ae l A rm ita g e , The Royal Air Force; an 
illustrated h is to ry  (L o n d o n , 1993), p . 75 .
43 A d m in is tra tiv e  d iary , 31 A u g ; 4  S ep t. 1939 (in m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
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path was made of lighting hay, and with [the] assistance of [the] headlamps of a 
car, he landed successfully.44
Subsequently the squadron commander reported that he had procured some Toledo flare 
for runway lighting and had erected some temporary obstruction lights in the vicinity of 
the aerodrome. In the absence of a proper ground station for communication with 
patrolling aircraft, and for the transmission of patrol reports to GHQ, these services were 
provided from a mobile radio car. Within days of arriving at Rineanna the signals officer, 
Lieut. P.J. Murphy received instructions form the director of signals in GHQ. The main 
directive was based on the fact that the Department of Posts and Telegraphs had agreed 
that the civil aeronautical communications station at Ballygireen would take over as the 
ground station for communications with the squadron aircraft. Ballygireen was to be 
used, not just for aeronautical communications, but also for the normal military wireless 
traffic with GHQ including patrol reports. On completion of the necessary arrangements 
with Mr. Enwright of Ballygireen, and the installation of a direct telephone line to GHQ 
via Ballgirreen, the wireless van was to be returned to Baldonnell.45
Many disadvantages, both technical and operational, were identified by Capt. W. 
J. Keane and his signals officer. These points were taken up by Mulcahy after he had 
visited Rineanna on 9 September. He informed the ACS that the arrangement, made by 
the director of signals, that Ballygireen radio station take over the military ground station 
duties was unworkable. He had observed that while he was in Rineanna one Air Corps 
patrolling aircraft working with the military wireless car while Ballygireen was working, 
on a different frequency, a flying boat which was on its way to Foynes. He concluded that 
Ballygireen could not be of service to military aircraft in such circumstances. He also 
pointed out that confidential matters in the reconnaissance reports had to be sent by 
secure radio reports to Command HQ and to intelligence branch (G2) of GHQ at the end 
of each patrol and that such matters could not be handled by the civilian staff. He stated 
that the wireless car must remain at Rineanna for aircraft duties and that Ballygireen
44 A d m in is tra tiv e  d iary , 4 Sept. 1939 (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
45 T e le p h o n e  m essag e, D S  to  C ap t. P .J. M u rp h y , 7 S ep t. 1939 (M A , A C /2 /8 /4 .)
318
could handle all normal ground messages and provide DF in cases of necessity.46 The 
wireless car remained at Rineanna as the only means of communication with aircraft on 
patrol and as a secure means of communication with Southern Command and GHQ 
intelligence staff.47
In the absence of reports on operational matters at Rineanna it is not clear to what 
extent the medium wave DF at Ballygireen was used either for navigation puiposes or as 
an aid to aircraft returning to the airfield in bad weather. It is however known that pilots 
were given instruction and practice in both instrument and night flying and used the DF 
station in making practice approaches to Rineanna. The squadron commander reported 
that there was no DF station at Rineanna and that the use of E.I.P. (Ballygireen) 
demanded the utmost precision as pilots familiarised themselves in approaching with the 
aid of QDMs and QDRs’ (magnetic bearings towards the station and magnetic bearings 
from the station).48 This precision was required due to the fact that the DF station was so 
far removed from the airfield at Rineanna. Aircraft initially had to home to overhead 
Ballygireen and then fly towards Rineanna on a QDR or reciprocal bearing. The further 
the aircraft progressed towards the airfield and away from the DF station the greater the 
effect of the slightest deviation from the desired track. A track error of more than one 
degree might mean the airfield would not be sighted in poor weather conditions.
Such use might have been made of Ballygireen DF on 10 October 1939 but 
apparently was not. On that day Anson 44 was being brought back to Rineanna after 
servicing. Having left Baldonnell at 18.30 hours the aircraft encountered low cloud and 
very poor visibility en route. When the conditions got too bad to continue visually the 
pilot decided to carry out a forced landing in blinding rain. In doing so the aircraft 
bounced and struck a hedge causing some £1,245 worth of damage to the aircraft, 
engines, and equipment. It is apparent from the abbreviated report on file that the 
subsequent court of inquiry did not examine the full circumstances of the accident at 
Ardcroney, Nenagh.49 Had the court done so it might have inquired why the aircraft, 
returning to Rineanna at dusk and in bad weather, was not flown at a safe altitude
46 Ibid; C ap t. W .J. K e an e  to O C  A C , 8 S ep t. 1939; O C  A C  to  A C S , 11 S ep t. 1939  (M A , A C /2 /8 /4 ) .
47 D S , ‘T ech n ica l In s tru c tio n  N o . 2 4 ’, 18 Ju n e  1941 (in  m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
48 K e an e  rep o rt, 12 A p r. 1940  (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
49 S ec  D O D  to  S ec  D F , 25 M a y  19 4 0  (N A I, D F , S .0 0 8 /0 0 2 9 /3 9 ) .
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towards the DF station at Ballygireen prior to making an instrument approach into 
Rineanna.
By 19 December 1939 a total of three Ansons had been removed from service as a 
result of accidents. The first, Anson 45, had been badly damaged as early as 8 September 
as a result of engine failure and a forced landing at Ballyferriter, county Kerry. The main 
contributory cause was a faulty fuel cock that caused fuel starvation. On 19 December 
1939 Anson 43 was damaged beyond repair due to engine failure that resulted in a forced 
landing into Galway Bay. Ansons 44 and 45 were to remain out of service for some time 
due to the difficulty in procuring spares.50 As early as November 1939 Mulcahy had 
reported that ‘the coastal patrol is being maintained with difficulty’ and that some 
aeroplanes ‘are being kept serviceable by taking parts and instruments from other 
aeroplanes’.51
The question arises as to the number of patrols undertaken. Initially the squadron 
carried out two per day. This frequency was quickly reduced. On 5 September the 
squadron commander recorded that until further notice there would be only one patrol per 
day with two pilots and crews on standby. While no figures are available for the total 
number of patrols carried out Mulcahy gave a somewhat vague indication to the 
investigation:
. . ..during last winter the reconnaissance squadron flew approximately 80,000 miles 
and covered generally the coastline from Wexford to Donegal, with particular 
attention to the west coast from Belmullet to the Mouth of the Shannon and the 
south coast from Mizen Head to Waterford.52
When asked what the distance represented in patrols Mulcahy suggested an average of 
one to two patrols per day suggesting that the complete area would be covered once a 
week and special areas once daily.55 This description does not appear to indicate more 
than a patrol per day at best. By April 1940, with three Ansons out of service pro tem the
50K e a n e  re p o rt, 12 A pr. 1940 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ); S ec  D O D  to  Sec D F , 27  M a y  1940; S ec  D O D  to  Sec  D F ,
16 S ep t. 1941 (N A I, D F , S .0 0 8 /0 0 2 9 /3 9 ).
51 O C  A C  to C O S , 23 N o v . 1939 (M A , A C /2 /2 /3 5 ).
52P .A . M u lc ah y  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 21 Jan . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
53 Ib id .
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maintenance of the remaining six was proving difficult due to lack of spares.54 The major 
difficulty was that, while twelve months supply of spares had been ordered when 
ordering aircraft, spares for Ansons were only arriving spasmodically. In the meanwhile 
radio sets and armament was being received for other aircraft that had not been delivered. 
On 29 April 1940 only three of the six remaining Ansons were serviceable as the other 
three awaited engine spares and it was predicted that if spares did not arrive quickly the 
coastal patrol operation would cease.55
The matter of aircraft serviceability and its effect on coastal patrols was brought 
to a head, not by Mulcahy but by the intervention of Col. M.J. Costello, by then OC 
Southern Command and Capt. W.J. Keane’s immediate superior. Costello acknowledged 
the Chief of Staffs role in directing and monitoring the conduct of patrol out of 
Rineanna. He indicated that it was with hesitation that he wrote on a matter that was 
strictly speaking outside his remit. The basic point that he made was to the effect that he 
considered that the Ansons were almost at the end of their useful life:
 the present position is so unsatisfactory that, unless there is a reasonable
prospect of maintaining a reconnaissance squadron at a reasonable [aircraft] 
strength the entire position of the Air Corps will have to be reviewed. ...In order 
to survive [sic] the limited number of flying hours left patrols are not now
undertaken save in the most favourable weather conditions I am sure that
you fully realise the serious strain on the morale of all ranks at Rineanna which the 
gradual petering out of their equipment imposes.56
Costello also described the living conditions at Rineanna in stark terms:
At the same time the accommodation in the camp is unsatisfactory from the point 
of view of its security, as well as from the point of view of the health and morale of
54 K e an e  rep o rt, 12 A p r. 1940  (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
55 S ec  D E A  to  D O , 6 M ay  19 4 0  (N A , D O  3 5 /1 0 7 8 /3 ) .
56 O C  S. C om d. to  C O S , 3 M a y  19 4 0  (M A , P C 5 8 6 ).
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the troops I think that we could not expect the squadron to survive another
winter with the present accommodation 57
The alarming aspect of the situation described by Costello was not that it had developed 
to such a poor state — in the circumstances it was probably inevitable — but that Mulcahy 
was not aware of, or had not seen fit to highlight in similar terms, gross inadequacies in 
the contexts of aircraft, the operation and general living conditions. On receipt of this 
letter from Costello the COS discussed the matters with Mulcahy and decided, amongst 
other things, to suspend coastal patrols, withdraw the Ansons to Baldonnell where they 
would be used for instruction in twin-engined aeroplane flying, navigation by radio and 
bomb aiming. The Walrus aircraft were to remain in Rineanna to carry out training for 
operation off water, instrument flying and navigation blind approach practice using DF. 
Calls for special missions were to be referred to OC AC who would decide whether to 
use aircraft from Baldonnell or from Rineanna.58
Mulcahy later recalled that ‘general coastal patrols were discontinued in May 
1940’ because the ‘few suitable aircraft available were becoming due for complete 
overhaul’ and that it had been necessary to conserve flying time ‘so that they would be 
available for other missions should the situation get worse’. He made the situation out to 
be less futile than it actually was:
Also the necessity arose at this time for holding aircraft for special missions as 
ordered by the Chief of Staff and the Officers Commanding Southern and Western 
Commands. Such missions included the interception of belligerent aircraft and 
special patrols of portions of the coast line’.59
This interpretation of the situation that pertained from about 10 May 1940 suggests that 
Mulcahy did not fully appreciate that the squadron cadre in Rineamia, and the remainder 
of the two reconnaissance elements located at Baldonnell had little or no capacity for 
normal or special missions at the particular juncture. The committee did not seek
57 Ibid.
58 C O S  to  O C  S. C o m d , 10 M ay  1940  (M A , P C 5 8 6 ).
’9 P .A . M u lc ah y  to  A C  in v e s tig a tio n , 19 N o v . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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clarification as to what Mulcahy had meant by the suitable aircraft. With three aircraft out 
of action there were still six Avro Ansons in service -  in theory sufficient to carry out the 
mission. The use of the term probably arises from an aspect explained by Capt. T.J. 
Hanley:
All Ansons have blind-flying equipment. The first four Ansons bought have only 
elementary blind-flying equipment which is insufficient for safe flying in bad 
weather. The last five Ansons have the complete blind-flying [instrument] panel but 
lack the vacuum pumps to operate the instruments.60
The points Hanley was making were to the effect that with three of the five newer aircraft 
unserviceable since 1939 only two others of the more suitable aircraft were available. But 
even these lacked the vacuum pumps that were a more reliable source of suction (for 
gyroscopic instruments) than the standard externally mounted venture tube that was 
susceptible to icing. In May 1940 these two Ansons, Nos. 41 and 42, on the basis of total 
flying hours, were close to major inspections the completion of which would be 
prolonged by the absence of spares.
About this time Capt. D.V. Horgan and R.W. O’Sullivan (Air Corps) and J.B. 
Carr of DOD spent twelve days in the UK. There, with the assistance of the high 
commissioner, they made representations to the War Office and Dominions Office about 
the supply of anny equipment and to the Air Ministry about, in particular, the supply of 
fifteen advanced trainers. The delivery of six (ex-RAF) Hawker Hinds and five new 
Miles Magisters resulted. A major concern however was the supply of spares for various 
aircraft, including the Ansons already in service. In the matter of spares the AM required 
lists and quantities required over a specified period and undertook to try to arrange a 
contract as required by DOD. A visit, by special written permit, to A.V. Roe was no more 
promising. Subject to ‘instructions to proceed’ being issued by the Air Ministry Mr. 
Burley promised that his company would do everything possible to assist.61 It is not 
discemable that any improvement in aircraft serviceability resulted. At this time, as
60 C ap t. T .J . H an ley  to  A C  in v e s tig a tio n , 23 Jan . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 2 3 ).
61 ‘M e m o ran d u m  o f  v is it to  E n g la n d ’, 21 M ay  - 2  Ju n e  194 0  (M A , A C /2 /2 /4 1 ).
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previously, the UK authorities were well disposed to assist in training matters but less so 
in regard to aircraft, equipment and spares that might be put to operational purposes. In 
the context of the intelligence value of coastal patrols this UK position appears somewhat 
contradictory
No records to indicate the extent of such reconnaissance missions or their 
effectiveness have been seen. The General Report on the Defence Forces 1940/41 made 
no reference to the Rineanna operation and, of course, did not note the termination of 
scheduled patrols. Similarly neither Archer’s summary report of March / April 1944, on 
relations and contacts with the British military, nor Childers’ (1947) comprehensive 
review of the Emergency period, make any reference to this important, but short-lived, 
aspect of Irish -  British wartime cooperation.
The Fighter Squadron and Air Defence Command
If the reconnaissance squadron in Rineanna was engaged on a fool’s errand -  and an 
examination of the voluminous investigation proceedings of 1941 and the report of 10 
January 1942 will support no other conclusion -  the 1st Fighter Squadron (Cadre) at 
Baldonnell will be seen to have been no better equipped for a viable wartime mission. 
The squadron was established under the peace establishment of April 1939 by the 
renaming of the 1st Co-operation Squadron that had existed, informally and formally, 
since 1930. While the Rineanna detachment had verbal orders Fighter Squadron, at least 
up to May 1940, appears to have had no orders, written or verbal, from OC AC or higher 
authority. At the outbreak of war Mulcahy reported that during the immediate pre-war 
period the Fighter Squadron had ‘concentrated on training to fit in to the air defence 
scheme for Dublin’.62 In terms of manpower the Fighter Squadron of September 1939 
was nine over strength due to a considerable surfeit of privates. At the same time pilot 
strength was about 40% of the number pennitted by the 1939 peace establishment. The 
maximum number of pilots attained during 1940, under the war establishment, was 
twelve or about 40% of the approved war establishment figure of twenty-seven.
61 O C  A C  to  C S O  D O D , A C F /6 3 1  d a ted  2 0  S ep t. 1939 , A C F /6 3 1  (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
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Table 10.2 Establishment and strength - No.l Fighter Squadron
Fighter Squadron Officers NCOs Privates Total Aircraft
1937 Co-op Sqn. (Cadre)65 11 15 36 62 Not specified
1939 Peace Establishment 
Fighter Sqn. (Cadre)64
18 28 28 74 Not specified
Strength - 20 Sept. 193965 7 12 64 83 3 Gladiators 
6 Lysanders
1940 War Establishment
‘Less [42 Other Ranks] not
27 57 149 233 22
to be raised’66 27 47 120 191
Strength - 12 Dec. 1940 9 26 119 154 3 Gladiators
Attached 3 1 5 9 6 Lysanders
Total67 12 27 124 163 2 Avro 636 
2 Hawker Hind 
1 DH Dragon 
1 Miles M agister 
15 Total
The 1940 war establishment was the first (and last) to provide for a specific 
number of aircraft for each squadron, in this case twenty-two. By convention the aircraft 
of a fighter squadron would be of a single current fighter type. Notwithstanding, the No. 
1 Fighter Squadron’s main equipment, on the 3 September 1939, consisted of three 
Gloster Gladiator I aircraft. It also had six Westland Lysander II and sundry older 
aircraft. The Gladiator was the last of a very long line of biplane fighters to serve with the 
RAF and was in production from 1935 to 193 8.68 Even as it was in production and 
entering squadron service it was being rendered obsolescent by the design and
63 1 9 3 7 P e a c e  e s ta b lish m e n t (M A ).
64 1 93 9 P e a c e  e s ta b lish m e n t (M A ).
64 O C  A C  to  C S O  D O D , A C F /6 3 1  d a ted  20  S ep t. 1939 (in  m y  p o ssess io n ).
66 W a r e s ta b lish m e n t, 13 Ju n e  1940  (M A ).
67 ‘In te rn a l o rg a n is a tio n a l c h a r t ’, F ig h te r  S q u a d ro n , 12 D e c . 1940  (in  m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
68K .J. M e e k o m s an d  E .B . M o rg a n  (e d s) , The British aircraft specifications file (T o n b rid g e , 19 9 4 ) p. 211 , 
255; M ic h ae l A rm ita g e , The Royal Air Force; an illustrated history (L o n d o n , 1993), pp  7 8 -9 .
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manufacture of high performance monoplanes such as the Hawker Hurricane and the 
Vickers Supermarine Spitfire. By the outbreak of war the Gladiator had been withdrawn 
from over 70% of the RAF’s UK-based front line squadrons. The remainder were 
replaced by April 1940 as scores of frontline squadrons were being re-equipped with 
various marques of Hurricane and Spitfire from 1938 onwards.69
The Lysander II aircraft had been delivered in July 1939. The type had been 
originally developed in response to an Air Ministry requirement for an aircraft capable of 
an artillery spotting and reconnaissance role to replace the Audax and Hector types which 
had been in service since 1934.70 In its reconnaissance role it was well suited to the static 
style of warfare of an earlier era but not to the highly mobile armoured warfare of 1939- 
45. In the RAF context it was largely withdrawn from the army cooperation role by 
1941.71 While the Westland Lysander was a purpose built army cooperation aircraft it 
was adapted, in RAF service, for roles such as the special operations into France 
dropping supplies and agents, that made the best use of its short take-off and landing 
characteristics.72 In the Air Corps context it had originally been purchased as an advanced 
trainer -  apparently erroneously so. When questioned on this point by the investigation 
committee Mulcahy was somewhat coy:
To the best of my recollection the Lysander was selected as the most suitable type 
available at the time as an advanced trainer. The order was placed, but as far as I 
know the firm was unable to supply dual controls. The machines had been built for 
us and we took delivery. The Lysander is a suitable machine for advanced
7 ^operational training.
The committee was not satisfied with this evasive answer and asked Mulcahy if it was 
nonnal to have Lysander aircraft fitted with dual controls. His response was brief:
6 J, J. H a ile y , Squadrons of the RAF, passim.
70 M e e k o m s  & M o rg a n , Specifications file, p. 201
71 A rm ita g e , RAF illustrated history, p . 83.
72 H a ile y , Squadrons of the RAF, p . 185.
77 P .A . M u lc a h y  to  A C  In v e s tig a tio n , 23 O c t. 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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It is normal to have Lysander aircraft fitted with dual controls when such aircraft 
are being used for flying instruction in the same way as advanced trainers are fitted 
with dual controls.74
The committee did not detect that the second answer was even more misleading than the 
first and, being satisfied, moved on to a different matter. However Mulcahy had 
succeeded in concealing the true situation from the investigation committee, who, to 
judge by many of the questions put, and the answers accepted, were very naive in 
technical matters. He implied that the Air Corps, when ordering the aircraft, had specified 
the inclusion of dual controls in a small batch specifically built for the Corps. Had this 
been the case the non-availability of dual controls would have been made known at the 
time of ordering. The Air Ministry production specifications indicate that the production 
of Lysander II commenced on or about 14 June 193 9.75 The Air Corps took delivery of 
the six aircraft, apparently off the standard production run of the type, on 15 July 1939.
With regard to the aircraft being bought as an advanced trainer the truth probably 
lies in the 1939/40 Defence estimates. These proposed the capital expenditure of £47,400 
for ‘6 single engined training aircraft (Lysander) @ £7,900’ each.76 It is not easy to 
understand how the Lysander II could be purchased as an advanced trainer. It was, purely 
and simply, an army cooperation aircraft. Though it was reasonably well armed nothing 
in its design, performance and handling characteristics fitted it for advanced training 
purposes. While the Directorate of Technical Development of the Air Ministry specified 
that provision be made for the installation of a dual control conversion kit there is no 
record of a Lysander being so modified.77 Had such a machine been developed it could 
only have been used for the conversion of pilots to the type and, most decidedly, not as 
an advanced trainer.
In effect, in their anxiety to expeditiously spend the monies allotted in the 
financial year 1939/40 the Air Corps apparently purchased aircraft without adequate 
reference to detailed technical specifications and without indicating any requirements. In
Ib id .
73 M e e k o n s  and  M o rg an , Specifications file, p. 269
76 S u b -h e a d  ‘O ’, D e fe n c e  e s tim a te s  1 9 3 9 /4 0  (N A I, D F , F . 1 0 2 /0 0 6 5 /3 8 ).
77 M e e k o m s  an d  M o rg a n , Specifications file, p . 235
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this case Mulcahy ended up with six aircraft unsuited to any training role. The anxiety to 
purchase training aircraft was due to the intended intake of short service cadets which 
eventually took place in August 1939. Notwithstanding any misunderstanding about dual 
controls it is not easy to understand how Mulcahy could have considered a classic army 
cooperation aircraft as being suitable for advanced training. Advice on the selection of 
aircraft would normally have been available from Comdt. G.J. Carroll. However the chief 
technical officer (and second-in-command of the Air Corps) was on half pay while 
functioning as general manager with Aer Lingus from 31 January to 1 September 1939. 
Mulcahy’s evidence to the investigation committee strongly suggests that he took his own 
advice on aircraft selection at this time.78 In Air Corps service, while operated by Fighter 
Squadron, the Lysander was designated as an army cooperation machine. Despite it being 
unsuitable Mulcahy was satisfied that it could be used as a fighter.79 Fundamentally the 
parasol type wing arrangement, and stability at slow speed that made it a very suitable 
aircraft for observation of the battlefield, in addition to its poor performance, rendered the 
type practically useless in terms of air combat. It could, if unopposed, act as a ground 
attack aircraft.
The first operations orders -  May 1940
Unlike the Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber Squadron (Cadre) that was, in effect, on 
active service since 30 August 1939 the manifest inadequacies of the Fighter Squadron 
were not exposed until the summer of 1940 when the fear of a German invasion was at 
its height. It was at this time that the first GHQ operations orders were drafted, for all 
Army elements, to direct action to counter the perceived threats of the IRA agitation and 
German invasion. Emergency defence plan No. 1/1940 was drafted on the basis that 
available information showed that the IRA was ‘planning something in the nature of a 
major operation’ and that the operation might ‘involve the support of a foreign power,
78 E x tra c t o f  o f f ic e r ’s h is to ry  sh ee t, 0 /2 8 7 ,  c o u rte sy  o f  C o m m iss io n e d  o ff ic e rs  re co rd  o ffice , D F  H Q , 
2 0 0 6 ; P .A . M u lc a h y  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 21 Jan . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
79 A n n ex  II I  to  O p e ra tio n  O rd e r N o . 1 /1 9 4 0 , 28  M ay  1940  (M A , E D P  1/1); M u lc a h y  to  A C  in v es tig a tio n , 
21 Jan . 1941 (M A , A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
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directly or indirectly’.80 Additional comment would suggest that there was little by way 
of a firm basis for the perceived threat other than ‘a study of the developments to date in 
the present international conflict’. The resulting Operations Order No. 1/1940 of 24 May 
1940 apportioned the defence of the state mainly on a geographic basis dictated by the 
command areas of the Eastern, Western and Southern Commands with mobile columns 
forming the first line of defence.81
The operations order assigned no mission to the Air Corps. It appears however 
that at about the same time Mulcahy had been instructed to draft an Air Corps annex. 
Annex No. Ill was submitted four days later for the approval and signature of the chief 
staff officer, operations, Maj. Gen. Hugo McNeill. Other annexes that would concern the 
Air Corps were those on the ‘Defence of Aerodromes’ (Annex V) and ‘Air Defence’ 
(Annex VI). Assessment of the various orders is made difficult by the lack of 
coordination apparent in the drafting of the main order and the several annexes. This 
resulted in fundamental responsibilities, particularly in relation to the air defence of the 
Dublin area, not being fixed definitively. It might be considered that the role of Fighter 
Squadron would have been clarified by orders relating to the air defence of the eastern 
region of the country and that Air Defence Command would be the appropriate agency to 
direct and co-ordinate the efforts of all air defence elements, including fighter aircraft. It 
might also be expected that the Air Corps responsibilities would be clearly set out in 
Annex III. Such assumptions would not be entirely valid. During the summer of 1940 the 
air defence of the region was mainly the responsibility of the 1st Anti-Aircraft Brigade, 
McKee Barracks whose orders purported to include some responsibility for the 
coordination of Air Corps aspects of air defence:
The air defence scheme for the protection of Dublin provide for combined active 
defence by aircraft and anti-aircraft units and its co-ordination and development in 
conjunction with passive defence measures.82
80 ‘O u tlin e  o f  E m e rg en c y  d e fe n c e  p lan  N o . 1, M a y l9 4 0  (M A , E D P  1/1).
81 C o lm  M a n g a n , ‘P lan s  and o p e ra t io n s ’ in Irish Swordxix, n o s. 75 & 7 6 (1 9 9 3 -4 ). p. 4 8 -9 , c itin g  E D P  N o . 
1, M a y  1940  (M A ).
82 O p e ra tio n s  O rd e r  N o. 2 /1 9 4 0 , I s' A A  B rig ad e , 25 M a y  1940  (M A , E D P /1 ).
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However neither ADC nor the AA Brigade made provision for the coordination of anti­
aircraft defences while the Air Corps aspect of air defence, in the event, was to be of little 
consequence. The air defence annex of Operations Order No. 1 mainly related to the 
responsibilities of Air Defence Command in coordinating and plotting the results of the 
intelligence gathering functions of various agencies.
A special scheme has been agreed upon between General Headquarters and Garda 
Siochana headquarters for the collection and rapid transmission of information 
concerning the activities of foreign aircraft seen over our territory or territorial 
waters. The scheme provides that look-out osts of the Marine Coast Watching
83Service and Garda stations will co-operate in the collection of such infonnation.
The orders required observers to supply detailed reports on all aircraft, not identified as 
Irish, in such spatial and temporal detail that the movements of individual aircraft, seen or 
heard, over land or sea, could be plotted at Air Defence Command, Dublin Castle, and 
any potential threat assessed. The ADC was required to keep OC Air Corps infonned of 
all reported movements of belligerent or unknown aircraft so that the ‘Air Corps 
Interception Service’ could be called into action. To illustrate the naivety of GHQ’s 
concept of what might constitute a defence against aircraft of an invading force it is 
necessary to quote a modicum of the relevant order:
(d) On receipt of all such information aircraft will be dispatched to intercept 
offending aircraft flying over Irish territory or territorial waters provided there is a 
reasonable chance of aircraft affecting this purpose.
The pilot of [the] Irish aircraft will signal to [the] foreign pilot that he is over 
neutral territory and endeavour to ascertain his mission.
If in communication by radio with his headquarters he will remain in [a] position of 
observation, report and await orders.
If not in radio communication he will collect all information and proceed to [the] 
nearest aerodrome, where he will make an immediate report.
83 ‘A ir  D e fen ce , A n n ex  N o . V I, O p e ra tio n s  O rd e r  N o . 1 25  M ay  1940  (M A , E D P  1/1).
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He will not initiate offensive action but if attacked will take all necessary defensive 
action.84
This order must be seen in the context of the time when a German invasion was expected 
at any moment. Air Defence Command’s primary function was the collection and 
recording of air and marine intelligence with particular reference to the movements of 
aircraft and ships. It did not constitute an early warning system in an accepted sense and, 
in particular, bore no relationship to the system exemplified by the use of static and 
mobile radars of the UK ‘Chain Home’ and ‘Chain Home Low’ stations. The latter 
system was particularly effective during thee Battle of Britain in the autumn of 1940.85 
By virtue of the visual and aural nature of the Irish observer system the identification of 
hostile aircraft, and the prediction of the tracks and possible targets, would be so delayed 
as to obviate interception by three obsolete aircraft on stand-by on the ground. Totally 
inadequate aircraft and pilot resources ruled out the possibility of standing patrols. In any 
event Baldonnell was too close to the target area of Dublin -  even if appropriate and 
sufficient aircraft were available. In the hypothetical context of a defence of Dublin 
several squadrons of aircraft would have been required to have been based in south-east 
Leinster.
The implication of the above order was that Fighter Squadron aircraft were 
expected to respond to each and every incursion of Irish airspace by foreign or 
unidentified aircraft. However, in practice, the order only applied to the ‘artillery zone of 
the A.A. defence of Dublin’ - delineated by lines joining Howth Harbour, Killiney Hill, 
Tallaght Aerodrome and Blanchardstown to Howth Head. With an average of over 400 
belligerent aircraft being identified each month during May to July 1940, mainly in the 
eastern region, such a task would not have been practical except with appropriate 
resources and systems.86 In the event single aircraft, that constituted the greater bulk of 
sightings, were ignored. The order was subsequently formally amended to reflect the fact
8j  Ib id .
83A rm ita g e , RAF illustrated histoiy, pp  95 -  112.
86O C  A C  to C O S , 16 Ju ly  1940 , E D P /2 1 ; A p p e n d ix  N o . I, (M A , G en era l re p o rt on th e  d e fen ce  fo rces, 
19 4 0 -4 1 ).
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that the simultaneous incursion of two or more aircraft together was to be considered a 
hostile act.87
The order was totally impractical from the points of view of the number and type 
of aircraft available and their inadequate communications. In the unlikely event of one of 
three Gloster gladiators intercepting a belligerent aircraft the Irish pilot would probably 
not have been able to maintain two-way communication with base due to the 
underpowered ground station at Baldonnell. It is not clear to what extent interceptions 
were attempted. In September 1940 an Air Corps note dealing with the activity of foreign 
aircraft did not elucidate but indicated that adequate numbers of suitable aircraft and 
pilots were not available to give an adequate interception service for the Dublin area. It 
also indicated that if Air Corps efforts at interception were to be successful it would be
essential to get earlier and more accurate reports from observer stations. The context
88would suggest that attempts at interceptions were very rare.
Notwithstanding the obvious impotence of the Fighter Squadron and the utter 
futility of interception as the squadron mission the ‘Air Defence Annex of Operations 
Order No. 4/1941’, a slightly revised version of the previous, was issued a year after the 
first. It designated to the Air Corps the task of continuing to operate the ‘Air Corps 
Interception Service’ as previously described. To a large extent it appears to have been a 
classic example of a staff officer taking out the previous order and changing the dates. 
The Air Corps paragraph was repeated practically verbatim in spite of the obvious major 
deficiencies.89 One is reminded of the candid admission made by Mulcahy to Air 
Commodore T.N. Carr only a few months after this order was renewed. Mulcahy made it 
clear that, having regard to the state of the aircraft and the state of readiness of the Air 
Corps, the corps could be ignored as a factor in the defence of the country.90
8 7 ‘A ir  D e fen c e  -  A d d e n d u m  N o . 1 to  O p e ra tio n s  O rd e r N o . 1’, 8 A u g . 1940 (M A , E D P  1/1).
88 A /O C  A C  to  C O S , 11 S ep t. 1940 (M A , E P D /2 1 ).
89 ‘A ir  D e fen c e , A n n ex  N o . 2 to  O p e ra tio n s  O rd e r  4 /1 9 4 1 ’, 8 Ju ly  1941 (M A , E D P /2 1 ) .
90 A ir  C o m m o d o re  T .N . C a rr  to  A M , 14 O ct. 1940  (N A , A ir  2 /5 1 3 0 ).
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The Air Corps’ orders in 1940
From May 1940 Air Defence Command functioned primarily as an intelligence 
organisation. It was also the nearest the country got to having an early warning system. 
The 1st Anti-Aircraft Brigade was responsible for the air defence of the Dublin region 
though the air defence response was not subject to central coordination measures. The Air 
Corps annex, though drafted by Mulcahy at Baldonnell, was signed by Gen. McNeill and 
had the same standing as other GHQ orders. It did not read like an operations order per 
se. It was poorly constructed and laid out and confusing as to its intent. In particular it 
made no reference to the current situation or to the specific Air Corps interception role 
indicated in the air defence order. Divided into three sections the annex initially imparted 
information to ground commanders regarding the broad roles and characteristics of both 
service and training aircraft that the order intimated would be operating in an army 
support role if and when the invasion came. The second section indicated the current 
mission of the Air Coips to consist of occasional coastal patrols out of Rineanna, aircraft 
on call at Baldonnell and Rineanna for special duties, and training.91
The future missions included the peacetime missions then being done. The 
retention of fighter aircraft for the future defence of Dublin was also mentioned, but in a 
manner that did not reflect the scope or urgency of the mission detailed in the air defence 
order. In effect the concept of an Air Corps Interception Service was largely ignored. 
However the third section made it abundantly clear that, in the event of invasion, a 
significant proportion of Air Corps resources would be dispatched to selected landing 
grounds in various commands where reconnaissance would be the principal air mission in 
cooperation with ground troops engaged in active operations.
From an examination of Annex III and bearing in mind the other orders it could 
be construed that the author was not au fait with all the relevant documents. In the hectic 
and somewhat confused circumstances of the last ten days of May 1940 this may well 
have been the case. Mulcahy appears to have been kept in the dark about many 
operational matters. He did not receive copies of operations orders as a standard practice
91 A n n e x  N o . III, 28  M ay  1940 , O p e ra tio n s  O rd e r N o . 1 /1 9 4 0 , 24  M a y  1940 (M A , E D P  1/1).
92 Ib id .
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but, if GHQ considered it necessary for him to read a particular order, he ‘had to go in [to 
GHQ] and read and initial it’. In this regard he is certified as having seen, on 23 
December 1940, Operations Order No. 3 dated 17 December 1940. In relation to his 
familiarity with Army orders he was asked, in October 1941, ‘are you informed of the 
plans for defence and employment of the forces, of the divisions and the commands?’ He 
answered in the negative’.93
In drafting and authenticating Annex No. Ill, Mulcahy was, in effect, acting as a 
GHQ staff officer. Continuing in this role he circulated an instruction on ‘Landing Fields’ 
on 30 May 1940. He infonned the Commands that he had been directed by the Chief of 
Staff to point out that it was essential to have landing grounds near column headquarters. 
He suggested that column commanders should identify suitable fields convenient to their 
headquarters and that the locations should be made known to the Air Corps so as to save 
aircraft flying time when they were being sent to cooperate with ground troops. He 
indicated the minimum dimensions of the fields required by Anson, Lysander, Magister 
and Avro 631 Cadet. Included with the instruction was a list of fifty-four fields mainly 
located in Leinster and Munster. He indicated that the fields had been inspected at 
various dates between 1932 and 1937 and had originally been licensed for aerial circus 
work. He suggested that the list of fields ‘might be of assistance when aircraft were 
operating with your columns’.94 Two days earlier GHQ had distributed copies of a ‘list of 
known places’ which had been prepared by the Air Corps and was recommended to the 
commands as being up to date. GHQ considered that any of the 139 fields, identified on 
One Inch OS sheets, would be ‘suitable in an emergency’.95
With the three Gladiators tasked to the defence of Dublin it might be assumed that 
that Mulcahy had issued orders, written or verbal, to the squadron or to individual pilots. 
However, no such orders are reflected in the EDP material or mentioned in the 
proceedings of the Air Corps investigation in Military Archives. Considering the extent 
and detail of the instruction regarding the designation of army cooperation landing fields 
the absence of orders for the conduct of interception is difficult to understand. The only
93‘L is t o f  o f f ic e rs ’ 23 D ec . 1940 (M A , E D P /1 /2 ): P .A . M u lc a h y  to  A C  In v e s tig a tio n , 22  O c t. 1941 (M A , 
A C S  2 2 /2 3 ).
94 ‘L an d in g  f ie ld s ’, O C  A C  to  C o m m a n d s, 30  M ay  1940 (M A , E D P /4 ).
95 C S O  G . l ,  G H Q  to  c o m m a n d s , 28  M a y  1940 (M A , E D P /4 ).
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instruction relating to the movement of fighter aircraft was issued in the context of 
arrangements for the dispersal of aircraft ‘in the event of the situation becoming more 
serious’. In the event of an attack, to prevent the destruction of the aircraft in the hangars, 
serviceable aircraft of Fighter Squadron were to be picketed around the perimeter of 
Baldonnell ‘ready to take the air for defence or reconnaissance purposes’.96
At best pilots may have had verbal orders from Mulcahy to get airborne when 
ordered to do so. Mulcahy’s attitude is illustrated by his evidence to the committee of 
investigation early in 1941:
Q. Why have you such a mixed collection of aircraft in the Fighter Squadron?
A. Because it was the most suitable equipment I had with which to train and keep 
on training the Fighter Squadron.
Q. The bulk of the equipment is training equipment?
A. Yes, it is something to progress with until something better comes along.
Q. Why should you have a Fighter squadron?
A. Because if you do not have fighter aircraft you could never have air superiority 
over an area. Fighter aircraft is [sic] the best form of anti-aircraft defence. Except 
you have fighter aircraft you cannot even have local air superiority.
Q. What use would our 3 Gladiators be against a determined attack on, say, Dublin?
A. Supposing bombers came over and that our three Gladiator pilots were shot 
down over Dublin, it would be a certain consolation to the people and would 
improve their morale by letting them know that we had at least done what we 
could.97
The above suggests that Mulcahy considered that Fighter Squadron was fundamentally 
still the peace-time training cadre of the 1939 peace establishment. However while he did
96 ‘S u p p le m e n ta ry  to  A n n ex  I IP  to  O p e ra tio n s  O rd e r  1 /1 9 4 0 , c irc a  15 Ju n e  1940  (M A , E D P /4  (1 9 4 0 )) .
97 P .A . M u lc ah y  to  A C  In v e s tig a tio n , 2 1 Jan . 1941.
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not specify so in writing, he appears to have had little difficulty in committing an 
inadequate number of obsolete aircraft to a war time defensive task that was patently 
impossible. His attitude is further explained by the tone and content of his ‘order of the 
day’, issued on 4 July 1940, when all aircrew were required to stand-by on the air station:
If we fail to get into the air, if we loose our aircraft on the ground, we have failed 
utterly in our duty to our people. It is therefore necessary that the crews of the 
service squadron and detachment at Baldonnel be readily available to their aircraft 
at all times Let us, therefore, bear inconvenience cheerfully now so that we will
98be standing by to perform [-] whatever the task and whatever the hour.
While Mulcahy appears to have willingly to accept an impossible task in behalf of 
Fighter Squadron, given the military situation in the summer of 1940 he had little choice 
in the matter. With fears of a German invasion running very high there was tacit 
agreement that British forces would come to the country’s assistance. However it was de 
Valera’s policy that before British assistance could be requested the Irish Army, of which 
the Air Coips was an integral part, had to take the brunt of an initial assault. 9 In such 
circumstances the squadron’s efforts would have been of little effect. (See Appendix 8)
The true attitude of GHQ to the effectiveness of the Air Corps in 1940 is reflected 
in a GHQ ‘map manoeuvre’ exercise, undertaken in preparation for the updating of 
defence plans, at which Colonel P.A. Mulcahy was assistant director in charge of air 
operations. The exercise ‘German estimate’ of ‘the enemy forces and disposition’ 
concluded that ‘as regards opposition to our attack, the Irish air force may be regarded as 
non-existent’.100 At the same time and while holding the above opinion GHQ, through the 
aegis of the air defence order, purported to defend the Dublin area by means of a largely 
mythical ‘Air Corps Interception Service’. Notwithstanding the provisions of the ADC 
order relating to the interception of aircraft, there is no evidence to indicate that Air 
Corps aircraft were ever scrambled to intercept unidentified foreign aircraft while 
encounters with even single aircraft were apparently invariably fortuitous, ineffective and
98 Ib id .
99 F isk , hi time of war, pp  2 3 4 -2 4 0 .
100 ‘G enera l S ta f f  e s tim a te  o f  th e  situ a tio n  N o . 2 ’, 30  O c t. 1940  (M A , E D P /1 9 ).
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embarrassing.101 The folklore suggests that the only aircraft intercepted were the 
relatively slow civil aircraft that occasionally strayed of the designated track into or out 
of Collinstown (Dublin Airport).
The release and recovery of Allied aircraft
The short-lived coastal patrol operation at Rineanna was the most substantial direct 
assistance rendered by the Air Corps, on order, to the UK. However, in the wartime 
records, this intelligence gathering activity was not acknowledged by the UK and 
studiously ignored by (or possibly deleted from) the Irish records. However there were 
other air-related activities that contributed to the UK air war effort. In February 1945 the 
Dominions Office listed the ‘facilities obtained from the government of Eire during the 
war’. The list of briefly stated activities appears to have been intended to merely 
acknowledge, rather than to emphasise, the considerable extent of the military assistance 
and cooperation received. The use of the Donegal corridor by aircraft patrolling the 
Atlantic is the best known and most cited instance of the facilities granted by de Valera’s 
government. This facility allowed flying boats based at St. Angelo on Uough Eme to fly 
due west across the south of Donegal and enter the North Atlantic expeditiously and 
commence anti-submarine patrols. This privilege was relatively innocuous compared 
with some of the others. The list did include acknowledgement of the fact that ‘full 
assistance was given in recovering damaged aircraft’.102 The matter referred to was the 
operation, mounted mainly by the Air Corps under the direction of the intelligence branch 
of GHQ, to salvage and return repairable Allied aircraft to the UK. Not specifically 
mentioned by the Dominions Office was the not inconsiderable number of allied aircraft 
that force-landed in Eire, usually through lack of fuel, and which were refuelled or 
otherwise helped to make a speedy return to their own jurisdiction.
It is not obvious how this process was initiated. Examination of files suggests that 
this it was probably something that developed out of British necessity and an undeclared
101 A id an  Q u ig ley , ‘A ir  a sp ec ts  o f  th e  e m e rg e n c y ’ in Irish Sword x ix , N o s . 75  &  76 (1 9 9 3 -4 ) , p . 90 .
102 ‘F a c ilitie s  o b ta in e d  from  th e  g o v e rn m e n t o f  E ire  d u r in g  th e  w a r’ , 21 F eb . 1945  (N A , D O  1 1 4 /1 1 7 ). A  
s lig h tly  d iffe re n tly  w o rd e d  v e rs io n  o f  th is  lis t is re p ro d u c e d , in  R o n an  F an n in g , Independent Ireland 
(D u b lin , 1983), pp  124-5 , c itin g  C A B  6 6 /6 2 , 21 F eb . 1945 (P R O , L o n d o n ).
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willingness on the part of the Eire government to render assistance in covert ways. The 
precedent for allowing British aircraft landing in the state to depart was set on the very 
first day of the war. On 3 September 1939 Royal Navy flying boats alighted at both 
Skerries and Dun Laoghaire seeking shelter from particularly bad weather while 
traversing the Irish Sea from south to north. After appropriate questioning of the aircrew 
and consultation between the COS and the minister these aircraft were permitted to 
resume their journeys. Eleven days later a third aircraft alighted at Ventry Harbour due to 
a broken fuel pipe. This aircraft was allowed to depart after effecting repairs with 
assistance from ‘Sean Clancy’s garage, Bridge St. Dingle’ where ‘the seaplane mechanic 
soldered the pipe himself.103
Thereafter the first land plane recorded as having been allowed to depart was one 
that made a forced landing at the Curragh at about 05.00 hours on 16 May 1940. The 
manner in which this forced landing was dealt was possibly typical of many that 
followed. A young officer was woken early that morning in Baldonnell and went to the 
airfield at the Curragh Camp having been authorised by higher authority to refuel the 
RAF Hampden bomber. Accompanied by the camp commandant the young officer 
supervised the refuelling of the aircraft with 200 gallons of the appropriate aviation spirit 
and received a receipt. The aircraft had been refuelled and departed for Aldergrove by 
09.30 hours the same morning.104 While it is not explicit in the surviving records it would 
appear that by this time outline arrangements were in place, or at least being formulated, 
that would facilitate aircraft to be refuelled and depart so rapidly. The general position 
was later explained by DOD.
During the period 1940 -  1945 aircraft of the British and American forces were 
forced down in this country as a result of fuel shortage, weather conditions, damage 
by belligerent aircraft, etc. Informal arrangements were made with the air attachés 
of these countries under which assistance was afforded by the Defence Forces in
103 C ap t. T .F . D o h e rty , ‘R e p o rt o f  se a p la n e s  lan d in g  at S k e rr ie s ’, 3 Sep t. 1939 ; C a p t. Iv o ry , G .2 jo u rn a l , 3 
Sept. 1939 (M A , G 2 /X /1 2 2 4 ); H Q  S C o m d . to  G .2  G H Q , 21 S ep t. 1939 (M A , S I/3 1 9 ).
104 L ieu t. P . S w an  to  O C  A C , 16 M a y  1940  (M A , A C F /S /3 6 ) .
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the rescue of crews and the salvage, repair refuelling, etc. of any planes forced 
down to enable as many as possible to take off again.105
With Wing Commander Lywood in the process of being appointed and taking up duty in 
early June 1940, it would appear that the an informal agreement was not yet in place to 
cover the above aircraft. However, for an aircraft to be turned around so rapidly, the 
decision makers must already have been well disposed. Subsequently at least twenty-nine 
British and eighteen US aircraft were facilitated in a similar manner.106 Col. W.J. Keane 
suggests that the Air Corps rendered assistance in about thirty-one of those cases and that 
a total of 7,900 gallons of fuel was supplied.107
The next two British aircraft that force-landed in Eire were recovered to 
Baldonnell and, after repair, were pressed into service. The first of these was Hawker 
Hurricane P.5178 of 79 Squadron, RAF Pembry (Wales), which landed at Ballyvaldon 
near Enniscorthy, County Wexford on 29 September 1940. Having landed with its 
undercarriage retracted the aircraft had sustained only minor damage to the underside. A 
local gentleman rendered assistance to Pilot Officer Paul Mayhew and was inclined to 
spirit him away and assist his return to the UK. However a Local Security Force officer, 
Major Bryan, himself a fonner RAF pilot, intervened and made sure that the pilot was 
detained by Gardai and subsequently interned in the Curragh. The aircraft was dismantled 
and brought to Baldonnell, repaired and entered service as Hurricane 93. A Miles Master 
which force-landed at Dungooley, County Louth on 21 December 1940 was also 
recovered to Baldonnell and subsequently entered service with the number 96.108
Early in 1941 one of the largest and longest salvage operations taken on followed 
the landing of RAF Lockheed Hudson number P. 5123 at Skreen, County Sligo on 24 
January. A salvage crew of an officer and nineteen other ranks was dispatched the 
following day. On 30 January Col. Mulcahy reported to the Chief of Staff that the aircraft 
appeared to be in reasonable condition and that the question of making it serviceable so 
as to fly it to Baldonnell was being examined. As a modem reconnaissance machine, a
l(b ‘M em o ran d u m  fo r  th e  G o v e rn m e n t’, D O D  3 /2 3 1 4 , M a y  1949 (in  m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
106 F ile , ‘R e p o rts  o f  fo rce  landed  o r c rash e d  a irc ra f t ( fo re ig n ) ’ ( M A , n o  re fe re n ce ) .
107 ‘C rash es  an d  fo rce d  lan d in g s, 1 9 3 9 -4 5 ’ (M A , P C 1 4 3 ) .
108 C o m d t. D . M a c k ey  to  C S O  G 2 , 2 O c t. 194 0  (M A , G .2 /X /0 5 1 3 ); K e a rn s ,‘Ir ish  A ir  C o rp s ’, p .4 5 9 .
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generation ahead of the Anson and valued at about £30,000, there would have been a 
great desire to acquire such an aircraft. The salvage operation was hindered by the remote 
location, inclement weather and very soft ground conditions. A further complication was 
the fact that the Air Corps did not have tools appropriate to American built aircraft or 
experience of aircraft of semi-monocoque construction.
After being raised onto its undercarriage the aircraft was moved to a better 
location and subjected to a damage inspection. The officer in charge of the salvage made 
a request for a considerable amount of materials, tools, tarpaulins, duckboards, 
Wellington boots and other equipment. These were withheld pending the minister’s 
decision regarding salvage. The major damage discovered by civilian inspector Ted 
Hoctor was serious cracks in the bottom members of the forward mounting on both 
engines. This matter having been reported, the COS authorised the sending of an officer 
to Northern Ireland to obtain materials required for the initial repairs -  intimating that the 
minister had approved the completion of at least the recovery aspect of the salvage.109
The UK air attaché and RAF NI were very cooperative in facilitating the return of 
the Hudson to serviceability. Materials, spares and tools sourced in NI were delivered, by 
‘Mr. Roberts’ to the crash site via the Customs Post at Belcoo. All concerned with the 
delivery were instructed to keep the matter very quiet. The officer in charge in Sligo, 
Lieut. Jim Teague, who had been instructed to tell his men to be discreet in regard to the 
origin of delivery, met the lorry at the border. The main items delivered to the crash site 
were two propellers, two engine bearers and an engine tool kit.110 Subsequently, engine 
mounting bolts, not available in NI were procured in the UK through the good offices of 
Wing Commander Lywood.111
In due course the aircraft was repaired to a condition that allowed it to be flown to 
Baldonnell. For this purpose the services of an officer of the Air Coips Reserve, Captain 
Ivor Hammond of Aer Lingus, were arranged by DOD. The aircraft was eventually flown 
to Baldonnell on 27 March 1941, nine weeks after it had landed. While no financial 
calculation appears to have been made there is little doubt that considerable resources
109 L ieu t. J. T ea g u e  to O C  A C  D e p o t, 2 F e b . 1941; F ile  n o te , C o m d t. P . Q u in n , 4  F e b . 1941 ; T ed  H o c to r  to 
R .W . O ’S u lliv a n , 3 F eb . 1941; F ile  n o te , C o l. P .A . M u lc a h y , 6 F eb . 1 9 4 1 (A C F /S /6 7 , in m y  p o sse ss io n ).
110 U n d a te d  f ile  n o te ; R e ce ip t s ig n ed  J. T e a g u e , 11 F e b . 1941; P .A . M u lc a h y  to  C O S  12 F e b . 1941 
(A C F /S /6 7 , in m y  p o sse ss io n ).
111 F ile  m em o ; 5 M a r. 1941; 6 M ar. 1941; 7 M a r. 1941; 8 M a r. 1941 (A C F /S /6 7 , in m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
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were committed to the venture. Not least of these were a total of 1,609 man days of 
labour and the completion of some 5,690 miles by sundry Air Corps vehicles. A 
considerable inventory of spares and materials were used in the repair while much 
equipment, tools and clothing was rendered unserviceable.112 After further inspection and 
repair the Hudson entered service with the Air Corps number 91. In June and August 
1941 two Hawker Hurricane II aircraft forced landed, were recovered to Baldonnel and 
entered subsequently Air Corps service. Similarly a Fairey Battle light bomber had been 
acquired on 24 April 1941.113
A system of skeleton crews, with five or six named individuals being nominated 
for the recovery of three different categories of allied aircraft, was put in place in April 
1941.
A. The repairing and servicing of aircraft that can be flown to an aerodrome in Eire.
B. The dismantling, packing and transporting to Baldonnel of aircraft that appear to 
be in a fairly good state of repair and are likely to be rebuilt.
C. The breaking up and transporting to a Military Post aircraft that are badly 
damaged.114
The context suggests that an ad hoc system had been in place and that salvage crews were 
put together on a case by case basis. The recovery vehicles, possibly purchased in the 
1940/41 financial year, comprised a single five-ton crane and two two-ton tractor and 
trailer combinations.115 The categories of aircraft and the actions to be taken suggest that 
the delivery of aircraft to the border had not yet started. The records indicate that the first 
aircraft to be handed back to the UK was a Spitfire that force-landed at Clogher Strand, 
County Donegal on 16 December 1941.116 It is not obvious how this came about. Perhaps 
the air attaché had noted how the Air Corps had salvaged a total of six aircraft, between
112 O C  A C  to  C O S , 2 A p r. 1941 (A C F /S /6 7 , in m y  p o sse ss io n ) .
113 A .P . K e a m s , ‘Ir ish  A ir  C o rp s ’, p . 4 4 6 .
114 C o m d t. P . Q u in n  to  O C  A C , 18 A p r. 1941 (M A , A C /2 /1 1 /20).
115 Ib id ; E s tim a te s  1940/41 (M A , A C /2 /2 /3 4 ) .
116 U n d a te d  list, ‘A irc ra f t  sa lv a g e d  a n d  r e tu rn e d ’, W .J . K e a n e  (M A , P C 1 4 3 )
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May 1940 and August 1941, and converted them to their own use. With aircraft always at 
a premium it would have made good sense to have lightly damaged aircraft returned to 
Allied service. It must be assumed that the suggestion got government approval before 
any action could be taken by the Air Corps. Defence’s justification for this service was 
directed by government:
 the international situation existing during the emergency was such that the state
considered it politic at the time that belligerent aircraft landing on out territory 
should be removed therefrom with all convenient speed.117
This assertion, that suggests that all foreign aircraft landing or crashing in Eire during the 
Emergency were repatriated, is not quite true. In practice the only aircraft allowed to 
depart, after minor repair and refuelling, were aircraft of the Allied countries. Similarly 
only Allied aircraft that were repairable were salvaged and delivered to the border. Where 
the recovery of an aircraft was very difficult secret or sensitive items, plus armament, 
were removed and the wreckage left in place. Crashed German aircraft, if not already 
destroyed, were blown up in situ after the removal of secret and sensitive equipment of 
intelligence value to the UK.
With circumstances conducive to the quick dispatch of serviceable aircraft 
existing almost from the beginning and the first repairable aircraft being handed back in 
December 1941 the aircraft recovery operation was apparently put on sounder footing in 
the first half of 1942. Defence subsequently explained the circumstances:
During the emergency certain equipment was supplied to the Air Corps by both the 
British and American authorities under special arrangements made separately from 
the ordinary purchase channels. The supplies included equipment for the salvage of 
crashed aircraft together with equipment for general Air Coips use, e.g. spare parts 
and radio equipment. The total value of the equipment so supplied was £14,600 of 
which supplies to the value of £10,600 were expressed to be a free gift The
117 ‘M e m o ran d u m  fo r  th e  G o v e rn m e n t’, D O D  3 /2 3 1 4 , M a y  1949  (in  m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
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balance of £4,000 represents transport equipment of which £2,400 worth was
1 18received from the British and £1,600 worth from the American authorities.
It seems that hand tools, sundry items of equipment and clothing, including Wellington 
boots, were included in the salvage equipment supplied.119 It is not clear when this 
informal arrangement was strengthened or exactly when the donated equipment entered 
service. However it appears that the main items, two sixty foot tractor and low loader 
combinations, were in service by May 1942. On 14 April 1942 a Hudson reconnaissance 
bomber had force-landed at Ely Bay, Blacksod, County Mayo. The following month it 
was transported by the Air Corps from there to Garrison, County Fermanagh. With an 
empty weight of 11,630 pounds or more this aircraft could not have been moved on the 
small capacity Air Corps low loader - strongly suggesting that ‘the heavy transport and 
equipment supplied from Northern Ireland’ had been used.120
While Fisk was not referring to the return of aircraft he might well have been 
when he hinted at the value of repatriated aircrew to the Allies:
Of much greater material value was the collusion between the Irish and British 
Governments over the Allied air crews whose planes crashed in Eire and who 
should, under the rules of neutrality, have been interned for the duration.121
While twenty-seven allied aircraft were handed back at the border (in addition to some 
forty-seven aircraft permitted to take off again), the repatriation of experienced aircrew 
was probably of equal or even greater military value. The management of the repatriation 
function, to the extent that it can be assessed, would tend to confirm collusion at a 
political level. During the period a total of 537 Allied aircrew survived crashes and 
forced landings in Eire. Of 273 RAF personnel in those categories only forty-five were 
interned. Eleven RAF aircrew escaped while most of the others were released long before 
the end of hostilities mainly on the basis of representations made at a diplomatic level by
118 Ib id .
119 O C  A C  to  A /C O S , 26  Ju n e  1944  (M A , A C /2 /1 0 /9 ).
120 O C  A C  to C O S , 2 N o v . 1942; G 2 , W . C o m d . to  O C  A C , 13 M a y  1943 (A C F /1 4 4 /1 , in m y  p o ssess io n ); 
C .F . S h o re s , ‘L o ck h e ed  H u d so n  M k s  I to  V I ’, in Aircraft Profile 253  (A p ril, 197 3 ), p . 174.
‘ F isk , In time of war, p . 176
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the British representative, Maffey. By contrast all German aircrew (and sailors) were
122interned for the duration and remained so on 30 June 1945.
The relatively small number of RAF internees is accounted for by the fact that all 
aircrew were encouraged to state that they were on training rather than operational 
missions or that they were involved in search and rescue. While De Valera accepted such 
concocted stories it appears Col. Archer had authority to make decisions on individual 
cases.123 In early 1942, while Air Corps officers were handling the matter of a Hurricane 
that had landed at Collinstown, directions were handed down by GHQ.
Col. Archer, Assistant Chief of Staff, phoned Comdt. Delamere to say he had 
decided to release the Hurricane and the pilot and that it was to proceed first thing 
on Thursday 29th. We were to ensure that the aircraft was checked and serviced 
.. ..filled with petrol... the pilot given instructions to proceed straight to Aldergrove 
Aerodrome 124
The aircraft departed for Aldergrove at 10.28 hours on 29 January 1942. One pilot who 
could not make a claim to being on a training flight made a force-landing near Athboy 
(Meath) on 21 August 1941. His Hawker Hurricane II had long range fuel tanks (and 
twenty gallons of fuel) and no less than ten Browning machine guns with about 900 
rounds of ammunition remaining.125 On the following day the Irish Press carried a brief 
report under the headline ‘British plane down in Co. Meath’.
The Government Information Bureau issued the following statement yesterday; ‘A 
British plane made a forced landing in Co. Meath this afternoon. The pilot, who 
was uninjured, has been interned.’126
' “ In te ll ig e n c e  file , ‘S u m m ary  o f  c h ro n o lo g ic a l list o f  fo rce d  lan d in g s  o r c ra sh e s  o f  b e llig e re n t a irc ra f t from  
th e  o u tb rea k  o f  w a r to  30  Ju n e  1 9 4 5 ’, (M A , n o  re fe re n ce ).
123 F isk , In time of war, pp  327  -  3 30 .
124 W .P . D e la m e re  to  C S O  G .2 , 29  Jan . 1942  (M A , G 2 /X /0 9 6 1 ).
125 C ap t. M . C u m isk ey  to  C S O  G .2 , 5 S ep t. 1 9 4 1 (M A , G 2 /X /0 8 2 7 ); F isk , In time of war, p p  3 2 7 -3 3 0
126 P re ss  cu ttin g , Irish Press, 22  A u g . 1941 (M A , G 2 /X /0 8 2 7 ).
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The Daily Mirror of 22 August 1941 carried basically the same report under the headline 
‘Eire interns RAF pilot’. Woolgar and Roberts’ Press Cutting Agency supplied their 
client, ‘Eire’, with the relevant cutting. While de Valera’s Government was no doubt 
interested to know how Irish affairs were being reported in the UK they were probably 
more concerned to give the impression, to Irish people, home and abroad, that all such 
aircraft incidents resulted in the internment of the crew. This of course was not always 
the case.127
While the memorandum for the government states that the arrangements for the 
return of aircraft were informally agreed it transpires that the DOD aspect of the matter, 
the salvage of aircraft as carried out by the Air Corps, was put on a regulatory basis in 
1943. This came about as part of the reorganisation that took effect on 29 March 1943. In 
the Technical Workshops of the Maintenance Unit a ‘Salvage’ section comprising a 
captain, six NCOs and sixteen privates was provided for. Listed under the heading of 
‘vehicles’, in the Transport Section of the Air Corps Depot, were no less than five 
‘tractors, aircraft’.128 A total of about 162 crashes and forced landings are recorded as 
having been dealt with by the armed forces during the period 1939-45.127
Aerodromes for RAF use
While the major practical aspects of Eire -  UK cooperation during the Emergency were 
directed by Government policy and affected by GHQ the Air Corps was involved in air 
related aspects other than air intelligence. One such significant aspect was the matter of 
aerodromes for the use of the RAF that might operate in Eire in support of a defence 
against a possible German invasion. In the context of such a defence it is considered that 
Gonnanston was ideally placed for the initial stages at least. However the position 
regarding the likely use of this aerodrome during the summer of 1940 is not obvious.
It is significant that Lywood’s first report indicated that the service tanks at 
Gonnanston held 12,000 gallons of aviation fuel, or 70.5% of its storage capacity of
127 P re ss  cu ttin g , Daily Mirror, 22  A u g . 1941 (M A , G 2 /X /0 8 2 7 ).
128 T a b le s  30  W  a n d  3 0 a  W , 1943 A C  e s tab lish m en t
129 In te ll ig e n c e  file , ‘S u m m a ry  o f  c h ro n o lo g ica l list o f  fo rce d  lan d in g s  o r  c ra sh e s  o f  b e llig e re n t a irc raft 
fro m  th e  o u tb rea k  o f  w a r to 3 0  Ju n e  1 9 4 5 ’ ( no  re fe re n ce , M A ).
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17,000 gallons, on or about 20 May 1940. Nine days later the holding was recorded by 
the Air Corps as 1 1,355 gallons or 66.8% of capacity. On the same day, 29 May,
130Baldonnell, where fuel was in daily use and with a similar capacity, held only 59% 
The question arises as to why Gormanston should hold more aviation fuel than 
Baldonnell at a time when German invasion, via the south coast, was feared. Under GHQ 
Operations Order No.l of 29 May 1940 Gormanston was not designated for Air Corps 
use in any circumstance. In fact the ‘defence of aerodromes’ annex, that directed defence 
measures for Baldonnell, Collinstown and Tallaght as well as three small private airfields
in the Eastern Command area, did not provide for the air defence of Gonnanston though
121 » . . . .  it was probably the most vulnerable and accessible of all. This omission is intriguing
when it is considered that Gormanston, though somewhat run-down, had been built to the
same training depot station specifications as Baldonnell and was potentially a viable air
base -  for friend or foe alike. It is unlikely that the fuel at Gormanston represented an Air
Corps reserve. At that time the return of fuel stocks indicated 102 tons of fuel in bulk
storage, as well as spare storage for a further fifty-eight tons, at Dublin docks. The
centrally stored fuel at Dublin was much closer to Baldonnell which itself had spare
capacity.132 In effect there was no apparent operational or strategic reason for such a
relatively large stock of fuel at a non-operational aerodrome such as Gormanston. A
possible explanation for the absence of air defence and the presence of a significant
amount of aviation fuel is that Gonnanston may have been designated, during the initial
period of concern regarding invasion and for a relatively short period, as a first base for
RAF aircraft answering the call to repel a German invasion in the early summer of 1940.
Its location, just fifty miles south of the border and on the east coast, would have made it
the natural first base for the RAF in Eire. In December 1940 Gormanston was initially
included on a list of ‘Emergency Landing Grounds’. Subsequently the name was
deliberately obscured on EDP copy of the order -  suggesting that the aerodrome was
13 3intended for some special purpose.
130 F u e l S to ck s, 29  M a y  19 4 0 , (M A , A C /2 /8 /3 )
131 A n n e x  N o . V  to  O p e ra tio n s  O r d e r N o .  1, 29  M ay  1940 , (M A , E D P  1/1)
132 ‘R e p o rt N o . 1 L y w o o d  to  A M , 11 Ju n e  1940 (N A , A ir  2 /5 1 3 0 ).
133 O p e ra tio n s  O rd e r  N o . 3 /1 9 4 0 , 17 D ec . 1940 (M A , E D P  1/2, P lan  2).
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Subsequent to the initial alarm period of May to July 1940 the RAF commenced a 
planning process aimed at the air defence of Eire in the context of a British response to a 
German invasion -  if and when asked. An early warning order directed that, in the event 
of Gennan invasion of Eire or Northern Ireland immediate action was to be taken against 
the invading forces by the air forces stationed in Northern Ireland.134 Fighter squadrons 
were to be the backbone of this defence.
 when the situation in Eire permits, the need to establish fighter sector stations in
the Dublin and Wexford areas with the object of affording protection to Eire and to 
British shipping in St. Georges Channel and the Irish Sea 135
This initial proposal provided for the operation of two fighter squadrons from Baldonnell 
‘with an advanced landing ground at Wexford’ and a further squadron located ‘in 
southern or central Eire’.136 Staff studies also considered the occupation of Collinstown, 
Curragh, and Rineanna and the posting to Ireland of five fighter squadrons and a 
servicing unit in addition to the RAF Headquarters and seven squadrons already in 
Northern Ireland.137 While a later study projected as many as seven sector stations and 
two forward aerodromes in Eire, plus a major expansion of R.D.F. (radar) stations to 
include the south and east coasts, RAF planning concentrated on the concept of 
Baldonnell and Collinstown as fighter stations with an advanced or forward airfield in 
Wexford. This latter plan, which outlined the communications for the R.A.F. in the event 
of operations outside Northern Ireland put two Battle squadrons at Collinstown, three 
Hurricane fighter squadrons at Baldonnell and capacity for two fighter squadrons at 
Wexford. The same plan provided for No. 11 Repair and Salvage Unit to be located at 
‘Gonnanstown’ and No. 23 Workshop Service Unit at Baldonnell.138
134 D e p u ty  C h ie f  o f  A ir  S ta f f  to  O C  R A F  A ld e rg ro v e , 21 Ju n e  1940 (N A , C A B  104 /1 8 4 ).
133 F ig h te r  C o m m a n d  R A F  to  D e p u ty  C A S , 19 Ju ly  1940  (N A , A ir  2 /5 1 8 5 ).
136 Ib id .
137 ‘P lan  fo r th e  p re p a ra tio n  o f  a ir  fo rce s  fo r o p e ra tio n s  in th e  e v en t o f  a G e rm an  a ttack  on E ire  o r N o rth e rn  
I re la n d ’, 4  A u g . 1940  (N A , A ir  2 /5 1 3 0 ).
138 W a r  C a b in e t, ‘R e v ie w  o f  th e  A ir  D e fe n c e  o f  I re la n d ’, O ct. /  D e c .1940  (N A , A ir  2 /5 1 7 2 ); H Q  R A F  N I to 
H Q  F ig h te r  C o m m a n d , 28  S ep t. 1940  (N A , A ir  16 /530).
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As early as July 1940 the availability of existing aerodromes and the selection of 
forward landing grounds had concerned both the RAF and the Air Ministry.139 Lywood 
was given direction on the matter:
For Lywood. It is desired make extensive reconnaissance Eire to ascertain landing 
grounds of possible use by enemy or ourselves. In view [of] your pre-occupations 
such reconnaissance might be conducted by two or three officers as tourists on 
instructions from Operations Department Air Ministry under your direction.140
Notwithstanding the excellent relationship that developed between Lywood and Mulcahy 
-  a relationship that might have negated the necessity for such subterfuge - the Air 
Ministry was still disposed to such covert action in February 1941.141 In the meanwhile 
the cooperation with Lywood appears not to have included information on sites suitable 
for advanced landing grounds though many such sites had been identified in the context 
of Air Corps’ army cooperation responsibilities. As Lywood himself had produced a 
survey of an unspecified number of sites, and because of difficulties and objections, the 
idea of spying trips was dropped.142 On 14 February Lywood was instructed by the Air 
Ministry to make representations to prevent some fourteen sites, presumably originally 
identified by him, from being ploughed under the compulsory tillage scheme. Fie was 
also to ask Mulcahy for any detailed information available on the sites.143
It appears that at about this time Mulcahy was being particularly helpful to 
Lywood -  apparently arising out of Mulcahy’s need of training aircraft.
It is necessary to make it clear that the question of the supply of these 10 Flector 
aircraft to Eire did not arise as the result of an official request from the Eire 
government. It has arisen in the course of a useful liaison which has grown up in 
the last few months between our air attaché in Dublin and Colonel Mulcahy 144
139 H Q  R A F  N I  to  A M , 30  Ju ly  1940  (N A , A ir  2 /5 1 3 0 ).
140 C y p h e r m essa g e , A M  to  S ta tio n  A .A ., 11 Ju ly  194, (N A , A ir  2 /5 1 2 9 ).
141 M in u te  36 , 8 F e b . 1940; M in u te  37 , 12 F eb . 1940, A M , S .5503  (N A , A ir  2 /5 1 7 2 ).
142 M in u te  39 , 15 F eb . 19 4 1 , A M , S .5 5 0 3  (N A , A ir  2 /5 1 7 2 ).
143 A M  to R .W .G . L y w o o d , 14 M ar. 1941 (N A , A ir  2 /5 1 7 2 ).
144 F ile  M e m o , ‘S u p p ly  o f  a irc ra ft to  E ir e ’, 26  Jan . 1941 (N A , A ir  8 /361).
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With Lywood supporting the supply of training aircraft, which have little potential 
offensive value Mulcahy had undertaken to ask his superiors for sanction for the 
construction of aerodromes in the Wexford and Cork sectors where the RAF need them 
most.145 In March 1941 Mulcahy gave instructions for the conduct of a survey of 
aerodromes for RAF rather than Air Corps use. He issued guidelines with regard to the 
characteristics required. Pilots were reminded that the surveys were to be kept secret and 
that in obtaining information about particular sites the real aim was not to be revealed.146 
Subsequently Mulcahy received reports and plans relating to nine sites from the 
Command Engineer, Eastern Command. The sites included Gaybrook, county 
Westmeath, Rathduff, county Tipperary and Rosegarland, county Wexford, the last being 
one of the RAF’s preferred sites. Mulcahy forwarded copies of the reports and plans to 
the COS.147 In August 1941 the COS made an announcement in relation to the 
'Preparation of emergency aerodromes’:
It has been decided that two emergency aerodromes are to be prepared -  one near 
Cashel and one near Mullingar and that no other aerodromes will be prepared 
elsewhere. The selected sites are Rathduff, Co. Tipperary and Gaybrook, 
Mullingar’.148
It was not explained why Rosegarland was not considered further but it seems probable 
that the projected development cost of £13,480 was the deciding factor.149 It was
specified that two runways at right angles with ‘minimum dimensions of 1,000 x 50
yards’, a capacity for further extension and ‘capable of taking a total load 7,000 lbs’ were 
required at each site to be developed. This represented a more demanding specification 
than the previous. This decision was endorsed by the minister a few days later.150 When 
acknowledging the decision Mulcahy indicated that he would have the sites resurveyed
143 ‘M e m o r a n d u m  by  V ic e  C A S ’, 24  Jan. 1941 (N A ,  A i r  8 /361).
146 O C  A C  to S q u a d ro n  c o m m a n d e r s ,  26  M ar .  1941 ( M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 4 ) .
147 O C  A C  to C o m m a n d  E n g in e e r ,  E. C o m d ,  12 Ju ly  1941 (M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 4 ) .
148 C O S  to  O C  A C ,  21 A u g .  1941 (M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 4 ) .
149 O C  A C  to C O S ,  16 Ju ly  1941 (M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 4 ) .
150 C O S  to  O C  A C ,  21 A u g .  1941;  F ile  m e m o  da ted  25 A u g .  194 (M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 4 ) .
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by his civilian aeronautical engineer and an officer appointed by the director of military 
engineering. Also he warned that the change in the specification requiring greater runway 
length might cause difficulties in one case.151
Within the week he submitted a further report indicating that runways of the 
required length and at right angles could not be fitted in at Rathduff due to ploughed 
fields. The position in relation to Gaybrook was even less satisfactory to the extent that 
the preparation of the site to the required specification would be a lengthy and expensive 
operation. It was recommended, in order to reduce expenditure, that less stringent 
provisions as regards the runway length might be acceptable. ‘Before arriving at a 
decision, I consider that certain interested parties should be consulted and pennitted to 
inspect both sites’.152 In August 1941 DOD had received outline financial approval ‘for 
the arrangements made in connection with the emergency accommodation of troops.’ In 
September the department stated that ‘landing ground[s] for Air Corps purposes’ and ‘for 
use in certain eventualities’ are required near Mullingar and near Golden (Rathduff).
Subsequently, following further inspection by engineers, the development of 
Gaybrook was abandoned -  apparently on the grounds of the potential expense resulting 
from the amount of levelling and grading required to meet the revised specifications.153 In 
requesting confirmation of verbal sanction previously given DOD requested approval for 
agreements to be entered into with the three landowners at Rathduff, Golden, Co. 
Tipperary. It was proposed to pay annual reservation fees of £52 to Mrs. D.H. Edwards, 
£12 to Thomas Burke and £6 to Denis Kennedy and to undertake to compensate for 
damage done by removing fences. A rental payment was intended in the event that the 
lands were actually used subsequently as an aerodrome.154 By October 1941 it was 
reported that the aerodrome at Rathduff was being developed to the modified 
requirements of 21 August 1941 except that the runways were at 93 degrees to each other 
in order to fit them in with surface details. Outstanding works, including the levelling of 
banks, ditches and hollows, would take six weeks to complete with one hundred men 
employed. The difficulty presented by the presence of a 200 yard strip of stubble that
151 O C  A C  to C O S ,  23 A ug .  1941 (M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 4 )
152 O C  A C  to C O S ,  29  A ug.  1941 (M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 4 )
153 O C  A C  to C O S ,  3 D e c .  1941 (M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 4 ) .
154 Sec D O D  to  Sec D F ,  4  Sept.  1941 (M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 4 ) .
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would not bear the required load was easily resolved. Arrangements were made with 
headquarters, RAF NI to make available the necessary quantity of Summerfield track for 
emergency runways if and when required. Mulcahy had gone to Fowlmere Aerodrome in 
August 1941 and inspected the reinforced wire mesh track (RSP- reinforced steel 
planking) used to stabilise soft ground.155 Rathduff was most likely ready for use by the 
end of 1941 but was not destined to be used by the RAF. The only Air Corps recorded 
use occurred during the Army exercises of September 1942.156 In May 1941 the Air 
Corps took delivery of ten ex-RAF Hawker Hectors and in January 1942 a further three. 
The machines were apparently supplied at a notional cost of £200 each, plus £15 each for 
equipment.157
Conclusions
From 1936 the Government’s concept of the Air Corps had been as a source of technical 
personnel and expertise for the advancement of civil aviation. The priority given to the 
employment of pilots in civil ATC from 1936 to 1946 can be seen as a major aspect of 
that policy. A second aspect was the conduct of three wings courses during the 
Emergency. With sixty-four students recruited and forty-three qualified the output of the 
previous seventeen years was duplicated in six while the post-war pilot requirements of 
civil aviation would be more than adequately provided for. It is significant that the Air 
Corps second-in-command spent the bulk of the Emergency period in a managerial 
position with Aer Lingus. It is similarly significant that an elusive and apparently 
minuscule Air Corps reserve that included Capt. Ivor Hammond, was not called to the 
flag.
Given the lack of preparation and planning, that was, in effect, part of the 
Government’s policy for the Emergency, it is easy to understand the quite unsatisfactory 
nature of the Air Corps’ contribution during the first twelve to sixteen months of the 
period. Whatever the circumstances, with the decision to post an air detachment to the
155 M a jo r  J. G le eso n  to O C  A C , 9 Oct .  1941; O C  A C  to C O S ,  13 Oct.  1941; O C  A C  to  C O S ,  17 O c t .  1941 
(M A , A C /2 /9 /1 4 ) .
156 U n d a ted  ‘R e p o r t  on  A r m y  e x erc is es  1 9 4 2 ’,circa Sept .  1942 (M A ) .
137 A .P .  K earn s ,  ‘I r ish  A i r  C o r p s ’ p. 459 ;  Sec D O D  to Sec  D F , 6 Jan . 1943 (N A I ,  D F ,  S. 0 0 8 /0 0 2 9 /3 9 ) .
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south west, the campaign started badly and from there matters got worse. It could rightly 
be stated that the R & MB Sqn. element exchanged the aviation backwater of Baldonnell 
for the aviation wilderness of Rineanna. Nothing in the aeronautical circumstances at 
Rineanna was conducive to the conduct of a successful military mission. The 
inadequacies included an ill-equipped and inadequately supported obsolete aircraft that 
was unsuited to the environment and to the mission. It could be stated that the loss of 
three aircraft early in the mission and the obvious lack of adequate spares were the main 
factors contributing to the degradation of the patrolling mission. However, the primitive 
nature of the location and facilities, including meteorology, communications, direction 
finding and other basic requisites, compounded by the absence of preparations of any 
description, contributed in no small way to an outcome that was probably inevitable in 
the circumstances.
At Baldonnell the position of the other operational squadron, from May 1940, 
was, if anything, even more unsatisfactory. The composition of the 1940 Fighter 
Squadron was an aeronautical nonsense. With fifteen aircraft of six inappropriate and 
obsolete types it was, as the investigation report subsequently stated, fighter in name 
only. While it is not possible to adequately assess the likely affect, in practical operation, 
of GHQ’s disjoined and uncoordinated operations orders, the concept of Fighter 
Squadron being the backbone of an Air Corps Interception Service indicates a naivety on 
the part of the military leadership which defies belief. The terms in which Mulcahy 
indicated his acceptance of the suggestion that a training cadre might make a worthwhile 
contribution to the defence of Dublin strongly suggests that his greater naivety influenced 
those who should have known better.
With its core roles ceasing to be of value it subsequently fell to the Air Corps to 
be the main conduit for the return of force-landed and repairable crashed aircraft. While 
the full circumstances of the evolution of this function are obscure it apparently soon 
became the Corps’ main significant contribution to the ongoing cooperation with the 
RAF. Mulcahy’s cooperative relationship with the UK air attaché, though it was at least 
partially driven by his need for spares and more particularly for training aircraft, tended 
to transcend the difficult political relationship between the two countries. That only one 
advanced airfield was developed for the RAF was probably not due to any lack of
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diligence on Mulcahy’s part while the number of aircraft acquired, albeit more obsolete 
than the previous, suggests reward for a degree of cooperation that the RAF and the Air 
Ministry could not have anticipated.
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CHAPTER 11
THE AIR CORPS INVESTIGATION OF 1941 
AND
THE 1943 REORGANISATION
In August 1939 the Air Corps, without the benefit of planning or preparation commenced 
the emergency period by dispatching, to Rineanna a detachment of less than 100 all ranks 
with Anson and Walrus aircraft. Their reconnaissance mission was to patrol the west 
coast and to report, in particular, German submarine activity. This operation, probably 
directed by government, and possibly at the request of the UK, was undertaken despite 
inappropriately equipped obsolete aircraft, inadequate training and abysmally poor 
aerodrome infrastructure, maintenance, spares and support services. Within eight months 
adverse circumstances, particularly very poor aircraft serviceability caused by chronic 
lack of spares, dictated that the coastal patrol operation be reduced to occasional patrols.
From May 1940, in similar circumstances of obsolete aircraft and inadequate 
service support the Fighter Squadron at Baldonnell was given an improbable role in a 
scheme for the air defence of the Dublin area. This scheme was ill-conceived and 
inadequately directed, controlled and coordinated. Despite the futility of its assigned role 
Fighter Squadron remained on endless stand-by for an invasion about which, had it 
happened, the squadron would have been capable of doing precious little. The minuscule 
Coastal Patrol Squadron, also based at Baldonnell, had no operational function but acted 
as a training element for the reconnaissance detachment in Rineanna. It was to be through 
the professional interest and the unprecedented intervention of two officers of this 
squadron that the inadequacies of the commanding officer and of aerodrome service 
support systems, particularly communications and direction finding, were to be 
highlighted.
This chapter will examine the immediate circumstances, identifying the particular 
aspects that caused officers to complain to higher authority about those decisions and 
actions of Colonel Mulcahy, which eventually lead to the investigation. The
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deliberations, the report and findings and main recommendations of the committee of 
investigation will be assessed with particular reference to any possible bias or prejudice 
in respect of any individual or group. It is also intended to establish the extent to which 
the report and proceedings reflect an accurate exposition of the effectiveness of the Air 
Corps and of the circumstances that brought its pilots to a demoralised and depressed 
state. The committee’s assessment of individual pilots will be explored. Central to this 
study will be an assessment of the roles and functions of Col P. A. Mulcahy from June 
1935 to January 1942 and of the degree to which he may have contributed to the problem. 
The main findings and recommendations, in particular those relating to Mulcahy will 
require close examination in the context of his decisions and actions over the years. The 
post-investigation period will be examined to assess the Army’s change of emphasis in 
air matters and, in effect, the return of the Air Corps to the army cooperation fold for the 
latter years of the Emergency.
The committee
The ‘Committee of investigation into the effectiveness, organisation, equipment, training 
and administration of the Air Corps’ was established by a convening order, dated 10 
January 1941, issued by the Chief of Staff. It consisted of Major General H. McNeill, 
Assistant Chief of Staff, and three majors (equivalent to lieutenant colonels). While the 
report states that the committee first convened on 28 January the first witness was heard 
on Tuesday 21 January 1941. The committee took evidence, under oath, four days each 
week until 18 April 1941 and from 23 September 1941 to 21 November 1941. They 
began formulating their report and findings on 8 December 1941 and delivered the report 
on 10 January 1942, exactly one year after the order had been issued. Though not cited as 
such it was, in effect, a court of inquiry as provided for by Defence Forces Regulation 
A.5 dated 10 April 1937, a process normally used to investigate vehicle accidents and 
losses and deficiencies of military stores. The regulation provided for the examination of 
witnesses and for rebuttal evidence in the event of a witness making remarks affecting the 
military reputation of an officer or giving evidence contradicting that of another witness. 
In practice the investigation examined each witness in private with all evidence being
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duly recorded. Subsequently an officer who had been the subject of adverse comment 
was given the opportunity to give rebuttal evidence. In its preamble on procedure the 
committee indicated that while the conduct of the investigation was formal and on oath 
the evidence was not necessarily spontaneous:
While the evidence is recorded in the form of question and answer, it was found 
desirable, because of the very wide scope of the matters under investigation, to 
permit witnesses to discuss with the committee and explain the points they desired 
to make. These discussions were then reduced to relevant and essential facts in the 
form of questions and answers and are so recorded.1
It is considered that this convenience the committee afforded themselves may have 
provided scope for a degree of selectivity in regard to what was considered relevant and 
essential. It is noted that, on occasion, the committee steered witnesses away from 
matters they might have preferred to pursue but that the committee might not. In the 
event the committee examined some forty-one witnesses -  all Air or Signal Corps 
personnel with the single exception of Colonel (later General) M. J. Costello, a senior 
officer on McNeill’s operations staff in GHQ. A total of 588 pages, or approximately 
265,000 words, of witness evidence was recorded while the report and findings, annexes 
and appendixes added a further 274 pages of typed foolscap. The appendixes comprised 
various correspondence and reports, mainly predating the investigation, that were 
accepted in evidence. Due to his key roles as OC Air Corps and director of military 
aviation and to the amount of criticism expressed before and during the investigation 
Colonel Mulcahy provided a proportionately large amount of this evidence -  about 20%. 
This was mainly due to his being recalled a number of times to give rebuttal evidence in 
respect of adverse comments on aspects of his command, decisions and actions. The 
committee also consulted some forty-four DOD and Air Corps files, the flying log books 
of forty-seven officers and sundry records and orders.2
1 R e p o r t  and  f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m i t te e ,  10 J a n u a ry  1942 ,  I-II (M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .  T h e  rep o r t  is p a g in a ted  in 
r o m an  capitals .
" ‘ L is t  o f  f i les and  o th e r  re co rd s  e x a m i n e d ’, A p p e n d ix  N o .  X L II  to  R e p o r t  and  f in d in g s  o f  the  co m m ittee ,  
10 Jan.  1942  (M A ,  A C S  22/23).
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The cause of the unrest
The terms of reference, the evidence of witnesses and the report and findings of the 
committee do not indicate the exact circumstances that led to the investigation. It would 
appear that the condition of the Air Corps during what Mulcahy called the ‘invasion 
nervous’ months of the summer of 19403 and the manner in which Mulcahy exercised his 
command and the functions of DMA before and during the early stages of Emergency 
were central factors. From Mulcahy’s final submission to the investigation committee on 
21 November 1941 it transpires that, during the latter part of 1940 in particular, his 
command was under severe strain due to alleged irregular communications from junior 
officers to persons outside the Army - including the minister. Mulcahy cited a visit to 
Baldonnell by the minister and the COS on 23 October 1940 in connection with certain 
allegations made in writing to the minister -  apparently in the recent past. While it is not 
clear by whom allegations had initially been made it appears that T.J. Hanley may have 
been one. We are not given any indication as to the exact nature of these allegations but 
the evidence of witnesses suggests several matters aired during the investigation hearings. 
These included standards of navigation and instrument flying, the standard of aircraft 
equipment such as instrument panels, direction finding equipment, communications 
generally and the failure to acquire vacuum pumps and loop aerials for Ansons.4
Subsequent to the visitation of 23 October, with the minister’s permission, two 
officers submitted written complaints. His evidence to the investigation confirms that 
Hanley was one of those invited to write to the Minister -  which he did on 4 November 
1940.5 One of the matters he complained of was the fact that vacuum pumps (for the 
better operation of gyroscopic instruments in Ansons), had been requisitioned by the Air 
Corps in June 1939, not ordered by Contracts Section DOD until June 1940 -  and 
apparently still not delivered in January 1941.6 While he possibly also mentioned the 
failure of the Air Corps to seek the purchase of loop aerials for Ansons, (a modification 
that was available since November 1938), this is not explicit in his evidence to the
3 P .A . M u lc a h y  to  A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  21 N o v .  1941 ( M A ,  A C S  22 /23) .
4 T .J .  H a n ley  to A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  23 Jan .;  17 A p r . ;  12 N o v .  1941 (M A ,  A C S  22 /23) .
3 P .A .  M u lc a h y  to  A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  19 N o v .  1941 ( M A ,  A C S  22 /23) .
6 T .J . H a n le y  to A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  23 Jan .  1941 ( M A ,  A C S  22 /23 ) .
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committee but is intimated in Mulcahy’s November 1940 defence of the allegations made 
against him.
On 15 November 1940 Mulcahy wrote to the COS in response to the matters 
contained in the two official letters to the minister. One of the main planks of his defence 
against the allegations was to denigrate Hanley for his lack of experience of staff duties 
stating that he was in no position to criticise constructively the administration of the Air 
Corps. Mulcahy went on, in an oblique fashion, to blame the procurement system for the 
failure to acquire equipment which Hanly saw as being of little importance to Mulcahy 
and his headquarters staff but a matter of life or death to those who flew every day. He 
summed up Hanley as follows:
Like many others he feels that every demand he makes for new or more equipment
should be supplied without delay.....................He forgets that these officers who
built up the [Air] Corps flew for years without the aid of modem equipment which 
he now has and without the new instruments and equipment which he states are 
essential.7
While Mulcahy blamed the system of financial control for the failure to acquire new 
instruments and equipment required by pilots he avoided direct reference to the failure to 
purchase the loop aerial and vacuum pump modifications for the Ansons. In the case of 
the loop aerial modification Hanly’s evidence to the committee strongly suggests that 
Mulcahy had knowingly withheld authority to buy the required materials.8
In denigrating Hanley’s lack of administrative experience and knowledge of 
procurement and, in effect, stating that pilots never had it so good, Mulcahy attempted to 
deflect attention away from Hanley’s fundamental point that Mulcahy’s Air Corps was 
not keeping Anson aircraft up to date in terms of equipment conducive to good 
navigation and that the failure to incorporate such modifications as vacuum pumps and 
loop aerials had rendered the reconnaissance operation more untenable than it might have 
been. It was in the context of this antipathy between Mulcahy and Hanley that the
7 P .A . M u lc a h y  to A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  19 N o v .  1941 ( M A ,  A C S  22 /2 3 ,
8 T .J .  H a n le y  to  A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  23 Jan . 1941 ( M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
3 5 8
incident, concerning the alleged irregular use of the civil DF station at Baldonnell on 21 
November 1940, had occurred.
On 24 October 1940 Mulcahy had felt obliged to issue orders prohibiting officers 
of one squadron from visiting other squadron areas to converse with fellow pilots except 
on official matters and then only with the permission of their unit commander. On 1 
November 1940, having been asked to do so by the COS, Mulcahy explained the reason 
for the order. The necessity arose because of Mulcahy’s belief, apparently based on his 
observation of the casual movement of officers between offices, that the practice of 
‘officers consorting with each other’ represented a waste of time and that it should be 
stopped. He considered that officers had deliberately misconstrued his order and reported 
it in an irregular manner.9 The tone of Mulcahy’s order about officers consorting with 
others, and the complains made by some officers to higher authority, strongly suggests 
that the dictatorial nature of his command, his lack of appreciation of the technical 
nuances of the aviation of the day, together with the inevitable demoralisation caused by 
the impotence of the two main operational squadrons, was causing great unrest amongst 
the flying officers. Mulcahy subsequently cited the letters of complaint, and other 
incidents, in concluding that ‘while these incidents were occurring, it was impossible to 
keep secret the fact that some disruptive element was at work and the effect on Corps 
morale and discipline will be appreciated’.10 In this regard it might be considered that 
Mulcahy mistook the symptoms for the cause.
There is one matter that particularly demonstrates the adverse effect Mulcahy had 
on the morale of pilot officers. A 1943 study of accident figures versus flying hours 
illustrated that in the first full year of Mulcahy’s command of the Air Corps, 1936, one 
flying accident was occurring every 950 hours of flying. By 1938 the figures reflected an 
accident every 525 hours. By 1942, the last full year of Mulcahy’s command, an accident 
was occurring, on average, every 210 flying hours. The statistics for 1941 and 1942 
reflected the loss of a total of eighteen aircraft (nine each year). By way of contrast no 
aircraft was lost in 1943, the first year of W.P. Delamere’s command.11
9 P.A. M u lc a h y  to A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  21 N o v .  1941 ( M A ,  A C S  22/23).
10 Ibid.
11 ‘M e m o r a n d u m  on f ly in g  a c c id e n t s  fo r  th e  in fo rm a t io n  o f  sen io r  o f f ice rs  o f  th e  A i r  C o r p s ’, W .  P. 
D e la m e re ,  29 N o v .  1943 ( in  m y  p o s s e s s io n ) .  T h e  s ta tis t ica l  s tu d y  s u p p o r t in g  th e  m e m o r a n d u m  w a s
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A picture emerges of a demoralised and frustrated pilot officer body that was no 
longer prepared to grin and bear it. In Hanley, who qualified in 1928, the younger pilots 
had a spokesman who had the professional expertise and moral authority of a long- 
qualified pilot (and who probably saw his future career as being outside military aviation) 
who could highlight the inadequacies of the director of military aviation. 
Notwithstanding, in the dictatorial atmosphere of the Army of the Emergency, where 
higher authority was right by virtue of superior rank, Hanley’s could have been a high 
risk strategy. It seems possible that Hanley and others had safeguarded their positions by 
keeping the Dail opposition informed thus obviating precipitous disciplinary action on the 
part of GHQ or the General Staff.
The investigation
It appears that, irrespective of the nature of Mulcahy’s defence against the written 
complaints higher authority (COS, DOD or the minister) deemed that a thorough 
investigation was warranted. In the circumstances outlined the investigation might have 
been centred on Mulcahy’s command and direction of the Air Corps that had resulted in 
demoralisation, inefficiency and stagnation.12 However the terms of reference, and the 
manner in which the committee proceeded, ensured that the spotlight was kept firmly on 
the perceived inadequacies of the Air Corps and the shortcomings of the pilots 
individually and collectively -  tending to presuppose that Mulcahy had little 
responsibility in the matter. In investigating ‘the effectiveness, organisation, equipment, 
training and administration of the Air Corps’ the committee addressed a number of 
standard questions, based on the nine main question in the terms of reference, to the more 
senior witnesses in particular. More specific questions were put to individuals as 
appropriate to their appointments, functions and evidence. The committee reported their 
proceedings, findings and recommendations under nine broad headings and several 
subheadings.
c o n d u c te d  b y  L ie u t .  J im  T e a g u e  (A i r  C o r p s  ae ro n au tica l  en g in eer ,  1940  to 1981).  In later  y e a rs  Lt. Col.  Jim  
T e a g u e  w a s  sc a th in g  in h is  c o m m e n ts  o n  P .A .  M u l c a h y ’s c o m m a n d  o f  th e  A ir  C o rp s  an d  o f  the  a d v erse  
e f fec t  h e  had on m o r a l e  and  fl ight  sa fe ty .
12 R e p o r t  a n d  f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m i t te e ,  10 Jan .  1942,  L X I X  ( M A ,  A C S  22 /23) .
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Effectiveness of the present Air Corps
The effectiveness or otherwise of the Air Corps was assessed by the committee in the 
context of the first question:
 whether the Air Corps, as now organised and equipped, is capable of co­
operating with other units of the Forces or of functioning usefully in any other 
capacity? To enable it to deal adequately with this question the Committee had to 
decide what type of co-operation our ground forces should expect from the Air 
Corps. 13
The committee, apparently without taking evidence on the matter or citing existing 
planning or policy documentation, but presumably drawing on the operations 
backgrounds of McNeill and Major (later Colonel) J.J. Flynn, stated that the co-operation 
required by the Defence Forces of the Air Corps might be divided into war and peace 
missions’.14 (Appendix No. 10) The war missions, in their broadest contexts, could be 
reconciled with the missions implied in the nomenclature of the three operational 
squadrons and might have been feasible in the context of Costello’s ten squadron Air 
Corps if properly equipped, manned and trained. In essence the war missions would have 
required an independent air force having an operational capacity many times that which 
existed during the Emergency. The peace missions, had the principles been applied in 
training prior to the Emergency, would have required several squadrons of army aviation, 
dispersed amongst the manoeuvring ground formations and devoted to the practice and 
simulation of wartime battle conditions. In the context of totally limited resources and the 
equally limited capabilities of the squadrons established the missions as stated have to be 
seen as being almost totally theoretical in nature.
Bearing in mind the fact that higher authority had not previously defined war and 
peace missions the introduction of such principles in the context of a major review of the
13 Ib id ,  VI.
14 Ibid.
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effectiveness of military aviation might have unduly complicated the study. In the event 
the investigation was to concentrate on its perception of the effectiveness of the existing 
Air Coips and on the corps’ potential, as army aviation, in support of ground forces. It did 
not try to compare what it actually found with the stated ideal. The introduction of the 
concept of war and peace missions, in the final report in January 1942, appears to 
emphasise the fact that the Army had neglected to address such important matters at a 
more appropriate earlier juncture.
The effectiveness of Air Corps aircraft was assessed with reference to the extent 
to which ‘a heterogeneous collection of aircraft, service and training, having as many 
different characteristics as there are types’ could perform their war missions or, in a 
future reorganisation, be adapted to reconnaissance missions. There were no conflicts of 
evidence in regard to the manifest inadequacies of individual aircraft types. The Gloster 
Gladiator, of which only three were in service in ‘A’ Flight of Fighter Squadron, was 
described as a single seat fighter of limited range with a poor radio and no armoured 
protection for the pilot. ‘In speed, armament and performance they would be completely 
outclassed by modern fighter aircraft.’ It was seen as having limited potential as a 
reconnaissance aircraft in that, as a single seat machine it did not have a rear gun and 
could not carry an observer.15
The committee reported that the other serviceable aircraft of Fighter Squadron 
consisted of five Lysanders organised in two flights. The sixth machine had been adapted 
for the target-towing requirements of anti-aircraft artillery.16 These were recognised to 
be very suitable army cooperation aircraft which, when used as fighters could use their 
low speed and manoeuvrability to avoid being shot down but, in reality, which would 
stand little chance in normal combat.17 In terms of effectiveness the committee suggested 
that, with both fighter and army cooperation aircraft, the Fighter Squadron could fulfil 
neither role satisfactorily. While the bulk of its aircraft were army cooperation machines 
that were unsuitable as fighters the pilots were also inadequately trained in anny 
cooperation duties. The report did not reflect the fact that during the pertinent period, the 
latter half of 1940, the Fighter Squadron had a total of fifteen aircraft (as against a
15 Ib id ,  IV.
16 A .P .  K e a rn s ,  ‘Ir ish  A i r  C o r p s ’, p .4 5 9
17 R e p o r t  a n d  f in d in g s  o f  the  c o m m i t te e ,  10 Jan .  1942, VI ( M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
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notional twenty-two) of no less than six different types - three Gladiators, six Lysanders, 
two Avros 636s, two Hawker Hinds, a DH Dragon and a Miles Magister - organised into 
four flights. The squadron had only eleven pilots out of a notional war establishment of 
twenty-seven. ‘B’ Flight, Fighter Squadron had five aircraft of no less than four different 
types. All-in-all the composition of the squadron, in the context of the norms of the 
organisation and equipment of air squadrons of the period, was a total nonsense.18 The 
committee concluded that ‘the fighter squadron is fighter in name only’. The committee’s 
final assessment was brutally frank:
The Committee considers that the employment of this insignificant unit would not 
be justified for fighter purposes. Such employment would be an unwarranted waste 
of life without any gain to the Army or the state.19
The committee described the Ansons of the R & MB Squadron as ‘twin-engined, slow, 
heavy and of limited manoeuvrability which renders them very easy prey to any type of 
enemy aircraft’. In this case the committee seems to have seen qualified merit in the 
manner in which the Anson was, and could in the future, be used:
The Anson machines can be employed on coastal patrol in normal weather during 
the present period of the emergency. They have in fact been employed on such 
duties during the autumn and winter of 1939, operating from a base at Rineanna
Aerodrome In the most favourable circumstances, they could be used to report
whether hostile sea-borne forces were at sea, were approaching our coast and the 
location of such forces being put ashore.20
In considering a possible army cooperation role for this squadron the committee 
suggested that the Anson might be used ‘over quiet sectors where hostile aircraft is [sic]
l8E x a m in a t io n  o f  The squadrons of the Royal Air Force ind ica tes  tha t  the  vast  m a jo r i ty  o f  sq u a d ro n s  h ad  no  
m o re  th an  a s in g le  a irc raf t  type  ex cep t  w h e n  b e in g  re -e q u ip p ed .  E ig h teen  o r  tw e n ty - fo u r  a irc raf t  w o u ld  be  a 
n o rm al  c o m p le m e n t .
l9R e p o r t  a n d  f in d in g s  o f  the  c o m m i t te e ,  10 Jan .  1942, V III  (M A ,  A C S  22/23) .
20 Ib id ,  V -V I .
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not operating’ or in lulls ‘between periods of hostile air activity’.21 As an operational unit 
the Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber Squadron was assessed to have the deficiencies 
inherent in its aircraft. The Coastal Patrol Squadron was deemed to be similarly afflicted. 
It was cited as having two ‘obsolete type Walrus aircraft’, one Avro Anson and two Avro 
Cadet training aircraft. Due to the lack of spare floats the Walrus aircraft were not 
allowed to operate from water.
The committee summarised the operational capacity, and thus ‘the effectiveness 
of the present Air Corps’, in necessarily blunt terms:
It will be seen from the foregoing that not alone is the Air Corps equipment 
obsolete, with the exception of the Lysanders, but is also totally inadequate. A so- 
called Fighter Squadron is maintained, possessing 8 service machines of which 
only 3 are fighters of an obsolete type. The Reconnaissance and Medium Bombing 
and the Coastal Patrol Squadrons have only enough aircraft to equip one flight 
each. In view of these facts the most that can be hoped for from the Air Corps under 
favourable conditions is intermittent [reconnaissance] information in limited areas
subsequent to invasion Protection of the civil population and the Defence
22Forces is definitely not possible.
The committee found that the extent and nature of the cooperation that the Air Corps, as 
then organized and equipped, could offer to the ground forces to be ‘so negligible that it 
can be discounted’. They considered two possible recommendations with regard to the 
future of the Corps. While they considered the disbandment of the Air Corps with its 
personnel being formed into an infantry unit or transferred to other ground units they 
recommended that the best use of personnel and equipment could be affected by a 
reorganisation of the Corps. The main role of a reformed Air Corps would be ‘assisting in 
the training of our ground forces in anti-aircraft measures and helping to overcome the
23psychological effects of aircraft bombing and machine-gunning attacks’.
21 Ib id ,  V.
22 Ibid,  IX.
23 Ibid,  IX-X .
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Organisation and equipment of the Air Corps and previous policies and 
organisation schemes
The second question addressed was that of the suitability of the current organisation and 
equipment of the Air Corps for defence purposes and the changes to both that might be 
required under the prevailing conditions of financial stringency and uncertain supply. 
The committee prefaced its deliberations by stating that the ‘organization, equipment and 
training of the Air Corps, as in the case of any branch of the service, must be based on a 
definite policy’ in turn based on the general policy of the Defence Forces. Before taking 
evidence they proceeded to ‘examine all relevant and available documents’ in order to 
review the historical position in respect of previous policies and organisation schemes. In 
reviewing the material relating to policy available on file it found that a conference of 17 
January 1929 had been made aware, by the then OC AC, of the inadequacies of the 
aircraft then in service and of the poor level of technical expertise available to maintain 
them. Quoting from the same file, DOD 2/49025, the committee noted that the minister, 
on 23 January 1929, had stated that ‘he considered it more essential to have mechanical 
personnel trained and the pilots trained’ before spending large amounts of money on 
aircraft and that ‘in whatever crisis that would arise in which the Air Corps would be 
required in war, the machines could and would be found’. The committee noted that no 
decision was taken as to whether pilots were to be trained for reconnaissance or fighter 
missions or for both. ‘In other words the defence role of the Air Corps was not adequately 
defined.’24
The committee, quoting from DOD file 2/33693 noted that Major Mulcahy had, 
on 16 September 1937, requested clarification from the Chief of Staff regarding 'general 
aviation policy’ and, pursuant to such a policy, the numbers of aircraft required for the 
following ten years. It was subsequently recorded in a minute of 18 October 1937, 
following discussions between the minister and the COS that ‘the government cannot at 
the moment lay down the policy on which a decision could be reached’. On 28 September 
1937 Mulcahy had recommended, ‘as the minimum number of Squadrons required’, the
24 Ibid, X.
3 6 5
establishment of ‘5 Fighter Squadrons’ and ‘5 Reconnaissance Squadrons’ to be 
dispersed to aerodromes in the vicinities of Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Sligo and Athlone. 
He further recommended that one squadron of each type should be maintained at full 
strength and the remainder at cadre strength strong enough to maintain all essential 
services and to carry out the required aircrew training.25
The committee considered that the Costello plan of 21 March 1938 that provided 
for the immediate raising of three squadron cadres and ultimately for a total of ten 
squadrons appeared to have been the first time that the Air Corps was given a definite 
objective towards which to aim. ‘From the nature and nomenclature of the Squadrons, 
their general role in the defence scheme can be judged.’26
They also noted that subsequently the government had come to no definite 
decision on the ultimate development of the Air Corps.27 On this point the evidence of 
Costello and Mulcahy clashed. While Costello insisted that his plan of 21 March 1938 
had been abandoned Mulcahy stated that he had not been so informed. The committee 
apparently saw no point in resolving the matter. This may well have been because the 
problem was getting close to home. With the abandonment of the Costello plan the matter 
of air policy appears to have been devolved, unknowingly, to Mulcahy while McNeill, 
Costello and Flynn, all of whom had occupied positions in the operations function of 
GHQ, could be faulted for not taking action to make the position adequately clear.
The committee noted that later, under the general scheme of organisation for the 
Army, war establishment tables were drawn up for one each of three types of squadron 
and financial sanction sought. Having received the approval of the Taoiseach on 10 
December 1938 and of the Government on 31 January 1939 these 1938 tables became the 
War Establishment that eventually came into effect on 13 June 1940. The committee 
however noted that the approved establishment included no provision for the expansion, 
to ten squadrons, as favoured by both Costello and Mulcahy. The committee intimated 
that, as the Air Corps’ general role in the scheme of defence could be deduced from the 
nomenclature of these squadrons, this in effect, constituted an adequate statement of the
2:1 Ibid,  X I ,  q u o t in g  O C  A C  to C O S ,  A C F /5 6 4  da ted  28 Sept .  1937. W h i le  th is  s u b m is s io n  w as  q u o ted  by 
M u lc a h y  a n u m b e r  o f  t im e s  he  w as  u n a b le  to p ro d u c e  a c o p y  fo r  th e  c o m m it te e .
26 R e p o r t  and  f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m i t te e ,  10 Jan .  1942, X I -X II ,  q u o t in g  D O D  fi le  S /1 5 7  (M A ,  A C S  22 /23 ) .
27 R e p o r t  and f in d in g s  o f  the  c o m m i t te e ,  10 Jan .  1942, X I -X II  (M A ,  A C S  22 /23 ) .
28 Ibid.
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Air Corps mission in wartime. They also considered that Tike the earlier proposals of 
March 1938, this organisation of December 1938, gives the [Air] Corps a definite, though 
more limited objective’ but stated that the decision came too late (January 1939) in terms 
of acquiring the numbers of the aircraft that would be required under a war 
establishment.
In assessing the ‘form of organisation suitable for defence needs’ the committee 
considered that such a study should be carried out on the basis of ‘what an Air Corps is 
required for’, ‘how it will be employed’ and ‘its size which must be governed by 
financial considerations’. It used the statement of missions as it had discussed earlier to 
suggest that ‘close reconnaissance aircraft of the [army] cooperation type’ were required 
to ‘obtain information of enemy movement and disposition after he had gained a footing 
in our territory’. Two such squadrons would be required, one per army division 
‘decentralised to provide flights to work in close cooperation with Brigades’ and for 
‘occasional special missions’. It was calculated that the capital expenditure for ‘new 
aircraft requirements and ancillary equipment for two squadrons’ would amount to 
£290,000 with about £91,000 annual expenditure on personnel maintenance and spares’.
In relation to coastal patrol aircraft the committee considered that its primary 
function was to ‘provide information of and on the approach of hostile forces to our 
shores’. The committee summarised its discussion of alternatives in obscure language:
In the case of invasion from the continent, it is possible that the other belligerent 
would be in a position to acquaint us of the movement by sea of hostile forces. In 
the case of invasion by the other belligerent, the main blow would almost definitely 
come overland and the need for long distance sea reconnaissance would not arise in 
an acute form’.29
The committee considered that long range maritime reconnaissance could only be 
executed efficiently by modem multi-engined aircraft as were in common use in Britain 
and cost over £30,000 each. They considered that ‘close-in reconnaissance of territorial 
waters’ ‘sufficient to deal with an invader other than a continental one’ could be done by
29 Ibid, XIV.
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close reconnaissance aircraft -  such as the Lysander. On the basis that long range 
reconnaissance could be regarded as a passing phase the existing Ansons could perform 
long range reconnaissance prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In effect having earlier 
highlighted the inadequacies of the Anson the committee, influenced by the cost of 
reequipping with, for example Lockheed Hudsons, recommended that no financial 
provision be made for different, modem, maritime patrol aircraft.30
While acknowledging that ‘the maximum size of the force maintained must be 
determined by our financial resources considered in relation to our commitments for 
other elements of the Defence Forces’ the committee proceeded to embark on a study of a 
fighter force of outlandish proportions. The study of the employment of fighter aircraft 
considered that, while it would be impossible ‘to estimate accurately the strength of an 
adequate fighter force’ in order to be reasonably safe ‘a force of 30-40 squadrons would 
probably be required. It calculated that the capital cost of a force of forty squadrons 
would be £6,400,000 based on a ‘fighter aircraft of the Hurricane type’ while the 
recurring annual expense per squadron would amount to £48,000.
To this must be added the cost of the necessary ancillary services required to enable 
a fighter force to function efficiently, including observer system, radio detection 
system, direction finding system, central control, provision of aerodromes and 
accommodation.31
The latter facilities were, in essence, the essential facilities that were absent from the 
existing authorised war establishment, the absence of which, along with inappropriate and 
inadequate numbers of aircraft, rendered the squadrons ineffective. In attempting to cut 
their cloth to suit the state’s measure the committee, recognising ‘the necessity of 
affording some degree of protection for Dublin, Cork and Limerick’ considered ‘that a 
force of five fighter squadrons is the absolute minimum required’ for which capital 
expenditure of £800,000 and recurring costs of £240,000 per annum, exclusive of 
ancillary services, would be required. While acknowledging that it was for the
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid, X V .
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government to decide whether the degree of protection which would be afforded by such 
a force would justify the level of expenditure the committee recommended. The 
committee found that the minimum number of operational squadrons required would be 
five fighter and two reconnaissance squadrons.32
‘Factors affecting organisation and equipment’
The committee considered the time, personnel, and financial aspects of the 
implementation of the significantly expanded organisation proposed and made equally 
significant recommendations. The two reconnaissance squadrons at a capital cost of 
£432,000 were to be equipped with a total of forty-two Lysanders at a capital cost of 
£432,000 and be located at Rineanna and Collinstown. These squadrons would be 
manned by existing pilots. The flying school would need to be organised and re-equipped 
to train an additional seventy-three officer and NCO pilots for the fighter squadrons. It 
was recommended that seventy modem fighter aircraft (with another 35 in reserve) were 
required for the five fighter squadrons which would be dispersed to separate locations -  
Collinstown, Cork, Rineanna, Curragh and Gormanston. They proposed capital 
expenditure of over £1,185,000 spread over four years at an annual cost of £296,000. In 
relation to fighter aircraft the committee suggested that ‘nothing but the most modem 
aircraft should be considered and that the 'complete equipment for one fighter squadron 
should be purchases every year ad in f in i tu m 33
The ‘recurrent annual expenditure’, for two reconnaissance and five fighters 
squadrons, as well as an ‘administrative and training organisation’ that would entail the 
recmitment of no less than 742 more personnel, was put at £440,000.34 While 
recommending the decentralisation of service squadrons -  thus ‘throwing them on their 
own resources’ and making ‘them more self reliant’ - no provision was apparently made 
for the new aerodrome facilities that would be required. ’3 The decentralisation of five 
squadrons should have been seen to be totally impractical except in the context of a
33 Ibid, X - X V I I .  
33Ibid, X X .
34 Ibid, X V II I ;  X X III .
35 Ibid, X V III .
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substantial investment in infrastructure and camp staffs. As had been demonstrated in the 
case of the Rineanna detachment squadrons had no resources on which to rely if removed 
from an established aerodrome.
In the context of the investigative review being undertaken, and of the annual 
expenditure on the Air Corps (£176,644 for 1940/41), the capital and recurring costs of 
the proposed reorganisation could only be described as alarming.36 Having regard to the 
Emergency circumstances of the time, with the threat of invasion not past and with a 
somewhat dysfunctional army air element in existence it is not clear why the committee 
contemplated such an ambitious expansion. The financial circumstances alone might have 
indicated to them that such a scheme was not feasible and would not even get past GHQ - 
never mind DOD or Finance.
Notwithstanding the fact that the committee had calculated that a force of 30 -  
40 squadrons was, in ideal circumstances, what was required the recommendation of a 
significant expansion to seven squadrons might have been considered excessive in the 
light of their review of policy considerations. It should have been obvious, based on the 
known opinions of the minister and An Taoisach previously that the government saw no 
necessity for other than a token level of military aviation. The heterogeneous collection 
of aircraft purchased in the years prior to the outbreak of war was all the government was 
prepared to fund and was, in effect, appropriate to its neutrality stance and commensurate 
with the level of cooperation with the British in defence matters. Perhaps the committee 
felt it their duty to identify the extent of fighter defences required irrespective of the 
State’s ability to fund such forces.
The most radical recommendation in respect of reorganisation was that ‘[Air] 
Corps Headquarters be abolished and replaced by a directorate of military aviation 
located at the Department of Defence’. The reason for this was explained:
It will bring the head of the Air Corps into closer touch with the General Staff; it 
will relieve him of many of the duties of administration and interior economy 
which seem to occupy so much time at the moment; it will give him greater 
freedom to concentrate on the inspection and training of the Corps; by removing
36 Ibid, Annex G.
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him from so much close contact with junior officers in our principle air station and 
placing him on the same basis as any other Director, his prestige would be 
enhanced.37
One would have to see the above argument as being totally spurious, reflecting, as it 
does, the belief that a director, having the technical and professional deficiencies manifest 
in the current officer commanding and who lacked the fundamental qualifications to 
satisfactorily perform the functions of OC AC or director of military aviation could 
function better if his appointment functions were moved to the Department of Defence. 
The recommendation appears to have had the aim of facilitating the rehabilitation of 
Mulcahy by removing him from the presence of turbulent pilots.
‘Adaptation of existing organisation’
Realising that their grand plan for an Air Corps, expanded to seven squadrons and some 
1,440 personnel, would require Government approval and, if authorised, would take a 
considerable time to implement, the committee recommended that the existing 
organisation and equipment should be adapted to form the basis for the establishment of 
two reconnaissance squadrons. It was suggested that existing aircraft could be 
reorganised to form two ‘provisional Squadrons’ -  No.l Squadron, Rineanna (with 
Lysander, Anson and Walrus aircraft) and No. 2 Squadron, Collinstown (with Lysanders, 
Ansons and Gladiators). It was argued that while the grouping of the Lysanders and 
Gladiators at Collinstown and the Ansons and Walrus at Rineanna would have been more 
logical from organisational and maintenance points of view both squadrons should have 
some of the most useful aircraft, the Lysander. It was considered that the Rineanna 
squadron could not perform cooperation training with the 1st Division without Lysanders. 
In effect, while the primary role of the two composite squadrons was to be army 
cooperation they could also do ‘coastal missions’. It was suggested that if each squadron 
had a ‘properly equipped’ Anson training in navigation would be facilitated. This 
proposal was to be modified if and when thirteen Hurricanes, ‘on order for a considerable
37 Ibid, XXIV .
37 1
time’, were delivered, and if the Government was prepared to proceed with the
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programme for five fighter squadrons.
Question three - training of the Air Corps
In the overall context of the committee’s investigation into the state of the Air Corps in 
1941 the module that addressed the questions relating to the ‘training of the Air Corps’ 
and possible changes in personnel, administration and training, was possibly the most 
crucial and most telling in terms of higher authority’s attitude to the Air Corps in general 
and the body of flying officers in particular. This section sought to define the efficiency 
of individual officers as service pilots and sough to decide whether or not ‘flying 
practice’ was ‘properly organised and carried out by flying personnel?’3 This emphasis 
suggests that the committee tended to place responsibility for the adjudged poor state of 
flying training and efficiency on squadron commanders who had to function in the 
absence of adequate guidance from the OC / DMA.
The committee experienced considerable difficulty in arriving at definite 
conclusions with regard to the abilities of individual pilots due to the conflicting nature of 
the evidence given and the fact that no standards were laid down in the Air Corps for 
service pilots’. This difficult arose because of the contradictory evidence of, on the one 
hand the commanding officer and squadron commanders who contended that the pilots 
were capable of carrying out any service mission using the aircraft available, and, of the 
more junior flight commanders and younger pilots on the other, who claimed that they 
had insufficient training in one aspect or another -  a situation that undermined their 
confidence to execute service missions under difficult conditions.40
On the evidence of the pilots...of the school ...and service squadrons, the 
interrogation of individual officers, the absence of prescribed standards of training 
for service pilots and the nature and methods of training in the service squadrons 
provides ... the committee [with] cumulative proof that the pilots of the service
38 Ibid, X X II I -X X IV .
39 Ibid, X X V .
40 Ibid,  X X V I .
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squadrons have not attained as high a standard of training ...as should be possible 
with existing aircraft 41
The committee observed that no standards of proficiency, in flying or ground subjects 
were laid down by Air Corps Headquarters or the Department of Defence (i.e. the 
General Staff and the civil Secretariat) for either the flying school or the three service 
squadrons. They did not comment upon the fact that the General Staff and the staff of 
GHQ, similarly had not laid down such standards. It might have been considered 
appropriate that the ‘first assistant to the chief staff officer’, as designated in 1924, who 
was the ‘technical officer responsible for inspecting the Air Corps’, or his current 
equivalent, would have had some responsibility to ensure the setting of flying standards.42 
The fact remained that no aviation expertise existed outside the Air Corps. It was, after 
all, at the insistence of GHQ that the syllabus of flying training for officers and cadets, 
that became DFR 7/1927, had been drafted by C.F Russell for the 1926/28 ‘wings’ 
course. More recently the school commandant had up-dated that syllabus as his 
immediate superior, the DMA was ill-equipped for such a task.
It was noted that the last satisfactory training directive had been issued in 1936 -  
presumably drafted by a flying officer on behalf of his newly appointed and uninitiated 
superior. It was also noted that those directives issued by Mulcahy in later years could not 
be regarded as having been an adequate guide as to exact nature and standard of flying 
expected of pilots in the operational squadrons. This failure to have a satisfactory training 
directive having the aim to pursue and improve the direction of training was not 
understood by the committee. Colonel Mulcahy’s evidence to the committee on the 
matter was quoted without comment.
‘There are no definite standards laid down, but unit commanders are sufficiently 
conversant with their duties and with what would be required of their officers to 
bring their units to a satisfactory standard’ ,43
41 Ibid.
42 ‘E x p la n a to ry  n o te s ’, O ’D u ffy  S c h e m e ,  I Ju ly  192 4  (N A I ,  D T ,  S .3 4 4 2 B ) .
43 R e p o r t  and  f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m i t te e ,  10 Jan .  1942, X X X  ( M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
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Being apparently satisfied with the hands-off policy adopted by Mulcahy with regard to 
standards and training the committee had proceeded to cross examine the three squadron 
commanders with particular reference to their respective unspecified responsibilities in 
the matter of flying training and proficiency. Notwithstanding the lack of direction from 
ACHQ, DOD and GHQ there was no cause for the committee to question the 
effectiveness of ab initio pilot training in Air Corps Schools:
It should be noted that not a single witness had any adverse criticism to offer of the 
school training, which training, in the opinion of the committee is generally 
satisfactory, except that advanced training is not catered for. In the school, the 
standards of training to be reached by the pupils in each subject are clear-cut and
definite.44
The committee did not comment on why this should be so. If it had done so it might have 
confirmed that the Schools’ training syllabus was fundamentally based on the syllabus of 
training drafted in 1926/27 by Colonel Russell, probably brought up to date as a result of 
the RAF instructors courses attended by Lt. W.J. Keane in the early 1930s and further 
refined on the basis of the visit to RAF training establishments by Delamere and Curran 
in early 1939. The accumulated experience of the flying instructors, who were adjudged 
by the committee to be efficient and painstaking, would have contributed to this 
satisfactory situation.
The syllabus of flying training might be considered to be the single most 
important document relating to the aviation history of the period in question. It was the 
only substantive regulatory instrument relating to the flying of military aircraft, laid down 
the standards required of pupil pilots of the Air Corps and, in effect, underpinned 
standards generally. Notwithstanding, not only did the committee not connect the 
syllabus with the satisfactory state of Schools training, but they failed to include DFR 
7/1927 of 18 March 1927 among the list of files and other records examined. 45 Whether
44 Ibid,  X X V II .
4:1 A p p e n d ix  N o.  X L II  to R e p o r t  a n d  f in d in g s  o f  the  c o m m i t te e ,  10 Jan .  1942 ( M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
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this indicates that the committee failed to consult the regulation or merely chose to ignore 
its importance is not clear.
The committee did, however, interrogate the squadron commanders of the three 
service squadrons, at some considerable length, to examine the contention of many of the 
flight commanders and junior pilots that they had inadequate training in various aspects 
of their profession. From their examination of those concerned the committee found ‘that 
the service training in the Fighter Squadron was of a haphazard type lacking in 
organisation, control and direction’ with, for example a course for three young pilots 
started in February 1940 likely to take two years instead of six months while essential 
ground school subjects had not started by 20 November 1941. It also found that there was 
no organised training for older pilots. While OC Fighter Squadron contended that training 
in aerial combat and formation tactics, complained of by many squadron pilots, was 
carried out to the best of his ability the committee found ‘that the individual training in 
aerial combat had not been as efficient as it should be’ and that there was ‘a definite lack 
of training in formation combat tactics’. The committee recognised, however that 
squadron formation could not be taught when there was only approximately a flight of 
fighter aircraft available.46 The criticism of this squadron commander can be understood 
on the basis that he was about forty years old in 1941. Air Corps folklore remembers this 
ex-IRA officer for his proficiency with handguns rather than his enthusiasm for flying.
In regard to training in R & MB Squadron the committee found that during 1940 
and up to the spring of 1941 it was carried out in an uncoordinated manner that prevented 
progress being measured but that the lack of organisation had since been remedied to the 
extent that pilots got more regular and useful flying. It could be argued that the adverse 
comment on training in the Rineanna detachment was ill-considered given the inadequate 
level of manpower, poorly equipped obsolescent aircraft, primitive airfield and 
inadequate support services -  not to mention the total lack of preparation prior to the 
occupation of the ‘aerodrome’. It was found that training in the Coastal Patrol Squadron 
(Baldonnell) that had, in effect, become the training element for the Reconnaissance 
Squadron detachment in Rineanna, was found to be conducted in a satisfactory manner.
46 R e p o r t  a n d  f in d in g s  o f  th e  c o m m i t te e ,  10 Jan .  1942, X X V I I  -  X X I X  (M A ,  A C S  22 /23) .
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This included ‘elementary aerial observation and elementary navigation instruction for 
other-rank aircrew members aimed at making them more efficient’.47
The overall comment on training was to the effect that the ‘majority of the 
officers of the Air Corps are not as efficient and capable of carrying out the duties of their 
appointments’ as the available aircraft would permit. The finding detailed the many 
shortcomings perceived:
The most important subjects in which the officers are backward are -  navigation, 
signals, night flying and service flying in general, including operating from
improvised flying fields Flying training is not properly organised in service
squadrons in as much as it is not designed to ensure the systematic progress of 
pilots towards acquiring and maintaining a definite standard of service proficiency. 
With the exception of the pupil pilots in the school and the young officers in the 
Coastal Patrol squadron, such flying training as is engaged in could be described as
48flying without an objective.
The connnents make no allowance for the fact that navigation training carried out in June 
/ July 1939 was totally inadequate for the squadron detachment that was dispatched to 
Rineanna on a general reconnaissance role. Similarly the ground and airborne signals (or 
communications) equipment, as well as aircraft flying instrumentation were inappropriate 
to the task. Except for a mild rebuke in the matter of his failure to adequately direct 
training standards Colonel Mulcahy did not come in for adverse comment. On the basis 
of the accepted military principle that the commanding officer is responsible for all his 
formation does or fails to do Mulcahy might have been found to have overall 
responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of flying training. However the committee 
placed most of the blame on two squadron commanders whom Mulcahy had considered 
were ‘sufficiently conversant with their duties and with what would be required of 
officers’ in respect to standards of proficiency.
47 Ibid,  X X V II  -  X X IX .
48 Ibid, X X X IV .
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However it did find that Colonel Mulcahy, in view of his ‘limited technical 
training, could not be expected to be able to supervise and inspect’ all aspects of Air 
Corps training ‘without having to rely, to an undesirable extent, on his subordinates.49 
There is adequate proof that Mulcahy did not welcome advice on such matters as 
navigation, meteorology, navigation and the communications although he functioned as 
director of military aviation in relation to all such matters. However the committee 
appears to have accepted that his limited technical training allowed him to devolve 
responsibility for training standards to the squadron commanders, in effect absolving him 
from the responsibility for those functions he purported to exercise since 3 June 1935.
The committee’s main recommendation was to the effect that definite standards of 
flying proficiency should be laid down and that ‘all standards should have the force of 
regulations’. The standards ‘to be reached and maintained by service pilots’ were to be 
appropriate to ‘the peculiar conditions under which the Air Coips must operate’. The 
committee put major emphasis on the development of cooperation with ground forces 
including having ‘a sound knowledge of the tactics, technique and organisation of such 
forces including practical experience in operating with these forces’ -  in effect 
recommending a return to the army cooperation role largely abandoned in the mid to late 
1930s.50
Under a sub-heading of training the ‘efficiency of Air Corps officers’ was 
assessed on the basis of verbal evidence given. The committee put the pilots, with the 
exception of Colonel Mulcahy, into four categories reflecting their assessment of 
individual standards. The first group included a number of experienced pilots’ who were 
considered to have failed to keep up to service standards due to lack of flying practice 
and instruction. It was considered that the majority of the pilots had completed a 
relatively good initial flying course but had not received progressive training since 
qualifying. The third group was made up of ‘a small group of very keen and efficient 
officers’ while the last were ‘a few officers whose ability as Air Corps officers is in 
question’.51
49 Ibid,  X X X II I .
50 Ibid, X X X V .
51 Ibid,  X X V I .
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Flying qualifications of the Commanding Officer
While not portrayed as such by the committee the questions as to whether the 
commanding officer should or should not be a flying officer, the flying qualifications of 
Colonel Mulcahy and the receipt by him of the flying pay appropriate to a duly qualified 
pilot, collectively represented possibly the most contentious issue to be examined by the 
committee. Paradoxically, of the seven substantive questions that it addressed the 
committee appears to have devoted least attention to what the pilots considered the most 
important consideration. The verbal accounts of the early Emergency, still frequently 
recalled during the author’s service in the 1960s, indicate that those pilots who qualified 
by successful completion of the standard flying course greatly resented the fact that 
Colonel Mulcahy was in receipt of flying pay at the rate appropriate to a fully qualified 
pilot and, more importantly, wore the flying badge or pilot’s ‘wings’. In fact many 
officers of that era believed that this matter was the main reason for the investigation. 
Mulcahy had completed an abbreviated course of flying instruction, reputed to have been 
only fifteen hours of flying, before putting up his wings. Subsequently, having had his 
certification of entitlement accepted and, being paid as a qualified pilot, he only flew as a 
passenger. It will be seen that the committee, in carrying out a somewhat superficial 
examination of the question as to whether the commanding officer should be a fully 
qualified pilot or not, chose to ignore the historical situation. To a large extent the 
committee actually avoided these matters claiming that ‘the term “flying officer” is 
somewhat lacking in precision in as much as it has no particular meaning in the Defence 
Forces’:
It does not lend itself to an exact definition which will convey precisely a standard 
of proficiency or degree of knowledge. The committee decided that the term must 
have been intended to mean an officer who is fully qualified to take off and land
52service aircraft and to perform service missions under all conditions’.
52 Ibid, XLIII.
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In arriving at this loose definition of the term ‘flying officer’ the committee quoted no 
written authority. They again chose to ignore the original flying course syllabus, DFR 
7/1927 that prescribed in considerable detail the subject matter and standard that had to 
be met before the award of ‘wings’. Similarly the committee chose to ignore DFR 
40/1936 and, in particular the ‘Young officers’ syllabus of flying training’ that devolved 
from the later DFR. Reference to the latter, more current, document would have provided 
a more than adequate definition of the standards of proficiency and degree of knowledge 
required by a qualifying pilot. Such a definition would, however, have identified Mulcahy 
as having qualified for flying pay without meeting the qualification standards laid down 
in the syllabus that devolved from the DFR. (See Chapter 5)
It is certain that the committee was well aware that Mulcahy was drawing flying 
pay at the higher rate of eight shilling per day as against the five shillings paid to those
53who qualified after him in accordance with the full syllabus. However the committee 
was prepared to accept, as DOD had previously, that Mulcahy had undergone flying 
training in accordance with the current regulation, DFR 40/1936, not realising, or not 
wanting to realise, that the DFR alone did not provide for the award of ‘wings’ and, by 
inference, did not provide for qualification for receipt of flying pay. (See Appendixes 6 
and 7) The committee instead addressed the problems of the Commanding Officer.
It was brought home to the Committee at a comparatively early stage of the 
proceedings that the task of the present commanding officer of the Air Corps is a 
particularly difficult one for the following reasons:-
(a) Numerous problems of a highly technical nature are constantly coming up for 
solution.
(b) The long absence of a clearly defined policy for the Corps together with the lack 
of adequate up-to-date equipment and the difficulties of its procurement.54
The committee also cited as a difficulty the fact that the younger officers, who were 
highly critical of the commanding officer and his staff for the small amount of flying the
33 T .J .  H a n le y  to A C  in v es t ig a t io n ,  17 A pr .  1941 (M A ,  A C S  22 /23) .
34 R e p o r t  an d  F in d in g s  o f  the  c o m m i t te e ,  10 Jan . 1942, X L I I I  (M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
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said officers engaged in, also blamed them for the ‘present lack of equipment and 
weakness of the Corps in general’ but did not understand that ‘financial considerations 
and the attitude of foreign powers in respect of supplies are insuperable factors’ and that 
administering the Air Corps curtailed the amount of flying Major Mulcahy and his 
headquarters staff headquarters staff could engage in.55
The report recorded that, in effect, the commanding officer should be a fully 
qualified pilot. Among the reasons cited were that he might ‘have the necessary prestige 
in the corps’ and ‘set an example to the older as well as to the younger officers’. It was 
considered that such qualifications would ensure the CO had ‘the necessary knowledge to 
fully appreciate the practical problems involved in flying, navigation and aerial 
operations’ and to ‘successfully guide training in Squadrons and Schools’. He would also 
be able to ‘give satisfactory decisions on the many technical matters’ that arise and 
appreciate modem developments. It was further observed:
The committee does not considerate it absolutely essential -  though undoubtedly it 
is desirable - that the commanding officer should fully undergo the course, as a 
pupil pilot, prescribed for personnel qualifying as pilots in the school. He should 
however undergo such instruction as is necessary for him to get the qualifications 
required to fit him for his appointment.
In the event of the committee’s recommendation regarding the appointment of 
director of military aviation and consequent abolition of the appointment of 
commanding officer, being accepted, the director should possess the qualifications 
outlined above as being essential to the commanding Officer.56
A majority of the committee subsequently recommended that Mulcahy be appointed 
DMA (in GHQ) but that he ‘should be required, at an early date, to undergo the 
additional training to obtain the qualifications which the committee’ considered
S7absolutely essential for the officer holding the appointment of DMA.
55 Ib id ,  X L IV .
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid,  LX I.
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I suggest that the committee’s position on the reappointment of Muicahy as DMA 
is quite contradictory. At one level the committee had no apparent difficulty with 
Muicahy’s flying qualification and receipt of flying pay, in affect considering him to have 
been a duly qualified pilot. At another level the committee accepted that Muicahy lacked 
the flying qualifications required, did not have the respect of his subordinates and 
generally lacked sufficient knowledge of flying to make aviation decisions or to direct 
and inspect flying training. His most glaring deficiency, as implied by the committee, was 
that he was unable to cope with the numerous problems of a highly teclmical nature that 
kept coming up. However these accumulated shortcomings were cited as mitigating 
circumstances that justified that he should undergo necessary additional training to 
qualify him to undertake the duties that the committee, in effect, considered he had been 
performing satisfactorily since 3 June 1935. The contradictions in the committee’s 
position suggest that they wrestled unsuccessfully with their collective consciences in 
order to endorse the decision of DOD / GHQ to make the original appointment back in 
1935 and the decision to grant him flying pay in questionable circumstances in 1936. The 
committee, comprised mainly of GHQ staff officers, were not likely to be very critical of 
Muicahy who had been on the same staff prior to 1935
Flying Pay
In considering the question ‘is the present system of pay and additional pay satisfactory, 
and, if not, what changes are considered necessary and is additional pay for flying 
personnel at all desirable?’ the committee mainly considered the case of the eight pilots 
who commenced flying training just prior to the publication of DFR 7/1937 dated 8 
February 1938) that reducing the flying pay for newly qualifying pilots. In brief they 
recommended that the officers affected should get the higher rate of pay.
Another cause of concern to the younger pilots, who did the major part of service 
flying, was that the more senior officers, by virtue of their appointments, did little or no 
training or service flying but received the flying pay at the higher rate. Similarly some 
pilots and observers, who were in effect ATC officers with the Department of Industry 
and Commerce, did little or no military flying and yet continued to receive eight shillings
381
per day. In this matter the committee recommended ‘that flying pay should not be paid 
unless flying is being properly engaged in’ and ‘be payable only on certification’. As in 
other aspects of their investigations the committee did not allow the matter of Mulcahy’s 
receipt of flying pay at the higher rate complicate matters.58
Turn over of pilots
In considering question six the committee discussed, in affect, how a reserve of pilots 
might be built up in such a manner as to have sufficient pilots available for an emergency. 
While it was not so stated the position that had existed immediately prior to the 
Emergency was one of stagnation with active flying appointments filled by relatively old 
pilots while the number of younger pilots was totally inadequate for the 1939 peace 
establishment and for the war establishment that was eventually activated in June 1940. 
The committee examined the problem in a vacuum -  not related to the record of pilot 
recruitment and training, the total number of pilots then in service or to the actual 
deficiency in pilot strength evident during the early Emergency. In particular the 
committee ignored the fact that only eight pilots were recruited and trained under 
Mulcahy’s stewardship in the years immediately prior to the war. It was considered that 
newly qualified pilots, after a number of years of service flying with a squadron, would 
revert to another corps and complete a short period of refresher flying training with the 
Air Corps on an annual basis. This idea was discarded on the basis that an officer could 
not be advanced professionally in two army corps at once. Also, once properly trained a 
pilot would have to function as such in any emergency thus depriving the other corps of 
an officer at a time of need. On a practical point, it was recognised, that a trained and 
motivated pilot would not easily settle down in any other corps.
The committee next considered the existing short service scheme as a basis for a 
turn over. It was felt that the fact that promising young officers could be retained in the 
Air Corps was a considerable advantage and that a reserve could be built up without 
affecting any other units. However the scheme was seen to have a major disadvantage
5 Ib id ,  L X V -  X L IX .  P .A .  M u lc a h y  w a s  s u b s e q u e n t ly  ap p o in te d  C O S  o f  the  D e f e n c e  F o rces  for th e  p e r io d  
Jan .  1955 to D ec .  1959.
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that if, on passing on to the reserve, officers could not get employment in the state there 
would be a temptation to seek employment abroad and thus devaluing the reserve. In 
terms of the strength and composition of the reserve it was considered that the number 
would depend on the number of squadrons to be organised’ and on the basis of having 
three pilots per aircraft - one pilot in pennanent service and two on the reserve. In effect 
the committee endorsed the scheme in current use.
Non-commissioned flying officers’
The committee considered the question of training non-commissioned personnel as pilots 
in the context of the formation of an active reserve of pilots. Without taking evidence on 
the matter and without much reflection the committee made what they saw as pertinent 
recommendations on the subject of NCO pilots on the basis that it was the practice in 
other countries. They were very specific as to the main conditions to be met:
The Committee is satisfied that there is a case for non-commissioned officer pilots 
in one circumstance only, and that is if it is proposed to build up five fighter 
squadrons. In that it is recommended that non-commissioned officer pilots be 
recruited in the proportion of two to each flight of three aircraft. 59
In this manner it was foreseen that NCO pilots could replace short service officers on the 
basis that twenty-four NCO pilots would require to be trained for each fighters squadron 
of whom sixteen would be maintained on the reserve. It was considered that NCO pilots 
were not required for reconnaissance squadrons because such pilots required a 
particularly high standard of training and a good knowledge of the tactics and techniques 
of ground forces and had to exercise command over non-commissioned aircrew 
members.60
59 R e p o r t  an d  f in d in g s  o f  the  c o m m it te e ,  10 Jan . 1942, LII  (M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
60 Ibid.
3 8 3
General aspects of Air Corps organization, administration, discipline, equipment 
and personnel
Under this heading the committee noted that various matters outside the terms of 
reference had been introduced in evidence and commented, generally very briefly, on 
some. Several complaints regarding aspects of the responsibilities of the Air Corps 
Company, Signal Corps had been raised in evidence. In commenting on these matters the 
committee demonstrated that it had understood little of the evidence relating, in 
particular, to aircraft wireless telegraphy and radio telephony sets and their uses. 
Similarly their grasp of the communications requirements of operational squadrons in 
general was not the best. In particular they did not understand of the necessity for radio 
telephony sets for fighter aircraft
In future if possible fighter sets should be capable of operating on the medium
wave-band as in the case of the T.R. 1082/83 [wireless telegraphy set], thus 
obviating in normal operation the need for a multiplicity of ground stations.61
It had been adequately demonstrated in evidence, and by the demonstration of Thomas 
Murphy’s transmitter in conjunction with Lieut. A.C. Woods’ receiver, that fighter 
aircraft required a short wave radio telephony set, operated by the pilot, for effective two- 
way voice communication demanded by the role. However the committee recommended, 
quite ill-advisedly, that fighter aircraft should operate with wireless telegraphy sets 
compatible with those of reconnaissance aircraft so as to reduce the number of ground 
stations.
The committee’s pronouncement on loop aerials was similarly lacking in 
perception. Acknowledging that loop aerials were only required on longer range aircraft 
they stated that ‘except for the existing Ansons the problem does not call for any serious 
consideration’. No mention was made of the fact that loop aerials could and should have 
been fitted to Ansons from November 1938 and that such action would have been a boon 
to safe navigation and to the effectiveness of the reconnaissance mission. To have drawn
61 Ibid, LIII.
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attention to this point might have implied criticism of Mulcahy and his command but this 
was something the committee tended to avoid.
While the committee acknowledged that ‘the system by which ground direction 
finding facilities were [not] made available until recently’ (late 1941) had been the 
subject of adverse comment they found no fault with the manner in which the matter of 
direction finding stations in general had been handled. They made no comment on the 
fact that it had taken so long for the Air Corps to be granted control and unrestricted use 
of the DF station at Baldonnell or to the fact that Air Corps HQ staff had contributed to 
the delay by putting civil aviation requirements ahead of the needs of military pilots who 
needed more and better aids to navigation. The greatest irony was in the fact that as the 
report was being drafted ‘two short-wave direction finding sets’ were Tying in the stores 
of the Signal Corps’ while no military DF stations had been installed.62 No mention was 
made of the fact that Air Corps-trained wireless operators, intended for flying duties, had 
to be used to carry out ground communications functions appropriate to the Signal Corps.
In effect the committee commented favourably on, in particular, the 
communications available at Baldonnell after the acquisition of Thomas Murphy’s short 
wave transmitter. While this was a considerable improvement that on the abysmal 
situation pertaining on 3 September 1939 it only affected three aircraft and improved the 
general situation very little. Maybe for obvious reasons neither the committee nor the 
Signal Corps witnesses alluded to the excellent communications and direction finding 
services provided for a modest level of civil aviation. Similarly the committee 
demonstrated no appreciation of what the Air Corps expected of the Signal Officer in the 
matter of aviation communications. From January 1929 the duties of the Signal Officer 
had been laid down:
.............He will be responsible for all types of signal communication in the [Air]
Corps  He will be responsible for keeping in touch with all new designs and
improvements in the different types of wireless apparatus used in aircraft from time 
to time.63
52 Ibid, L IV.
63 ‘Signal  O f f ic e r ’, Sec tion  23, 1 Jan. 1929, A ir  C o ip s  S ta n d in g  O rd e rs ,  1929/35  (in m y  p o sse s s io n ) .
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In the above regard the evidence, mainly of Signal Corps personnel themselves, 
adequately demonstrated that the Signal Corps had not kept abreast of developments and 
had served the Air Corps very poorly at a critical time. As in the case of Mulcahy the 
committee appears to have been reluctant to criticise the Signal Corps. (See Chapter 9)
Personnel Matters
In its subsequent appraisal of individual officers the committee was generally 
complimentary. It commented favourably on the service of many of the more senior 
officers -  P.A. Mulcahy, W.P. Delamere, P. Quinn, D.V. Horgan, T.J. Hanley, W.J. 
Keane, F. O’Cathain and K.T. Curran. However, in the context of promoting the retention 
of P.A. Mulcahy as DMA, the majority of committee expressed a major reservation about 
likely successors:
Whilst there is within the Corps a number of promising officers, none of them, in 
the opinion of three members of the committee concerned is fitted at this stage to 
effectively direct the Corps in its present condition.64
A further five officers were considered to have performed to a lesser level of satisfaction 
and, in effect, having stagnated in their current appointment, were recommended for 
transfer within the Air Coips in the interest of efficiency. A further four officers were 
recommend for transfer out of the Air Corps. Two of these were so recommended on the 
basis that they were ATC Officers seconded to the Department of Industry and 
Commerce. A single officer was identified as being unsuited in several respects for the 
duties of an Air Coips flying officer. His transfer to another corps, or dismissal from the 
service, was recommended. The last officer, Lieut. A.C. Woods, who had been active in 
his opposition to Mulcahy as DMA, was effectively identified as a disruptive influence 
and recommended for transfer out of the Coips. It was considered, without detailing the 
circumstances, that his action of procuring possession of official documents in an
w R ep o r t  and  f in d in g s  o f  the  c o m m i t te e ,  10 Jan . 1942, L X I  (M A ,  A C S  2 2 /2 3 ) .
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irregular manner, irrespective of his motivation, was reprehensible. In addition to those 
senior personnel favourably mentioned the committee also identified six very keen and 
efficient junior officers and recommended that they be considered for promotion when 
opportunities arose.65
The appraisal of Col. P.A. Mulcahy by the majority of the committee set out to 
ensure his reappointment as DMA. However the assessment (Appendix No.9) does not 
amount to a fulsome endorsement of his perfonnance and record as officer commanding. 
To a certain extent it highlighted the shortcomings and failings that had been identified 
earlier and, only in a minor way, was he the subject of adverse comment:
Whilst Colonel Mulcahy bears responsibility for the low standard of training in the
Air Corps, the mitigating circumstances mentioned .........  must be taken into
consideration.66
The mitigating circumstances referred to, including the problems of the commanding 
officer already referred to, in effect, made Mulcahy unsuitable for the functions of his 
appointment. The impact of this recommendation was further reduced by the proviso that 
Mulcahy undergo training to fit him for the job he purported to have been doing since 
June 1935. While the majority recommendation of the committee was fundamentally in 
favour of maintaining the status quo in terms of the command and direction of the Air 
Corps the minority opinion of the chairman was to totally undermine their position:
I am satisfied that no one other than a fully qualified flying Officer possessing 
considerable practical experience should be placed in charge of the Air Corps. The 
fact that in the past several such non-qualified officers have been from time to time 
placed in charge of the Corps is, in my opinion, one of the causes of the condition 
of affairs this committee was set up to investigate.67
65 Ibid, L X III  - L X V I.
66 Ibid,  LXI.
67 Ibid,  L X X .
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McNeill went on to state that Mulcahy was not qualified for the appointment and did not 
enjoy the confidence of the officers under his command. ‘With the best will in the world I 
do not see how this state of affairs can be completely set right.’ He recommended that
Mulcahy be relieved of his appointment (not command) and that ‘Major G. J. Carroll be
68recalled to active duty as director of military aviation’. In affect he was stating that 
Mulcahy was part of the problem and could not be part of the solution. This was a very 
radical position for McNeill to take. As a very senior GHQ staff officer from 1922, and 
latterly as Assistant Chief of Staff, he had been central to the decision making process 
that had appointed Mulcahy in 1935 and that had, in effect, given him free rein that had 
resulted in the demoralisation of the Air Corps. More recently, as ACS, operations, he 
had issued the various operations orders that had specifically tasked Fighter Squadron to 
the defence of Dublin. He probably realised more than anyone the extent to which GHQ 
was culpable for the mismanagement of the aviation functions of the Army.
Implementation of the report - the 1943 reorganisation
With the report being submitted to the COS on or about 10 January 1942 no action was 
obvious until the following December. GHQ summarised the condition of the Air Corps 
as the report was awaited.
It should be noted ... that the unavoidably protracted sittings of the board were 
bound to have an adverse affect as pending the issue of that report all promotions 
were held up and a general spirit of uncertainty prevailed in the Corps.69
However there is every reason to believe that the committee’s two stated options, to 
reorganise the Air Corps or alternatively ‘to disband the Corps and form the personnel 
into a ground combat unit or transfer them to other units of the forces’ -  were both being 
examined. Ironically the Air Corps of the period was better equipped to function as an 
infantry formation than in an air defence role. This situation derives from the fact that
68 Ibid.
69 ‘G en era l  reports  on the  D e fe n c e  fo rces ,  I Apr .  1941 to 31 M ar.  1 9 4 2 ’ (M A ) .
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while the 1940 war establishment did not specify the number or types of weapons to be 
carried by any aircraft, reconnaissance or fighter, the number of revolvers, rifles and 
machine guns appropriate to each unit or squadron was so specified. While only 236 
rifles, 157 revolvers and thirty-two light machine guns were to be specified in the 1940 
war establishment already, in March 1939, the Air Corps units had a total of 485 rifles, 
forty-seven revolvers and thirteen machine guns. As late as April 1944 the units held a 
total of 565 rifles.70
In May 1941 the flying squadrons held a total of fifty aerial machine guns. 
However, as early as December 1941 it was directed that some thirty-four machine guns, 
some recovered from allied aircraft, be sent to the Ordnance Depot to be converted to 
ground use.71 The situation being such, with the Air Corps better equipped in infantry 
weapons juxtaposed with impotent and ineffective operational squadrons it is not 
surprising that the disbandment of air units was contemplated. Air Coips folklore reflect 
the abiding fear of the young pilots that the aircraft might be placed on the aerodrome as 
deterrent to uninvited landings while all personnel would be armed and tasked in an 
infantry defensive role. Confirmation of the possibility of disbandment comes from an 
unusual quarter:
The Air Ministry should, however, be allowed to provide sufficient equipment to 
Eire at their own discretion in exchange for certain useful concessions which they 
are able to obtain through the Eire Army Air Corps, whose disbandment would not
79be in our interest.
It is probable that this reading of the situation reached the UK Chiefs of Staff through 
intelligence gleaned from Mulcahy by Lywood.
The major decision resulting from the investigation was to reorganise the Air 
Corps. Prior to the reorganisation a new commanding officer was appointed. Despite the 
opinion of the investigation committee, that none of the current air officers were ready for
0 ‘R if le s  inspec ted  by  C o m d t .  M . K e l ly ’, 24  Apr.  1941 ( M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 9 ) .
n W a r  es tab l ish m en t ,  1940 (M A ) ;  ‘O rd n a n ce ,  A ir  C o r p s ’, 4  M ar.  1939; ‘L o ca t io n  o f  aeria l  and  land  
m ac h in e  g u n s ’, 20  M a y  1941 (M A ,  A C /2 /9 /1 9 ) .
72 C h ie fs  o f  S ta f f  C o m m i t te e  m in u te s  27  Ju ly  1942, W a r  C a b in e t  report ,  6 A u g u s t  1942 (N A ,  A i r  2 0 /2 4 4 2 ) .
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the top leadership role, W. P. Delamere was promoted to acting major and appointed 
Acting OC Air Corps on 11 December 1942. With the new establishment of 29 March 
1943 he was made substantive in the position. The appointment is considered significant 
in that Delamere was the last ex-RAF pilot in permanent service. The previous periods of 
command of ex-RAF officers had been marked by their brevity and the abruptness of 
departure. In appointing Delamere DOD had ignored the credentials of the remaining four 
ex-IRA officers who had been advantageously placed in 1928. The senior of this group, 
Comdt. P. Quinn, might have considered as suitable as Delamere though he lacked the 
latter’s broad experience. In due course Quinn got his turn when Delamere was head­
hunted by the Department of Industry and Commerce and took the position of manager of 
Dublin Airport with effect from 2 October 1946.73
Notwithstanding the committee’s recommendation that two reconnaissance and 
five fighter squadrons be established in the medium term the new establishment 
represented a considerable reduction in personnel and squadrons. It appears to have been 
precisely tailored to absorb all those officers serving at the time. It provided for Air Corps 
Headquarters, Depot, Maintenance Unit, Schools, Central Control (Air & Marine 
Intelligence) and a Fighter Squadron which was detached to Rineanna. The notional 
establishment comprised forty eight officers, 176 NCOs and 438 privates -  a total of 662 
all ranks. The Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber and Coastal Patrol Squadrons were 
disbanded and the aircraft redistributed. Some forty-eight aircraft of eight different types 
went on charge to the Schools.74
Despite the fact that five fighter squadrons were not going to be established the 
short service NCO pilot course commenced in December 1943. Starting with thirty-two 
pupils, (about a quarter of the total number since 1922), this course was to be the main 
preoccupation for the Air Corps for the remainder of the Emergency.75
3 C u r r icu lu m  vitae, 0 / 6 4 4 ;  0 / 2 8 2 6 ,  c o u r te sy  o f  O f f i c e r s ’ R e c o r d s  Sec tion ,  D F H Q ;  R e c o rd  o f  p i lo t  in tak e  
to A ir  C o rp s  (A C  M u s e u m ) .
'4 T ab le s  2 9 W  to 33 W ,  A i r  C o rp s  e s tab l i sh m en t ,  1 A p r .  1943 ( M A ) ;  ‘O p e ra t io n a l  Ins t ruc tion  N o .  1 /1943  -  
R e -o rg an iza t io n  -  A i r  C o r p s ’, O C  A C ,  3 Apr.  1943 (in m y  p o ss e s s io n ) .
73 S ergean t  p i lot c o u rse  f i le  (c o u r te sy  o f  S choo l  C o m m a n d a n t ) .
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The 1942 Army exercises.
The future direction of the Corps had already been set by the nature of its participation in 
the Army exercises of September 1942. Aircraft operating from Rineanna and Rathduff 
supported, respectively, the 1st and 2nd Divisions. With no fighter support on either side 
the style of air reconnaissance conducted was that appropriate to the early stages of the 
Great War. The main air task was the observation and reporting of the movements of the 
opposing forces. Operation below 1,500 feet was prohibited except for message dropping 
and for the final brief river defence exercise.
A major aim of the ground troops was to avoid observation by proper use of 
camouflage. All manner of aircraft, whether suited to the task or not, were committed to 
the exercises. Included were several low-winged monoplanes types. The Avro Ansons, 
which had been noted by the investigation committee as being totally unsuited, were 
used. Also included was the Miles Magister, which, without a wireless was even less 
suited and had to resort to the dropping of handwritten messages. While this 
anachronistic use of aircraft appears to have done little for the advancement of the Air 
Corps at least one general was very satisfied.76
I am more than pleased with the work of the [blue] air component They supplied
a stream of information which was in the main much more accurate than that 
supplied by the ground forces. Their reports gave an excellent picture of most of the 
various crossings and attempted crossings of the Blackwater. They gave phase by 
phase reports of the movement of 4th Brigade at the last stage of the first exercise 
and the movement of the 2nd Brigade at the last stage of the second exercise.77
This glowing testament to unopposed air observation might appear to endorse the 
outmoded use of aircraft and the artificial air situation of the exercise. However General 
M.J. Costello was in fact acknowledging the direction of his air component by Comdt. 
W.J Keane and the exceptional skill and judgement in the evaluation of all
76 Lieut. L. O’Rfiain], ‘A pilot looks down; an Air Corps officers impressions of the 1942 exercises’ in An 
Cosantoirlll, No. 3 (Mar. 1943), pp 163-68, passim.
77 GOC l sl. Div. to COS 19 Sept. 1942, Army exercises 1942 file (MA, no reference).
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reconnaissance reports. It is highly unlikely that aircraft were used in the 1942 exercises 
to lend realism to an exercise in modem warfare. It is much more probable that the 
exercises were intended to bring the Air Corps back to its army cooperation roots and to 
remind the pilots that they were still part of the Army. Another exercise that might have 
had a similar aim took place in May 1944. Colonel Liam Archer led a team of no less 
than thirty-five officers in an inspection, by GHQ, of the basic infantry skills of the Air 
Coips. The other ranks personnel were divided into five companies of approximately 
eighty each and were tested in accuracy of aim and rapid fire. Other aspects of infantry 
training examined included syllabi, programmes and training diaries, coaching, range 
duties and zeroing of weapons.78
Fighter Squadron and Hawker Hurricanes
In what was probably a welcome break from the constant stand-by at Baldonnell thee 
three Gladiators were based at Ballinter House near Navan, County Meath during the 
summer of 1941. They were in support of the 2nd Brigade’s operation monitoring the 
suspicious movement of British troops along the border. A pilot observed that ‘the unit
79flew an incredible number of patrol hours in daylight’ during a two-month period. 
However, as late December 1941 it was the practice to maintain a flight of aircraft on 
“Stand-to” at Baldonnell for the purpose of intercepting belligerent aircraft infringing the 
country’s neutrality. In January 1942 a single aircraft was still being detailed for the duty 
on a daily basis. In view of the futility of the operation the committee recommended that
on
the practice be discontinued.
From October 1940, and possibly earlier, the Air Corps had been trying to obtain 
more advanced fighter aircraft. Mulcahy used the occasion of Air Commodore Carr’s 
visit to Baldonnell to indicate his ‘urgent requirement’ for ‘one squadron of fighters, 
preferably Hurricanes, and ten advanced trainers’.81 The RAF indicated that it was well 
disposed:
78 ‘Training Inspection’, 1 May 1944 (MA, AC/2/9/19).
79 Aidan Quigley, ‘Air aspects of the emergency’ in Irish Sword, xix, Nos. 75 & 76 (1993-4) p. 88.
so Report and findings of the committee, 10 Jan. 1942, LV1II (MA, ACS 22/23).
81 AOC RAF NI to AM, 14 Oct. 1940 (NA, Air 2/5130).
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 In these circumstances it would surely be a mistake not to follow up the
discussions which took place between Colonel Mulcahy and Air Commodore Carr? 
Probably we could get the Eire air force to build aerodromes where we want them 
at the price of some obsolete aircraft [for training], perhaps with the addition of a 
promise that we will give them Hurricane Is some time next month when we shall 
be replacing them with Hurricane IIs. The political effect of such an agreement
O'}
would be wholesome.
As a result of Mulcahy’s RAF contacts ten ex-RAF Hawker Hectors were delivered in 
May 1941 and a further three in January 1942. However Hurricanes were not 
immediately forthcoming. The Air Corps had already acquired one force-landed 
Hurricane I on 29 September 1940 and two Hurricane Mk IIs in similar circumstances in 
June and August 1941.83
With the selective implementation of the recommendations of the report and 
finding of the committee Fighter Squadron was relocated to Rineanna in April 1943. It 
comprised a HQ and three flights. Initially it had twelve aircraft -  three each of Hawker 
Hurricane, Miles Master, Gladiator and Lysander.84 The squadron, though designated a 
fighter squadron initially at least, took the form of one of the two provisional
o ^
reconnaissance squadrons as recommended by the committee. Eighteen pilots were 
provided for -  eight officers and ten sergeant pilots. The latter had yet to be trained. On 
15 April 1943 the personnel left Baldonnell at 07.00 hours, marched to Lucan South 
station and took a train to Limerick. From there they marched to Rineanna.86
At Rineanna the squadron was attached to the 8th Brigade, Southern Command -
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notionally as part of the defence of Rineanna / Shannon Airport. Gradually the squadron
82 RAF memo to CAS, 16 Oct. 1940 (NA, Air 2/5130).
83 Kearns, ‘Irish Air Corps’, p. 459.
84 ‘Operational Instruction No. 1/1943, Re-organization -  Air Corps’, OC AC, 3 Apr. 1943 (in my 
possession) .
83 Report and findings of the committee, 10 Jan. 1942, XXIII (MA, ACS 22/23).
86 Table 31W, 1943 establishment (MA); No. 1 Squadron Movement Order 1/1943, 11 April 1943; ‘Air 
Corps-appointments officers’, 18 Mar. 1943; ‘Reorganisation Air Corps’, 3 Apr. 1943 (in my possession, 
Operational Instruction No. 1/1943; ‘Aircraft’, 3 Jan. 1945 (MA, EDP/24).
87 Aidan A. Quigley, Green is my sIcy (Dublin, 1983), p .152.
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began to assume the form of a fighter squadron. In July four Hurricane Is were received 
in exchange for the two Mk. IIs which were returned to the RAF. The Gladiators were 
returned to Baldonnell, with two being scrapped in late 1943 and the third the following 
year. By November 1943 the three Lysanders, Nos. 61, 63 and 66 had been returned to 
Baldonnell. With the receipt of three Hurricane Is in November 1943 and a further four 
by March 1944, followed by the return of the three Masters to Baldonnell, Fighter
oo
Squadron became a single aircraft-type squadron for the first time.
Notwithstanding its notional role in defence of Shannon the maintenance and 
operation of aircraft was not a priority with 8th Brigade. As early as July 1943 it was 
reported that the number of aircraft unserviceable on a monthly basis was increasing 
rapidly -  25% in May, 42% in June and 58% in July -  with a prediction that it would be 
up to 80% in August. This was put down to the fact that only twenty-two of the seventy- 
seven technical personnel were available to work on aircraft on any given day. This in 
turn was put down to the number of personnel, by direction of OC 8th Brigade, who were 
on involved in fatigues, guard duties, infantry training, kit inspections and cutting turf in 
the bog. 89 A pilot recalled his feelings at the time:
I was only down there 4 days and I was sent off to the bog and I was the adjutant. I
was out in the bog cutting turf! and a lot of the aeroplanes were up on stilts in the
hangars because the fitters..... were on guard duty, out cutting turf and on
fatigues it was appalling appalling.90
The situation did not improve with the delivery of the ex-RAF Hurricanes in November 
1943. Soon after arriving in Rineanna it was found that aircraft had components that were 
excessively worn. One machine was in such poor condition its continued service was in 
doubt. A major factor contributing to poor aircraft serviceability at Rineanna at this time 
was the fact that the Hurricanes, like practically all aircraft acquired during the
88Kearns, ‘Irish Air Corps’, p. 459; Lt. Col. J. Teague, ‘Irish Air Corps aircraft registrations, 1921-1974’, in 
my possession; A.P. Kearns, ‘The Air Corps 1939 -1945’ in An Cosantoir 49, No. 9 (Sept. 1989) p .19
89M.J. Noone, Air Corps operations 1939-1945 (MA thesis, NUI Maynooth, 2000), p. 31-42, citing W.J. 
Keane to OC AC, 24 July 1943 ( MA, ACF/750/17).
90 M.J. Noone, Air Corps operations 1939-1945 (MA thesis, NUI Maynooth, 2000), p. 42, citing an 
interview with Capt. A.A. Quigley, 6 Dec. 1999.
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Emergency came direct from active service with RAF squadrons and were probably not 
in prime condition. In fact they were probably selected at squadron level because of their 
poor condition. Unlike aircraft supplied by manufactures they were delivered without 
technical familiarisation, airframe and engine manuals and appropriate hangar equipment 
essential to normal maintenance. The biggest difficulty was that spares were not available 
for aircraft like the Hurricane that was still in active RAF service while spares peculiar to 
older obsolete aircraft were probably not being manufactured.91 Tony Kearns summarised 
the situation:
During 1943/44 very little flying was done due to a chronic lack of spares, 
especially tyres. Day after day a Hurricane would be taken out of the hangar; its 
engine run up for five minutes and then silenced as it was pushed back into its
stable.92
As an indicator of serviceability the returns of flying hours show that the Hurricanes flew 
an average of thirty-three hours each in 1943 and less than fifty in 1944. None of the 
Hurricanes acquired in 1943/44 did more than 170 hours flying in four years of Air Corps 
service. With about ten pilots in the squadron they would have averaged less than fifty 
flying hours each in 1944.93 The Chief of Staffs report for the year ending 31 March 
1945 gives the misleading impression that Fighter Squadron had been carrying out a 
worthwhile defensive role at Rineanna for the previous two years.
The general improvement in training discipline and morale [in the Air Corps]...
 has been well maintained. Towards the end of the period it was decided to move
the Fighter Squadron to Gormanstown. This decision was made possible by the 
lessening danger of any sudden invasion.94
91 R.W. O’Sullivan to OC AC, 12 Apr. 1944 (MA, AC/2/9/19).
92 A.P. Kearns, ‘The Air Corps 1939 — 1945’ in An Cosantoir 49, no. 9 (Sept. 1989), p. 19,
93 Lt. Col. J. Teague, ‘Aircraft flying time 1943/8’ (in my possession).
94 ‘General reports on the Defence Forces, 1 Apr. 1944 to 31 Mar. 1945’ (MA).
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The main reason actually was that the authorities at Shannon (and the Department of 
Industry and Commerce), who had wanted rid of the Air Corps from very early in the 
Emergency, saw the squadron as a hindrance to civil aviation. Relief, for Shamion and the 
squadron, eventually came when the unit, with its ninety-five personnel and nine 
Hurricanes moved to Gormanston on 1 May 1945.95
Conclusions
The general belief, handed down by successive generations of flying officers, is that the 
matter of Mulcahy being in receipt of flying pay and wearing pilot’s wings, was the main 
cause of the investigation. However the evidence, both written and verbal, as presented to 
the committee confirms that various complaints regarding the teclmical and professional 
failings of Mulcahy were primarily the factors that brought it about. While the precise 
nature of the written complaints made to the minister is not known they must have been 
very serious and well stated.
To a certain extent, when investigating the various matters, the committee was 
somewhat selective. While they had little difficulty in deciding that the Air Corps, as then 
organised, was ineffective and inefficient they accepted Mulcahy’s plea that the UK in 
affect dictated the type of aircraft and the supply, or not, of spares. However they did not 
comment on Mulcahy’s judgement in the matter of committing obsolete and poorly 
equipped aircraft to roles in the defence of the country.
In the matter of training standards the committee found Mulcahy at some fault but 
allowed his lack of expertise in such matters to be mitigating circumstances excusing his 
failure to adequately direct flying training and training standards. While the role of GHQ, 
whose function it was to direct all training standards for the whole Army, was ignored, 
the committee found it appropriate that the squadron commanders should share the major 
part of the blame.
The manner in which the committee found fault with the squadron commanders’ 
training of their units and with the effectiveness of the pilot body generally contrasts with
95 Lt. Col. M. O ’Malley, Gormanston Camp 1917 -  1986 (Defence Forces, 1986), pp 17-19; ‘Fighter 
Squadron movement order No. 1/45’, 17 Apr. 1945 (in my possession).
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the minor rebuke of Mulcahy in respect of his direction of training -  particularly when 
the proceedings and report more than adequately demonstrated the latter’s incompetence 
in all technical and professional areas related to military aviation.
The committee, in trying to come to terms with the impotent state of the 
squadrons, researched much of the background to those policy decisions that resulted in 
an unprepared Air Corps being tasked to what soon became impossible tasks. The 
committee did not even consider, let alone adjudicate on, the decision to send a 
detachment to Rineanna on a wartime mission. They found the air defensive mission of 
Fighter Squadron to be so futile as to be an unacceptable risk to the lives of pilots. Yet 
they made no comment on the series of orders, including those of Mulcahy, which put 
lives unnecessarily at risk.
The main complaints from flying officers were in respect of the failure to keep 
aircraft modified with the latest equipment while also failing to ensure the availability of 
serviceable communications and direction finding and best practice in aircraft navigation. 
Notwithstanding the inadequacies elucidated before and during the investigation the 
committee, mainly from a position of not understanding such technicalities, failed to 
address these matters properly and were unable, or unwilling, to identify the failings of 
both Mulcahy and the Signal Corps in their respective areas.
In view of the fact that the Air Corps, as then organised and equipped, had been 
found wanting the medium term solution recommending two reconnaissance and five 
fighter squadrons is difficult to understand. The committee recognising that whatever 
establishment was put in place its size, role and equipment would be dictated by financial 
constraints without reference to perceived defensive needs. It is not to be wondered at 
therefore that DOD subsequently reduced the squadrons from three to one. It is surprising 
that GHQ purported to have Fighter Squadron, based at Rineanna, functioning in a 
worthwhile defensive role against invasion as late as 1944/45.
While the fact should have been obvious to DOD and Government long since, the 
inability of the Air Corps to perform any worthwhile defensive role was proved without 
doubt with the promulgation of the report of January 1942. Subsequently, apart from 
aircraft recovery and other cooperative contacts with the RAF, as well as support of civil 
aviation, the Air Corps had no other function - in the defence of the country or otherwise.
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As Fighter Squadron had only a notional role in the defence of Rineanna / Shannon the 
training of the large class of sergeant pilots in 1943/45 was to become the main function, 
and achievement, of the latter years of the Emergency.
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CHAPTER 12
CONCLUSIONS
It could be said that the conditions conducive to the establishment of the Military Air 
Service in 1922 came about as a result of fortuitous circumstances and ad hoc decision 
making that had as an original and main aim the setting up of a civil air service. These 
conditions evolved during the peace and treaty negotiations of the latter part of 1921 and 
in the six month period leading up to the start of the Civil War. In the aforementioned 
negotiations with the British the matter of defence, air defence in particular, was mainly 
discussed in tenns of Britain’s current and future requirements for naval and air bases in 
Ireland. On the other hand civil aviation was of particular concern to Michael Collins 
and, as a result, provision was made in the Treaty for a future convention on air 
navigation. Subsequent developments in both civil and military aviation devolve from an 
apparently very harmonious working relationship between Michael Collins and Charles 
F. Russell, a Dublin bom ex-RAF llying officer.
For reasons that may never be fully understood the second Dail, with the 
influence and authority of Michael Collins who was aided and abetted by C.F. Russell, 
purchased two aircraft in October 1921. The circumstances indicate that the aircraft, one 
civil and one military were purchased during the Treaty negotiations with contrasting 
contingencies in mind. In the event of the peace negotiations breaking down in an 
acrimonious fashion the civil passenger aircraft was to have been used to transport 
Collins and his fellow delegates back to Dublin. If hostilities were subsequently rejoined 
the military aircraft appears to have been intended for bombing purposes against British 
forces in Ireland. With a peaceful outcome the civil passenger aircraft was to be used to 
start a civil air service to Britain. With the signing, and subsequent ratification, of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty of 6 December 1921 the aircraft were not used for the original 
intended functions and both remained in storage at Croyden for some months.
In the first six months of 1922, again apparently with Collins’ interest and 
authority, and following extensive study of the matter by C.F. Russell, a Civil Aviation
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Department was set up with the aim of regulating civil aviation, operating a civil 
aerodrome and commencing a civil air service subsidised by the state. While Collins 
demonstrated a certain level of interest in a civil air service the one-sided nature of the 
correspondence on the matter denies us a clear assessment of the extent of that interest 
and of the authority and scope he granted Russell in pursuit of an air service. Similarly 
we cannot estimate the extent to which Collins would have backed Russell in more 
favourable circumstances. However it is considered that the convening of an Air Council, 
the founding of a Civil Aviation Department and the taking over of a civil aerodrome 
could not have been achieved by Russell without Collin’s considerable active support. It 
is probable that Collins viewed the initiation of a State sponsored air service, as was the 
international practice at the time, as a necessary expression of national identity and 
independence. Had the Civil War not intervened it is probable that a civil air service 
would have been established sooner rather than later.
By 28 June 1922 the Civil Aviation Department, under the aegis of the evolving 
Free State or National Army and the direction of C.F. Russell, had a small staff and an 
aerodrome at Baldonnell. By 22 July 1922 however this embryonic air service had been 
absorbed into its smaller military counterpart. In the meanwhile with the inevitable 
approach of hostilities, the small military air element, under another ex-RAF pilot, that 
heretofore had little or no official backing began to assume greater significance. As civil 
war approached it is probable that Collins took the initiative that resulted in W.J. 
McSweeney being authorised, on about 20 June 1922, to purchase a single 
reconnaissance aircraft in Britain. On 4 July, with no aircraft in operation and the Civil 
War in progress, Michael Collins appealed to Churchill for military aircraft to be used for 
reconnaissance purposes. Two Bristol Fighters handed over by the RAF at Collinstown 
were pressed into service carrying out reconnaissance missions against the Irregulars. 
From about 7 July 1922 until Collins’ death on 22 August a minuscule force of three 
aircraft and two pilots carried out a modest campaign of reconnaissance flights mainly in 
south Leinster and north east Munster. The Military Air Service, which had absorbed its 
civil counterpart on or about 22 July, was an integral part of the National or Free State 
Army. However its operations, dictated by the progress of the ground war, appear to have 
been largely independent of Army GHQ. The reconnaissance effort was directed by
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Collins, managed and administered by McSweeney while the actual flying missions were 
carried out almost exclusively by C.F. Russell. While the intelligence value of this 
operation cannot be judged it was apparently sufficient to persuade Collins to authorise 
the purchase of more aircraft and the hiring of more ex-RAF pilots at a time when such 
officers were not welcome in the Army. Collins also authorised the expansion of the 
reconnaissance operation into Cork and Kerry as the ground campaign concentrated in 
that area.
After the death of Collins the Military Air Service was gradually expanded to 
eleven pilots and twenty-two aircraft and a total of some 243 all ranks. The 
reconnaissance operation, as originally recommended by Collins, was eventually moved 
to the south west and was conducted from bases at Fennoy, from October, and Tralee 
from mid November 1922 - but only after an apparently unjustified delay of about six 
weeks. With aircraft operating under local commanders, in the absence of reconnaissance 
reports, and from the evidence of inaccurately kept aircraft log books, it is not possible to 
quantify the work done much less to judge the intelligence or other military value of the 
armed reconnaissance and escort patrols.
With the end of the Civil War the financial retrenchment of the Department of 
Finance set in with immediate effect. Notwithstanding the modest amount (about 
£29,000) spent on the purchase and operation of military aircraft the future of a military 
air service was put in severe doubt by the Department of Finance’s perception that the 
existing service had incurred a disproportionate amount of the Army’s expenditure during 
the war. In spite of the opposition of Finance, the indifference of General Richard 
Mulcahy and of GFIQ, General Eoin O’Duffy, in his reorganisation scheme of 1924, 
recommended to the Government that an Army Air Corps of 155 all ranks should be 
maintained. This recommendation was made subsequent to the demobilisation process of 
1923/24, when seven Air Service officers were let go and after the trauma of the mutiny 
period when a further thirteen officers were discharged. The particular circumstances, in 
which Major General W.J. McSweeney and Commandant J.J. Flynn were discharged as 
alleged mutineers, were never adequately clarified. Examination of the personal files and 
other records strongly suggest that summary justice was based on rumour and perception 
of guilt.
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It is apparent from O’Duffy’s scheme of reorganisation that the air element was 
not retained on ideological grounds. While army aviation was declared to be essential to a 
modem force, basically, had the air element not already existed, no such corps would 
have been included in O’Duffy’s reduced and reorganised Army. The Air Corps of 1 
October 1924 consisted of a headquarters and a single training squadron totalling 151 all 
ranks. Apparently established on a temporary basis this token force had insufficient 
personnel to include the functions of a camp garrison or those of the administration of a 
civil / military aerodrome in addition to its core functions of maintaining and operating 
aircraft. The commanding officer in 1924/25 had grave doubts about the Corps’ capacity 
to even fulfil the latter functions. Aviation folklore suggests that the Army Air Corps of 
1924 to 1930 was little more than a state-funded aero club.
The Air Service of 1922/24 had been shaped by civil war circumstances and by 
pragmatic decisions made on a day to day basis without the benefit of policy or plan. The 
Air Corps of 1924 to 1945, as an integral part of a predominantly infantry Army, was to 
be little different -  except to the extent that matters proceeded at a more leisurely pace. 
As with the Army of which it was an integral, if ill-defined, part the Army Air Corps was 
bereft of policy that might have dictated its organisation, established strength, roles and 
equipment. From 1922 to 1931 a series of ex-RAF flying officers were in command of 
the Air Corps for brief periods -  averaging less than two years each. The minutes of the 
Council for Defence suggest that these officers were rarely, if ever, asked for their 
professional opinions on air matters. Policy, to the extent to which it could be deemed to 
exist, was dictated by minister and his Council of Defence. In 1925 six new Bristol 
Fighters were purchased, on the authority of the Minister, as part of a programme that 
was intended to result in the establishment of a fighter squadron. This programme was 
soon abandoned in favour of reconnaissance. From about 1930 M.J. Costello was 
determined that there should be an Air Corps policy on which to base aircraft roles and 
the numbers and types of aircraft to be purchased. Unable to get such guidance he 
concluded that the policy was that there should be an Air Coips -  nothing more and 
nothing less.
In the absence of any defined policy it is not easy to understand why the Air 
Corps of June 1935, under the command of an Artillery Corps commanding officer,
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should initiate the evaluation process on a medium range reconnaissance aircraft. From 
1930, with the purchase of the Vickers Vespa aircraft, the implied operational role was 
that of army cooperation. The subsequent training in close reconnaissance and the 
eventual formal establishment of the 1st Army Co-operation Squadron on 22 October 
1934 confirmed the Air Corps’ primary function as army aviation. Notwithstanding, 
within nine months of the formal establishment of that squadron, Air Corps officers had 
begun the task of assessing the suitability of an aircraft intended for a substantially 
different role -  the Avro Anson and medium range reconnaissance.
By 1 April 1937 two Avro Ansons were in service. These were to be followed by 
two more in 1938 and another five in 1939. The most significant development, on 1 April 
1937, was the establishment of the 1st Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber Squadron 
(Cadre). Though comprised of only six pilot officers and twenty-four other ranks it 
should have marked the first steps towards the developing of medium range 
reconnaissance and the airmanship and navigation standards commensurate with such an 
operation. This trend towards air force roles continued in 1938 with the delivery of four 
Gloster Gladiators. Four others, ordered at the same time were withheld by the British as 
were a further eight ordered for delivery in 1939. However, the entry into service of a 
relatively potent fighter aircraft suggested the adoption of another air force role -  that of 
the fighter squadron. In due course the Army Co-operation Squadron was re-designated 
as 1st Fighter Squadron (Cadre) -  suggesting the abandomnent of the close 
reconnaissance army aviation role.
As the Gladiator was entering Air Corps service Colonel M.J. Costello was 
revealing his Air Corps expansion plan of 21 March 1938. The plan proposed a large 
expansion in personnel numbers, initially three training cadres and eventually ten 
operational squadrons with expenditure in the order of £1 million. Like the corresponding 
plan for a large conventional Army, it was never going to be realised. However the plan 
did shed light on the reasons for purchase of medium range reconnaissance and fighter 
aircraft. Three squadrons were initially proposed under Costello’s plan - ,
Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber, Fighter, and Coastal Patrol -  all at training cadre 
strength. These cadres were subsequently confirmed in the 1939 peace establishment and 
the 1940 war establishment. As three inappropriate Walrus aircraft were subsequently
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purchased for the Coastal Patrol Squadron it was to remain totally ineffective, except for 
training purposed, until being disbanded in 1943.
It would be convenient, but ill-advised, to blame P.A. Mulcahy for all the 
subsequent ills and short-comings of the Air Corps. To a large extent he was also a victim 
of circumstances. The Air Corps of 1939-1945 was the product of a tradition absence of 
policy combined with the Army’s suicidal planning for a conventional air force that was 
to have been an integral part of a grand defence plan. Costello’s proposals for an air force 
of ten squadrons was over-ambitious in all aspects and, as part of the Army’s proposed 
large three-service conventional force, was never going to be approved by Government or 
funded by Finance. While GHQ envisaged a military defence of the country the 
government was working on a strategy that emphasised, almost exclusively, passive 
defence measures. This was done with the guidance and assistance of the UK 
administration and in a manner that was dependent on close wartime cooperation between 
the two countries. With the Costello plan abandoned the Air Corps of 1939/40 was 
comprised of three under-strength training cadres that, in effect, under the direction of 
Col. P.A Mulcahy, were masquerading as operational squadrons. This should not have 
been a problem even though the squadrons were equipped with thirty obsolete aircraft 
rather than fifty-four modem machines. This was so because the Government’s strategy 
did not envisage a defensive role for the Air Corps while the token expenditure on 
aircraft, a modest expansion in personnel numbers and a minimal and much delayed 
training effort meant that the Corps was quite unprepared for even the most modest air 
task.
However the posting of the under-strength and poorly equipped reconnaissance 
detachment to Rineanna on 30 August 1939, in order to patrol the west coast, changed all 
that. The basic prerequisites, such as modem properly equipped aircraft and appropriate 
navigation equipment and training, were not in place. Similarly the aircraft were 
operating from a primitive airfield that had no redeeming features. It was a matter of 
when, not if, the mission would terminate. The fact that scheduled patrol missions were 
reduced from two per day to one per day within days of the start of the operation would 
seem to indicate the mission was in trouble from the very beginning. With the mission 
being eventually downgraded in May 1940 due to the loss of three aircraft and a chronic
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lack of aircraft spares it was a mercy that the squadron did not have to attempt a full 
patrol regime for another winter. It is not easy to understand how the Chief of Staff could 
stand over the initial ill-judged decision except to the extent that it was almost certainly 
directed by government, without estimate or evaluation of any description, but for good 
political reasons.
While the Army’s leadership would have no option but to send the R & MB 
Squadron to Rineanna in August 1939 the same cannot be said for the tasking of Fighter 
Squadron to the defence of Dublin in May 1940. When contemplating the improbable, 
nay impossible, task given to a flight of three aircraft - the Air Corps Interception Service 
-  there is some consolation in the thought that at least the investigation committee 
eventually saw the mission for what it was -  a potential waste of life for no possible 
return. It is difficult to understand the naivety of Colonel P.A. Mulcahy and his infantry 
superiors in presuming that the squadron could perform any worthwhile defensive role in 
an invasion context. No doubt the Chief of Staff and the Army were under severe 
pressure to be seen to be able to mount a sacrificial defence that had to be committed 
before the Government could request outside military assistance. However, given the 
abysmally poor resources available to the ‘front line squadrons’ it is easily understood 
how and why the pilot body in Baldonnell got totally frustrated and demoralised and took 
the unprecedented step of complaining to the minister.
While the period 1921 to 1945 was characterised by a total lack of policy in such key 
areas as organisation, establishments, manpower and role other matters were very much 
subject to day-to-day influences. This was particularly so in the area of recruitment and 
training of pupil pilots. From very early even Collins reflected the reluctance amongst the 
National Army to want to recruit ex-British officers. Early on in the Civil War, with very 
few reconnaissance missions actually being carried out and with aircraft being collected 
painfully slowly, it must have been obvious to Collins that he needed extra pilots. With 
McSweeney very much involved in aircraft purchase and the duties of his command the 
reconnaissance mission, up to 22 August 1922, was Russell’s one man show.
The eventual recruitment of another eleven ex-RAF pilots, between July and 
December 1922, and the concentration of ex-British officers that it represented, probably
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made the problem of such officers without pre-Truce service more visible. However the 
ad hoc recruitment and informal training of a motley group of officers and other ranks, 
initiated late in 1922, was not the solution. The net output of this unstructured course for 
fourteen pupils was six pilots of mixed ability who qualified as pilots without the 
requisite ground training and theory. While not advertised as such this course had 
apparently been authorised by the Adjutant General to facilitate the qualification of pilot 
officers with suitable nationalist backgrounds and in sufficient numbers to allow the 
services of the ex-RAF officers to be dispensed with. O’Duffy, in his 1924 scheme of 
reorganisation, acknowledged that this venture had been a dismal failure.
O’ Duffy recommended that pupil pilots for the Corps should be recruited from 
the school-leaving youth of the country who had the right motivation -  the forerunner of 
the cadet scheme still in use today. After some questionable administrative practices in 
GHQ, that reduced 140 candidates down to nine the said nine cadets were attested in the 
Curragh and commenced training on 12 April 1926. In the meanwhile the Army 
leadership set about satisfying the ambitions of seventeen mature army officers who were 
too old to be cadetship candidates. There is little doubt that, in most cases, these officers 
were attracted to the Air Corps by the considerable increase in pay that eight shillings a 
day flying pay represented. Through administrative slight of hand in its dealing with the 
Finance GHQ arranged for seventeen army officers, in addition to the nine cadets already 
undergoing military training in the Curragh, to commence flying training. This was done 
at a time when there were only six vacancies out of a total officer establishment of 
twenty-two. The aim of this subterfuge was twofold. Imposing older ex-IRA officers on 
the Air Coips would help to negate the influence of the ex-RAF staff on young and 
impressionable cadets and, of course, the ex-IRA group would themselves be immune 
from contamination. In addition by the training of officers who would always retain 
seniority over their cadet classmates GHQ would ensure that the future leadership would 
first devolve to an officer of a suitable nationalist background and infantry ethos. It is 
possible that higher authority presumed that the juxtaposition of such opposing ethos and 
cultures might encourage ex-RAF individuals to move on.
The course, starting with twenty-six pupils ran from June 1926 to June 1928 with 
officers and cadets completing the syllabus drafted by C.F. Russell (DFR 7/1927 dated 18
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March 1927). Subsequently six of each group qualified and while the officers assumed 
the vacant appointment the cadets had to wait five extra months so that vacancies could 
be created to allow them to be commissioned. The delay was caused by the fact that 
approval for the creation of additional appointments had to be sought from the 
Department of Finance. The net result of four pilot intakes was that by 1928 the small 
pilot body consisted of four disparate groupings -  ex-RAF pilots, ex-IRA officers and 
other ranks of the 1922/23 intake, newly commissioned cadets and newly qualified ex- 
IRA officers. The records do not show how the individual groups got on but it would 
seem inevitable that various tensions existed.
While a number of small intakes of officers and cadet took place between 1933 
and 1935 a major change to the intake system were initiated by Major P.A. Mulcahy and 
approved by DOD and the Minister in 1936. By means of erroneous advice Mulcahy 
convinced higher authority to issue a new DFR the only direct effect of which was to 
allow him qualify as a military pilot after approximately fifteen hour flying and to draw 
the highest rate of flying pay while, paradoxically, being prohibited by his subordinates 
from flying aircraft on his own. Not surprisingly this action led to unrest, not least among 
those who subsequently saw that higher rate of flying pay reduced to their disadvantage 
while their irregularly qualified commanding officer continued to draw the higher rate for 
many years.
Mulcahy also brought about the situation where the Air Corps cadetship was done 
away with as a means of entry. This was justified on the basis that only duly qualified 
army officers had the knowledge and appreciation of infantry tactics to facilitate being 
trained as effective army cooperation pilots. This aspect backfired in two ways. Firstly, 
after only one such intake GHQ refused to post Cadet School graduate officers into the 
Air Corps between 1938 and 1945 -  apparently on the basis that their infantry skills 
would be wasted on the Air Corps and on the flying of aircraft. In addition the 
reorganisation of 1939, in which Mulcahy had a hand, disbanded the Army Cooperation 
Squadron.
During the Emergency pilot intake was done on the basis of a short service 
scheme copied from the RAF. Between 1939 and 1945 three classes of pupils, totalling 
sixty -  four, more than the total of all previous pupil intakes put together, were trained.
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The scheme had been projected to produce a reserve of 300 pilots, for the future benefit 
of civil aviation rather that for the current needs of the military. The records strongly 
suggest that the training of short service pilots absorbed significantly more Air Corps 
resources than the operational squadrons. This is on the basis of the flying instructors’ 
time, aircraft flying hours and of new and used training aircraft acquired during the 
emergency. The small number of pilots in service in 1939 and the casual and belated start 
of the short service scheme testify to the fact that pilot numbers was never a factor and 
that neither Mulcahy nor his superiors ever intended to fill such vacancies even when 
some squadron numbers were below 25%.
The impotent and ineffective state of the Air Corps that was eventually identified and 
acknowledged by the committee of investigation in 1942 was the product of many inter­
related factors. These included inadequately equipped and obsolete aircraft, poor 
planning and preparation and lack of coordination between Army and government on 
defence strategy -  aspects that resulted in two squadrons being sent on fools’ errands. 
The manner in which effective support services for civil aviation evolved in time for the 
start of Aer Lingus 1936 was in sharp to the haphazard fashion in which the 
corresponding services became available to military aviation.
For unknown reasons the Air Service / Air Corps was very reluctant to take a 
meaningful initiative in the matter of meteorology. While the Air Service had weather 
reports and forecasts for a brief period during the Civil War the Air Corps was 
subsequently only in receipt of such information on an intermittent and delayed basis that 
made meteorology a theoretical rather than practical discipline. While meteorological 
theory was an essential aspect of ground school in pilot training it was to remain 
theoretical in the absence of a meteorological station and reporting and forecasting 
facilities. The Air Corps was fortunate to have a chaplin of an appropriate scientific 
background who was willing to impart meteorological theory to pilot ‘wings’ courses and 
who endeavoured to generate pilots’ interest in synoptic meteorology. While it appears 
that Father Bill O’Riordan, by means of an infonned and well-argued paper on the 
subject, was influential in having the state undertake its international obligations by 
setting up the Meteorological Service in 1936, he was less influential in Baldonnell.
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Despite the fact that Baldonnell was the country’s only military aerodrome, and the 
airport of entry for civil aircraft, no meteorological station was located there in the period 
under review. The indifference of P. A. Mulcahy to the needs of pilots and his inability to 
take advice on matters outside his area of expertise resulted in a poor and arms length 
relationship with Father Bill. Mulcahy did not take advantage of the opportunity 
presented by the advent of commercial operations to insist on having a meteorological 
station established at Baldonnell. In fact it appears that he conspired with his GHQ 
superiors to frustrate such a development. The lack of motivation on the part of Air 
Corps pilots in regard to meteorology in general is notable. They do not appear to have 
expressed opinions on the desirability of a meteorological station at Baldonnell. Perhaps 
they had considered that Father Bill had a better chance of success than they had. 
Alternatively they may have been brow-beaten by a disciplinarian commanding officer 
who took little, if any, advice and possibly saw the offering of such advice as an 
indication of indiscipline.
Like the meteorological Service the civil Aviation Communications Service was 
established in 1936. The service installed communications and direction finding services 
in keeping with the best practice of the time and commensurate with the needs of civil 
aviation. Military aviation communications were non-existent during the civil war as the 
requirements of the GOC at the time were studiously ignored by Liam Archer in his 
capacity as OC Signals. In doing so Archer apparently got away with disobeying the 
lawful order of his superior General Mulcahy. Like meteorology, in the absence of 
personnel in the establishment and wireless sets in the aircraft, aviation communications 
was to be largely theoretical for some years. With the advent of training in army 
cooperation wireless sets were fitted to aircraft, apparently selectively, for annual air 
firing and for exercises with ground units from about 1932. No wireless sets, other than 
wireless telegraphy, were required up to 1938 and the delivery of the Gloster Gladiators. 
The Gladiators had a radio telephony set as standard equipment. No ground station 
existed for these aircraft until a Gladiator crashed and its salvaged transmitter and 
receiver were mounted as a ground station. The Air Corps started the Emergency with a 
W/T ground station at Baldonnell and a mobile radio car at Rineanna each with a range of 
sixty miles while the R/T station at Baldonnell had a range of ten miles or less. At the
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same time civil aircraft using Baldonnell civil airport were serviced by WT, R/T and DF 
stations appropriate to the requirements of the cross-channel air service. The Foynes / 
Shannon area was even more commodiously facilitated having ground-to-air and air-to- 
ground ranges of 1000 miles and more. It is not at all clear why the Signal Corps did not 
develop the W/T, R/T and DF systems appropriate to the Air Corps’ aircraft, airborne 
equipment and notional roles. It is probable that Mulcahy, even though he had a signals 
staff officer to advise him, did not himself appreciate the scale and scope of the 
communications requirements of reconnaissance and fighter operations. The Baldonnell 
company or squadron of the independent Signal Corps did not answer to Mulcahy or his 
squadron commanders but to the director of signals. As Liam Archer had done in 1922 
the Director independently decided the wireless and radio equipment appropriate to the 
various corps and units. Mulcahy’s lack of technical appreciation, and an appreciation of 
what pilots required, even if he had been favourably disposed to that group, would have 
prevented him from demanding proper equipment and services. While the range of R/T 
transmissions improved after the demonstration and purchase of Mi'. Murphy’s radio in 
1941 it was a matter of too little too late. The communications and direction finding 
facilities available to the pilots of Air Corps aircraft on 3 September 1939 were abysmal 
and improve little thereafter.
The civil Air Traffic Control service, regulated by the Department of Industry and 
Commerce, and developed and delivered by the Air Corps, evolved from 1936. With two 
officers allotted to civil aviation duties at Baldonnel initially, this task expanded 
considerably from 1939. While the Air Corps’ needs in terms of ATC were fulfilled by a 
small establishment of meteorologists from 1939 the various civil requirements at 
Foynes, Shannon and Dublin employed six officers at any one time. These duties were 
performed mainly by pilots but also by a few observers and engineers. The fact that 
flying officers were withdrawn from flying duties for extended periods during a national 
emergency indicates that the Air Corps’ flying, and therefore its role in the defence of the 
country, was purely notional.
During the Emergency the two operational squadrons were, in effect, manned by 
the pilots left over after all other commitment had been met. Fighter squadron had a 
maximum of twelve pilots in 1940 while R & MB Squadron had no more. The Air Corps
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second-in-command spent almost all the Emergency period in the employ of Aer Lingus. 
The Schools had to be kept staffed with flying instructors at a much higher level that 
previously due to the substantially larger number of pupils being trained while the civil 
ATC rosters appeared to have priority over most, if not all, other duties. In 1943 and 
after, by which time an additional twenty-three pilots had been qualified, Fighter 
Squadron never had more than a dozen pilots though it was, at least notionally, the only 
remaining operational squadron. Suffice it to say that the numbers of pilots never 
appeared to be a priority while pilot training and civil ATC received priority.
It is evident that Government expenditure on military aviation, prior to and during 
the Emergency, was of token proportions only. For example the expenditure on the Air 
Corps’ somewhat primitive facilities at Rineanna, including £11,000 plus spent on the 
hangar, was kept to miserly amounts. However, while the expenditure put into the 
development of Foynes and Shamion from 1936 and Collinstown (Dublin) Airport from 
1937, up to and including concrete runways at both of the latter locations, is unknown the 
indications are that it ran into several millions of pounds.
During the period the government followed a course of cooperative neutrality 
with the United Kingdom while the Department of Finance was vigorously exercising 
financial retrenchment in regard to the defence vote. At the same time two under­
resourced token squadrons were committed, albeit briefly, to operational roles that should 
have been seen by the Army’s leadership to be potentially suicidal. It can only be 
concluded that those who had seen merit in the Army plan for a large, conventional three- 
service defence of the country were too naïve to recognise the folly of the decision to 
allot such tasks to Reconnaissance and Medium Bomber Squadron and Fighter Squadron 
in 1939 and 1940. In the circumstances it is understandable that demoralisation set in so 
early in the Emergency. Notwithstanding, the aircraft recovery operation and other 
aspects of cooperation with the Air Ministry / RAF ensured a supply of training aircraft 
in numbers adequate to ensure the training of pilots for the post-war benefit of civil 
aviation.
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Liaison Papers 
Local Strength Returns
Memorandum on the Defence Forces, August 1944
Ministers Secretary fries
Officers’ Personal files
Personal Collection 586 -  Col. M.J. Costello
Personal Collection 143 -  Col. W.J. Keane
Proceedings of committee of investigation into effectiveness, organisation, equipment, 
training and administration of the Air Corps.
National Archives, Dublin
Dail Eireann Accounts 
Department of Finance Supply 
Department of the Taoiseach 
Early Department of Finance 
Office of Public Works
2. Collections of private papers
National Library of Ireland
Art O’Brien Papers
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University College Dublin Archives
Eamonn de Valera papers.
Sean McEntee Papers 
Richard Mulcahy papers
Papers in my possession
Aerodromes book RFC / RAF Ireland.
Air Corps files; ACF/36/8, ACF/144/1, ACF/338, ACF/465, ACF/503/2, ACF/S/67.
Air Corps Standing Orders 1927, 1929, 1935.
Army Book 129, Complete list of landing grounds - Ireland, Capt. C.M. Pixton, RAF. 
Establishment Tables, Air Corps, 1924-46
Flying Time & Aircraft Accidents 1923 -  1963 (Lt. Col. J. Teague)
Key to air and marine special map.
Maps / drawings; Baldonnell Aerodrome 1927, Fermoy Aerodrome 1922, Tralee Landing 
Ground 1922, Rathduff 1942.
Memorandum for the government, DOD 3/2314, May 1949.
Miscellaneous documents - Air Corps files; ACF/36/34, ACF/150, ACF/336/5, 
ACF/338/5, ACF/564/5, ACF/631,
Nominal rolls - Air Corps officers;12 July 1928, 3 June 1935, 1 April 1937, 5 May 1939, 
16 August 1941, 18 April 1943, 2 December 1943, 14 December 1944, 4 January 1945. 
Orders; Operational Instruction No. 1/1943, No. 1 Fighter Squadron - Movement Order 
1/1943, No. 1 Fighter Squadron -  Movement Order, 17 April 1945,
Unit organisational charts and nominal rolls, Dec. 1940 / Jan. 1941; Air Corps HQ & 
Depot, Air Coips School, Fighter Squadron, Reconnaissance & Medium Bomber 
Squadron, Coastal Patrol Squadron.
Other papers in private keeping
Col. W.P. Delamere Peter Delamere, Kiliney, Co. Dublin.
Lt. Col. P.J. Hassett Capt. Eoin Hassett, Skerries, Co. Dublin.
Capt. D.J. McKeown Padraic Molloy, Celbridge, Co. Kildare.
Lieut. T.J. Nevin G.M. Nevin, Loughrea, Co. Galway.
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Air Corps Flying School files; ACF/36/23, ACF/564/1, ACS/14/2, ACS/103, 
ACS/103/5/1, ACS/103/11/2, ACF/109/1, ACS/177/11. In the keeping of School 
Commandant, Air Corps.
3. Printed primary sources
Fanning, Ronan (ed.), Documents on Irish foreign policy: Vol. I /9/9-22(T)ublin, 1998).
 (ed.) Documents on Irish foreign policy vol. II 7922-2(5(Dublin, 2000).
 __________(ed.) Documents on Irish foreign policy vol. I ll  1926-32(Dublin, 2000).
4. Newspapers and contemporary periodicals
Aeroplane 
An Cosantoir 
An t-Oglcigh 
Aviation 1935 -1937 
Evening Mail 
Flight
Freeman’s Journal 
Irish Times
5. Defence Forces publications
Defence Forces Handbook (1982)
Irish Defence Forces Handbook 1968 
Irish Defence Forces Handbook 1974 
The Army To-day ( 1945)
The Irish Air Corps 1922-1997
The Irish Defence Forces -  a handbook (1988)
6. Works of reference
Lalor, Brian, (ed.) The encyclopaedia o f Ireland (Dublin, 2003)
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7. Official publications - Irish
A handbook on the identification o f aircraft, Department of Defence, March 1941. 
Constitution o f Ireland, 1 July 1937.
Dail Eireann parliamentary debates
Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923-45.
Defence Forces Act, 1937 
Ministers and Secretaries Act, 1924 
Peace Establishments 1931 - 1932
8. Official publications -  UK
Air publication 129, Royal Air Force flying training manual, Part I, Flying Instruction, 
(Air Ministry, 1923).
Air publication 129, RAF flying training manual, Parti, Flying Instruction (Air Ministry, 
1931).
Air publication 1234, Manual o f air navigation, Vol. I  (Air Ministry, 1936).
Air Publication 1525A, Pilot’s notes for Anson I  (Air Ministry, 1943).
9. Military regulations and orders
Air Corps Standing Orders 1927; 1929; 1935.
Defence Forces Regulations
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General Routine Orders 1922/23
Orders No. 3, Defence Forces (Organisation) Order, 1924.
Staff Duty Memos 1923/24
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APPENDIX 1
Summary of expenses in connection with the purchase, maintenance and equipment of
two aeroplanes.1
Received from Art O’B r ie n -19 Oct. 1921 £1,500. 0. 0
Received from Art O’Brien - 12 Dec. 1921 £1,300. 0. 0.
Received from Art O’Brien -  30 Dec. 1921 £ 250. 0. 0.
Received from other sources £ 60. 0. 0.
Total received £3,110.0. 0.
Purchased from Messrs. Martinsyde, Ltd. One five-seater aeroplane £2,300
One set of floats for same £ 300
One Avro machine £ 130
Alterations to five-seater machine to increase accommodation £ 100
To dual control by Company pilot2 £ 17. 10. 0.
Lieut. McSweeney, I.R.A., Expenses before the purchase of the machines £ 25. 0. 0,
Maps, helmet and Compass Box £ 10. 0. 0.
Petrol, oil and mechanic’s fees £ 25. 0. 0.
Travelling expenses Brooklands £ 40. 0. 0.
Travelling expenses Woking £ 34. 0. 0.
Irish travelling expenses £ 130. 0. 0.
Hotel expenses -  London & Dublin £ 65. 0. 0.
Miscellaneous expenses £ 10. 0. 0.
Expenses in connection with two machine guns -  London £ 5. 0. 0.
Expenses (to Capt. Clarke) £ 10. 0. 0.
Insurance & garage for aeroplanes £ 20. 0. 0.
Report on Haulbowline as an Air Station [supplied by Director of
Handley Page London -  Paris service]3 £ 25. 0. 0.
Total expenses £3,247. 10. 0.
Total amount expended as per above £3,247. 10. 0.
Total amount received as per above £3,110. 0. 0.
Balance due to C.F. Russell £ 137. 10. 0.
Statement of immediate financial requirements [7 April 1922]4
Packing & shipping of Martinsyde aeroplane, London to Dublin £ 150. 0. 0.
Packing & shipping of Avrò aeroplane, London to Dublin £ 100. 0. 0.
Balance due to Martinsyde, Avrò aeroplane £ 130. 0. 0
1 S ta tem en t o f  e x p en ses , C .F . R u sse ll to  M ich ae l C o llin s , 27  F eb . 1922  (N A I, D T  S .4 0 0 2 ); L o n d o n  o ffice  
a cc o u n ts , I O ct. 1921 to  31 D ec . 1921 (N L A , M s s8 4 3 1 -2 , A rt O ’B rien  p ap ers) .
" D ua l fly in g  in s tru c tio n  on  th e  M a rtin sy d e  a irc ra ft
3 ‘Irish  A ir  F o rc e ’ u n d a te d  A v ia tio n  D e p a rtm e n t m em o , M arch  /  A pril 1922 (M A , P C  143).
4 M in is te r  fo r  D e fe n c e  to  M in is te r  fo r  F in a n ce , 7 A p ril 1922  (N A I, D T  S .4 0 0 2 ).
422
Balance due to Martinsyde, garage & insurance 
Salaries of staff for one month
Special -  expenses for two of our mechanics to go to London to watch 
Disassembling of these machines.
Miscellaneous
[Total costs associated with the purchase of two aircraft
£ 10. 0. 0.
£ 40. 0. 0.
£ 40. 0. 0.
£ 50. 0. 0.
£ 520. 0. 0.
£3,767. 0. 0.
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APPENDIX 2
POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS.5
TELEGRAMS RECEIVED IN THE IRISH OFFICE.
Date -  4 July 1922
Handed in at DUBLIN CASTLE at__________ Received here at 11. 39 am.
From ______Cope_______  To Curtis for Mr. Churchill
Collins wants two aeroplanes one with undercarriage for bombing and one without.
Reasons for request are
(1) McSweeney has not brought over his plane yet due to inclement weather.
(2) Telegraph and telephone communication is interrupted and particulars of the 
surrounding country are not available
(3) Reports come in of concentrations of irregulars in Dublin County and 
neighbouring Counties. Troops and transport are sent out on these reports and 
search country for hours for these concentrations but fail to find them and men 
and time are wasted.
(4) Collins is satisfied he could clean up the Country districts if he could get early 
information of concentrations and keep up communications. As an example of (2) 
above there were reports yesterday that irregulars were doing well in Drogheda.
At P.G.’s request I got through to Gormanstown by wireless for information but 
wires were down between Gormanstown and Drogheda and no infonnation could 
be obtained.
It would be most undesirable for P.G. to use our pilots owing to the dead 
set which is being made by republicans on P.G. receiving assistance from us.
Each issue of the Republic of Ireland mentions either Mr. Churchill, General 
Macready or myself as giving assistance in the fight and the mainspring of the 
republican propaganda is that British forces are prompting and assisting in the 
killing of Irishmen.
I suggest one aeroplane being handed over at once. Can this be done 
please. The handing over should be at Baldonnell. The P.G. have one or two 
efficient ainnen -  of this I am certain.
5 N A , A ir 8/49.
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Appendix 3
Statement of expenditure by Major General McSweeney from the sum of 
£3,800 advanced by the Ministry of Defence.6
1922 £ s d
20 June Received from Chief of Staff 1,300. 0. 0.
Received from Chief of Staff 2,500. 0. 0.
21 June- 4  
July 1922
McSweeney -  misc. expenses Dublin /London / 
Dublin /London /Dublin
43. 1. 2.
24 June Aircraft Disposal Co 400. 0. 0.
26 June C. Baker 3. 7. 0.
26 June Gamages 2. 2. 0.
1 July Aircraft Disposal Co. 400. 0. 0.
1 July G. Adams 4.17. 0.
2 July C. Baker 9. 0. 0.
13 July_ Yeates 1.10. 0.
15 July T.S. Harris 86.12. 6.
15 July Aircraft Disposal Co. 1,100. 0. 0.
17 July Royal Air Force 4.18. 4.
30 July Col. Russell 9.17. 4.
30 July -  14 
Aug.
McSweeney -  misc. expenses Dublin /London / 
Dublin
37. 1. 2.
31 July Dixon Hempenstall 2. 2. 0.
1 Aug. Burberrys 3. 10. 0.
4 Aug. Gieves. 2. 10. 0
Wages 21. 2. 3.
C. Baker. 9. 0. 0.
G. Adams 6. 5. 6.
Col. Russell - Expenses 10. 18. 0.
Advance -  Mr. Piercey, ADC. 15. 0. 0.
11 Aug. Wages 18. 7. 10.
18 Aug. Wages 19. 2. 5.
25 Aug Wages 25. 14. 1.
30 Aug. Cox Shipping Co. 32. 6. 6.
Lieuts. Crossley and Maloney 35. 0. 0.
1 Sept. Wages. 17. 16. 3.
9 Sept. Wages 29. 13. 0.
16 Sept. Wages 3. 15. 0.
Wages 31. 5. 6.
Mr Piercey [Mono engine] 100. 0. 0.
6 ‘S ta te m en t o f  e x p e n d itu re ’, 28 Ju ly  1923 ; ‘E x p en ses  o f  M a jo r  G en era l M c S w e e n e y  d u rin g  y e a r  1922- 
1 9 2 3 ’, 30  O ct. 1922 (M A , A C /2 /2 /1 ).
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22-27 Sept. McSweeney misc. expenses Dublin /London/ 
Dublin
15. 14. 8.
3 Oct. L.B. Fitch 1. 10. 0.
10 Oct. Dairy Engineering Co. 6. 6.
14 Oct. Fox, carter. (Wages) 12. 0. 0,
28 Oct. Fox, Carter (Wages) 8. 0. 0
27 Jan. 1923 Jacob’s [second hand flying suits] 67. 10. 0,
1 Nov. Allowed as expenses - McSweeney
13 Sept. Refunded to DOD. (National Land Bank) 829. 10. 7.
13 Sept. Refund to DOD (Munster & Leinster Bank) 360. 18. 4.
1 Nov. 1923 Account balanced 3,800. 0. 0
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APPENDIX 4
D e p a r tm e n t o f  C iv il A v ia tio n  -  2 0  Ju ly  1 9 2 2 7
Name Duties Salary Commenced
Chas. F. Russell Director, Civil Aviation, 
Sec. Aviation Council
£300 p.a. 1 April 1922
Miss McLoughlin Typist, Civil Aviation 
Department
£2 -  10s. p.w. 1 April 1922
A.J. Russell Junior Clerk £1 -  10s. p.w. 23 April 1922
W.J. Guilfoyle Engineer, Baldonnell & 
Tallaght.
£6 -  10s. p.w. 30 April 1922
Frederick Laffan Switch Board Attendant £3 -  10s. p.w. 30 April 1922
A. Conmee Switch Board Attendant £3 -  10s. p.w. 30 April 1922
J. Byrne Engine Driver, Clondalkin 
Pumping Station
£2 -  10s. p.w. 30 April 1922
L. Nelson General Labourer £2 -  16s. p.w 6 May 1922
Vol. G. Dunne Labourer, Sewage & Fire 
Hydrants
£2 -  10s. p.w. 10 June 1922
Vol. M. Horan Fitter & Turner £3 -  13s p.w. 10 June 1922
P. Condon Store Keeper / Caretaker of 
Aerodrome fittings
£ 2 -  18s.- 4d 
p.w.
10 June 1922
Chas. O’Toole Aero Ground Engineer £5 -  0s. p.w. 14 June 1922
H. Mathews Labourer, cleaning duties. £2 -  3s. p.w. 16 June 1922
M. Perkins Fitter £3 -  13s. p.w. 17 July 1922
M. O’Gorman Electrician £3 -  10s p.w. 17 July 1922
E. Broy Accountant & Clerk £5 - 0s. p.w. 19 July 1922
7 P 7 /4 9 /3 8  (U C D A , M P ).
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APPENDIX 5
D e p a rtm e n t o f  M ilita ry  A v ia tio n  -  2 2  J u ly  1 9 2 2 8
Rank Name Duties Date of 
Appointment
Pay per Week
Lieut. G. Dowdall Adjutant 25 May 1922 £ 4 - 0 - 0
2/Lt T. Nolan (in 
Hospital)
Observer 7 July 1922 £ 2 - 0 - 0
2/Lt J. McCormac Pilot
(Dismissed)
11 July 1922 £ 2 - 0 - 3
S/Capt. W. Stapleton Observer
(Acting)
11 July 1922 £
Capt. Mills M.O. 11 July 1922 Not paid through
Aviation
Sergt. J. McCarthy Rigger 1 Feb. 1922 £ 2 - 1 0 - 0
Cpl. J. Curran Rigger 30 March 1922 £ 1 - 6 - 3
Cpl. A. Hughes Fitter 30 March 1922 £ 2 - 1 4 - 3
Cpl. H. White QM&
Discipline
£ 2 - 1 4 - 3
Vol. F. Kerrigan Fitter 7 June 1922 £ 1 - 4 - 6
Vol. M. Lawler Rigger 20 June 1922 £ 1 - 4 - 6
Vol. T. McGee Fitter MT 20 July 1922 £ 1 - 4 - 6
Vol. Behan Fitter MT Attached from 
Garrison
Vol. J. Stephenson Fitter MT 20 July 1922 £ 1 - 4 - 6
Vol. Gerard Rigger £ 1 - 4 - 6
Vol. T. Clarke Rigger 20 July 1922 £ 2 - 1 2 - 6
Vol. J. Reid Fitter 20 July 1922 £
Vol. Hussy Fitter MT 19 July 1922 £
Sergt. Sean Waldron Medical )Not Paid
Vol. W. Winters Medical )
Vol. M. Adamson Medical )
Vol. J. O’Leary Medical )By Aviation
Miss M. Kiernan Typist 24 March 1922 £ 2 - 1 0 - 0
Mr. W. Keogh i/c MT Repair £ 4 - 1 0 - 0
8 P 7 /4 9 /3 7  (U C D A , M P ).
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Mr. H. Cleary Cook 12 July 1922 £ 4 - 1 0 - 0
Mr. F. Sullivan Cook 12 July 1922 £ 3 - 1 0 - 0
Mr. M. Hennebry 
(Survey)
Carpenter 10 July 1922 £ 3 - 0 - 0
Mr. J. Hennebry Carpenter 10 July 1922 £ 3 - 0 - 0
Mr. A. Fay Carpenter 10 July 1922 £ 3 - 0 - 0
Mr. Doyle C / Labourer 21 July 1922 £ 2 - 1 0 - 0
Vol. P. Kelly Telephone
operator
22 July 1922 £ 1 - 4 - 6
Vol. D. Kelly Telephone
operator
22 July 1922 £ 1 - 4 - 6
Vol. M. Campbell Rigger 22 July 1922 £ 3 - 0 - 0
Vol. J. Daly Rigger 22 July 1922 £ 2 - 1 2 - 6
Vol. E. Sutcliffe Rigger 22 July 1922 £ 1 - 4 - 6
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APPENDIX 6
DEFENCE FORCE REGULATIONS 
Roinn Cosanta 
18th March, 1927
SYLLABUS OF TRAINING. 
D.F.R. 7 
1927
PUPIL OFFICERS AND CADETS IN THE ARMY AIR CORPS
1. The Duration of the training period for pupil Officers and Cadet in the Army Air Corps 
shall be two years. The syllabus of training for each year shall be as prescribed herein 
provided that during the first year flying instruction will also be given in addition to the 
ground instruction as prescribed in the syllabus for that year.
2. The Officer Commanding the Army Air Coips may use his discretion in covering the 
syllabus of training for the first year and shall not be definitely limited to the syllabus as 
laid down for each particular quarter of that year, provided the entire syllabus is covered 
within a period of twelve months.
3. Syllabus of training -  1st year 
1st Quarter.
This quarter will be devoted to a special Course of Infantry Training at the School of 
Instruction, Curragh Camp.
2IK| Quarter.
This quarter will be devoted to lectures at Baldonnel, of an elementary nature on the 
following subjects and also elementary Flying Training (Dual control).
Theory of Flight
i. Types of aircraft
ii. Principles of Flight.
iii. Definitions of aeronautical terms.
iv. Air Flow over Flat Plane, C.ambered Plane
V . Centre of Pressure.
vi. Streamline Section.
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vii. Lift and Drag, Formuline and Curves.
viii. Function of control Surfaces.
ix. The Air Screw.
x. The Aeroplane in Flight.
xi. Gliding and Gliding Angle.
Rigging.
i. Materials used in aircraft construction.
11. Names of different parts and their uses.
iii. Construction of main planes and control surfaces.
iv. Measurement of angles.
v. Assembling and dismantling.
vi. Types of aeroplanes.
vii. Rigging characteristics.
Aero Engines.
i. Principles of internal combustion engine.
ii. Cycle of operations.
iii. Names of various parts and their functions.
iv. Cooling, lubricating and ignition system.
v. The carburetter, [sic]
vi. The magneto.
vii. Types of engines.
viii. Detailed information on the Mono Engine.
Wireless.
i. Elementary principles of magnetism.
ii. Theory of wireless.
iii. Transmission and reception of wireless wave.
iv. Timing.
v. Buzzing (Sending and receiving [morse code at] 6 words per minute).
Map reading.
i. Introduction and general definitions.
ii. Scales, representative fractions and conversions
iii. Use of protractor and other instruments.
iv. Conventional signs, contouring and contours.
V . Relief, methods of showing and reading.
vi. Section drawing and mutual visibility.
vii. Map reading and orienting.
viii. Resection and traversing.
ix. Map enlarging.
Machine guns -  Lewis and Vickers guns.
i. General description of the gun and parts.
ii. Stripping and assembling.
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iii. Sequence and operations.
iv. Loading, firing and unloading.
v. Care and maintenance.
vi. Points before and after flight.
Machine drill.
Pupil Officers and Cadets will be qualified to take charge of a crew moving and starting 
up machines and will be required to be proficient in the drill for swinging propellers. 
Lectures will also be given in morale and discipline and instruction in physical training.
3ld Quarter.
During this period further lectures of a more advanced nature will be given in the subjects 
laid down above, and, in addition:
Photography.
i. Theory of light.
ii. Lenses.
iii. Theory of photography.
i v . Plates and filters.
V. Types of aerial cameras.
vi. Method of operation.
vii. Suspension and installation of cameras in the aircraft.
Instruments.
i. Air speed indicator.
ii. Revolution counter.
iii. Oil and pressure gauges.
iv. Altimeter.
V. Thermometer.
vi. Inclinometer.
vii. Reid control indicator.
Meteorology.
i. Constituents of atmosphere.
ii. Meteorological elements.
iii. Circulation of atmosphere.
iv. Methods of observation.
V. Winds, cloud formations.
vi. Visibility.
vii. Thunderstorms, cyclones and anticyclones.
viii. Weather forecasting.
Navigation.
i. Introduction and definitions.
ii. Measurement of distance on earth’s surface.
iii. Projections.
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iv. Maps and charts.
V. Magnetism, properties of magnets, terrestrial magnetism, dip variation and
correcting for variation.
vi. The Aero compass, compass adjustment, preparation of deviation card,
compass errors.
vii. Measurement of bearing, fixing position.
viii. Bigswort chart board and protractor, effect of wind on aircraft, drift.
ix. Course setting, composition and resolution of forces, application of
parallelogram and triangle of forces’ to course setting.
X. Radius of action.
xi. Interception of aircraft.
xii. Course and distance calculator.
xiii. Instruments used in aerial navigation.
International Air Regulations.
i. Regulation drawn up by the International Convention.
ii. Amendments and additions.
Reconnaissance.
i. Definition of reconnaissance.
ii. Uses of aircraft in this connection.
iii. What to observe and how to report it.
iv. Co-operation with Infantry.
V. Artillery co-operation.
Bombs.
i. Types of bombs and bomb racks.
ii. Safety devices.
iii. Care and maintenance.
iv. Bomb sights.
V. Bomb dropping.
C.C. Interrupter gear.
i. General description of gear.
ii. Operation of gear.
iii. Timing and fitting.
iv. Care and maintenance.
V. Points before and after flight.
4tl‘ Quarter.
This quarter will be devoted to revision of the lectures given above, and to examination in 
the various subjects.
The course will be divided into two periods:- Elementary and Advanced.
Examinations will be held at the end of each period and marks will be allotted to the 
various subjects as set out below.
433
In order to pass in the undermentioned subjects a minimum of 50 per cent must be 
obtained and Officers obtaining 80 per cent will be granted a pass with honours.
Elementary Advanced
Subject
Total
Mark
Obtainable
Pass
Total
Subject Marks
obtainable
Pass
Rigging 150 75 Photography 150 75
Engines 150 75 Instruments 40 20
Wireless theory 150 75 Meteorology 100 50
Buzzing 50 25 Navigation 150 75
Theory of flight and Reports 50 25
Elementary mechanics 150 75 Armament, Bombs
Machine drill 100 50 C.C. gear etc. 100 50
Map reading 150 75 International Air
General knowledge Regulations 50 25
(Aviation) 100 50
Total 1.000 500 640 320
4. Syllabus of training - 2nd year.
Pupil Officers will be expected to have completed Dual Instruction and Solo Flying on
the elementary types of machines at the end of the first year. The whole of the second
year will be devoted to Dual Instruction and Solo Flying on the Service types of 
machines, and in addition practical application of the subject upon which lectures were 
given during the first year. Periods of bad weather, unsuitable for flying, will be devoted
to revision of the lectures given during the first year and practice in Buzzing and machine 
guns and instruction in Army and Corps Administration.
Before passing on to service types of aircraft, Pupil Officers and Cadets must:-
i. Flave completed a total of 40 hours solo and Dual on elementary type 
machine, of which 20 hours must be Solo flying.
ii. Be able to flymachine reliably and accurately, and land consistently well, tail 
down, at low speed.
iii. Have passed the following tests on the elementary type machine. Tests (a),
(b), (c), and (j) will be carried out solo unaccompanied by an Instructor or 
passenger. Tests (d) to (i) will be accompanied by an Instructor, but the 
candidate will be required the manoeuvres himself, an will be considered to ha 
e failed in the tests if assistance is given by the Instructor:-
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(a) Climb to 6,000 feet and remain there for at least 15 minutes, afterwards making a 
good landing without the use of the engine, and coming to rest within 100 yards 
of the mark selected by the examiner.
(b) Make three landings without the assistance of the engine, the points where the 
aeroplane first touches the ground and where it finally came to rest within in a 
fixed circle of 150 yards diameter. In a ground wind of 15 m.p.h. or over this 
diameter will be reduced to 125 yards. (The prescribed limits will be indicated to 
the pupil before he leaves the ground).
(c) Carry out a cross-country flight of at least 60 miles without losing his way. On 
return the candidate will be required to describe accurately the ground details of 
three previously selected pin points on his route. These pin point will not be 
prominent land marks, nor will the route chosen be defined by railway, river or 
canal.
(d) Execute three sustained turns in each direction, with and without engine. Air 
speed of aeroplane not to vary by more than 10 miles an hour throughout the 
whole turn. Bank to be not less than 45 degrees.
(e) Execute small figures of eight without losing height or side-slipping.
(f) Stall his machine with and without engine.
(g) Sideslip his aeroplane in either direction without stalling or exceeding an airspeed 
of 75 m.p.h.
(h) Fly in clouds and rough weather, and manipulate a forced landing successfully.
(i) Execute spin, half-roll, stall turn, and loop.
(j) Take off and land his machine cross-wind.
In addition to the above tests on elementary types of aircraft, the following conditions 
must be fulfilled before a Pupil Officer or Cadet is granted authority to wear the flying 
badge:-
i. Have completed a total of 60 flying, of which at least 20 hours must be solo 
flying on a Service type aircraft.
ii. Be able to fly his service machine reliably and accurately and land 
consistently well, tail down at low speeds.
iii. Have carried a passenger in a service machine (two seater Service types only).
iv. Have a good working knowledge of the engine and in the use of Vacuum 
Controls.
v. Have passed to the following tests on his service machine: Tests (a), (b), and
(c) and will be carried out solo unaccompanied by Instructor or passenger. 
Tests (dO to (k) will be carried out accompanied by the Instructor, but the 
candidate will be required to execute the manoeuvres himself, and will be 
considered to have failed in the tests if assistance is given by the Instructor;-
(a) Climb to 15,000 feet and remain at that height for at least 15 minutes, afterwards 
making a good landing without the use of his engine, and coming to rest within 175 
yard of mark previously selected by his examiner:
(b) Make three landings without the assistance of the engine the point where his 
aeroplane first touches the ground and where it finally comes to rest being included 
within a fixed circle, the diameter of which will be 150 yards for all types. In a wind
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of 15 m.p.h. or over, this diameter will be reduced to [1]25 yards. The prescribed 
limits will be marked and indicated to the candidate by the instructor
(c) Carry out four cross-country flights of at least 60 miles each over unfamiliar 
country, without losing his way. On return the candidate will be required to describe 
accurately the ground details of three previously selected pin points on his route. 
These pin points will not be prominent land marks nor will the route chosen be 
defined by a railway, river or canal.
(d) Execute three sustained turns in each direction with and without engine. Air speed 
not to vary by more than 10 m.p.h. throughout the whole turn. Bank not to be less 
than 45 degrees.
(e) Execute small figures of eight without losing height or sideslipping.
(f) Stall with and without engine.
(g)Sideslip in either direction without stalling or exceeding an air speed of 80 m.p.h.
(h) Satisfy the examiner that the candidate is a safe pilot in cloud and rough weather, 
(j) Execute unassisted four forced landings in different field selected by the examiner, 
(k) Compass Test - Candidates will not be provided with a map but will be given a 
compass bearing upon which they will be required to fly for 15 minutes. The 
Instructor will check the compass reading every 30 seconds. The maximum error will 
not exceed 30 degrees and the average error 15 degrees. On completion of fifteen 
minutes flying the instructor will give the candidate a map of the country, upon which 
he wil mark the position of the machine.
(1) Keep his position in a formation, and be capable of picking up and taking up 
position in a formation.
(m) Carry out six Reconnaissance flights and submit satisfactory reports.
(n) Take six Aerial Photography of prominent ground objects, the centres of which 
are approximately in centre of Plates. Take a satisfactory series of overlaps of a given 
area of ground.
5. Nomination of Cadets to the Executive Council for the grant of Commissions as 2nd 
Lieutenants in the Army Air Corps will be conditional on their passing the above tests 
(Ground and Flying), their suitability for appointment to commissioned rank, and on 
vacancies existing in the Corps.
Made and prescribed in exercise of the powers in this behalf vested in me by Defence 
Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, 1923 to 1926.
[ Signed]
AIRE COSANTA
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APPENDIX 7
Roinn Cosanta, 21 may 1936
D.F.R. 40 
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AIR CORPS SCHOOL
1. The function of the Air Corps School shall be -
i. To provide a uniform medium of instruction in the tactics and technique of the 
Air Corps for such officers, non-commissioned officers and men as are 
detailed.
ii. (a) To conduct the Young Officers’ Flying Training Course.
[etc]
3. Young Officers Flying Training Course. The syllabus of the Young Officers’ Flying 
Training Course shall be as follows:-
Group I. History of Aviation; Characteristics of Aircraft; Organisation and 
Administration of the Air Corps; Flight Administration; Elementary Theory of Flight.
Group II. Rigging; Instruments; Power Plants.
Group III. Air Navigation; Photography; Radio and other means of communication.
Group IV. Aerial Armament; Theoretical Instruction in Aerial Bombing; Practical 
Ground Gunnery.
Group V. Airmanship; Flying Training.
Group VI. Meteorology; Air Navigation Regulations
4. [etc]
DEFENCE FORCE REGULATIONS
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APPENDIX 8
To All officers at Baldonnel, through Unit Commanders.9
Although there is abundant evidence that an invasion of our country is contemplated, it is 
not possible for us to be told when or where the enemy will strike.
It is our duty to be at our posts, ready to take our part at the moment of attack.
We may get a few hours warning. We may get no warning. Nevertheless, it is our duty to 
be ready at the precise moment.
If we fail to get into the air, if we loose our aircraft on the ground, we have failed utterly 
in our duty to our people. It is, therefore, necessary that the crews of the Service 
Squadron and detachment at Baldonnel be readily available to their aircraft at all times.
Until further notice, the crews of service aircraft will occupy quarters in Camp. Married 
personnel whose families live out of Camp will be granted pennission to visit their 
families during the afternoon or evening, dependent on military exigencies and such 
personnel must return to camp before 23.59 hours or earlier, if required.
All officers sleeping in Camp must be in their quarters before 25.59 hours and strict quiet 
will be maintained in quarters after that hour.
If any married officer should consider this order harsh because other Army units are not 
on active service let us remember that an officer of the ground forces may be able to 
make up for a few lost hours but an Air Corps officer who fails to get into the air to carry 
out his allotted task, has betrayed his trust.
Let us, therefore, bear inconveniences cheerfully now so that we will be standing by to 
perform whatever the task and whatever the hour.
Signed P.A. Mulcahy, Colonel, Officer Commanding, The Air Corps, 4 July 1940.
9 P.A . M ulcahy to A C  investigation, 21 N ov. 1941(M A , A CS 22/23).
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APPENDIX 9
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION INTO 
fEFFECTIVNESS.l ORGANISATION. TRAINING. ADMINISTRATION 
AND EQUIPMENT OF THE MR CORPS.10
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION.
1. TERMS OF REFERENCE:
The Committee was established by Convening Order dated 10th January, 1941, 
issued by the Chief of Staff. This Order read as follows:-
I. A Committee of officers composed as hereunder is herby constituted to 
investigate and report on the following matters:-
Chairman: Major General H. MacNeill, Assistant Chief of Staff
(Major T. Fox, Officer Commanding, 3ld Brigade. 
Members: (Major C. Whelan, Office of Chief of Staff.
(Major J. Flynn, General Staff.
II. The Committee will assemble at a time and place to be fixed by the 
Assistant Chief of Staff.
III. The Committee will enquire into the matters raised on the following questions 
and will provide an adequate answer to each. It will provide such additional 
information and such recommendations as, in its discretion, it may consider 
necessary.
1. Is the Air Corps, as now organized and equipped, capable of co-operating 
with other units of the Forces or of functioning usefully in any other 
capacity in the defence of the State?
2. (a) Having regard to our financial resources and the difficulty in 
obtaining equipment, is the present form of organization of the Air Corps 
the most suitable for defence needs?
(b) If the present organization is not considered suitable, what changes are 
recommended?
(c) Is the present type of equipment suited to our defence needs, and, if 
not, what type of equipment would be more suitable?
3. (a) Are the officers of the Air Corps as efficient and capable of carrying
10 R eport and findings o f  the C om m ittee  and A nnexes thereto , 10 Jan. 1 9 4 2 ,1-II (M A , A CS 22/23).
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out the duties of their appointments as available equipment permits?
(b) Is flying practice properly organized and carried out by flying 
personnel?
(c) If not what changes in personnel or in the system of administration and 
training are considered necessary?
4. Is it considered essential that:-
(a) The Commanding Officer should be a flying officer.
(b) He should have completed a full flying course as laid down for flying 
personnel of the Air Corps?
5. Is the present system of pay and additional pay satisfactory and, if not, what 
changes are considered to be necessary, and is additional pay for flying 
personnel at all desirable?
6. Could a scheme be evolved which would enable a turnover of pilots to be 
effected, i.e., could pilots after undergoing, say 3 years training be 
appointed to other units of the forces and returned to the Air Corps for a 
refresher course of, say a month each year?
7. Is the present system of limiting pilot personnel to commissioned ranks 
desirable, having regard to the practice in other countries of having N.C.O. 
pilots?
IV. The Committee will determine the method of procedure and the form of its 
report and shall have powers to take evidence on oath and call for documents 
relevant to the above matters.
V. The Committee will assemble as soon as circumstances permit and, on the 
conclusion of its investigations, will report without delay.
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APPENDIX 10
The co-operation required by the Defence Forces may be divided into War and Peace 
Missions as follows:-
War Missions
(1) Provision of infonnation regarding strength, disposition and movement of hostile 
forces at sea en route to invade our territory.
(2) Provision of similar infonnation of hostile forces which have invaded our territory 
and may be in contact with or moving against our ground forces.
(3) Provision of communications on a small scale such as message dropping and transport 
of commanders and staff officers.
(4) Interception of bomber and dive bomber fonnations.
(5) Limited attack on hostile ground troops.
Peace Missions
(1) To accustom the ground forces to the tactics of bombing, dive bombing and machine- 
gunning aircraft, by means of exercises demonstrating these tactics.
(2) To test and examine the concealment and camouflage of ground forces and thus 
perfect their teclmique in this important aspect of modem warfare.
(3) To test alarm and evacuation plans of ground forces.
(4) To test air discipline of ground troops in camps and on the move.
(5) To train ground troops and Air Corps, separately and in combination, in their War 
Mission.
Missions o f the Air Corps 1 10 January 1942]11
11 R eport and findings o f  the C om m ittee and A nnexes thereto , 10 Jan, 1942, IV  (M A , A CS 22/23).
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APPENDIX 11
Colonel P.A. Mulcahy 12
Three members of the Committee favour the appointment of Colonel Mulcahy as 
Director of Military Aviation. The fourth member dissents and is submitting a separate 
recommendation. In recommending Colonel Mulcahy, these three members do so on the 
grounds that;
(i) Colonel Mulcahy took over the command of the Air Corps in 1935 when it 
was in a very bad condition. He was seriously handicapped by not having a 
policy for the Corps and by inadequate equipment.
(ii) He has a good conception of the requirement and role of the Air Corps and 
endeavoured to obtain a decision on policy. The supply of equipment has been 
to a large extent outside his control.
(iii) In a small Unit such as the Air Corps with officers having grievances about 
their flying pay, the inadequacies of equipment and lack of policy, discontent 
was bound to arise, thus making Colonel Mulcahy’s task very difficult. In 
such circumstances, criticism is always rife.
a. That Colonel Mulcahy succeeded in maintaining a high standard of 
discipline in such circumstances rebounds to his credit.
b. Whilst Colonel Mulcahy bears responsibility for the low standard of 
training in the Air Corps, the mitigating circumstances in Section V, 
paragraph 24, must be taken into consideration.
The above mentioned considerations render it necessary that any Officer nominated to 
replace Colonel Mulcahy requires to be a good administrator, have technical ability and 
possess strong character and personality. Whilst there is within the Corps a number of 
promising officers, none of them, in the opinion of the three members of the Committee 
concerned is fitted at this stage to effectively direct the Corps in its present condition.
In order to satisfactorily fill his appointment, however, the three members in favour of his 
appointment consider that Colonel Mulcahy should be required, at an early date, to 
undergo the necessary additional training to obtain the qualifications which the 
Committee have recommended in Section V of the Report as being essential for the 
Officer holding the appointment of Director of Military Aviation.
p R eport and findings o f  th e  C om m ittee and A nnexes thereto , 10 Jan. 1942, L X I (M A , A CS 22/23)
APPENDIX 12
• * 13Minority report re appointment of Director of Military Aviation.
I regret that I cannot agree with my colleagues regarding the advisability of retaining 
Colonel P.A. Mulcahy in the Air Corps, even on the conditions set out in paragraph 
39(b).14 This opinion is based on two factors, neither of which should be taken as 
reflecting in any way on Colonel Mulcahy personally. These factors may be summarised 
as follows:
I am satisfied that no one other than a fully qualified Flying Officer possessing 
considerable practical experience should be placed in charge of the Air Corps. The fact 
that in the past several such non-qualified officers have been from time to time placed in 
charge of the Corps is, in my opinion, one of the causes of the condition of affairs this 
committee was set up to investigate. As already stated in this Report, such officers must 
of necessity rely on their subordinates to an undesirable extent in matters connected with 
the organisation, training and administration of the Air Corps.
Colonel Mulcahy does not possess these qualifications and I firmly believe that no 
amount of training at this stage could bring him up to the required standard. Furthermore, 
if the continuance of Colonel Mulcahy in the Air Corps is made conditional upon his 
attempting to qualify as a Flying Officer as set out in Section V of this Report, I believe 
that this would have a very adverse effect on his prestige and upon the discipline of the 
Corps in general.
The confidence of a large number at least of the junior officers in Colonel Mulcahy has, 
through one cause or another, been hopelessly been undermined. Furthermore the 
confidence of Colonel Mulcahy in the loyalty of a large number of his officers has been 
similarly been undermined as a result of the existing situation. With the best will in the 
world, I cannot see how this state of affairs can be completely set right while Colonel 
Mulcahy and the Officers concerned are required to serve together in the same Corps.
I, therefore, recommend that Colonel Mulcahy be relieved of his present appointment and 
posted to some other appointment commensurate with his rank, qualifications and 
experience and that Major G.J. Carroll be recalled to active duty as Director of Military 
Aviation. This officer is a very experienced pilot, as far as I know he has not been 
connected with any of the existing factions in the Air Corps, and should, therefore, enjoy 
the full confidence of the Officers of the Corps.
[Aodh MacNeill] Major General. 
(Aodh MacNeill)
President, Committee of Investigation.
13 Report and findings of the Committee and Annexes thereto, 10 Jan. 1942, LXX (MA, ACS 22/23).
14 Should read 41(b).
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